International Handbook on the Economics of CorruptionSusan Rose-Ackerman This collection of articles offers a comprehensive assessment of the subtle but nevertheless pervasive economic infrastructure of corruption. It provides suitable core or adjunct reading for law school, graduate, and undergraduate courses on international |
Contents
What do we know from a crosssection of countries? | 3 |
2 Measuring governance using crosscountry perceptions data | 52 |
3 Measuring institutions | 105 |
PART II CORRUPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE | 125 |
the role of institutions | 127 |
incentives and constraints in politics | 140 |
6 Decentralization corruption and government accountability | 161 |
7 Corruption hierarchies and bureaucratic structure | 189 |
11 Why are some public officials more corrupt than others? | 323 |
12 Corruption and the demand for regulating capitalists | 352 |
the perspective of Norwegian firms | 381 |
14 Laboratory experiments on corruption | 418 |
PART V SECTORAL ANTICORRUPTION POLICIES | 439 |
15 How corruption affects service delivery and what can be done about it | 441 |
16 Corruption and the management of public works in Italy | 457 |
lessons from institutional reforms in Uganda | 484 |
the limits of conventional economic analysis | 216 |
PART III CORRUPTION IN THE TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM | 245 |
preliminary evidence from the postcommunist transition countries | 247 |
different legacies of central planning | 278 |
PART IV SURVEYS AND EXPERIMENTS | 321 |
lessons from a widespread customs reform | 512 |
19 Prescription for abuse? Pharmaceutical selection in Bulgarian healthcare | 546 |
Name index | 597 |
604 | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
administration agents analysis argue average Azerbaijan bribe amount bribery rates Bulgaria bureaucratic capital changes China clients coefficient Colombia competition conclusion rate contracts correlation Corruption Perceptions Index costs decentralization developing countries drug EBITDA effect electoral empirical enforcement error estimates evidence example firms formal governance indicators growth halo effects higher impact import capture ratios incentives income increase infrastructure institutions International investment Journal of Economics Kaufmann Kunicová levels of corruption measures ment monitoring NHIF nomic official type outcomes party payments percent political corruption Polity IV presidential systems procurement PSI product PSI programs public officials reduce reform regions regression regulations Reinikka rent seeking reported respondents revenue Rose-Ackerman rules ruption Russia sample schools sector selection Shleifer significant social survey Tangentopoli tion transition Transparency International Uganda variables World Bank World Values Survey