CA1102453A - Computer accessing system - Google Patents
Computer accessing systemInfo
- Publication number
- CA1102453A CA1102453A CA322,630A CA322630A CA1102453A CA 1102453 A CA1102453 A CA 1102453A CA 322630 A CA322630 A CA 322630A CA 1102453 A CA1102453 A CA 1102453A
- Authority
- CA
- Canada
- Prior art keywords
- computer
- access
- congruent
- pseudorandom
- access code
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
- G06F21/34—User authentication involving the use of external additional devices, e.g. dongles or smart cards
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
- G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
- G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1016—Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2101—Auditing as a secondary aspect
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
-
- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y10—TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC
- Y10S—TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y10S379/00—Telephonic communications
- Y10S379/903—Password
Abstract
ABSTRACT OF THE DISCLOSURE
A communications link between a computer and a remote user is effected by a portable access unit which generates a non-recurring access code which is a function of a password and a pseudorandomly generated number. She access code is transmitted and compared with an access code generated by a computer access controller. In addition to the access code, the pseudorandomly generated number provides an encryption key which ? not trans-mitted but corresponds to a mating encryption key generated at the controller. The mating encryption keys are utilized to set up data transmission enciphering/deciphering networks successive links are established by incremented pseudorandomly generated access codes.
A communications link between a computer and a remote user is effected by a portable access unit which generates a non-recurring access code which is a function of a password and a pseudorandomly generated number. She access code is transmitted and compared with an access code generated by a computer access controller. In addition to the access code, the pseudorandomly generated number provides an encryption key which ? not trans-mitted but corresponds to a mating encryption key generated at the controller. The mating encryption keys are utilized to set up data transmission enciphering/deciphering networks successive links are established by incremented pseudorandomly generated access codes.
Description
~,-'`- ' ` , ., ` ~
. ' .
E3ACKGRCUND OF TED3 INVFNTIO~J
~'''`'"'~ ' .
-~ _1. Summar~ of the Invention .~ : This invention relates generally to securi.ng communica tion links between a computer and a remote terminal and more par-j :~ ticularly to a system for accessing a computer and keying an encryption network for data transmission through pseudorandom ¦
: number generation.
: . . ` . .
,-~ . . . .
`: , ~ ' ' ' . ':
:` ~ ` ', ,: - ' ~ ' `` ' `:
. , . : ... ,. , ~ `, ` .
.: . ` - . ` ~ ::
.. - -` ~ Zg~
. -! l -: :; , I . .
,.. , I .
Society's multifaceted dependency upon computer systems ¦has increased the possible effe~ts of unauthorized computer access ¦to untold level3. Computer networking,such as time sharing ¦systems, has led to inherent security problemsisince programs ¦e~ecuted by ~uch sy3tems shared access and cooperated wlth each ¦other. The capabilities of recent computer systems included not ¦only the utilization o remote terminals but extensive resource ¦sharing and batch processing of different projects. The use of ¦such systems has necessarily increased the likelihood of deliberat a or even accidental acquisition and/or alteration of data.
¦ computer systems have been sub~ect to a variety of ¦ security risks ranging from misappropriation of confidential data ¦ through unauthorized use of computing time. Access controls have ¦ been used in virtually all time sharing and most other computer ¦ syst2ms. Differences in the nature of the information being ¦ processed have given rise to various security measures and pro- `
¦ cedures commensurate with the value attached to such data and the ¦ consequences of unauthorized access and/or appropriation thereof.
For example, the data proces`sed in computer systems utilized for financial transactions has a substantial value due to the monetar~
losses which could be sustained as a result of system penetration.¦
A user has been traditionally identified by at least one of the following:
la) through somethirg he knew or had memorized, e.g. a password;
(b) through somethiny he carried with him, e.g. a card or badge: or '~' ' . . - ' , , . '.
. - , . . .
.-: - .
.
. . .- : ' . -: .. , ~ ` 115~Z453 ¦ (c) through a personal physical characteristic, e.g.
¦recognition by a guard.
I Passwords have been widely employed to authenticate a ¦remote terminal user. The use oE passwords has been augmented by ¦secondary security measures in many instances. For example, a ¦typical consumer banXing terminal accesses its computer by using la combination of a magnetically encoded card and the user's ` ¦memorized password commonly referred to as a personal identi~ica~
¦tion number.
¦ While such systems might have been satisfactory from a ¦cost/loss risk standpoint, there were subject to penetration with ¦ or without access to the individual user's card. Various pass-¦ word selection procedures and their susceptibility to penetration I have been discussed in a U. S Department of Commerce publication ¦ entitled The Use of Passwords for Controlled Access to Computer ¦ Resources, NBS Special Publication 500-9 dated May 1977.
In addition to penetration of the user's password, ¦ passwords themselves were ineffective, for example, against the ¦ penetration threat of between-lines entry and piggy-~ack infiltra-I tion. Unauthoxized interception of communication links between ¦ the computer and a remote user has been a further security problen ¦ and resulted in obtalning not only the data transmitted but the ¦ user's password Eor subsequent acces~.
.. . ' .' ' . , . , : : '. , : :
' ` ': .
"~ , llQZ'.'53 i ¦ SUMMARY OF ~HE INVENTION
,.,." I .
A remote computer i9 a~cessed by a nonrecurring acces~
code generated as a function of a pseuaorandom number and a user password. The access code is transmitted over telephone lines through the`use of a digital ~ignal to audio tone modem and decoded at the computer location. An access controller receives the decoded access code and compares it to an expected access cod which has baen congruently generated. Upon recognition of an equality between the controller generated access code and the transmitted access code, the control~er grants access to the computer. The generated pseudorandom number can be divided into two segments, one of which is used to furnish the access code and the other an encryption key utilized for subsequent data transmis sion between the user and the computer or, in the olternative, tw pseudorarldom numbersare generated, one of which is utili~ed for access code generation and the o~her for the encryption Xey.
From the above compendium it will be appreciated that it is an object of the present invention to provide a remote accessing system of the general character described Eor establish ing a communications link between a computer and a remote user which is not subject to the disadvantages aforementioned.
A further object of the present invention is to provld , a remote accessing system of the general character described for establishing a communications link between a computer and a user employing an accessing password which is not transmitted over communlcations lines. -_4_ .~ , . . , , . , .
~, . : .. ., , .. ~
.:
.
- '. ' ' . : , -. . : . : . :
~: ' : , :
-. , -:. ~ ' ' . ' ' ' ':
A further object of th~ pre~nt invention is to pro-vide a remote accessihg syste~ cf the general character descrlbed for establishing a communications link bPtween a computer and a user which utilizes p~e~dorandom number yeneration to provide nonrecurring access code~.
Another object of the pre~ent invention is to provide a remote accesqing system of the general character described for e~tablishing communication links between a computer and a user which employs data encryption established in conjunction with a nonrecurring ancryption key.
A further object of the present invention is to pro-vide a remote accessing system of the general character described for establishing communications links between a computer and a user which utili~es pseudorandom number generation for the pur-pose of both acces~ing the computer and providing a data en-cryption key.
Another object of the prese~t invention is to provide i a remote accessing syste~ of the general character described for es~tablish1ng communlcations links between a computer and a user wher~in interception of user-computer communications will not provide sufficient data for independently accessing the computer.
Other objects of the invention in part will be ob-vious and in part will be pointed out hereinafter.
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' - ' . ... .
:~.
5 _ 1 ...-., ..., 1 '~''~'; . .
., . :: : ' ' : .. , -'', . ~, : .. '.: . , :, , .
- . ~ : : . .
According to one aspect o~ the present inven-tion there is provided a system for accessing a computer by a user having an assigned password to establish a communications link for data transmission between a computer terminal and a computer, the system comprising means at the terminal sequentially generating nonrecurring pseudorandom numbers in a reproducible fashion means receiving the pseudorandom number and the user assigned password and i.n response thereto modifying the pseudorandom number as a predetermined function of the password to provide an access code signal, means transmitting the access code signal from the terminalt controller means at the computer, the controller means receiving the transmitted access code signal, the controller means including means for sequentially generating congruent pseudorandom numbers and ~or modifying a congruent pseudorandom number with the user assigned password to provide a congruent access code signal and in response to the equality thereof providing an access signal, switch means receiving the access signal and in response thereto establishing a data transmisision path between the terminal and the computer, whereby computer access is secured through a sequential change of access codes in a pseudorandom fashion without direct transmission of the userls password.
According to a second aspect there is provided a . .
. method of accessing a computer at one location by a user positioned at a second location and having an assigned password, .` the method comprising the steps of : (a) sequentially generating a nonrecurri.ng pseudo-random number at the second location, , '' ~
. ~it ~
0-- - 5a -. . .
csm/ ~ ~
: . . . .
'' ', ' " ' '' ' ''` .'' .. - . : :
~l~Z~L53 ~...... ' ~
(b) modifying the pseudorandom number as a function of the user assigned password to provide an access code, ~ c) transmitting the access code Erom the second location to the first location, (d) receiving the transmitted access code at the first location, (e) sequentially generating a congruent nonrecurring - pseudorandom numbe.r, (f) modifying the congruent pseudorandom number with the user assigned password to provide a congruent access code, (g) comparing the received access code with the ~ congruent access code, and .-~ (h) granting access to the:computer upon recognition . -- of an equality between the received access code and the congruent -. access code, whereby computer access is secured through a change of access codes in a pseudorandom fashion without direct transmission of the user's password.
:,. . .
.. ~
.; .
' ,, . ' - 5b -"
;,, . ~ cs~
' .:
,. . .. . . :
:: . . .
':
. ' .
E3ACKGRCUND OF TED3 INVFNTIO~J
~'''`'"'~ ' .
-~ _1. Summar~ of the Invention .~ : This invention relates generally to securi.ng communica tion links between a computer and a remote terminal and more par-j :~ ticularly to a system for accessing a computer and keying an encryption network for data transmission through pseudorandom ¦
: number generation.
: . . ` . .
,-~ . . . .
`: , ~ ' ' ' . ':
:` ~ ` ', ,: - ' ~ ' `` ' `:
. , . : ... ,. , ~ `, ` .
.: . ` - . ` ~ ::
.. - -` ~ Zg~
. -! l -: :; , I . .
,.. , I .
Society's multifaceted dependency upon computer systems ¦has increased the possible effe~ts of unauthorized computer access ¦to untold level3. Computer networking,such as time sharing ¦systems, has led to inherent security problemsisince programs ¦e~ecuted by ~uch sy3tems shared access and cooperated wlth each ¦other. The capabilities of recent computer systems included not ¦only the utilization o remote terminals but extensive resource ¦sharing and batch processing of different projects. The use of ¦such systems has necessarily increased the likelihood of deliberat a or even accidental acquisition and/or alteration of data.
¦ computer systems have been sub~ect to a variety of ¦ security risks ranging from misappropriation of confidential data ¦ through unauthorized use of computing time. Access controls have ¦ been used in virtually all time sharing and most other computer ¦ syst2ms. Differences in the nature of the information being ¦ processed have given rise to various security measures and pro- `
¦ cedures commensurate with the value attached to such data and the ¦ consequences of unauthorized access and/or appropriation thereof.
For example, the data proces`sed in computer systems utilized for financial transactions has a substantial value due to the monetar~
losses which could be sustained as a result of system penetration.¦
A user has been traditionally identified by at least one of the following:
la) through somethirg he knew or had memorized, e.g. a password;
(b) through somethiny he carried with him, e.g. a card or badge: or '~' ' . . - ' , , . '.
. - , . . .
.-: - .
.
. . .- : ' . -: .. , ~ ` 115~Z453 ¦ (c) through a personal physical characteristic, e.g.
¦recognition by a guard.
I Passwords have been widely employed to authenticate a ¦remote terminal user. The use oE passwords has been augmented by ¦secondary security measures in many instances. For example, a ¦typical consumer banXing terminal accesses its computer by using la combination of a magnetically encoded card and the user's ` ¦memorized password commonly referred to as a personal identi~ica~
¦tion number.
¦ While such systems might have been satisfactory from a ¦cost/loss risk standpoint, there were subject to penetration with ¦ or without access to the individual user's card. Various pass-¦ word selection procedures and their susceptibility to penetration I have been discussed in a U. S Department of Commerce publication ¦ entitled The Use of Passwords for Controlled Access to Computer ¦ Resources, NBS Special Publication 500-9 dated May 1977.
In addition to penetration of the user's password, ¦ passwords themselves were ineffective, for example, against the ¦ penetration threat of between-lines entry and piggy-~ack infiltra-I tion. Unauthoxized interception of communication links between ¦ the computer and a remote user has been a further security problen ¦ and resulted in obtalning not only the data transmitted but the ¦ user's password Eor subsequent acces~.
.. . ' .' ' . , . , : : '. , : :
' ` ': .
"~ , llQZ'.'53 i ¦ SUMMARY OF ~HE INVENTION
,.,." I .
A remote computer i9 a~cessed by a nonrecurring acces~
code generated as a function of a pseuaorandom number and a user password. The access code is transmitted over telephone lines through the`use of a digital ~ignal to audio tone modem and decoded at the computer location. An access controller receives the decoded access code and compares it to an expected access cod which has baen congruently generated. Upon recognition of an equality between the controller generated access code and the transmitted access code, the control~er grants access to the computer. The generated pseudorandom number can be divided into two segments, one of which is used to furnish the access code and the other an encryption key utilized for subsequent data transmis sion between the user and the computer or, in the olternative, tw pseudorarldom numbersare generated, one of which is utili~ed for access code generation and the o~her for the encryption Xey.
From the above compendium it will be appreciated that it is an object of the present invention to provide a remote accessing system of the general character described Eor establish ing a communications link between a computer and a remote user which is not subject to the disadvantages aforementioned.
A further object of the present invention is to provld , a remote accessing system of the general character described for establishing a communications link between a computer and a user employing an accessing password which is not transmitted over communlcations lines. -_4_ .~ , . . , , . , .
~, . : .. ., , .. ~
.:
.
- '. ' ' . : , -. . : . : . :
~: ' : , :
-. , -:. ~ ' ' . ' ' ' ':
A further object of th~ pre~nt invention is to pro-vide a remote accessihg syste~ cf the general character descrlbed for establishing a communications link bPtween a computer and a user which utilizes p~e~dorandom number yeneration to provide nonrecurring access code~.
Another object of the pre~ent invention is to provide a remote accesqing system of the general character described for e~tablishing communication links between a computer and a user which employs data encryption established in conjunction with a nonrecurring ancryption key.
A further object of the present invention is to pro-vide a remote accessing system of the general character described for establishing communications links between a computer and a user which utili~es pseudorandom number generation for the pur-pose of both acces~ing the computer and providing a data en-cryption key.
Another object of the prese~t invention is to provide i a remote accessing syste~ of the general character described for es~tablish1ng communlcations links between a computer and a user wher~in interception of user-computer communications will not provide sufficient data for independently accessing the computer.
Other objects of the invention in part will be ob-vious and in part will be pointed out hereinafter.
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' - ' . ... .
:~.
5 _ 1 ...-., ..., 1 '~''~'; . .
., . :: : ' ' : .. , -'', . ~, : .. '.: . , :, , .
- . ~ : : . .
According to one aspect o~ the present inven-tion there is provided a system for accessing a computer by a user having an assigned password to establish a communications link for data transmission between a computer terminal and a computer, the system comprising means at the terminal sequentially generating nonrecurring pseudorandom numbers in a reproducible fashion means receiving the pseudorandom number and the user assigned password and i.n response thereto modifying the pseudorandom number as a predetermined function of the password to provide an access code signal, means transmitting the access code signal from the terminalt controller means at the computer, the controller means receiving the transmitted access code signal, the controller means including means for sequentially generating congruent pseudorandom numbers and ~or modifying a congruent pseudorandom number with the user assigned password to provide a congruent access code signal and in response to the equality thereof providing an access signal, switch means receiving the access signal and in response thereto establishing a data transmisision path between the terminal and the computer, whereby computer access is secured through a sequential change of access codes in a pseudorandom fashion without direct transmission of the userls password.
According to a second aspect there is provided a . .
. method of accessing a computer at one location by a user positioned at a second location and having an assigned password, .` the method comprising the steps of : (a) sequentially generating a nonrecurri.ng pseudo-random number at the second location, , '' ~
. ~it ~
0-- - 5a -. . .
csm/ ~ ~
: . . . .
'' ', ' " ' '' ' ''` .'' .. - . : :
~l~Z~L53 ~...... ' ~
(b) modifying the pseudorandom number as a function of the user assigned password to provide an access code, ~ c) transmitting the access code Erom the second location to the first location, (d) receiving the transmitted access code at the first location, (e) sequentially generating a congruent nonrecurring - pseudorandom numbe.r, (f) modifying the congruent pseudorandom number with the user assigned password to provide a congruent access code, (g) comparing the received access code with the ~ congruent access code, and .-~ (h) granting access to the:computer upon recognition . -- of an equality between the received access code and the congruent -. access code, whereby computer access is secured through a change of access codes in a pseudorandom fashion without direct transmission of the user's password.
:,. . .
.. ~
.; .
' ,, . ' - 5b -"
;,, . ~ cs~
' .:
,. . .. . . :
:: . . .
':
2~S;~
.. . .
.
With these ends in view the invention finds embodiment . - in certain combir~ations of elements, arrangements of parts .: and serie~ of ~teps by whi~h the object3 aforementioned and cer~
. : tain other o~jects are hereinafter attained, all as ~ul~y de-: scribed with reference to the accompanying drawings and the scope of which is more particularly pointed out and indicated - in the appended claims.
` - ~ .RIEE DES~RIPTION O~ TKE DR~ I~GS
}n the accompanying drawings in which is shown one of the var~ous possible exemplary embodiments of the inventio~, FIG. 1 is a schematized block diagram of a remote accessing system constructed in accordance with and embodying : the invention and illustrating an access unit at a remote terminal establishing a communications link to a main computer;
FIG. 2 is a flow diagram illustrating an access con-troller routine for establishing access to the computer: and : FIG. 3 is a flow diagram illustrating a continuation ~ of tne controller routine originating in ~IG. 2.
; DESCRIPTIO~ OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIME~T
Referring now in detail to the drawings, and specif-. ~ ically to FIG. 1 wherein a block diagram illustrating a typical ~ communications channel linking a remote user which a computer :.~ is shown, the reference numeral 10 denotes generally a remote - terminal from which a user communicates with a computer 12.
: ~ In accordance with the present invention, a communicatiOnS lin~
14 is established through the use of conventional data trans-mission facilities such as, for e~ample, a telephone line or carrier wave transmission.
.r~.~ . . .
.. . .
~'`' , ' ' ' ` ' ' '' , ''" ` `
. ' , ` ' ' , :
'':, ~: .
;"`` ~ Si3 , ~
.
The present invention prevents unauthorized aeees~
to the eomputer 12 through the use of a user assigned password which funetions only in eonjunetion with a user assigned aeees~
unit 16. The aeeess unit 16 is preferably lightweight and hand-carried and typieally ineludes a mieroproeessor 18 sueh as MOS Teehnology 6502 programmed to generate a series of pseudo-random numbers in a reproducible ashion from an initial group-ing of seed numbers.
The aeeess unit 16 further includes a data eneoder 20 for the purpose of enerypting data for transmission over the link 14 to render intercepted data communications ~nintelligibl .
The encoder 20 may comprise data encryption hardware compatible with the Data Eneryption Standard algorithm promulgated by the National Bureau of Standards. Among the devices presently available for data encryption utilizing the Data Encryption Standard algorithm are the Rockwell-collins CR-100 Network En-cryptor, the Hansco Data Processing -Federal 007 and the Mo~oro a "In~oGuard" system. Use of the Data Eneryption Standard algo-rithm is by way of example only, and any other encryption algo-rithms and encryptors such as the DatoteX DEI-26 security device ean be employed.
In addition to the microprocessor lS and t~e encoder 20, the access unit also includes an input~output device 22, typically comprisin~ a keyboard and a transient display for .
indicating keyboard entries which,as will be described herein, comprise the user assigned pas~word.
_7_ ..' ' .' ,,~r-' ''' ' , '.
- - . ~ - .
. .
:, :' .
;
, ~ `
- -~ ~ 453 ~, . .
~-:,' .
Preferably, an authorized user carries his access unit 16 to the remote terminal 10 and interconnects the access unit with remote terminal computer peripherals such as an input output device ~4 Which may comprise A keyboard and/or CRT or TT
Communication from the input/output device 24 to the computer 1 is first encrypted by the encoder 20 and then encoded into audi _ tones at a tone encoder/decoder modem 26 which may comprise, by way of example, a Bell System 103A Data Set. The ton~ en-coded data is transmitted to the computer 12 ~ia the communica-tions link 14.
Pursuant to the in~ention,the microprocessor 18 is actuated to generate a chain of nonrecurring numbers from a group of seed numbers originally implanted. A typical pro-cessor sub-routine fo~ repeatable pseudorandom number generatio is disclosed in U. S. Patent ~o. 3,792,446 issued February 12, 1974 to McFiggins et al and assigned to the assignee of the present invention. It should be understood that such pseudo-random number generation sub-routine i5 exemplary of manifold random nu;nber generatiOn algorithms which may be employed.
User password integrity is maintained in accordance with the present invention by not directly transmitting the pas _ word over the communications link 14. Further, pursuant to the instant invention, possession of the password witho~t the ac-cess unit will not permit access to the computer, nor will possession of the access unit without the user's assigned password.
''.-~' . ,, , . .
~ -8-'',''' , " .
.
' ' , ~ /
~. ~ } d4b3 ._ `:
Generation of an acceptable access code signal by the acces9 unLt 16 entails the generation of a predicted pseudo-random numbar by the microprocessor 18 and modiEication of th~
pseudorandom numbes as a function of the password which is en-tered on the keyboard ~input/output device 22). For example, the access code may comprise pseudorandomly generated numbers multiplied by the user's password which also comprises a number.
The access code thus generated is fed to the modem 26 along with a constant access unit preface number for transmission via the communications link 14 to the computer 12. Interception of the access code transmission will not reveal the user's password but only the access unit preface number and the access code for the intercepted communication. As will be later described, such access code i3 not valid for subsequent communication links and cannot form the basis for deriving subsequent valid codes.
The tone encoded transmissions through the communica-tions link 14 are received at a companion modem 28 for conver-sion to digital waveEorms. Access to the main computer 12 is controlled by a controller unit 30 which monitors the communica-tions link 14. The controller may comprise a minicomputer such as the Data General NOVA series or even a microprocessor such as the microprocessor used in conjunction with random number generation at the access unit. -_9_ '' ~ ., ' . . , ,.
. .
''', '', , , , ' . : "
.~ .
: .
-:
.
' ' : l I . .
¦ It ~hould bo appreciated that the controller 30 ls : ¦ programmed with a congruent random number generation algorithm - 1 and initial seed numbers compatible with those assigned to all ... ¦ authori2ed access units. Further, the controller 30 may be set.
. . ¦ up such that the initial access code generated by each author-- I ized access unit and its associated assigned password is stored in a self-contained memory for ready reference.
: ¦ Referring now to the flow diagram of FIGS. 2 and 3 ... ¦ where the accessin~ sub-routine of the controller unit 30 is 1~ 1 depicted, .it will be appreciated that.after answering an incom-; ¦ ing telephone signal, the controller receives, through the modem .
. 1 30, the unit preface numb~r followed by the transmitted access .. I code as shown at an input block 32.
.~ ¦ As shown in a decision block 34,inquiry is made for verification of the incoming access un.it preface number with . . I access unit preface numbers stored in the controller memory to 1 determine whether the attempt to gain computer access is being ~ I . made through the use of a validly assigned access unit 16 which .,. ¦ has not been reported to be in the possession of anyone other . . than its authorized user. If the access unit preface.number is . ¦ not valid or if the preface number has been generated by a unit reported as stolen or mi.ssing, the program exits the deci-¦ sion block.34 on a branch 36 and the controller 30 logs the security violation and terminates the telephone link 14. ' ~ ' ' , -10- '. ~ ~
''.;"~ ~ . . ' .
' .' I . .
I ~ , ...
. r -: - ~ ' ., ~, , ^`~ .~
~2~L~i3 .,'. . , .
Upon acknowledgment of an incoming signal from a valid acces~ unit, the program exits the decision block 34 on a branch 38 and the controller retrieves the expected access code to be receivad from such access unit from a memory and compares the expected acce4s code witll the~code received over the com-munications link as depicted in a further decision block 40.
In order to prevent access code discrepancies due to signal interference from terminating a valid accees atteMpt, the controller 30 will permit a valid access unit to transmit its.access code a predetermined number of times. If the trans-mitted access code does not match the access code assigned to .
that unit number and stored in the controller memory, the program exits on a branch 42, the access code attempt is logged .
and the ccntroller determines how many attempts have been made to transmit the access code as shown in a decision block 44. If there have been less than the allotted number of attempts, a message is returned to indicate that the transmitted acce~
code has been re~ected and is to be retransmitted and the pro-gram reverts to the input block 32. After the allotted number of attempts has been reached, the program exits the decision block 44 on a branch 46 to break the communications link 14.
Upon receiving a transmitted access code which co- ¦
incides with the stored access code anticipated, the program exits the deci~ion block 40 on a branch 48 and the controller ' 30 thereafter sends a message to the access unit microprocessor 18 indicating acceptance of the access code such that the micro-processor will generate the next sequential pseudorandom number . . .
.,. , ' -11- ' ' . .
. ~
- ' :'" ~', . ~"' ' ' ` ~, . ':
.
::
~`
,; upon ~ubsequent actuation rather than repeat its last pseudo-random number.
~ he controller 30 then searches its nonvolatile memory and retrie~es a stored encryption key for the assigned access unit 16. The encryption key can comprise either a segment - of a single random number generation or a separate random number as generated by both the access unit microprocessor 1~ and the controller 30. The encryption key retrieved by the controller 30 is used to key an encoder/decoder 50 associated with the controller. It should be appreciated that the encryption key is not transmitted over the communications link 14 and i5 in-dependently generated at both the access unit 16 and the con-troller 30 on opposite ends of the link 14. Thus, anyone inter-cepting and recording the data transmission over the link 14 will not obtain the encryption key used to set up the enciphering/ , deciphering network.
- As shown in a block 52 of FIG. 3, the controller 30 : thereafter generates the next expected access code for the access ; unit 16 through the pseudorandom number generation algorithm with'. I!
; '! seed numbers which have been generated, e.g. as described in U.S.
Patent 3,79Z,446, and modifies the pseudorandom number by the I password. Additionally generated is the successive encryption key which may comprise a segment of the random number. The con-troller 30 thereafter rcplaces the previous access code and en-cryption Xeys ~or the aFcess unlt 6 in its nonvolatile memory.
'' . . - , ~ : ~
- I ~Z~5;3 ..; l .
',''; I .
¦ The program thereafter exits the block 52 and advi3es the computer 12 of the access unit preface number,as shown in a block 54, and connects a data path from the remote terminal 10 , to the computer 12 through the encoder 50 and a computer access ¦switch 56.
¦ At the termination of the communication between the ¦input/output device 24 at the terminal 10 and the computer 12, ¦the controller logs the communication with reference to the acce~s ¦unit preface number,the time and the date and thereafter di~-¦connects the communications iink 14.
¦ It should be appreciated that the controller 30 may ¦readily be adapted to simultaneously control a plurality of com-¦munication links 14 established by various access units. Further , ¦in lieu of generating the access code and encryption key in ad-¦ vance, the controller may generate these numbers during accessing ¦procedure. Similarly, the acces~ unit microprocessor 18 may generate its pseudorandom numbers upon each actuation or generate ¦ the numbers once and store them in a memory for recall when an access code i5 to be generated.
The access unit 16, upon actuation, will generate its ¦next sequential pseudorandom number modified by whatever password ¦is attempted. If the user is not authorized, he will not know ¦that the access code generated will not grant access unless an ¦attempt is made to gain access. Such attempts are logged by the controller 30, and security personnel will be alerted upon the ¦occurrence of any unusual pattern of access attempts by any given ¦access unit as identified by its preface number.
., I . ''. .' '.
' ' : , .. :
- : . .
- - ' ~ ,~ ,'' ' " ,' ' ~' .
.
` Il~Z4~3 _ ;''` . .
' '~ .
Thus, it will be seen that there i8 provided a co~-. puter accessing ~yst~m which achieve~ the, various object,~ of the .~ invention and i3 well suit7d to meet the co~ditions of practical usage.
~ ' - . .
~'' 'I . . .
,,,, . ' ` .
'''' ' ' .
' . .
., . . .
. .~., ` ' , ' . .
~ ~ .
' :
.. . .
.
With these ends in view the invention finds embodiment . - in certain combir~ations of elements, arrangements of parts .: and serie~ of ~teps by whi~h the object3 aforementioned and cer~
. : tain other o~jects are hereinafter attained, all as ~ul~y de-: scribed with reference to the accompanying drawings and the scope of which is more particularly pointed out and indicated - in the appended claims.
` - ~ .RIEE DES~RIPTION O~ TKE DR~ I~GS
}n the accompanying drawings in which is shown one of the var~ous possible exemplary embodiments of the inventio~, FIG. 1 is a schematized block diagram of a remote accessing system constructed in accordance with and embodying : the invention and illustrating an access unit at a remote terminal establishing a communications link to a main computer;
FIG. 2 is a flow diagram illustrating an access con-troller routine for establishing access to the computer: and : FIG. 3 is a flow diagram illustrating a continuation ~ of tne controller routine originating in ~IG. 2.
; DESCRIPTIO~ OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIME~T
Referring now in detail to the drawings, and specif-. ~ ically to FIG. 1 wherein a block diagram illustrating a typical ~ communications channel linking a remote user which a computer :.~ is shown, the reference numeral 10 denotes generally a remote - terminal from which a user communicates with a computer 12.
: ~ In accordance with the present invention, a communicatiOnS lin~
14 is established through the use of conventional data trans-mission facilities such as, for e~ample, a telephone line or carrier wave transmission.
.r~.~ . . .
.. . .
~'`' , ' ' ' ` ' ' '' , ''" ` `
. ' , ` ' ' , :
'':, ~: .
;"`` ~ Si3 , ~
.
The present invention prevents unauthorized aeees~
to the eomputer 12 through the use of a user assigned password which funetions only in eonjunetion with a user assigned aeees~
unit 16. The aeeess unit 16 is preferably lightweight and hand-carried and typieally ineludes a mieroproeessor 18 sueh as MOS Teehnology 6502 programmed to generate a series of pseudo-random numbers in a reproducible ashion from an initial group-ing of seed numbers.
The aeeess unit 16 further includes a data eneoder 20 for the purpose of enerypting data for transmission over the link 14 to render intercepted data communications ~nintelligibl .
The encoder 20 may comprise data encryption hardware compatible with the Data Eneryption Standard algorithm promulgated by the National Bureau of Standards. Among the devices presently available for data encryption utilizing the Data Encryption Standard algorithm are the Rockwell-collins CR-100 Network En-cryptor, the Hansco Data Processing -Federal 007 and the Mo~oro a "In~oGuard" system. Use of the Data Eneryption Standard algo-rithm is by way of example only, and any other encryption algo-rithms and encryptors such as the DatoteX DEI-26 security device ean be employed.
In addition to the microprocessor lS and t~e encoder 20, the access unit also includes an input~output device 22, typically comprisin~ a keyboard and a transient display for .
indicating keyboard entries which,as will be described herein, comprise the user assigned pas~word.
_7_ ..' ' .' ,,~r-' ''' ' , '.
- - . ~ - .
. .
:, :' .
;
, ~ `
- -~ ~ 453 ~, . .
~-:,' .
Preferably, an authorized user carries his access unit 16 to the remote terminal 10 and interconnects the access unit with remote terminal computer peripherals such as an input output device ~4 Which may comprise A keyboard and/or CRT or TT
Communication from the input/output device 24 to the computer 1 is first encrypted by the encoder 20 and then encoded into audi _ tones at a tone encoder/decoder modem 26 which may comprise, by way of example, a Bell System 103A Data Set. The ton~ en-coded data is transmitted to the computer 12 ~ia the communica-tions link 14.
Pursuant to the in~ention,the microprocessor 18 is actuated to generate a chain of nonrecurring numbers from a group of seed numbers originally implanted. A typical pro-cessor sub-routine fo~ repeatable pseudorandom number generatio is disclosed in U. S. Patent ~o. 3,792,446 issued February 12, 1974 to McFiggins et al and assigned to the assignee of the present invention. It should be understood that such pseudo-random number generation sub-routine i5 exemplary of manifold random nu;nber generatiOn algorithms which may be employed.
User password integrity is maintained in accordance with the present invention by not directly transmitting the pas _ word over the communications link 14. Further, pursuant to the instant invention, possession of the password witho~t the ac-cess unit will not permit access to the computer, nor will possession of the access unit without the user's assigned password.
''.-~' . ,, , . .
~ -8-'',''' , " .
.
' ' , ~ /
~. ~ } d4b3 ._ `:
Generation of an acceptable access code signal by the acces9 unLt 16 entails the generation of a predicted pseudo-random numbar by the microprocessor 18 and modiEication of th~
pseudorandom numbes as a function of the password which is en-tered on the keyboard ~input/output device 22). For example, the access code may comprise pseudorandomly generated numbers multiplied by the user's password which also comprises a number.
The access code thus generated is fed to the modem 26 along with a constant access unit preface number for transmission via the communications link 14 to the computer 12. Interception of the access code transmission will not reveal the user's password but only the access unit preface number and the access code for the intercepted communication. As will be later described, such access code i3 not valid for subsequent communication links and cannot form the basis for deriving subsequent valid codes.
The tone encoded transmissions through the communica-tions link 14 are received at a companion modem 28 for conver-sion to digital waveEorms. Access to the main computer 12 is controlled by a controller unit 30 which monitors the communica-tions link 14. The controller may comprise a minicomputer such as the Data General NOVA series or even a microprocessor such as the microprocessor used in conjunction with random number generation at the access unit. -_9_ '' ~ ., ' . . , ,.
. .
''', '', , , , ' . : "
.~ .
: .
-:
.
' ' : l I . .
¦ It ~hould bo appreciated that the controller 30 ls : ¦ programmed with a congruent random number generation algorithm - 1 and initial seed numbers compatible with those assigned to all ... ¦ authori2ed access units. Further, the controller 30 may be set.
. . ¦ up such that the initial access code generated by each author-- I ized access unit and its associated assigned password is stored in a self-contained memory for ready reference.
: ¦ Referring now to the flow diagram of FIGS. 2 and 3 ... ¦ where the accessin~ sub-routine of the controller unit 30 is 1~ 1 depicted, .it will be appreciated that.after answering an incom-; ¦ ing telephone signal, the controller receives, through the modem .
. 1 30, the unit preface numb~r followed by the transmitted access .. I code as shown at an input block 32.
.~ ¦ As shown in a decision block 34,inquiry is made for verification of the incoming access un.it preface number with . . I access unit preface numbers stored in the controller memory to 1 determine whether the attempt to gain computer access is being ~ I . made through the use of a validly assigned access unit 16 which .,. ¦ has not been reported to be in the possession of anyone other . . than its authorized user. If the access unit preface.number is . ¦ not valid or if the preface number has been generated by a unit reported as stolen or mi.ssing, the program exits the deci-¦ sion block.34 on a branch 36 and the controller 30 logs the security violation and terminates the telephone link 14. ' ~ ' ' , -10- '. ~ ~
''.;"~ ~ . . ' .
' .' I . .
I ~ , ...
. r -: - ~ ' ., ~, , ^`~ .~
~2~L~i3 .,'. . , .
Upon acknowledgment of an incoming signal from a valid acces~ unit, the program exits the decision block 34 on a branch 38 and the controller retrieves the expected access code to be receivad from such access unit from a memory and compares the expected acce4s code witll the~code received over the com-munications link as depicted in a further decision block 40.
In order to prevent access code discrepancies due to signal interference from terminating a valid accees atteMpt, the controller 30 will permit a valid access unit to transmit its.access code a predetermined number of times. If the trans-mitted access code does not match the access code assigned to .
that unit number and stored in the controller memory, the program exits on a branch 42, the access code attempt is logged .
and the ccntroller determines how many attempts have been made to transmit the access code as shown in a decision block 44. If there have been less than the allotted number of attempts, a message is returned to indicate that the transmitted acce~
code has been re~ected and is to be retransmitted and the pro-gram reverts to the input block 32. After the allotted number of attempts has been reached, the program exits the decision block 44 on a branch 46 to break the communications link 14.
Upon receiving a transmitted access code which co- ¦
incides with the stored access code anticipated, the program exits the deci~ion block 40 on a branch 48 and the controller ' 30 thereafter sends a message to the access unit microprocessor 18 indicating acceptance of the access code such that the micro-processor will generate the next sequential pseudorandom number . . .
.,. , ' -11- ' ' . .
. ~
- ' :'" ~', . ~"' ' ' ` ~, . ':
.
::
~`
,; upon ~ubsequent actuation rather than repeat its last pseudo-random number.
~ he controller 30 then searches its nonvolatile memory and retrie~es a stored encryption key for the assigned access unit 16. The encryption key can comprise either a segment - of a single random number generation or a separate random number as generated by both the access unit microprocessor 1~ and the controller 30. The encryption key retrieved by the controller 30 is used to key an encoder/decoder 50 associated with the controller. It should be appreciated that the encryption key is not transmitted over the communications link 14 and i5 in-dependently generated at both the access unit 16 and the con-troller 30 on opposite ends of the link 14. Thus, anyone inter-cepting and recording the data transmission over the link 14 will not obtain the encryption key used to set up the enciphering/ , deciphering network.
- As shown in a block 52 of FIG. 3, the controller 30 : thereafter generates the next expected access code for the access ; unit 16 through the pseudorandom number generation algorithm with'. I!
; '! seed numbers which have been generated, e.g. as described in U.S.
Patent 3,79Z,446, and modifies the pseudorandom number by the I password. Additionally generated is the successive encryption key which may comprise a segment of the random number. The con-troller 30 thereafter rcplaces the previous access code and en-cryption Xeys ~or the aFcess unlt 6 in its nonvolatile memory.
'' . . - , ~ : ~
- I ~Z~5;3 ..; l .
',''; I .
¦ The program thereafter exits the block 52 and advi3es the computer 12 of the access unit preface number,as shown in a block 54, and connects a data path from the remote terminal 10 , to the computer 12 through the encoder 50 and a computer access ¦switch 56.
¦ At the termination of the communication between the ¦input/output device 24 at the terminal 10 and the computer 12, ¦the controller logs the communication with reference to the acce~s ¦unit preface number,the time and the date and thereafter di~-¦connects the communications iink 14.
¦ It should be appreciated that the controller 30 may ¦readily be adapted to simultaneously control a plurality of com-¦munication links 14 established by various access units. Further , ¦in lieu of generating the access code and encryption key in ad-¦ vance, the controller may generate these numbers during accessing ¦procedure. Similarly, the acces~ unit microprocessor 18 may generate its pseudorandom numbers upon each actuation or generate ¦ the numbers once and store them in a memory for recall when an access code i5 to be generated.
The access unit 16, upon actuation, will generate its ¦next sequential pseudorandom number modified by whatever password ¦is attempted. If the user is not authorized, he will not know ¦that the access code generated will not grant access unless an ¦attempt is made to gain access. Such attempts are logged by the controller 30, and security personnel will be alerted upon the ¦occurrence of any unusual pattern of access attempts by any given ¦access unit as identified by its preface number.
., I . ''. .' '.
' ' : , .. :
- : . .
- - ' ~ ,~ ,'' ' " ,' ' ~' .
.
` Il~Z4~3 _ ;''` . .
' '~ .
Thus, it will be seen that there i8 provided a co~-. puter accessing ~yst~m which achieve~ the, various object,~ of the .~ invention and i3 well suit7d to meet the co~ditions of practical usage.
~ ' - . .
~'' 'I . . .
,,,, . ' ` .
'''' ' ' .
' . .
., . . .
. .~., ` ' , ' . .
~ ~ .
' :
Claims (23)
1. A system for accessing a computer by a user having an assigned password to establish a communications link for data transmission between a computer terminal and a computer, the system comprising means at the terminal sequentially gener-ating nonrecurring pseudorandom numbers in a reproducible fashion means receiving said pseudorandom number and said user assigned password and in response thereto modifying the pseudorandom number as a predetermined function of the password to provide an access code signal, means transmitting the access code signal from the terminal, controller means at said computer, the controller means receiving the transmitted access code signal, the controller means including means for sequentially generating congruent pseudorandom numbers and for modifying a congruent pseu-dorandom number with the user assigned password to provide a congruent access code signal and in response to the equality thereof providing an access signal, switch means receiving the access signal and in response thereto establishing a data transmission path between the terminal and the computer, whereby computer access is secured through a sequential change of access codes in a pseudorandom fashion without direct transmission of said user's password.
2. A system fox accessing a computer to establish a communications link for data transmission constructed in accordance with claim 1 wherein the computer terminal is positioned remote from the computer.
3. A system for accessing a computer to establish a communications link for data transmission from a remote terminal as constructed in accordance with claim 2 wherein the means transmitting the access code comprises a telephone communi-cations link.
4. A system for accessing a computer to establish a communications link for data transmission constructed in accordance with claim 1 wherein the means generating the pseu-dorandom number comprises a portable unit.
5. A system for accessing a computer to establish a communications link for data transmission constructed in accordance with claim 1 wherein a plurality of remote terminals are provided, the system further including a plurality of means generating pseudorandom numbers in a reproducible fashion.
6. A system for accessing a computer to establish communication links for data transmission constructed in accor-dance with claim 1 wherein the means generating the pseudorandom number comprises an access unit, the access unit further including encryption means adapted to establish an enciphering/deciphering network in response to an encryption key signal, the controller means including a congruent encryption means, the pair of encryption means being adapted to encrypt data transmission between the terminal and the computer.
7. A system for securing a communications link for data transmission constructed in accordance with claim 6 wherein the access unit includes means adapted to separate the pseudo-random number into segments, one of the segments comprising an encryption key signal, the controller means including means to separate the congruent pseudorandom number into segments, a congruent segment comprising the encryption key for the con-gruent encryption means, whereby data transmission is secured through a sequential change of encryption keys in a pseudorandom fashion without direct transmission of the encryption keys.
8. A system for securing a communications link for data transmission constructed in accordance with claim 6 wherein the means adapted to generate the pseudorandom number is adapted to generate a pair of pseudorandom numbers, one of which is modi-fied by the password and the other of which comprises the encryp-tion key signal, the means for sequentially generating congruent pseudorandom numbers being adapted to generate a pair of congruent pseudorandom numbers one of which is modified by the password to provide the congruent access code signal and the other of which comprises the congruent encryption key signal, whereby data transmission is secured through a sequential change of encryption keys in a pseudorandom fashion without direct transmission of the encryption keys.
9. A system for securing data transmission between a computer and a computer terminal, the system comprising means at the terminal for sequentially generating nonrecurring pseudoran-dom numbers in a reproducible fashion, encryption means receiving a pseudorandom number as an encryption key and in response thereto establishing an encryption pattern, controller means associated with the computer, the controller means including means for sequentially generating congruent pseudorandom numbers in synchronization with the pseudorandom numbers generated at the terminal, congruent encryption means, the congruent encryption means receiving a congruent pseudorandom number as an encryption key and in response thereto establishing a congruent encryption pattern for data transmission, whereby data transmission is secured through a sequential change of encryption keys in a pseudorandom fashion without direct transmission of the encryp-tion keys.
10. A system for securing data transmission con-structed in accordance with claim 9 wherein the computer terminal is positioned remote from the computer.
11. A system for securing data transmission communi-cations between a computer and a computer terminal constructed in accordance with claim 9 wherein the means sequentially generating the pseudorandom numbers comprises a portable unit.
12. A system for securing data transmission communi-cations between a computer and a computer terminal constructed in accordance with claim 9 wherein a plurality of remote terminals are provided, the system further including a plurality of means sequentially generating pseudorandom numbers.
13. A method of accessing a computer at one location by a user positioned at a second location and having an assigned password, the method comprising the steps of (a) sequentially generating a nonrecurring pseudo-random number at the second location, (b) modifying the pseudorandom number as a function of the user assigned password to provide an access code, (c) transmitting the access code from the second location to the first location, (d) receiving the transmitted access code at the first location, (e) sequentially generating a congruent nonrecurring pseudorandom number, (f) modifying the congruent pseudorandom number with the user assigned password to provide a congruent access code, (g) comparing the received access code with the congruent access code, and (h) granting access to the computer upon recognition of an equality between the received access code and the congruent access code, whereby computer access is secured through a change of access codes in a pseudorandom fashion without direct transmission of the user's password.
14. A method of accessing a computer as set forth in claim 13 wherein the next sequential congruent access code is generated prior to receipt of the next transmitted access code, the method further including the steps of storing the next congruent access code and recalling said next congruent access code upon receipt of the next transmitted access code.
15. A method of accessing a computer as set forth in claim 13 wherein the pseudorandom number generated at the second location comprises two segments, one of which is used to generate the access code, the method further including the step of keying an encryptor at the second location with a further segment of the pseudorandom number, the congruent pseudorandom number comprising two segments, one of which is used to generate the congruent access code, the method further including the step of keying a congruent encryptor at the first location with a further segment of the congruent pseudorandom number, whereby data transmission is secured through sequential change of encryption keys in a pseudorandom fashion without transmission of the encryption key from one location to the other.
16. A method of establishing a data encryption network between a computer at one location and a terminal at a remote location, said method comprising the steps of (a) generating a nonrecurring pseudorandom number at the remote location, (b) keying an encryptor at the remote location with the pseudorandom number, (c) generating a congruent nonrecurring pseudorandom number at the one location and keying a congruent encryptor at the one location with the congruent pseudorandom number, whereby data transmission is secured through a sequential change of encryption keys in a pseudorandom fashion without transmission of encryption keys between the one location and the remote location.
17. A system for accessing a computer by a user having an assigned password to establish a communication link for data transmission between a computer terminal and a computer via a data transmission path, said system comprising a portable access unit connectable as a peripheral to said terminal and comprising:
(a) means sequentially generating nonrecurring pseudorandom numbers in a reproducible fashion, and (b) means modifying said pseudorandom numbers as a predetermined function of said password to provide a first access code signal, and means applying said access code signal to said data transmission path prior to data from said computer terminal; said system further comprising, at said computer;
(c) means for sequentially generating pseudorandom numbers congruent with those generated by said access unit, (d) means for modifying said congruent pseudorandom numbers with said user assigned password to provide a second access code signal, (e) means for receiving said first access code signal and comparing it with said second access code signal and in response to the equality thereof providing an access signal, (f) switch means receiving the access signal and in response thereto establishing a data transmission path between the terminal and the computer, whereby computer access is secured through a sequential change of access codes in a pseudorandom fashion without direct transmission of the user's password.
(a) means sequentially generating nonrecurring pseudorandom numbers in a reproducible fashion, and (b) means modifying said pseudorandom numbers as a predetermined function of said password to provide a first access code signal, and means applying said access code signal to said data transmission path prior to data from said computer terminal; said system further comprising, at said computer;
(c) means for sequentially generating pseudorandom numbers congruent with those generated by said access unit, (d) means for modifying said congruent pseudorandom numbers with said user assigned password to provide a second access code signal, (e) means for receiving said first access code signal and comparing it with said second access code signal and in response to the equality thereof providing an access signal, (f) switch means receiving the access signal and in response thereto establishing a data transmission path between the terminal and the computer, whereby computer access is secured through a sequential change of access codes in a pseudorandom fashion without direct transmission of the user's password.
18. The system of claim 17, wherein said terminal comprises a I/O unit fox providing data signals, and said access unit is connectable to said I/O unit.
19. The system of claim 18, wherein said access unit includes keyboard means for entering said password.
20. The system of claim 18, wherein said access unit further comprises means for preceeding said access code signal with a constant access unit code signal individual to said access unit.
21. The system of claim 18, wherein said access unit comprises means for encrypting data from said I/O unit prior to application to said data transmission path.
22. A portable access unit for insertion in a data transmission path between a digital computer and a remote terminal, to enable access of said terminal to said computer, said unit having a communication path adapted to be connected in series in said transmission path and including encrypting means for encrypting data from said terminal, a source of pseudorandom number signals, a keyboard for receiving a password unique to said unit coproducing password signals, means modifying said random number signals by said password signals and applying the modified random number signals to said communication path, and means applying a constant identification signal unique to said unit to said communication path.
23. The access unit of claim 22 further comprising a display for displaying entries in said keyboard.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US06/892,252 US4310720A (en) | 1978-03-31 | 1978-03-31 | Computer accessing system |
US892,252 | 1978-03-31 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
CA1102453A true CA1102453A (en) | 1981-06-02 |
Family
ID=25399646
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
CA322,630A Expired CA1102453A (en) | 1978-03-31 | 1979-03-02 | Computer accessing system |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US4310720A (en) |
JP (1) | JPS54136205A (en) |
CA (1) | CA1102453A (en) |
DE (1) | DE2912696A1 (en) |
FR (1) | FR2421426B1 (en) |
GB (2) | GB2019060B (en) |
Families Citing this family (202)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JPS56125139A (en) | 1980-02-04 | 1981-10-01 | Nippon Telegr & Teleph Corp <Ntt> | Communication controller of parallel processing |
FR2483713A1 (en) * | 1980-05-30 | 1981-12-04 | Cii Honeywell Bull | DEVICE FOR TRANSMITTING SIGNALS BETWEEN TWO INFORMATION PROCESSING STATIONS |
EP0044630B1 (en) * | 1980-07-01 | 1984-03-21 | Scovill Inc | Electronic security device |
US4447890A (en) * | 1980-07-14 | 1984-05-08 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Remote postage meter systems having variable user authorization code |
FR2492135B1 (en) * | 1980-09-16 | 1988-01-22 | Cii Honeywell Bull | APPARATUS FOR DISTRIBUTING OBJECTS AND ACQUIRING SERVICES |
US4386233A (en) * | 1980-09-29 | 1983-05-31 | Smid Miles E | Crytographic key notarization methods and apparatus |
FR2496294B1 (en) * | 1980-12-15 | 1987-01-02 | Thomson Csf | PROTECTED DEVICE FOR AUTHENTICATING USERS OF A MESSAGE TRANSMISSION TERMINAL AND TRANSACTION SYSTEM COMPRISING SUCH DEVICES |
FR2497617B1 (en) * | 1981-01-07 | 1989-08-18 | Transac Develop Transactions A | SECURITY METHOD AND DEVICE FOR TRIPARTITY COMMUNICATION OF CONFIDENTIAL DATA |
GB2092344B (en) * | 1981-01-30 | 1985-12-18 | Halpern John Wolfgang | Security in electronic fund transfer systems |
JPS57137957A (en) * | 1981-02-20 | 1982-08-25 | Hitachi Ltd | Terminal connection system |
CA1176335A (en) * | 1981-06-05 | 1984-10-16 | Exide Electronics Corporation | Computer communications control |
FR2514592A1 (en) * | 1981-10-12 | 1983-04-15 | Widmer Michel | METHOD AND DEVICE FOR CONSULTING DATA FILES AND / OR BANKING TRANSACTIONS, PRESERVED FROM FRAUD THANKS TO A COMMUNICATION PROCESS BY RANDOM VARIABLE |
USRE33189E (en) * | 1981-11-19 | 1990-03-27 | Communications Satellite Corporation | Security system for SSTV encryption |
US4484027A (en) * | 1981-11-19 | 1984-11-20 | Communications Satellite Corporation | Security system for SSTV encryption |
US4604708B1 (en) * | 1981-12-07 | 1997-10-14 | Gainer R Lewis | Electronic security system for externally powered devices |
US4430728A (en) * | 1981-12-29 | 1984-02-07 | Marathon Oil Company | Computer terminal security system |
US4479122A (en) * | 1982-03-05 | 1984-10-23 | At&T Bell Laboratories | Remotely controlled switched access to the console port of an electronic computer |
NL8201077A (en) * | 1982-03-16 | 1983-10-17 | Philips Nv | A COMMUNICATION SYSTEM, CONTAINING A CENTRAL DATA PROCESSING DEVICE, ACCESS STATIONS AND EXTERNAL STATIONS, WHICH A CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECK IS FORDICULARIZING AN EXTERNAL STATION, AND EXTERNAL STATIONS FOR USE IN SUCH A COMMUNITY. |
DE3210081C2 (en) * | 1982-03-19 | 1984-12-20 | Siemens AG, 1000 Berlin und 8000 München | Method and arrangement for the transmission of encrypted texts |
FR2525790A1 (en) * | 1982-04-22 | 1983-10-28 | Enigma Logic Inc | SECURITY DEVICE FOR CONTROLLING AND CONTROLLING ACCESS TO LOCATIONS AND DETERMINED OBJECTS |
US4533948A (en) * | 1982-04-30 | 1985-08-06 | General Instrument Corporation | CATV Communication system |
US4539654A (en) * | 1982-07-28 | 1985-09-03 | Rca Corporation | Switch arrangement for accessing a computer |
US4513394A (en) * | 1982-07-28 | 1985-04-23 | Rca Corporation | System for providing a multi-bit input to a computer controlled system |
US4499588A (en) * | 1982-07-28 | 1985-02-12 | Rca Corporation | System for converting the frequency of a pulse train to a binary number |
US4599606A (en) * | 1982-07-28 | 1986-07-08 | Rca Corporation | System for inputting a selected one of a plurality of inputs to a computer |
US4538027A (en) * | 1982-07-28 | 1985-08-27 | Rca Corporation | System for inputting a security code to a computer |
US4531023A (en) * | 1982-08-13 | 1985-07-23 | Hlf Corporation | Computer security system for a time shared computer accessed over telephone lines |
US4757468A (en) * | 1982-09-22 | 1988-07-12 | Intel Corporation | Authenticated read-only memory |
DE3382261D1 (en) * | 1982-12-28 | 1991-05-29 | Toshiba Kawasaki Kk | PRIVACY PROCEDURE. |
US4723284A (en) * | 1983-02-14 | 1988-02-02 | Prime Computer, Inc. | Authentication system |
JPS59151261A (en) * | 1983-02-18 | 1984-08-29 | Fujitsu Ltd | Dealing securing system |
US4588991A (en) * | 1983-03-07 | 1986-05-13 | Atalla Corporation | File access security method and means |
US4536647A (en) * | 1983-07-15 | 1985-08-20 | Atalla Corporation | Pocket banking terminal, method and system |
FR2549989B1 (en) * | 1983-07-29 | 1985-09-13 | Philips Ind Commerciale | AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM BETWEEN A CARD READER AND A PAYMENT CARD EXCHANGING INFORMATION |
GB2146815A (en) * | 1983-09-17 | 1985-04-24 | Ibm | Electronic fund transfer systems |
GB2146814A (en) * | 1983-09-17 | 1985-04-24 | Ibm | Electronic fund transfer systems |
US4652990A (en) * | 1983-10-27 | 1987-03-24 | Remote Systems, Inc. | Protected software access control apparatus and method |
US4674047A (en) * | 1984-01-31 | 1987-06-16 | The Curators Of The University Of Missouri | Integrated detonator delay circuits and firing console |
US4630201A (en) * | 1984-02-14 | 1986-12-16 | International Security Note & Computer Corporation | On-line and off-line transaction security system using a code generated from a transaction parameter and a random number |
US4707804A (en) * | 1984-02-21 | 1987-11-17 | Leal Luis T | Computer security system |
US4599489A (en) * | 1984-02-22 | 1986-07-08 | Gordian Systems, Inc. | Solid state key for controlling access to computer software |
US4609777A (en) * | 1984-02-22 | 1986-09-02 | Gordian Systems, Inc. | Solid state key for controlling access to computer software |
US4604499A (en) * | 1984-02-24 | 1986-08-05 | Raymond F. Hughes | Computer telephone access security processor |
DE3448393C2 (en) * | 1984-03-24 | 1992-01-02 | Philips Patentverwaltung Gmbh, 2000 Hamburg, De | Identification code monitoring circuit |
DE3410937A1 (en) | 1984-03-24 | 1985-10-03 | Philips Patentverwaltung Gmbh, 2000 Hamburg | Method for identifying the unauthorised use of an identifier |
US4835697A (en) * | 1984-04-02 | 1989-05-30 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Combination generator for an electronic postage meter |
US4672572A (en) * | 1984-05-21 | 1987-06-09 | Gould Inc. | Protector system for computer access and use |
FR2566155B1 (en) * | 1984-06-19 | 1988-01-29 | Cii Honeywell Bull | METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR ENCRYPTING AND DECIPHERING INFORMATION TRANSMITTED BETWEEN A TRANSMITTING DEVICE AND A RECEIVING DEVICE |
US4791565A (en) * | 1984-06-20 | 1988-12-13 | Effective Security Systems, Inc. | Apparatus for controlling the use of computer software |
US4845715A (en) * | 1984-10-29 | 1989-07-04 | Francisco Michael H | Method for maintaining data processing system securing |
US4866666A (en) * | 1984-10-29 | 1989-09-12 | Francisco Michael H | Method for maintaining data integrity during information transmission by generating indicia representing total number of binary 1's and 0's of the data |
US4694492A (en) * | 1984-11-09 | 1987-09-15 | Pirmasafe, Inc. | Computer communications security control system |
US4691355A (en) * | 1984-11-09 | 1987-09-01 | Pirmasafe, Inc. | Interactive security control system for computer communications and the like |
US4698757A (en) * | 1984-11-15 | 1987-10-06 | International Business Machines Corp. | Terminal procedure for utilizing host processor log on and log off prompts |
US4799153A (en) * | 1984-12-14 | 1989-01-17 | Telenet Communications Corporation | Method and apparatus for enhancing security of communications in a packet-switched data communications system |
US4672533A (en) * | 1984-12-19 | 1987-06-09 | Noble Richard G | Electronic linkage interface control security system and method |
US4800590A (en) * | 1985-01-14 | 1989-01-24 | Willis E. Higgins | Computer key and computer lock system |
GB8524455D0 (en) * | 1985-10-03 | 1985-11-06 | Isolation Systems Ltd | Monitoring activity of peripheral devices |
US4779224A (en) * | 1985-03-12 | 1988-10-18 | Moseley Donald R | Identity verification method and apparatus |
EP0198384A3 (en) * | 1985-04-09 | 1988-03-23 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Berlin Und Munchen | Method and device for enciphering data |
US4763351A (en) * | 1985-04-24 | 1988-08-09 | Lipscher Bernard N | Computer security system |
FR2582421B1 (en) * | 1985-05-24 | 1987-07-17 | Lefevre Jean Pierre | IDENTITY AUTHENTICATION APPARATUS |
DE3687671D1 (en) * | 1985-06-07 | 1993-03-18 | Siemens Ag | METHOD AND ARRANGEMENT FOR SECURING ACCESS TO A COMPUTER SYSTEM. |
FR2583538A1 (en) * | 1985-06-13 | 1986-12-19 | Brechet Michel | Removable control card with keyboard |
US4679226A (en) * | 1985-06-17 | 1987-07-07 | Alltel Corporation | Computer security guard circuit |
CA1270339A (en) * | 1985-06-24 | 1990-06-12 | Katsuya Nakagawa | System for determining a truth of software in an information processing apparatus |
JP2564480B2 (en) * | 1985-07-16 | 1996-12-18 | カシオ計算機株式会社 | IC card system |
US4697243A (en) * | 1985-07-25 | 1987-09-29 | Westinghouse Electric Corp. | Methods of servicing an elevator system |
US4733345A (en) * | 1985-07-29 | 1988-03-22 | Anderson Paul D | Computer-telephone security device |
JPS6253061A (en) * | 1985-09-02 | 1987-03-07 | Nec Corp | Method for preventing illegal access |
GB2181281B (en) * | 1985-10-03 | 1989-09-13 | Isolation Systems Limited | Device for controlling access to computer peripherals |
JPH074449B2 (en) * | 1985-10-04 | 1995-01-25 | 任天堂株式会社 | Cartridge for game machine and game machine using the same |
USRE34161E (en) * | 1985-10-04 | 1993-01-12 | Nintendo Company Limited | Memory cartridge and information processor unit using such cartridge |
US4891838A (en) * | 1985-11-04 | 1990-01-02 | Dental Data Service, Inc. | Computer accessing system |
AU6732787A (en) * | 1985-11-19 | 1987-06-02 | Santiago Data Systems, Inc. | Trade show data acquisition system |
FR2592502B1 (en) * | 1985-12-26 | 1990-03-30 | Lefevre Jean Pierre | SEQUENTIAL STORAGE CERTIFIER |
FR2597538B1 (en) * | 1986-04-22 | 1995-03-31 | Soum Rene | SECURITY LOCK ASSEMBLY WITH REMOTE CONTROL IN WHICH THE KEY HAS ONLY A TRANSMISSION FUNCTION AND THE RECEPTION LOCK |
US4882752A (en) * | 1986-06-25 | 1989-11-21 | Lindman Richard S | Computer security system |
US5261070A (en) * | 1986-07-24 | 1993-11-09 | Meiji Milk Product Co., Ltd. | Method and apparatus for forming unique user identification data at remote terminal for secure transmission of data from host terminal |
GB8621333D0 (en) * | 1986-09-04 | 1986-10-15 | Manitoba Telephone System | Key management system |
US4796181A (en) * | 1986-10-24 | 1989-01-03 | Wiedemer John D | Billing system for computer software |
US5047928A (en) * | 1986-10-24 | 1991-09-10 | Wiedemer John D | Billing system for computer software |
US5155680A (en) * | 1986-10-24 | 1992-10-13 | Signal Security Technologies | Billing system for computing software |
SE452082B (en) * | 1986-12-15 | 1987-11-09 | Inter Innovation Ab | DATA COMMUNICATION MANUAL |
JPS63229541A (en) * | 1987-03-04 | 1988-09-26 | シーメンス、アクチエンゲルシヤフト | Data exchange system |
WO1988007240A1 (en) * | 1987-03-12 | 1988-09-22 | Siemens Ltd. | Controlling security access |
FR2615638B1 (en) * | 1987-05-20 | 1989-07-21 | Dassault Electronique | COMPUTER OR TELEMATIC ENABLING DEVICE AND METHOD |
FR2619941B1 (en) * | 1987-08-31 | 1992-04-17 | Signaux Equip Electroniques | SYSTEM FOR CONTROLLING THE LINK BETWEEN TWO TERMINALS OF A DATA PROCESSING INSTALLATION |
US5131025A (en) * | 1987-11-25 | 1992-07-14 | Omron Tateisi Electronics Co. | Intelligent modem system which determines proper access thereto |
EP0320489A3 (en) * | 1987-12-07 | 1990-03-28 | Automations & Informat Systeme | Method to increase ic-card security, and ic-card making use of this method |
US4918653A (en) * | 1988-01-28 | 1990-04-17 | International Business Machines Corporation | Trusted path mechanism for an operating system |
US4944008A (en) * | 1988-02-18 | 1990-07-24 | Motorola, Inc. | Electronic keying scheme for locking data |
US5060263A (en) * | 1988-03-09 | 1991-10-22 | Enigma Logic, Inc. | Computer access control system and method |
GB8807020D0 (en) * | 1988-03-24 | 1988-08-24 | Racal Guardata Ltd | Data-processing apparatus |
US4992783A (en) * | 1988-04-04 | 1991-02-12 | Motorola, Inc. | Method and apparatus for controlling access to a communication system |
AU3594189A (en) * | 1988-06-21 | 1990-01-04 | Amdahl Corporation | Controlling the initiation of logical systems in a data processing system with logical processor facility |
US4926481A (en) * | 1988-12-05 | 1990-05-15 | The United States Of America As Represented By The Administrator Of The National Aeronautics And Space Administration | Computer access security code system |
US5058025A (en) * | 1989-03-23 | 1991-10-15 | F.M.E. Corporation | Emergency post office setting for remote setting meter |
US5077660A (en) * | 1989-03-23 | 1991-12-31 | F.M.E. Corporation | Remote meter configuration |
US5107455A (en) * | 1989-03-23 | 1992-04-21 | F.M.E. Corporation | Remote meter i/o configuration |
US5369401A (en) * | 1989-03-23 | 1994-11-29 | F.M.E. Corporation | Remote meter operation |
US5120939A (en) * | 1989-11-09 | 1992-06-09 | At&T Bell Laboratories | Databaseless security system |
FR2656125B1 (en) * | 1989-12-19 | 1994-07-08 | Bull Cp8 | METHOD FOR GENERATING A RANDOM NUMBER IN A DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM, AND SYSTEM IMPLEMENTING SUCH A METHOD. |
US5029206A (en) * | 1989-12-27 | 1991-07-02 | Motorola, Inc. | Uniform interface for cryptographic services |
US6507909B1 (en) | 1990-02-13 | 2003-01-14 | Compaq Information Technologies Group, L.P. | Method for executing trusted-path commands |
DE69126223T2 (en) * | 1990-02-14 | 1997-09-18 | Fujitsu Ltd | System for creating a transmission path in a tightly coupled computer system |
CA2076366C (en) * | 1990-03-02 | 1998-05-26 | Michel J. Remion | Telecommunication interface apparatus and method |
DE4008971A1 (en) * | 1990-03-20 | 1991-09-26 | Siemens Nixdorf Inf Syst | METHOD FOR AUTHENTICATING A USER USING A DATA STATION |
US5046082A (en) * | 1990-05-02 | 1991-09-03 | Gte Mobile Communications Service Corporation | Remote accessing system for cellular telephones |
US5208853A (en) * | 1991-09-09 | 1993-05-04 | Motorola, Inc. | Method and apparatus for usage protection of data files using split key and unique variable |
FR2685510B1 (en) * | 1991-12-19 | 1997-01-03 | Bull Cps | PROCESS FOR AUTHENTICATION, BY AN EXTERNAL MEDIUM, OF A PORTABLE OBJECT CONNECTED TO THIS MEDIA BY THE INTERMEDIATE OF A TRANSMISSION LINE, AND SYSTEM FOR IMPLEMENTATION |
KR100302222B1 (en) * | 1992-06-12 | 2001-11-22 | 그레이스 스테펀 에스 | Security Front End Communication Systems for Process Control Computers and Methods |
WO1993025965A1 (en) * | 1992-06-12 | 1993-12-23 | The Dow Chemical Company | Intelligent process control communication system and method |
US5313639A (en) * | 1992-06-26 | 1994-05-17 | George Chao | Computer with security device for controlling access thereto |
DE69332633T2 (en) * | 1992-07-20 | 2003-11-06 | Compaq Computer Corp | Procedure and system for discovering aliases based on certification |
US20020091850A1 (en) | 1992-10-23 | 2002-07-11 | Cybex Corporation | System and method for remote monitoring and operation of personal computers |
US5444780A (en) * | 1993-07-22 | 1995-08-22 | International Business Machines Corporation | Client/server based secure timekeeping system |
US7035832B1 (en) | 1994-01-03 | 2006-04-25 | Stamps.Com Inc. | System and method for automatically providing shipping/transportation fees |
US5606507A (en) * | 1994-01-03 | 1997-02-25 | E-Stamp Corporation | System and method for storing, retrieving and automatically printing postage on mail |
US5559888A (en) * | 1994-02-15 | 1996-09-24 | Lucent Technologies Inc. | Secure information retrieval service (SIRS) |
US6185546B1 (en) | 1995-10-04 | 2001-02-06 | Intel Corporation | Apparatus and method for providing secured communications |
US5539828A (en) * | 1994-05-31 | 1996-07-23 | Intel Corporation | Apparatus and method for providing secured communications |
AU3099295A (en) * | 1994-08-09 | 1996-03-07 | Shiva Corporation | Apparatus and method for restricting access to a local computer network |
US6092117A (en) * | 1994-09-02 | 2000-07-18 | Packard Bell Nec | System and method for automatically reconnecting a wireless interface device to a host computer |
US6292181B1 (en) | 1994-09-02 | 2001-09-18 | Nec Corporation | Structure and method for controlling a host computer using a remote hand-held interface device |
US5867106A (en) * | 1994-09-02 | 1999-02-02 | Packard Bell Nec | Password switch to override remote control |
US6137473A (en) * | 1994-09-02 | 2000-10-24 | Nec Corporation | System and method for switching control between a host computer and a remote interface device |
US6262719B1 (en) | 1994-09-02 | 2001-07-17 | Packard Bell Nec, Inc. | Mouse emulation with a passive pen |
US5974558A (en) * | 1994-09-02 | 1999-10-26 | Packard Bell Nec | Resume on pen contact |
US6209034B1 (en) | 1994-09-02 | 2001-03-27 | Nec Corporation | Remote keyboard macros activated by hot icons |
US5604490A (en) * | 1994-09-09 | 1997-02-18 | International Business Machines Corporation | Method and system for providing a user access to multiple secured subsystems |
US7095854B1 (en) | 1995-02-13 | 2006-08-22 | Intertrust Technologies Corp. | Systems and methods for secure transaction management and electronic rights protection |
EP1643340B1 (en) * | 1995-02-13 | 2013-08-14 | Intertrust Technologies Corp. | Secure transaction management |
US7133845B1 (en) * | 1995-02-13 | 2006-11-07 | Intertrust Technologies Corp. | System and methods for secure transaction management and electronic rights protection |
US6948070B1 (en) * | 1995-02-13 | 2005-09-20 | Intertrust Technologies Corporation | Systems and methods for secure transaction management and electronic rights protection |
US5588059A (en) * | 1995-03-02 | 1996-12-24 | Motorola, Inc. | Computer system and method for secure remote communication sessions |
US5721842A (en) * | 1995-08-25 | 1998-02-24 | Apex Pc Solutions, Inc. | Interconnection system for viewing and controlling remotely connected computers with on-screen video overlay for controlling of the interconnection switch |
US5724423A (en) * | 1995-09-18 | 1998-03-03 | Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson | Method and apparatus for user authentication |
US6126327A (en) * | 1995-10-16 | 2000-10-03 | Packard Bell Nec | Radio flash update |
US6924790B1 (en) | 1995-10-16 | 2005-08-02 | Nec Corporation | Mode switching for pen-based computer systems |
US7512671B1 (en) * | 1995-10-16 | 2009-03-31 | Nec Corporation | Computer system for enabling a wireless interface device to selectively establish a communication link with a user selectable remote computer |
US5996082A (en) * | 1995-10-16 | 1999-11-30 | Packard Bell Nec | System and method for delaying a wake-up signal |
US6005533A (en) * | 1995-10-16 | 1999-12-21 | Packard Bell Nec | Remote occlusion region |
US6148344A (en) * | 1995-10-16 | 2000-11-14 | Nec Corporation | System and method for enabling an IPX driver to accommodate multiple LAN adapters |
US6108727A (en) * | 1995-10-16 | 2000-08-22 | Packard Bell Nec | System having wireless interface device for storing compressed predetermined program files received from a remote host and communicating with the remote host via wireless link |
US6018806A (en) * | 1995-10-16 | 2000-01-25 | Packard Bell Nec | Method and system for rebooting a computer having corrupted memory using an external jumper |
US6071191A (en) * | 1995-11-22 | 2000-06-06 | Nintendo Co., Ltd. | Systems and methods for providing security in a video game system |
US6190257B1 (en) | 1995-11-22 | 2001-02-20 | Nintendo Co., Ltd. | Systems and method for providing security in a video game system |
US5949881A (en) * | 1995-12-04 | 1999-09-07 | Intel Corporation | Apparatus and method for cryptographic companion imprinting |
US6088450A (en) * | 1996-04-17 | 2000-07-11 | Intel Corporation | Authentication system based on periodic challenge/response protocol |
US6181803B1 (en) | 1996-09-30 | 2001-01-30 | Intel Corporation | Apparatus and method for securely processing biometric information to control access to a node |
US5828753A (en) | 1996-10-25 | 1998-10-27 | Intel Corporation | Circuit and method for ensuring interconnect security within a multi-chip integrated circuit package |
US6578146B2 (en) * | 1996-11-19 | 2003-06-10 | R. Brent Johnson | System, method and article of manufacture to remotely configure and utilize an emulated device controller via an encrypted validation communication protocol |
US6499108B1 (en) | 1996-11-19 | 2002-12-24 | R. Brent Johnson | Secure electronic mail system |
US5970149A (en) * | 1996-11-19 | 1999-10-19 | Johnson; R. Brent | Combined remote access and security system |
US5905861A (en) * | 1996-12-02 | 1999-05-18 | Lovell; William S. | Data authentication circuit |
US5818939A (en) * | 1996-12-18 | 1998-10-06 | Intel Corporation | Optimized security functionality in an electronic system |
JPH10229392A (en) * | 1997-02-13 | 1998-08-25 | Rohm Co Ltd | Authentication system and authentication method |
US6105133A (en) * | 1997-03-10 | 2000-08-15 | The Pacid Group | Bilateral authentication and encryption system |
US5964877A (en) * | 1997-04-07 | 1999-10-12 | Victor; David William | Method and system for programming a security system to protect a protected unit |
TW338865B (en) * | 1997-06-03 | 1998-08-21 | Philips Eloctronics N V | Authentication system |
US5974143A (en) * | 1997-09-30 | 1999-10-26 | Intel Corporation | Virus-resistent mechanism for transaction verification to confirming user |
US6275855B1 (en) | 1997-11-02 | 2001-08-14 | R. Brent Johnson | System, method and article of manufacture to enhance computerized alert system information awareness and facilitate real-time intervention services |
JPH11261731A (en) * | 1998-03-13 | 1999-09-24 | Nec Corp | Mobile communication system, connection method in the mobile communication system and storage medium with the method written therein |
JP4146089B2 (en) * | 1998-09-22 | 2008-09-03 | アボセント ハンツヴィル コーポレーション | System for remote access to personal computers |
US20020191786A1 (en) * | 1999-11-30 | 2002-12-19 | Nestor Marroquin | Polymorphous encryption system |
US6775274B1 (en) * | 2000-01-27 | 2004-08-10 | International Business Machines Corporation | Circuit and method for providing secure communication over data communication interconnects |
US6789199B1 (en) * | 2000-02-08 | 2004-09-07 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tamper resistance with pseudo-random binary sequence program interlocks |
DE10032192A1 (en) * | 2000-07-01 | 2002-01-10 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | Software usage license management method involves checking assigned software usage quota, on detecting utilization of software by user and generating software enable or blocking code accordingly |
US20070219918A1 (en) * | 2001-01-19 | 2007-09-20 | Jonathan Schull | System and method for controlling access to protected information |
US7133662B2 (en) * | 2001-05-24 | 2006-11-07 | International Business Machines Corporation | Methods and apparatus for restricting access of a user using a cellular telephone |
US7133971B2 (en) * | 2003-11-21 | 2006-11-07 | International Business Machines Corporation | Cache with selective least frequently used or most frequently used cache line replacement |
US7577250B2 (en) | 2004-08-12 | 2009-08-18 | Cmla, Llc | Key derivation functions to enhance security |
US8077861B2 (en) | 2004-08-12 | 2011-12-13 | Cmla, Llc | Permutation data transform to enhance security |
US7564970B2 (en) * | 2004-08-12 | 2009-07-21 | Cmla, Llc | Exponential data transform to enhance security |
US7293179B2 (en) * | 2001-08-01 | 2007-11-06 | Johnson R Brent | System and method for virtual tape management with remote archival and retrieval via an encrypted validation communication protocol |
US7290040B2 (en) * | 2001-12-12 | 2007-10-30 | Valve Corporation | Method and system for load balancing an authentication system |
US8108687B2 (en) * | 2001-12-12 | 2012-01-31 | Valve Corporation | Method and system for granting access to system and content |
US7373406B2 (en) | 2001-12-12 | 2008-05-13 | Valve Corporation | Method and system for effectively communicating file properties and directory structures in a distributed file system |
US7243226B2 (en) * | 2001-12-12 | 2007-07-10 | Valve Corporation | Method and system for enabling content security in a distributed system |
US7580972B2 (en) | 2001-12-12 | 2009-08-25 | Valve Corporation | Method and system for controlling bandwidth on client and server |
US7096328B2 (en) * | 2002-01-25 | 2006-08-22 | University Of Southern California | Pseudorandom data storage |
EP1349033B1 (en) * | 2002-03-26 | 2004-03-31 | Soteres GmbH | A method of protecting the integrity of a computer program |
US20040025039A1 (en) * | 2002-04-30 | 2004-02-05 | Adam Kuenzi | Lock box security system with improved communication |
US7061367B2 (en) * | 2002-04-30 | 2006-06-13 | General Electric Company | Managing access to physical assets |
US7596531B2 (en) * | 2002-06-05 | 2009-09-29 | Sun Microsystems, Inc. | Method and apparatus for protecting against side channel attacks against personal identification numbers |
US7818572B2 (en) * | 2003-12-09 | 2010-10-19 | Dominic Kotab | Security system and method |
US20050160298A1 (en) * | 2004-01-20 | 2005-07-21 | Arcot Systems, Inc. | Nonredirected authentication |
US7567658B1 (en) | 2005-06-22 | 2009-07-28 | Intellicall, Inc. | Method to verify designation of pay telephone with an interexchange carrier |
US8612361B1 (en) | 2006-12-27 | 2013-12-17 | Stamps.Com Inc. | System and method for handling payment errors with respect to delivery services |
US8775331B1 (en) | 2006-12-27 | 2014-07-08 | Stamps.Com Inc | Postage metering with accumulated postage |
US9670694B2 (en) * | 2007-04-12 | 2017-06-06 | Utc Fire & Security Americas Corporation, Inc. | Restricted range lockbox, access device and methods |
US8533821B2 (en) | 2007-05-25 | 2013-09-10 | International Business Machines Corporation | Detecting and defending against man-in-the-middle attacks |
US7530106B1 (en) | 2008-07-02 | 2009-05-05 | Kaspersky Lab, Zao | System and method for security rating of computer processes |
US8844023B2 (en) * | 2008-12-02 | 2014-09-23 | Micron Technology, Inc. | Password protected built-in test mode for memories |
US20100269162A1 (en) | 2009-04-15 | 2010-10-21 | Jose Bravo | Website authentication |
US8683609B2 (en) * | 2009-12-04 | 2014-03-25 | International Business Machines Corporation | Mobile phone and IP address correlation service |
US20120063597A1 (en) * | 2010-09-15 | 2012-03-15 | Uponus Technologies, Llc. | Apparatus and associated methodology for managing content control keys |
US8838988B2 (en) | 2011-04-12 | 2014-09-16 | International Business Machines Corporation | Verification of transactional integrity |
US10713634B1 (en) | 2011-05-18 | 2020-07-14 | Stamps.Com Inc. | Systems and methods using mobile communication handsets for providing postage |
US9471772B2 (en) | 2011-06-01 | 2016-10-18 | Paypal, Inc. | Password check by decomposing password |
US8917826B2 (en) | 2012-07-31 | 2014-12-23 | International Business Machines Corporation | Detecting man-in-the-middle attacks in electronic transactions using prompts |
Family Cites Families (18)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CH411983A (en) * | 1963-10-18 | 1966-04-30 | Gretag Ag | Method for encrypting and decrypting pulse-shaped messages |
US3798605A (en) * | 1971-06-30 | 1974-03-19 | Ibm | Centralized verification system |
US3798359A (en) * | 1971-06-30 | 1974-03-19 | Ibm | Block cipher cryptographic system |
GB1393920A (en) * | 1972-12-12 | 1975-05-14 | Ibm | Electric digital data processing systems |
US3800284A (en) * | 1973-01-12 | 1974-03-26 | Pitney Bowes Inc | Electronic combination lock and lock system |
US3860911A (en) * | 1973-11-01 | 1975-01-14 | Pitney Bowes Inc | Electronic combination lock and lock system |
FR2266222B1 (en) * | 1974-03-25 | 1980-03-21 | Moreno Roland | |
US3956615A (en) * | 1974-06-25 | 1976-05-11 | Ibm Corporation | Transaction execution system with secure data storage and communications |
GB1478363A (en) * | 1974-07-30 | 1977-06-29 | Mullard Ltd | Data transmission systems |
CH578807A5 (en) * | 1974-11-05 | 1976-08-13 | Patelhold Patentverwertung | |
US3958081A (en) * | 1975-02-24 | 1976-05-18 | International Business Machines Corporation | Block cipher system for data security |
US4079188A (en) * | 1975-04-14 | 1978-03-14 | Datotek, Inc. | Multi-mode digital enciphering system |
FR2311360A1 (en) * | 1975-05-13 | 1976-12-10 | Innovation Ste Int | SYSTEM FOR STORING DATA CONFIDENTIALLY BY MEANS OF PORTABLE ELECTRONIC OBJECTS INCLUDING A CONFIDENTIAL CODE ERROR MEMORIZATION CIRCUIT |
US3996449A (en) * | 1975-08-25 | 1976-12-07 | International Business Machines Corporation | Operating system authenticator |
US4017798A (en) * | 1975-09-08 | 1977-04-12 | Ncr Corporation | Spread spectrum demodulator |
US4074066A (en) * | 1976-04-26 | 1978-02-14 | International Business Machines Corporation | Message verification and transmission error detection by block chaining |
US4133973A (en) * | 1976-11-10 | 1979-01-09 | Datotek, Inc. | Digital cryptographic system having synchronous and asynchronous capabilities |
US4123747A (en) * | 1977-05-20 | 1978-10-31 | International Business Machines Corporation | Identity verification method and apparatus |
-
1978
- 1978-03-31 US US06/892,252 patent/US4310720A/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
-
1979
- 1979-03-02 CA CA322,630A patent/CA1102453A/en not_active Expired
- 1979-03-28 GB GB7910799A patent/GB2019060B/en not_active Expired
- 1979-03-28 GB GB8119489A patent/GB2076615B/en not_active Expired
- 1979-03-30 JP JP3826679A patent/JPS54136205A/en active Pending
- 1979-03-30 DE DE19792912696 patent/DE2912696A1/en active Granted
- 1979-04-02 FR FR7908261A patent/FR2421426B1/en not_active Expired
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
JPS54136205A (en) | 1979-10-23 |
FR2421426A1 (en) | 1979-10-26 |
US4310720A (en) | 1982-01-12 |
GB2019060A (en) | 1979-10-24 |
GB2076615A (en) | 1981-12-02 |
GB2076615B (en) | 1983-01-19 |
FR2421426B1 (en) | 1986-09-19 |
DE2912696A1 (en) | 1979-10-11 |
GB2019060B (en) | 1982-09-02 |
DE2912696C2 (en) | 1989-03-16 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
CA1102453A (en) | Computer accessing system | |
US5872917A (en) | Authentication using random challenges | |
US4596898A (en) | Method and apparatus for protecting stored and transmitted data from compromise or interception | |
US4694492A (en) | Computer communications security control system | |
US4349695A (en) | Recipient and message authentication method and system | |
US5491752A (en) | System for increasing the difficulty of password guessing attacks in a distributed authentication scheme employing authentication tokens | |
US4731841A (en) | Field initialized authentication system for protective security of electronic information networks | |
US5020105A (en) | Field initialized authentication system for protective security of electronic information networks | |
US6173400B1 (en) | Methods and systems for establishing a shared secret using an authentication token | |
US5887063A (en) | Communication system for portable appliances | |
US4691355A (en) | Interactive security control system for computer communications and the like | |
US5311596A (en) | Continuous authentication using an in-band or out-of-band side channel | |
US5636280A (en) | Dual key reflexive encryption security system | |
US3798605A (en) | Centralized verification system | |
CA2066715C (en) | Challenge-and-response user authentication protocol | |
US5343529A (en) | Transaction authentication using a centrally generated transaction identifier | |
US5371796A (en) | Data communication system | |
US6044154A (en) | Remote generated, device identifier key for use with a dual-key reflexive encryption security system | |
US5196840A (en) | Secure communications system for remotely located computers | |
EP0223122B1 (en) | Secure component authentication system | |
US6134661A (en) | Computer network security device and method | |
EP0756397B1 (en) | System and method for key distribution and authentication between a host and a portable device | |
CA2118644A1 (en) | Personal Identification Encryptor and Method | |
GB9422389D0 (en) | Authenticating access control for sensitive functions | |
US6088456A (en) | Data encryption technique |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
MKEX | Expiry |