Faith (religious)

Usually defined in terms of belief in something – a ‘god’ or ‘gods’ or some ‘higher power’† – which cannot be proven, not necessarily indicating that such belief is false but that whether or not the belief is true, by the very nature of the belief, it is outside of the sphere of demonstration on the evidence. “A belief which does not rest upon logical proof or material evidence”.

When events present themselves which strike devotees as provoking grounds to question their belief, the customary response of religious ‘authorities’ is to assert that the conviction of followers is being “‘tested’ by ‘god’”, with the implication that – unlike the scientific approach to (falsifiable) claims – there is little point in probing how things look: i.e., do these circumstances support or refuse acceptance of the religion’s “god hypothesis”? as such considerations can have no real bearing in these systems of thought on whether one should or should not hold to one’s ‘faith’. Often it is contended that the belief should be maintained or continued in spite of conditions – the gap between belief and evidence is filled by an act of will – choosing to believe even though the belief isn’t warranted by the evidence. This is why religious ‘faith’ is often represented as opposed to reasonableness. The upshot of this is to give adherents an illusion of certainty of belief.

That such beliefs cannot, on the evidence, be shown to be true or false does not mean that one cannot take a rational approach about whether to expend significant (intellectual and other) resources on treating the belief as though it were true. The view can be taken that if it is the case that there is no avenue available to verify or even assign a ‘ballpark’ probability about such ‘faiths’ that a “no belief in a ‘god’ or ‘gods’” attitude is sensible to hold. Applying oneself to religious doctrines and rituals, and especially making oneself obedient to religious dogma (in some sense relinquishing a questioning attitude) involves the utilization of energies which could be directed towards other, perhaps more deserving, areas or interests, see opportunity costs.

†and the consequences accompanying that, for example, doctrinal ‘imperatives’ such as, almost always absolutist, ‘moral laws’ supposedly originating from a ‘god’. An ever-present danger springs from people’s tendency to apply such consequences to inappropriate areas or withholding critical review (and correction), for example, having their public policy view on a particular matter ‘informed’ by their religious convictions, when the subject or claims concerned should principally rely upon whether the selected approach or strategy actually works effectively as well as rational ethical considerations, that is, in what way does the available evidence justify the favoured public policy view. If we are weighing a decision on which course-of-action is likely to be most effective in assisting people affected by a number of different (illegal) drugs – Heroin, PCP, Cocaine and Crack-cocaine, Ecstasy, Crystal Meth, etc. – and society-at-large, we need to know of the batch of available approaches which strategies seem most credible, and then what good evidence is there for each of these current top-tier methods of dealing with this thorny and complex problem, indeed if these current strategies fall far short of what is required it may be that we need a coming together of experts to formulate better proposals. Blindly adhering to and attempting to rely upon one’s religious convictions short-changes Society, ourselves, and especially the people whose lives’ are being devastated by the ravages of such things as methamphetamines.