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F. A. Muller1, 2
Received: 22 February 2008 Accepted: 24 April 2009 Published online: 17 November 2009 Abstract We inquire into the question whether the Aristotelian or classical ideal of science has been realised by the Model Revolution, initiated at Stanford University during the 1950s and spread all around
the world of philosophy of science—salute Suppes. The guiding principle of the Model Revolution is: a scientific theory is a set of structures in the domain of discourse of axiomatic set-theory, characterised by a set-theoretical predicate. We expound some critical reflections on the Model Revolution; the conclusions
will be that the philosophical problem of what a scientific theory is has not been solved yet—pace Suppes. While reflecting critically on the Model Revolution, we also explore a proposal of how to complete the Revolution
and briefly address the intertwined subject of scientific representation, which has come to occupy center stage in philosophy of science over the past decade.
Perfect SymmetriesRichard HealeyPhilosophy Department, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721-0027, USA rhealey@email.arizona.edu
While empirical symmetries relate situations, theoretical symmetries relate models of a theory we use to represent them. An empirical symmetry is perfect if and only if any two situations it relates share all intrinsic properties. Sometimes one can use a theory to explain an empirical symmetry by showing how it follows from a corresponding theoretical symmetry. The theory then reveals a perfect symmetry. I say what this involves and why it matters, beginning with a puzzle that is resolved by the subsequent analysis. I conclude by pointing to applications and implications of the ideas developed earlier in the paper. measuring_uncertainty.zimmermann.fupir2009.pdf (application/pdf Object)
logika.flu.cas.cz/files/uploaded/UserFiles/File/ko... Measuring Uncertainty with Elements of the
[0,1]-Interval of Partially Ordered Rings J¨org Zimmermann and Armin B. Cremers Institute of Computer Science University of Bonn, Germany J A Contrast Between two Decision Rules for use with (Convex) Sets of Probabilities: Γ-Maximin Versus E-Admissibilty
Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief
A Prehistory of n-Categorical Physics
John C. Baez Aaron Lauday August 18, 2009 Abstract This paper traces the growing role of categories and n-categories in physics, starting with groups and their role in relativity, and leading up to more sophisticated concepts which manifest themselves in Feynman diagrams, spin networks, string theory, loop quantum gravity, and topological quantum eld theory. Our chronology ends around 2000, with just a taste of later developments such as open-closed topological string theory, the categori cation of quantum groups, Khovanov homology, and Lurie's work on the classi cation of topological quantum eld theories. Scientific Realism and the Rationality of Science - Australasian Journal of Philosophy
www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a9138355... Scientific Realism and the Rationality of Science
Author:
Stathis Psillos a
DOI:
10.1080/00048400902941430
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Volume
87,
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4
December
2009
, pages 681
- 684
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Philosophy;
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Field’s logic of truth
Precis of saving truth from paradox
BRUNO DE FINETTI. Philosophical Lectures on Probability. Collected, edited, and annotated by Alberto
philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/nkp01... BRUNO DE FINETTI. Philosophical Lectures on Probability. Collected, edited, and annotated by Alberto Mura. Translated by Hykel Hosni. Synthese Library; 340
Symmetry and Its Formalisms: Mathematical Aspects*Alexandre Guay and Brian Hepburn†‡ This article explores the relation between the concept of symmetry and its formalisms. The standard view among philosophers and physicists is that symmetry is completely formalized by mathematical groups. For some mathematicians however, the groupoid is a competing and more general formalism. An analysis of symmetry that justifies this extension has not been adequately spelled out. After a brief explication of how groups, equivalence, and symmetries classes are related, we show that, while it’s true in some instances that groups are too restrictive, there are other instances for which the standard extension to groupoids is too unrestrictive. The connection between groups and equivalence classes, when generalized to groupoids, suggests a middle ground between the two. Discerning Elementary Particles*F. A. Muller and M. P. Seevinck† We maximally extend the quantum‐mechanical results of Muller and Saunders (2008) establishing the ‘weak discernibility’ of an arbitrary number of similar fermions in finite‐dimensional Hilbert spaces. This confutes the currently dominant view that (A) the quantum‐mechanical description of similar particles conflicts with Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII); and that (B) the only way to save PII is by adopting some heavy metaphysical notion such as Scotusian haecceitas or Adamsian primitive thisness. We take sides with Muller and Saunders (2008) against this currently dominant view, which has been expounded and defended by many.
Arché's Logic Bibliographieshttp://arche-wiki.st-and.ac.uk/~ahwiki/bin/view/Arche/LogicBibliographies This is a (non-systematic) collection of some ArcheBibliographies that deal with logic in one way or other. There is no pretense of completeness in way of form, of course. Maintaining and expanding Arché's bibliographies is done by Arché's members and associates by editing this page and/or adding new entries by using the form at the bottom of this page. Please see the Instructions before editing or adding to the bibliography. Remember, Remember the Fifth of November : The Primate Diaries
scienceblogs.com/primatediaries/2009/11/remember_r... Francis Bacon is widely credited with being the intellectual father of the scientific method. He strongly felt that gathering evidence and using inductive reasoning was the best approach to understanding first principles at work in the natural world. However, strangely enough, he argued that this same reasoning didn't apply in trying to understand the causes of political violence. In his 17th century treatise A declaration of the practises & treasons attempted and committed by Robert late earle of Essex and his complices, he stated it was: [A] vaine thing to thinke to search the rootes and first motions of treasons, which are knowen to none but God that discernes the heart, and the Divell that gives the instigation. In defence of structural universals
Author:
D. M. Armstrong a
DOI:
10.1080/00048408612342261
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Steps Toward a Constructive NominalismNelson Goodman and W. V. Quine Source: J. Symbolic Logic Volume 12, Issue 4 (1947), 105-122. Full-text: Remote access Towards structural universals
Author:
John Bigelow a
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10.1080/00048408612342291
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"What's Wrong with the Received View on the Structure of Scientific Theories?"
Author(s): Frederick Suppe Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Mar., 1972), pp. 1-19 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/186589
Tarski, Truth and Model Theory
Author(s): Peter Milne Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 99 (1999), pp. 141-167 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Aristotelian Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545302 Tarski's Theory of Truth
Author(s): Hartry Field Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 69, No. 13 (Jul. 13, 1972), pp. 347-375 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024879 What is a Theory of Truth?
Author(s): Scott Soames Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 81, No. 8 (Aug., 1984), pp. 411-429 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026307 Truth in a Structure
Author(s): Wilfrid Hodges Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 86 (1985 - 1986), pp. 135-151 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Aristotelian Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545041 JSTOR: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Jan., 1953), pp. 1-6
www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/pss/185617?cooki... The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments
Review: Willard V. Quine, Notes on Existence and NecessityAlonzo Church Source: J. Symbolic Logic Volume 8, Issue 1 (1943), 45-47. Reviewed Works:Willard V. Quine, Notes on Existence and Necessity. http://projecteuclid.org/DPubS?service=UI&version=1.0&verb=Display&handle=euclid.jsl/1183389431
Don Howard1
Abstract Pierre
Duhem's often unrecognized influence on twentieth-century philosophy of
science is illustrated by an analysis of his significant if also
largely unrecognized influence on Albert Einstein. Einstein's first
acquaintance with Duhem's La Théorie physique, son objet et sa structure
around 1909 is strongly suggested by his close personal and
professional relationship with Duhem's German translator, Friedrich
Adler. The central role of a Duhemian holistic, underdeterminationist
variety of conventionalism in Einstein's thought is examined at length,
with special emphasis on Einstein's deployment of Duhemian arguments in
his debates with neo-Kantian interpreters of relativity and in his
critique of the empiricist doctrines of theory testing advanced by
Schlick, Reichenbach, and Carnap. Most striking is Einstein's 1949
criticism of the verificationist conception of meaning from a holistic
point of view, anticipating by two years the rather similar, but more
famous criticism advanced independently by Quine in  Two Dogmas of Empiricism .I
wish to thank the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, which holds the
copyright, for permission to quote from the unpublished letters of
Einstein. Items in the Einstein Archive are cited by giving their
number in the control index after the following format: EA nn-nnn.
Similar formats are employed for citing other archival material. Thus AA refers to material in the Adler Archive at the Verein für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, Vienna; and RC
refers to material in the Rudolf Carnap collection at the Archive for
Scientific Philosophy, Department of Special Collections, Hillman
Library, University of Pittsburgh. The research for this paper was
supported in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation, No.
SES-8420140, as well as by grants from the Deutscher akademischer
Austauschdienst, the American Philosophical Society, and the University
of Kentucky Research Foundation.What is a Logic, and What is a Proof?
CJO - Abstract - INVERSION BY DEFINITIONAL REFLECTION AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF LOGICAL RULES
journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?from... INVERSION BY DEFINITIONAL REFLECTION AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF LOGICAL RULES
AbstractThe inversion principle for logical rules expresses a relationship between introduction and elimination rules for logical constants. Hallnäs & Schroeder-Heister (1990, 1991) proposed the principle of definitional reflection, which embodies basic ideas of inversion in the more general context of clausal definitions. For the context of admissibility statements, this has been further elaborated by Schroeder-Heister (2007). Using the framework of definitional reflection and its admissibility interpretation, we show that, in the sequent calculus of minimal propositional logic, the left introduction rules are admissible when the right introduction rules are taken as the definitions of the logical constants and vice versa. This generalizes the well-known relationship between introduction and elimination rules in natural deduction to the framework of the sequent calculus. Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification -- Fantl and McGrath 111 (1): 67 -- Philosophical Review
philreview.dukejournals.org.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/cg...
CJO - Abstract - ON DEFINABILITY IN MULTIMODAL LOGIC
journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?from... ON DEFINABILITY IN MULTIMODAL LOGIC
AbstractThree notions of definability in multimodal logic are considered. Two are analogous to the notions of explicit definability and implicit definability introduced by Beth in the context of first-order logic. However, while by Beth’s theorem the two types of definability are equivalent for first-order logic, such an equivalence does not hold for multimodal logics. A third notion of definability, reducibility, is introduced; it is shown that in multimodal logics, explicit definability is equivalent to the combination of implicit definability and reducibility. The three notions of definability are characterized semantically using (modal) algebras. The use of algebras, rather than frames, is shown to be necessary for these characterizations.
Abstract This article sketches a theory of objective probability focusing on nomic probability, which is supposed to be the kind of probability figuring in statistical laws of nature. The theory is based upon a strengthened probability calculus and some epistemological principles that formulate a precise version of the statistical syllogism. It is shown that from this rather minimal basis it is possible to derive theorems comprising (1) a theory of direct inference, and (2) a theory of induction. The theory of induction is not of the familiar Bayesian variety, but consists of a precise version of the traditional Nicod Principle and its statistical analogues.
James LADYMAN, Science Metaphysics and Structural Realism.
http://logica.ugent.be/philosophica/abstracts.php The Structuralist Conception of Objects
http://individual.utoronto.ca/anjan/downloads/objects.pdf Anjan Chakravarttyy This paper explores the consequences of the two most prominent forms of contemporary structural realism for the notion of objecthood. Epistemic structuralists hold that we can know structural aspects of reality, but nothing about the natures of unobservable relata whose relations define structures. Ontic structuralists hold that we can know structural aspects of reality, and that there is nothing else to know—objects are useful heuristic posits, but are ultimately ontologically dispensable. I argue that structuralism does not succeed in ridding a structuralist ontology of objects. The Dissolution of Objects: Between Platonism and Phenomenalismhttp://www.springerlink.com/content/q31u0r054x170j95/Steven French and James Ladyman Remodelling Structural Realism: Quantum Physics and the Metaphysics of Structurehttp://www.springerlink.com/content/h3t1r11v415217r4/Steven French1 and James Ladyman2
Abstract We
outline Ladyman's 'metaphysical' or 'ontic' form of structural realism
and defend it against various objections. Cao, in particular, has
questioned the view of ontology presupposed by this approach and we
argue that by reconceptualising objects in structural terms it offers
the best hope for the realist in the context of modern physics. Leibniz's Influence on 19th Century Logic (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-logic-influence... Leibniz's Influence on 19th Century LogicFirst published Fri Sep 4, 2009
It is an important question in the historiography of modern logic whether Leibniz's logical calculi influenced logic in its present state or whether they were only ingenious anticipations. The most significant of Leibniz's contributions to formal logic were published in the early 20th century. Only then, Leibniz's logic could be fully understood. Nevertheless, the essentials of his philosophy of logic and some technical elaborations could be derived from early editions of his writings published in the 18th and 19th centuries. Corroboration and auxiliary hypotheses: Duhem’s thesis revisited
http://www.springerlink.com/content/e056723r4475272q/ Darrell P. Rowbottom1 Contact Information (1) University of Oxford, 10 Merton Street, Oxford, OX1 4JJ, UK Received: 01 December 2008 Accepted: 10 July 2009 Published online: 11 August 2009 Abstract This paper argues that Duhem’s thesis does not decisively refute a corroboration-based account of scientific methodology (or ‘falsificationism’), but instead that auxiliary hypotheses are themselves subject to measurements of corroboration which can be used to inform practice. It argues that a corroboration-based account is equal to the popular Bayesian alternative, which has received much more recent attention, in this respect. Withering away, weakly
http://www.springerlink.com/content/f8t7772242267528/ F. A. Muller1, 2 Contact Information (1) Faculty of Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Burg. Oudlaan 50, 3062 PA Rotterdam, The Netherlands (2) Department of Physics and Astronomy, Utrecht University, Budapestlaan 6, IGG–3.08, 3584 CD Utrecht, The Netherlands Received: 15 October 2008 Accepted: 01 April 2009 Published online: 11 August 2009 Abstract One of the reasons provided for the shift away from an ontology for physical reality of material objects & properties towards one of physical structures & relations (Ontological Structural Realism: OntSR) is that the quantum-mechanical description of composite physical systems of similar elementary particles entails they are indiscernible. As material objects, they ‘whither away’, and when they wither away, structures emerge in their stead. We inquire into the question whether recent results establishing the weak discernibility of elementary particles pose a threat for this quantum-mechanical reason for OntSR, because precisely their newly discovered discernibility prevents them from ‘whithering away’. We argue there is a straightforward manner to consider the recent results as a reason in favour of OntSR rather than against it. Belief and contextual acceptanceEleonora Cresto1 Contact Information(1) CONICET (Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas), Buenos Aires, Argentina http://www.springerlink.com/content/341854154q4156v6/ Received: 11 August 2008 Accepted: 06 July 2009 Published online: 13 August 2009 Abstract I develop a strategy for representing epistemic states and epistemic changes that seeks to be sensitive to the difference between voluntary and involuntary aspects of our epistemic life, as well as to the role of pragmatic factors in epistemology. The model relies on a particular understanding of the distinction between full belief and acceptance, which makes room for the idea that our reasoning on both practical and theoretical matters typically proceeds in a contextual way. Within this framework, I discuss how agents can rationally shift their credal probability functions so as to consciously modify some of their contextual acceptances; the present account also allows us to represent how the very set of contexts evolves. Voluntary credal shifts, in turn, might provoke changes in the agent’s beliefs, but I show that this is actually a side effect of performing multiple adjustments in the total lot of the agent’s acceptance sets. In this way we obtain a model that preserves many pre-theoretical intuitions about what counts as adequate rationality constraints on our actual practices—and hence about what counts as an adequate, normative epistemological perspective. The Uncertain Reasoner's Companion - Cambridge University Press
www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=052... Reasoning under uncertainty, that is, making judgements with only partial knowledge, is a major theme in artificial intelligence. Professor Paris provides here an introduction to the mathematical foundations of the subject. It is suited for readers with some knowledge of undergraduate mathematics but is otherwise self-contained, collecting together the key results on the subject and formalizing within a unified framework the main contemporary approaches and assumptions. The author has concentrated on giving clear mathematical formulations, analyses, justifications and consequences of the main theories about uncertain reasoning, so the book can serve as a textbook for beginners or as a starting point for further basic research into the subject. It will be welcomed by graduate students and research workers in logic, philosophy and computer science as an account of how mathematics and artificial intelligence can complement and enrich each other.
When Fair Odds are not Degrees of Belief.pdf (application/pdf Object)
www.hss.cmu.edu/philosophy/seidenfeld/relating%20t... The "Dutch Book" argument, tracing back to Rarnsey (1926) and deFinetti (1974),
offers prudential grounds for action in conformity with personal probability. Under several structural assumptions about combinations of stakes (that is, assumptions about the combination of wagers), your betting policy is consistent (coherent) only if your fair-odds are probabilities. The central question posed here is the following one: Besides providing an operational test of coherent betting, does the "Book" argument also provide for adequate measurement (elicitation) of the agent's degrees of beliefs? That is, are an agent'sfair odds also histher personal probabilities for those events? We argue the answer is "No!" The problem is created by state-dependent utilities. The methods of elicitation proposed by Rarnsey, by deFinetti and by Savage (1954), are inadequate to the challenge of state-dependent va1ues.l The degree of incoherence, when previsions are not made in accordance
with a probability measure, is measured by the rate at which an incoher- ent bookie can be made a sure loser. We consider each bet from three points of view: that of the gambler, that of the bookie, and a neutral viewpoint. From each viewpoint, we de ne an normalization for each bet, and the sure loss for incoherent previsions is divided by the normal- ization to determine the rate of incoherence. Several di erent de nitions of normalization are considered in order to determine plausible ranges for the degree of incoherence. We give examples of the measurement of incoherence of of some classical statistical procedures. Fundamental Theorems April 12, 2007.pdf (application/pdf Object)
www.hss.cmu.edu/philosophy/seidenfeld/relating%20t... Let
be a set of states with a -field of subsets A. Let X stand for a set of measurable real-valued functions defined on . Whether X contains unbounded functions will be made clear in each context. The elements of X will be called gambles, risky assets, or random variables. Functions of elements of X will also be called by those same names. Abstract Richard Jeffrey long held that decision theory should be formulated without recourse to explicitly causal notions. Newcomb
problems stand out as putative counterexamples to this ‘evidential’ decision theory. Jeffrey initially sought to defuse Newcomb
problems via recourse to the doctrine of ratificationism, but later came to see this as problematic. We will see that Jeffrey’s
worries about ratificationism were not compelling, but that valid ratificationist arguments implicitly presuppose causal decision
theory. In later work, Jeffrey argued that Newcomb problems are not decisions at all because agents who face them possess
so much evidence about correlations between their actions and states of the world that they are unable to regard their deliberate
choices as causes of outcomes, and so cannot see themselves as making free choices. Jeffrey’s reasoning goes wrong because
it fails to recognize that an agent’s beliefs about her immediately available acts are so closely tied to the immediate causes
of these actions that she can create evidence that outweighs any antecedent correlations between acts and states. Once we
recognize that deliberating agents are free to believe what they want about their own actions, it will be clear that Newcomb
problems are indeed counterexamples to evidential decision theory.
We generalize the Kolmogorov axioms for probability calculus to obtain conditions defining, for any given logic, a class of probability functions relative to that logic, coinciding with the standard probability functions in the special case of classical logic but allowing consideration of other classes of "essentially Kolmogorovian" probability functions relative to other logics. We take a broad view of the Bayesian approach as dictating inter alia that from the perspective of a given logic, rational degrees of belief are those representable by probability functions from the class appropriate to that logic. Classical Bayesianism, which fixes the logic as classical logic, is only one version of this general approach. Another, which we call Intuitionistic Bayesianism, selects intuitionistic logic as the preferred logic and the associated class of probability functions as the right class of candidate representions of epistemic states (rational allocations of degrees of belief). Various objections to classical Bayesianism are, we argue, best met by passing to intuitionistic Bayesianism—in which the probability functions are taken relative to intuitionistic logic—rather than by adopting a radically non-Kolmogorovian, for example, nonadditive, conception of (or substitute for) probability functions, in spite of the popularity of the latter response among those who have raised these objections. The interest of intuitionistic Bayesianism is further enhanced by the availability of a Dutch Book argument justifying the selection of intuitionistic probability functions as guides to rational betting behavior when due consideration is paid to the fact that bets are settled only when/if the outcome bet on becomes known.
what_cp_couldnt_be.pdf (application/pdf Object)
philrsss.anu.edu.au/people-defaults/alanh/papers/w... ABSTRACT. Kolmogorov’s axiomatization of probability includes the familiar ratio
formula for conditional probability: (RATIO) P(A | B) = P(A ∩ B) P(B) (P (B) > 0). Call this the ratio analysis of conditional probability. It has become so entrenched that it is often referred to as the definition of conditional probability. I argue that it is not even an adequate analysis of that concept. I prove what I call the Four Horn theorem, concluding that every probability assignment has uncountably many ‘trouble spots’. Trouble spots come in four varieties: assignments of zero to genuine possibilities; assignments of infinitesimals to such possibilities; vague assignments to such possibilities; and no assignment whatsoever to such possibilities. Each sort of trouble spot can create serious problems for the ratio analysis. I marshal many examples from scientific and philosophical practice against the ratio analysis. I conclude more positively: we should reverse the traditional direction of analysis. Conditional probability should be taken as the primitive notion, and unconditional probability should be analyzed in terms of it. This is the sequel to my ‘‘Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism’’
(Erkenntnis 1997), the second half of a long paper that attacks the two main forms of frequentism about probability. Abstract The Cable Guy will definitely come between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., and I can bet on one of two possibilities: that he will arrive
between 8 and 12, or between 12 and 4. Since I have no more information, it seems (eminently) plausible to suppose the two
bets are equally attractive. Yet Hajek has presented a tantalising argument that purports to show that the later interval
is, initial appearances to the contrary, more choice worthy. In this paper, I rebut the argument.
In this article, we review the role of the Dirichlet process and related prior distribtions in nonparametric Bayesian inference. We discuss construction and various properties of the Dirichlet process. We then review the asymptotic properties of posterior distributions. Starting with the definition of posterior consistency and examples of inconsistency, we discuss general theorems which lead to consistency. We then describe the method of calculating posterior convergence rates and briefly outline how such rates can be computed in nonparametric examples. We also discuss the issue of posterior rate adaptation, Bayes factor consistency in model selection and Bernstein-von Mises type theorems for nonparametric problems. Mathematical Explanation in ScienceDoes mathematics ever play an explanatory role in science? If so then this opens the way for scientific realists to argue for the existence of mathematical entities using inference to the best explanation. Elsewhere I have argued, using a case study involving the prime-numbered life cycles of periodical cicadas, that there are examples of indispensable mathematical explanations of purely physical phenomena. In this paper I respond to objections to this claim that have been made by various philosophers, and I discuss potential future directions of research for each side in the debate over the existence of abstract mathematical objects. The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/122528887/abstract jEpistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or non-mental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two problems for the view that reasons are propositions. Section 5 presents two problems for the view that reasons are non-mental facts. Section 6 argues that reasons are mental states. Section 7 responds to objections. The road to Experience and Prediction from within: Hans Reichenbach’s scientific correspondence from Berlin to Istanbulhttp://www.springerlink.com/content/e729pq6726142900/Abstract Ever since the first meeting of the proponents of the emerging Logical Empiricism in 1923, there existed philosophical differences as well as personal rivalries between the groups in Berlin and Vienna, headed by Hans Reichenbach and Moritz Schlick, respectively. Early theoretical tensions between Schlick and Reichenbach were caused by Reichenbach’s (neo)Kantian roots (esp. his version of the relativized a priori), who himself regarded the Vienna Circle as a sort of anti-realist “positivist school”—as he described it in his Experience and Prediction (1938). One result of this divergence was Schlick’s preference of Carnap over Reichenbach for a position at the University of Vienna (in 1926), and his decision not to serve as a co-editor with Reichenbach for the journal Erkenntnis that they jointly established in 1930 (which was then co-edited by Carnap and Reichenbach from 1930 to 1938). A second split rooted in different views on induction and probability, which culminated in the Hans Reichenbach’s refusal to serve as an invited author on probability within the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science series ed. by Rudolf Carnap, Charles Morris and Otto Neurath from 1938 onwards. In this regard it is remarkable that also Richard von Mises, who was the second leading figure of Logical Empiricism in Turkish exile, criticized the theory of probability put forward by his former Berlin colleague. In this paper I analyse this controversial exchange, drawing on the relevant correspondence and asking whether these (meta)philosophical differences were a typical feature of the pluralism inherent in Logical Empiricism in general. After the 1980s there was an explosion of methods together with the apparition of new paradigms
which have not yet stabilized. The contributions presented here provide then material that could be reworked or whose foundations could be modified later on. Indeed, over these years we have 1 ludovic.lebart@telecom-paristech.fr seen the development of neural networks, self organizing maps, data mining, learning theory, independent components analysis, and resampling methods, which are all methods, schools or currents that are bound to contribute to the theme that we are interested in but which are still subject to debate or even controversy, and considerable terminological dispersion. Many of the authors of this thematic issue have been or are still major actors in exploratory multivariate data analysis, which gives this collection of testimonies an undeniable documentary interest. Two approaches have dominated discussion of logical consequence in recent years, the model-theoretic and the inferentialist. The model-theoretic analysis identifies logical consequence with truth-preservation in models: every model of the premises must also be a model of the conclusion. Such models can, in Etchemendy's terminology, be either interpretational (varying the interpretation of the vocabulary) or representational (varying the "facts"). In contrast, the inferentialist analysis of consequence concentrates on the notion of proof or derivation, consisting in the application of a set of rules of inference. Rather than judge the rules as correct if they are truth-preserving over models, the inferentialist approach takes the rules as autonomous, constitutive of the meaning of at least the logical terms they contain. For example, the reason Modus Ponens (to infer B from A and 'if A then B') is a correct form of inference is not because it preserves truth; on the contrary, 'if' gains its meaning from being that expression which permits inferences of this form. The order of explanation is reversed.
The aim of the Workshop was to explore these two approaches, clarify their statement and evaluate their relative success in providing a foundation for the notion of logical consequence. e-Records of three of the talks are available from the links below. (Peter Milne's session will be available shortly.) Nelson Goodman’s new riddle of induction forcefully illustrates a challenge that must be confronted by any adequate theory
of inductive inference: provide some basis for choosing among alternative hypotheses that fit past data but make divergent
predictions. One response to this challenge is to distinguish among alternatives by means of some epistemically significant
characteristic beyond fit with the data. Statistical learning theory takes this approach by showing how a concept similar
to Popper’s notion of degrees of testability is linked to minimizing expected predictive error. In contrast, formal learning
theory appeals to Ockham’s razor, which it justifies by reference to the goal of enhancing efficient convergence to the truth.
In this essay, I show that, despite their differences, statistical and formal learning theory yield precisely the same result
for a class of inductive problems that I call strongly VC ordered, of which Goodman’s riddle is just one example.
Abstract Bayesian models typically assume that agents are rational, logically omniscient and opinionated. The last of these has little
descriptive or normative appeal, however, and limits our ability to describe how agents make up their minds (as opposed to
changing them) or how they can suspend or withdraw their opinions. To address these limitations this paper represents the
attitudinal states of non-opinionated agents by sets of (permissible) probability and desirability functions. Several basic
ways in which such states of mind can be changed are then characterised and compared with those found in AGM style models
of attitude revision. Finally these models are employed to describe how agents make up their mind when deliberating.
Abstract I. Levi has advocated a decision-theoretic account of belief revision. We argue that the game-theoretic framework of Interrogative Inquiry Games, proposed by J. Hintikka, can extend and clarify this account. We show that some strategic use of the game rules (or ‘policies’)
generate Expansions, Contractions and Revisions, and we give representation results. We then extend the framework to represent explicitly (multiple) sources of answers, and apply it to discuss the Recovery Postulate. We conclude with some remarks about the potential extensions of interrogative
games, with respect to some issues in the theory of belief change.
David Lewis (1941–2001) was one of the most important philosophers of
the 20th Century. He made significant contributions to philosophy of
language, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science, decision
theory, epistemology, meta-ethics and aesthetics. In most of these
fields he is essential reading; in many of them he is among the most
important figures of recent decades. And this list leaves out his two
most significant contributions.
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/pss/2346164?cookieSet=1
AbstractA new method is proposed for making inferences from multinomial data in cases where there is no prior information. A paradigm is the problem of predicting the colour of the next marble to be drawn from a bag whose contents are (initially) completely unknown. In such problems we may be unable to formulate a sample space because we do not know what outcomes are possible. This suggests an invariance principle: inferences based on observations should not depend on the sample space in which the observations and future events of interest are represented. Objective Bayesian methods do not satisfy this principle. This paper describes a statistical model, called the imprecise Dirichlet model, for drawing coherent inferences from multinomial data. Inferences are expressed in terms of posterior upper and lower probabilities. The probabilities are initially vacuous, reflecting prior ignorance, but they become more precise as the number of observations increases. This model does satisfy the invariance principle. Two sets of data are analysed in detail. In the first example one red marble is observed in six drawings from a bag. Inferences from the imprecise Dirichlet model are compared with objective Bayesian and frequentist inferences. The second example is an analysis of data from medical trials which compared two treatments for cardiorespiratory failure in newborn babies. There are two problems: to draw conclusions about which treatment is more effective and to decide when the randomized trials should be terminated. This example shows how the imprecise Dirichlet model can be used to analyse data in the form of a contingency table.ScienceDirect - Artificial Intelligence : Measures of uncertainty in expert systems
www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=... This paper compares four measures that have been advocated as models for uncertainty in expert systems. The measures are additive probabilities (used in the Bayesian theory), coherent lower (or upper) previsions, belief functions (used in the Dempster-Shafer theory) and possibility measures (fuzzy logic). Special emphasis is given to the theory of coherent lower previsions, in which upper and lower probabilities, expectations and conditional probabilities are constructed from initial assessments through a technique of natural extension. Mathematically, all the measures can be regarded as types of coherent lower or upper previsions, and this perspective gives some insight into the properties of belief functions and possibility measures. The measures are evaluated according to six criteria: clarity of interpretation; ability to model partial information and imprecise assessments, especially judgements expressed in natural language; rules for combining and updating uncertainty, and their justification; consistency of models and inferences; feasibility of assessment; and feasibility of computations. Each of the four measures seems to be useful in special kinds of problems, but only lower and upper previsions appear to be sufficiently general to model the most common types of uncertainty.
 Abstract Recent semantic approaches to scientific structuralism, aiming to make
precise the concept of shared structure between models, formally frame a model as a type of set-structure. This framework is then used to provide a semantic account of (a) the structure of a scientific theory, (b) the applicability of a mathematical theory to a physical theory, and (c) the structural realist’s appeal to the structural continuity between successive physical theories. In this paper, I challenge the idea that, to be so used, the concept of a model and so the concept of shared structure between models must be formally framed within a single unified framework, set-theoretic or other. I first investigate the Bourbaki-inspired assumption that structures are types of set-structured systems and next consider the extent to which this problematic assumption underpins both Suppes’ and recent semantic views of the structure of a scientific theory. I then use this investigation to show that, when it comes to using the concept of shared structure, there is no need to agree with French that “without a formal framework for explicating this concept of ‘structure-similarity’ it remains vague, just as Giere’s concept of similarity between models does…” (French, 2000, Synthese, 125, pp. 103–120, p. 114).Neither concept is vague; either can bemade precise by appealing to the concept of a morphism, but it is the context (and not any set-theoretic type) that determines the appropriate kind of morphism. I make use of French’s (1999, From physics to philosophy (pp. 187–207). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) own example from the development of quantum theory to show that, for both Weyl and Wigner’s programmes, it was the context of considering the ‘relevant symmetries’ that determined that the appropriate kind of morphism was the one that preserved the shared Lie-group structure of both the theoretical and phenomenological models. Abstract From 1929 onwards, C. I. Lewis defended the foundationalist claim that judgements of the form ‘x is probable’ only make sense if one assumes there to be a ground y that is certain (where x and y may be beliefs, propositions, or events). Without this assumption, Lewis argues, the probability of x could not be anything other than zero. Hans Reichenbach repeatedly contested Lewis’s idea, calling it “a remnant of rationalism”.
The last move in this debate was a challenge by Lewis, defying Reichenbach to produce a regress of probability values that
yields a number other than zero. Reichenbach never took up the challenge, but we will meet it on his behalf, as it were. By
presenting a series converging to a limit, we demonstrate that x can have a definite and computable probability, even if its justification consists of an infinite number of steps. Next we
show the invalidity of a recent riposte of foundationalists that this limit of the series can be the ground of justification.
Finally we discuss the question where justification can come from if not from a ground.
Abstract Rudolf Carnap’s Der logische Aufbau der Welt (The Logical Structure of the World) is generally conceived of as being the failed manifesto of logical positivism. In this paper we will consider the following
question: How much of the Aufbau can actually be saved? We will argue that there is an adaptation of the old system which satisfies many of the demands of
the original programme. In order to defend this thesis, we have to show how a new ‘Aufbau-like’ programme may solve or circumvent the problems that affected the original Aufbau project. In particular, we are going to focus on how a new system may address the well-known difficulties in Carnap’s Aufbau concerning abstraction, dimensionality, and theoretical terms.
Social Epistemology Theory and Applications--Alvin Goldman
fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/goldman/Social%20Episte... Epistemology has had a strongly individualist orientation, at least since Descartes. Knowledge, for Descartes, starts with the fact of one’s own thinking and with oneself as subject of that thinking. Whatever else can be known, it must be known by inference from one’s own mental contents. Achieving such knowledge is an individual, rather than a collective, enterprise. Descartes’s successors largely followed this lead, so the history of epistemology, down to our own time, has been a predominantly individualist affair.
Frege's Judgement Stroke and the Conception of Logic as the Study of Inference not Consequence
www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/122445694/abst... One of the most striking differences between Frege's Begriffsschrift (logical system) and standard contemporary systems of logic is the inclusion in the former of the judgement stroke: a symbol which marks those propositions which are being asserted, that is, which are being used to express judgements. There has been considerable controversy regarding both the exact purpose of the judgement stroke, and whether a system of logic should include such a symbol. This paper explains the intended role of the judgement stroke in a way that renders it readily comprehensible why Frege insisted that this symbol was an essential part of his logical system. The key point here is that Frege viewed logic as the study of inference relations amongst acts of judgement, rather than – as in the typical contemporary view – of consequence relations amongst certain objects (propositions or well-formed formulae). The paper also explains why Frege's use of the judgement stroke is not in conflict with his avowed anti-psychologism, and why Wittgenstein's criticism of the judgement stroke as 'logically quite meaningless' is unfounded. The key point here is that while the judgement stroke has no content, its use in logic and mathematics is subject to a very stringent norm of assertion. How Probabilities Reflect Evidence--James M. Joyce
www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118716072/abst... No Abstract How the Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green Defeats What is New in the New Riddle of
www.springerlink.com/content/216p4123g2340hr6/?p=6... http://www.pitt.edu/~jdnorton/papers/Grue_Syn.pdf
Abstract That past patterns may continue in many different ways has long been identified as a problem for accounts of induction. The novelty of Goodman’s ”new riddle of induction” lies in a meta-argument that purports to show that no account of induction can discriminate between incompatible continuations. That meta-argument depends on the perfect symmetry of the definitions of grue/bleen and green/blue, so that any evidence that favors the ordinary continuation must equally favor the grue-ified continuation. I argue that this very dependence on the perfect symmetry defeats the novelty of the new riddle. The symmetry can be obtained in contrived circumstances, such as when we grue-ify our total science. However, in all such cases, we cannot preclude the possibility that the original and grue-ified descriptions are merely notationally variant descriptions of the same physical facts; or if there are facts that separate them, these facts are ineffable, so that no account of induction should be expected to pick between them. In ordinary circumstances, there are facts that distinguish the regular and grue-ified descriptions. Since accounts of induction can and do call upon these facts, Goodman’s meta-argument cannot provide principled grounds for the failure of all accounts of induction. It assures us only of the failure of accounts of induction, such as unaugmented enumerative induction, that cannot exploit these symmetry breaking facts. Fundamental Statistical Concepts in Presenting Data
biostat.mc.vanderbilt.edu/twiki/pub/Main/RafeDonah... Science without (parametric) models: the case of bootstrap resampling--Jan Sprenger
www.springerlink.com.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/content/x... Abstract Scientific and statistical inferences build heavily on explicit, parametric models, and often with good reasons. However,
the limited scope of parametric models and the increasing complexity of the studied systems in modern science raise the risk
of model misspecification. Therefore, I examine alternative, data-based inference techniques, such as bootstrap resampling.
I argue that their neglect in the philosophical literature is unjustified: they suit some contexts of inquiry much better
and use a more direct approach to scientific inference. Moreover, they make more parsimonious assumptions and often replace
theoretical understanding and knowledge about mechanisms by careful experimental design. Thus, it is worthwhile to study in
detail how nonparametric models serve as inferential engines in science.
Labels:
Models, Data, Inductive inference, Nonparametric statistics, Bootstrap resampling Indiscernibility and bundles in a structure--Sun Demirli
www.springerlink.com.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/content/r... Abstract The bundle theory is a theory about the internal constitution of individuals. It asserts that individuals are entirely composed
of universals. Typically, bundle theorists augment their theory with a constitutional approach to individuation entailing the thesis ‘identity of constituents is a sufficient ground for numerical identity’ (CIT). But then the bundle
theory runs afoul of Black’s duplication case—a world containing two indiscernible spheres. Here I propose and defend a new
version of the bundle theory that denies ‘CIT’, and which instead conjoins it with a structural diversity thesis, according to which being separated by distance is a sufficient ground for numerical diversity. This version accommodates
Black’s world as well as the three-spheres world—a world containing three indiscernible spheres, arranged as the vertices of an equilateral triangle. In this paper, I also
criticize Rodriguez-Pereyra’s alternative attempt to defend the bundle theory against Black’s case and the case of the three-spheres world.
Labels:
Bundle theory, Identity of indiscernibles, Individuation, Universals, Compresence, Structuralism, Diversity Identity and similarity-Igor Douven and Lieven Decock
www.springerlink.com.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/content/n... Abstract The standard approach to the so-called paradoxes of identity has been to argue that these paradoxes do not essentially concern
the notion of identity but rather betray misconceptions on our part regarding other metaphysical notions, like that of an
object or a property. This paper proposes a different approach by pointing to an ambiguity in the identity predicate and arguing
that the concept of identity that figures in many ordinary identity claims, including those that appear in the paradoxes,
is not the traditional philosophical concept but one that can be defined in terms of relevant similarity. This approach to
the paradoxes will be argued to be superior to the standard one.
Labels:
Identity, Similarity, Conceptual spaces, Context Abstract In the 1960s and 1970s, Hilary Putnam articulated a notion of relativized apriority that was motivated to address the problem
of scientific change. This paper examines Putnam’s account in its historical context and in relation to contemporary views.
I begin by locating Putnam’s analysis in the historical context of Quine’s rejection of apriority, presenting Putnam as a
sympathetic commentator on Quine. Subsequently, I explicate Putnam’s positive account of apriority, focusing on his analysis
of the history of physics and geometry. In the remainder of the paper, I explore connections between Putnam’s account of relativized
a priori principles and contemporary views. In particular, I situate Putnam’s account in relation to analyses advanced by
Michael Friedman, David Stump, and William Wimsatt. From this comparison, I address issues concerning whether a priori scientific
principles are appropriately characterized as “constitutive” or “entrenched”. I argue that these two features need to be clearly
distinguished, and that only the constitutive function is essential to apriority. By way of conclusion, I explore the relationship
between the constitutive function a priori principles and entrenchment.
Abstract This paper considers the connection between concepts, conceptual schemes and grammar in Wittgenstein’s last writings. It lists
eight claims about concepts that one can garner from these writings. It then focuses on one of them, namely that there is
an important difference between conceptual and factual problems and investigations. That claim draws in its wake other claims,
all of them revolving around the idea of a conceptual scheme, what Wittgenstein calls a ‘grammar’. I explain why Wittgenstein’s
account does not fall prey to Davidson’s animadversions against the idea of a conceptual scheme as a force operating on a
pre-conceptual content. In the sequel I deny that the distinction between grammatical and empirical propositions disappears
in the last writings: it is neither deliberately abandoned, nor willy-nilly undermined by the admission of hinge propositions
in On Certainty or by the role accorded to agreement in judgement.
Labels:
Concepts, Conceptual schemes, Wittgenstein, Davidson, On certainty, Grammar, Grammatical proposition, Empirical proposition, Hinge proposition, Framework, Agreement in judgement In this paper, I argue that there are universals. I begin (Sect. 1) by proposing a sufficient condition for a thing’s being a universal. I then argue (Sect. 2) that some truths exist necessarily. Finally, I argue (Sects. 3 and 4) that these truths are structured entities having constituents that meet the proposed sufficient condition for being universals.
Labels:
Universals, Possible worlds, Modality, Propositions, Realism, Nominalism The transmission of support: a Bayesian re-analysis: Jake Chandler
www.springerlink.com/content/a264533117201843/ Abstract Crispin Wright’s discussion of the notion of ‘transmission-failure’ promises to have important philosophical ramifications,
both in epistemology and beyond. This paper offers a precise, formal characterisation of the concept within a Bayesian framework.
The interpretation given avoids the serious shortcomings of a recent alternative proposal due to Samir Okasha.
Labels:
Transmission-failure, Bayesianism The Geometry of Standard Deontic Logic: Alessio Moretti
www.springerlink.com/content/c42816t520204h36/ Abstract Whereas geometrical oppositions (logical squares and hexagons) have been so far investigated in many fields of modal logic
(both abstract and applied), the oppositional geometrical side of “deontic logic” (the logic of “obligatory”, “forbidden”,
“permitted”, . . .) has rather been neglected. Besides the classical “deontic square” (the deontic counterpart of Aristotle’s
“logical square”), some interesting attempts have nevertheless been made to deepen the geometrical investigation of the deontic
oppositions: Kalinowski (La logique des normes, PUF, Paris, 1972) has proposed a “deontic hexagon” as being the geometrical
representation of standard deontic logic, whereas Joerden (jointly with Hruschka, in Archiv für Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie
73:1, 1987), McNamara (Mind 105:419, 1996) and Wessels (Die gute Samariterin. Zur Struktur der Supererogation, Walter de Gruyter,
Berlin, 2002) have proposed some new “deontic polygons” for dealing with conservative extensions of standard deontic logic
internalising the concept of “supererogation”. Since 2004 a new formal science of the geometrical oppositions inside logic
has appeared, that is “n-opposition theory”, or “NOT”, which relies on the notion of “logical bi-simplex of dimension m” (m = n − 1). This theory has received a complete mathematical foundation in 2008, and since then several extensions. In this paper,
by using it, we show that in standard deontic logic there are in fact many more oppositional deontic figures than Kalinowski’s
unique “hexagon of norms” (more ones, and more complex ones, geometrically speaking: “deontic squares”, “deontic hexagons”,
“deontic cubes”, . . ., “deontic tetraicosahedra”, . . .): the real geometry of the oppositions between deontic modalities
is composed by the aforementioned structures (squares, hexagons, cubes, . . ., tetraicosahedra and hyper-tetraicosahedra),
whose complete mathematical closure happens in fact to be a “deontic 5-dimensional hyper-tetraicosahedron” (an oppositional
very regular solid).
Labels:
logical square, logical hexagon, logical bi-simplexes, modal logic, deontic logic, opposition theory, oppositional geometry, modal graphs Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic: Michael Huemer
bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/60/2/345... A central problem facing a probabilistic approach to the problem of induction is the difficulty of sufficiently constraining prior probabilities so as to yield the conclusion that induction is cogent. The Principle of Indifference, according to which alternatives are equiprobable when one has no grounds for preferring one over another, represents one way of addressing this problem; however, the Principle faces the well-known problem that multiple interpretations of it are possible, leading to incompatible conclusions. I propose a partial solution to the latter problem, drawing on the notion of explanatory priority. The resulting synthesis of Bayesian and inference-to-best-explanation approaches affords a principled defense of prior probability distributions that support induction.
Labels:
principal of indifference, explanation, Bayesianism Scientific Realism, the Atomic Theory, and the Catch-All Hypothesis: Can We Test Fundamental
bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/60/2/253... Sherri Roush ([2005]) and I ([2001], [2006]) have each argued independently that the most significant challenge to scientific realism arises from our inability to consider the full range of serious alternatives to a given hypothesis we seek to test, but we diverge significantly concerning the range of cases in which this problem becomes acute. Here I argue against Roush's further suggestion that the atomic hypothesis represents a case in which scientific ingenuity has enabled us to overcome the problem, showing how her general strategy is undermined by evidence I have already offered in support of what I have called the ‘problem of unconceived alternatives’. I then go on to show why her strategy will not generally (if ever) allow us to formulate and test exhaustive spaces of hypotheses in cases of fundamental scientific theorizing.
How Science Textbooks Treat Scientific Method: A Philosopher's Perspective -- Blachowicz 60 (2): 303
bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/60/2/303... This paper examines, from the point of view of a philosopher of science, what it is that introductory science textbooks say and do not say about ‘scientific method’. Seventy introductory texts in a variety of natural and social sciences provided the material for this study. The inadequacy of these textbook accounts is apparent in three general areas: (a) the simple empiricist view of science that tends to predominate; (b) the demarcation between scientific and non-scientific inquiry and (c) the avoidance of controversy—in part the consequence of the tendency toward textbook standardization. Most importantly, this study provides some evidence of the gulf that separates philosophy of science from science instruction, and examines some important aspects of the demarcation between science and non-science—an important issue for philosophers, scientists, and science educators.
ISIPTA'07 -
FIFTH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON
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Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism Edited by David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Nola  Table of Contents and Sample ChaptersMany philosophical naturalists eschew analysis in favor of discovering metaphysical truths from the a posteriori, contending that analysis does not lead to philosophical insight. A countercurrent to this approach seeks to reconcile a certain account of conceptual analysis with philosophical naturalism; prominent and influential proponents of this methodology include the late David Lewis, Frank Jackson, Michael Smith, Philip Pettit, and David Armstrong. Naturalistic analysis (sometimes known as "the Canberra Plan" because many of its proponents have been associated with Australian National University in Canberra) is a tool for locating in the scientifically given world objects and properties we quantify over in everyday discourse. |
Bas van Fraassen’s empiricist reading of Perrin’s achievement invites the question: whose doubts about atoms did Perrin put
to rest? This comment recontextualizes the argument and applies the notion of empirical grounding to some contemporary work
in behavioral biology.
ABSTRACT. The semantic view of theories is one according to which theories are construed
as models of their linguistic formulations. The implications of this view for scientific
realism have been little discussed. Contrary to the suggestion of various champions of
the semantic view, it is argued that this approach does not make support for a plausible
scientific realism any less problematic than it might otherwise be. Though a degree of independence
of theory from language may ensure safety frompitfalls associated with logical
empiricism, realism cannot be entertained unless models or (abstracted and/or idealized)
aspects thereof are spelled out in terms of linguistic formulations (such as mathematical
equations), which can be interpreted in terms of correspondence with the world. The putative
advantage of the semantic approach – its linguistic independence – is thus of no help to
the realist. I consider recent treatments of the model-theoretic view (Suppe, Giere, Smith),
and find that although some of these accounts harbour the promise of realism, this promise
is deceptive.
No Place for the A Priori
Devitt:
In other works I have defended the naturalistic view that there is no a priori by attempting to undermine the motivation for the a priori and by demonstrating its obscurity (1996, 1998, 2002, 2005a,b).[1] In this paper, I shall summarize this attempt and then develop it further.
Devitt:
In other works I have defended the naturalistic view that there is no a priori by attempting to undermine the motivation for the a priori and by demonstrating its obscurity (1996, 1998, 2002, 2005a,b).[1] In this paper, I shall summarize this attempt and then develop it further.
[1] On the naturalistic view, epistemology is part of science. It is important not to misunderstand this, as van Fraassen seems to (2000, pp. 261-71). It goes without saying that epistemology implies the methods of science. But van Fraassen seems to take the naturalist view to be that basic science, or special sciences like biology, medicine, and psychology, imply the methods of science, a view that he rejects. That is not my view of naturalism (1997a, pp. 75-9). I take epistemology to be itself a special science. As such it is no more simply implied by another science than is any other special science: it has the same sort of relative autonomy, and yet dependence on basic science, as other special sciences. So we should not go along with Quine’s view that epistemology is a “chapter of psychology” (1969, p. 82). Naturalized epistemology, like any special science, applies the usual methods of science, whatever they may be, mostly taking established science for granted, to investigate its special realm. In the case of epistemology that realm is those very methods of science. The aim is to discover empirically how we humans learn, and should learn, about the world. We have no reason to suppose that the methods that have yielded knowledge elsewhere cannot yield knowledge in epistemology.
Abstract A variety of logical frameworks have been developed to study rational agents interacting over time. This paper takes a closer
look at one particular interface, between two systems that both address the dynamics of knowledge and information flow. The
first is Epistemic Temporal Logic (ETL) which uses linear or branching time models with added epistemic structure induced
by agents’ different capabilities for observing events. The second framework is Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) that describes
interactive processes in terms of epistemic event models which may occur inside modalities of the language. This paper systematically
and rigorously relates the DEL framework with the ETL framework. The precise relationship between DEL and ETL is explored
via a new representation theorem characterizing the largest class of ETL models corresponding to DEL protocols in terms of notions of Perfect Recall, No Miracles, and Bisimulation Invariance. We then focus on new issues of completeness. One contribution is an axiomatization for the dynamic logic of public announcements constrained by protocols, which has
been an open problem for some years, as it does not fit the usual ‘reduction axiom’ format of DEL. Finally, we provide a number
of examples that show how DEL suggests an interesting fine-structure inside ETL.
Abstract This paper explores the interaction of well-motivated (if controversial) principles governing the probability conditionals,
with accounts of what it is for a sentence to be indefinite. The conclusion can be played in a variety of ways. It could be
regarded as a new reason to be suspicious of the intuitive data about the probability of conditionals; or, holding fixed the
data, it could be used to give traction on the philosophical analysis of a contentious notion—indefiniteness. The paper outlines
the various options, and shows that ‘rejectionist’ theories of indefiniteness are incompatible with the results. Rejectionist
theories include popular accounts such as supervaluationism, non-classical truth-value gap theories, and accounts of indeterminacy
that centre on rejecting the law of excluded middle. An appendix compares the results obtained here with the ‘impossibility’
results descending from Lewis (1976).
'Barcan Formulas in Second-Order Modal Logic' (added 01.10.2008)
Timothy Williamson
Harman and Lewis credit Kripke with having formulated a puzzle that seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. The puzzle
is widely regarded as having been solved. In this paper we argue that this standard solution, in its various versions, addresses
only a limited aspect of the puzzle and holds no promise of fully resolving it. Analyzing this failure and the proper rendering
of the puzzle, it is suggested that it poses a significant challenge for the defense of epistemic closure.
http://www.springerlink.com.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/content/e8wp1u83j4m60lvp/fulltext.pdf
http://www.springerlink.com.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/content/e8wp1u83j4m60lvp/fulltext.pdf
Are there any possible worlds? The idea of a point in logical space – at which every proposition is either True or False – seems at the one and the same time compelling and repellant. The notion plays a vital role in the semantics of logics of modality and conditionality, and so, is compelling. It is hard to take modal logic seriously without points in models that play the role of deciding every statement one way other the other. But to take possible worlds seriously as more than a useful fiction has seemed too great a price for many to pay. This squeamishness seems, to many, to have a distinctly ‘ontological’ flavour. Places at which there are blue swans or in which kangaroos have no tails seems to crowd the halls of being with blue swans and tailless kangaroos. We would do better without such things if we can. If we can explain possible worlds away – as propositions, or stories or abstracta or something else relatively tame – then we should. But ontological squeamishness is not my complaint about non-actual possible worlds. Instead of their non-actuality, my worry about possible worlds is their worldishness.
"Both qualitative and quantitative symmetries are possible. Epistemological holism is false."
"My preference is the no-theory theory of probability, which rejects the need for a reductive analysis of what probability statements mean. Probability is a theoretical quantity. It obeys the axioms of probability and it bears nondeductive inferential relations to observed relative frequencies. Probability, like other theoretical magnitudes, cannot be reduced to observations, nor does it need to be."
"Must a solution to the Duhem-Quine problem give scientists advice on whether they should formulate an alternative to the hypothesis H or an alternative to the auxiliary assumptions A when the conjunction (H & A) generates a failed prediction? I do not think so. Epistemology does not have the burden of predicting that Uranus’s orbit should be handled in one way while Mercury’s should be handled in another. It took an Einstein (namely, the Einstein) to discover this; there was nothing in the anomalous data and their relation to Newtonian theory that indicated what the facts would turn out to be. It is perhaps more reasonable for philosophy in this instance to remain on one side of the divide between the context of discovery and the context of justification.28 The likelihood analysis describes how alternatives should be compared once they are formulated, not whether they are worth constructing in the first place."
"The assumption that there are just seven planets was much less enmeshed with other data sets, so it made sense for Adams and Le Verrier to have held on to Newtonian theory while attempting to revise the auxiliary assumption about the number of planets.26 As is well known, the same strategy met with failure when applied to the problem of explaining Mercury’s orbit. Einstein’s general theory of relativity was able to solve the problem precisely because it fit the data that Newton’s theory also fit, while fitting the data on Mercury better."
"The likelihood analysis describes how alternatives should be compared once they are formulated, not whether they are worth constructing in the first place."
Sober, "LIKELIHOOD, MODEL SELECTION, AND THE DUHEM-QUINE PROBLEM".
"My preference is the no-theory theory of probability, which rejects the need for a reductive analysis of what probability statements mean. Probability is a theoretical quantity. It obeys the axioms of probability and it bears nondeductive inferential relations to observed relative frequencies. Probability, like other theoretical magnitudes, cannot be reduced to observations, nor does it need to be."
"Must a solution to the Duhem-Quine problem give scientists advice on whether they should formulate an alternative to the hypothesis H or an alternative to the auxiliary assumptions A when the conjunction (H & A) generates a failed prediction? I do not think so. Epistemology does not have the burden of predicting that Uranus’s orbit should be handled in one way while Mercury’s should be handled in another. It took an Einstein (namely, the Einstein) to discover this; there was nothing in the anomalous data and their relation to Newtonian theory that indicated what the facts would turn out to be. It is perhaps more reasonable for philosophy in this instance to remain on one side of the divide between the context of discovery and the context of justification.28 The likelihood analysis describes how alternatives should be compared once they are formulated, not whether they are worth constructing in the first place."
"The assumption that there are just seven planets was much less enmeshed with other data sets, so it made sense for Adams and Le Verrier to have held on to Newtonian theory while attempting to revise the auxiliary assumption about the number of planets.26 As is well known, the same strategy met with failure when applied to the problem of explaining Mercury’s orbit. Einstein’s general theory of relativity was able to solve the problem precisely because it fit the data that Newton’s theory also fit, while fitting the data on Mercury better."
"The likelihood analysis describes how alternatives should be compared once they are formulated, not whether they are worth constructing in the first place."
Sober, "LIKELIHOOD, MODEL SELECTION, AND THE DUHEM-QUINE PROBLEM".
Sober's test kit example is pretty convincing.
Labels:
philosophy, philosophy of statistics
MODERN SCIENCE AND
THE BAYESIAN-FREQUENTIST CONTROVERSY
Bradley Efron
Abstract
The 250-year debate between Bayesians and frequentists is unusual among philosophical arguments in actually having important practical consequences. Whenever noisy data is a major concern, scientists depend on statistical inference to pursue nature’s mysteries. 19th Century science was broadly Bayesian in its statistical methodology, while frequentism dominated 20th Century scientific practice. This brings up a pointed question: which philosophy will predominate in the 21st Century? One thing is already clear – statistical inference will pay an increased role in scientific progress as scientists attack bigger, messier problems in biology, medicine, neuroscience, the environment, and other fields that have resisted traditional deterministic analyses. This talk argues that a combination of frequentist and Bayesian thinking will be needed to deal with the massive data sets scientists are now bringing us. Three examples are given to suggest how such combinations might look in practice. A large portion of the talk is based on my presidential address to the American Statistical Association and a related column in Amstat News.
THE BAYESIAN-FREQUENTIST CONTROVERSY
Bradley Efron
Abstract
The 250-year debate between Bayesians and frequentists is unusual among philosophical arguments in actually having important practical consequences. Whenever noisy data is a major concern, scientists depend on statistical inference to pursue nature’s mysteries. 19th Century science was broadly Bayesian in its statistical methodology, while frequentism dominated 20th Century scientific practice. This brings up a pointed question: which philosophy will predominate in the 21st Century? One thing is already clear – statistical inference will pay an increased role in scientific progress as scientists attack bigger, messier problems in biology, medicine, neuroscience, the environment, and other fields that have resisted traditional deterministic analyses. This talk argues that a combination of frequentist and Bayesian thinking will be needed to deal with the massive data sets scientists are now bringing us. Three examples are given to suggest how such combinations might look in practice. A large portion of the talk is based on my presidential address to the American Statistical Association and a related column in Amstat News.
Labels:
philosophy, philosophy of statistics
Stalnaker on belief revision.
Iterated Belief Revision
from Erkenntnis
Abstract This
is a discussion of the problem of extending the basic AGM belief
revision theory to iterated belief revision: the problem of formulating
rules, not only for revising a basic belief state in response to
potential new information, but also for revising one’s revision rules
in response to potential new information. The emphasis in the paper is
on foundational questions about the nature of and motivation for
various constraints, and about the methodology of the evaluation of
putative counterexamples to proposed constraints. Some specific
constraints that have been proposed are criticized. The paper
emphasizes the importance of meta-information—information about one’s
sources of information—and argues that little of substance can be said
about constraints on iterated belief revision at a level of abstraction
that lacks the resources for explicit representation of
meta-information.
Absence of evidence and evidence of absence: evidential transitivity in connection with fossils,
www.springerlink.com/content/7300x710l184060n/
www.springerlink.com/content/7300x710l184060n/
“Absence of evidence isn’t evidence of absence” is a slogan that is popular among scientists and nonscientists alike. This
article assesses its truth by using a probabilistic tool, the Law of Likelihood. Qualitative questions (“Is E evidence about H?”) and quantitative questions (“How much evidence does E provide about H?”) are both considered. The article discusses the example of fossil intermediates. If finding a fossil that is phenotypically
intermediate between two extant species provides evidence that those species have a common ancestor, does failing to find
such a fossil constitute evidence that there was no common ancestor? Or should the failure merely be chalked up to the imperfection
of the fossil record? The transitivity of the evidence relation in simple causal chains provides a broader context, which
leads to discussion of the fine-tuning argument, the anthropic principle, and observation selection effects.
In this essay I renew the case for Conditional Excluded Middle (CXM) in light of recent developments in the semantics of the
subjunctive conditional. I argue that Michael Tooley’s recent backward causation counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis comparative
world similarity semantics undermines the strongest argument against CXM, and I offer a new, principled argument for the validity
of CXM that is in no way undermined by Tooley’s counterexample. Finally, I formulate a simple semantics for the subjunctive
conditional that is consistent with both CXM and Tooley’s counterexample.
This essay answers the “Bayesian Challenge,” which is an argument offered by Bayesians that concludes that belief is not relevant
to rational action. Patrick Maher and Mark Kaplan argued that this is so because there is no satisfactory way of making sense
of how it would matter. The two ways considered so far, acting as if a belief is true and acting as if a belief has a probability
over a threshold, do not work. Contrary to Maher and Kaplan, Keith Frankish argued that there is a way to make sense of how
belief matters by introducing a dual process theory of mind in which decisions are made at the conscious level using premising policies. I argue that Bayesian decision theory alone shows that it is sometimes rational to base decisions on beliefs; we do not
need a dual process theory of mind to solve the Bayesian Challenge. This point is made clearer when we consider decision levels: acting as if a belief is true is sometimes rational at higher decision levels.
Margins for Error and Sensitivity: What Nozick Might Have Said
www.springerlink.com/content/504lvl1346470m0j/
www.springerlink.com/content/504lvl1346470m0j/
Timothy Williamson has provided damaging counterexamples to Robert Nozick’s sensitivity principle. The examples are based
on Williamson’s anti-luminosity arguments, and they show how knowledge requires a margin for error that appears to be incompatible
with sensitivity. I explain how Nozick can rescue sensitivity from Williamson’s counterexamples by appeal to a specific conception
of the methods by which an agent forms a belief. I also defend the proposed conception of methods against Williamson’s criticisms.
BRUNO DE FINETTI. Philosophical Lectures on Probability. Collected, edited, and annotated by Alberto
philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/nkp01...
philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/nkp01...
BRUNO DE FINETTI. Philosophical Lectures on Probability. Collected, edited, and annotated by Alberto Mura. Translated by Hykel Hosni. Synthese Library; 340