CA2133200C - A cryptographic communications method and system - Google Patents
A cryptographic communications method and systemInfo
- Publication number
- CA2133200C CA2133200C CA002133200A CA2133200A CA2133200C CA 2133200 C CA2133200 C CA 2133200C CA 002133200 A CA002133200 A CA 002133200A CA 2133200 A CA2133200 A CA 2133200A CA 2133200 C CA2133200 C CA 2133200C
- Authority
- CA
- Canada
- Prior art keywords
- key
- smart card
- basis
- random key
- secret
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired - Fee Related
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/355—Personalisation of cards for use
- G06Q20/3552—Downloading or loading of personalisation data
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/36—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes
- G06Q20/367—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes
- G06Q20/3674—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes involving authentication
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
- G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
- G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1016—Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0877—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L9/3006—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters
- H04L9/302—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters involving the integer factorization problem, e.g. RSA or quadratic sieve [QS] schemes
Abstract
A method for loading secret data, such as an application key, on a smart card (6 ), which involves storing a random key on the card (6), encrypting the random key on the basis of a public key, and provid ing the encrypted random key to a central processing station (4). The encrypted random key is decrypted at the central station on the basis of a secret key, and the station (4) encrypts data on the basis of the random key and transmits it to the smart card (6). The smart card decrypts the encrypted data on the basis of the random key. The random key can be generated internally and stor ed on read protected memory (23) of the card (6). The public key encrypting and secret key decrypting steps may be based on t he RSA algorithm, using a small encryption exponent.
Description
WO 93/20~38 PCI/AI '93/00137 -1 2t3~2~
A CRYPI OGR~PHIC COMMUNICATIONS
METHOD AND SYSTEM
The present invention relates to a cryptographic method and system and, in particular to a smart card and method of initialising a smart card.
Cryptographic techniques are used to enerypt and deerypt sensitive communications between two terminals. A particular problem exists in ensuring secure eomml-nications between credit eards and a central proeessin~ station, or host, and the problem beeomes more acute with respect to smart eards whieh are intçnde~ to transmit 15 and reeeive sensitive data. Conventional eneryption te~hni.lues require that the smart eard have a secret key before any sensitive data can be loaded onto the card. Present solutions for smart eards are usually based around one of two teehniques. The first involves loading the eard with secret information through a physieally secure colulllunications ch~nnPl, whieh unfortunately is not always practical. The second teehnique involves '~0 relying on the eard mAnufA~ tnrer to plaee an initial seeret key on the card, and the eard owner then uses the secret key to load the sensitive data required for eard applieations.
Ul~follullately, the eard manufaeturer then has at its disposal all of the information neceSs~ry to decipher communications with the card and to recover any secret information loaded on the eard.
''5 Eulopeall patent publieation 138,386 deseribes a system for smart eard eo~ .l-...ie~tion with a host where the eneryption and deeryption keys are ge~ ated internally by the eard and the host on the basis of a random number generated by the host and a pre-assigned eode number PN allocated to the eard. The system, however, again 30 suffers from the disadvantage that the pre-assigned eode number needs to be stored in the card on m~nllf~rture or else it must be plaeed on the eard in a physieally secure el~vi~ullll~nt If the pre-assigned eode number PN eannot be llallsf~lled in a physieally W O 93/20538 ~33~Q PC~r/AU93/00137 securc environmcnt, thcn there is a risk it may become known to someone other than an authorised user. The card could then be used in an lln~uthorised manner by simply providing an applo~u~iate random number to the card, once the PN and logic used to generated the encryption key are known. It is therefore advantageous to provide a system 5 which could be used for smart cards, and which does not require any third party to be provided with inforrnation from which an encryption key can be simply derived or a secure environment within which a pre-assigned code number must be transferred.
Most encryption techniques use a key which is generally a large number on which 10 the encryption and decryption processes are based. Public key encryption tccl-niques~
where the transmitting terminal employs a public key to encrypt the tr~n~mitted data, and the receiving terrninal uses a secrct key to decrypt the data, have been found to be particularly advantageous. Data can be readily encrypted without requiring a secret key, yet encrypted communications cannot be intercepted and then decrypted without 15 knowledge of the secret key. The secret key needs to be such that it is related to the public ke~ but cannot be efficiently derived from the public key. An encryption method which uses such a public key and secret key technique is known as the RSA method, and is described in U.S. patent specification 4,405,829. According to the RSA method, a message M is encrypted into ciphertext C using the following:
C -- M '(mod n) 20 where n = p.q, p and q are prime numbers and e is a number relatively prime to (p-1)(q-1). The message, or plaintext, is reconstructed from the transmitted ciphertext using the following:
M -- C d(mod n) where d is dctermined from p,q and e bv the following relationship:
e.d - 1 (mod (lcm (p-l),(q-1))) Icm being the acronym for least common multiple. The e~l.on._"l e and the modulus n '5 are used as the public key and thc primes p and q and exponent d are kept secret and constitute the secret kcy. Providcd n is made sufficiently largc, such as 512 bits, the WO 93/20538 è~ 32 o oPCr/AU93/oO137 primes cannot be cfficicntl~ dctcrmincd from n. The RSA method, however, is computationally intensive and is primarily suitable for powerful processing systems.
Public key techniques, or algorithms, being computationally intensive have been 5 considered too slow to execute and rcquiring too much memory in order to be practieal for use on smart cards without additional specialised hardware. Most smart eards have very limited memory for both data and program storage, and employ microprocessors, such as 8 bit microprocessor, which are very slow col,.pa,~d with more powerful processors employed in personal computers and computer wolh~ ions. Many smart eard 10 applieations require all of the program memory available on the eard, and as much memory as possible for data, which renders permanent hard~ e and software implementations of public kev algorithms impractieal.
The present invention provides a cryptographic col...~.~..ieations method ~5 Collll lisil~g:
storing a random key on a smart eard;
enerypting said random key on the basis of a public key and providing the enerypted random key to a central processing station;
decrypting said encrypted random key at said central station on the basis of a~O seeret key;
enerypting data on the basis of said random key and transmitting the ell. .ylJted data from said eentral station to said smart eard; and decl~lJtillg the encrypted data at said smart eard on the basis of said l~lldGIII key.
~5 The present invention also provides a eo.. n~nir~tions system CGIII~IiSillg smart eard means and a eentral processing station, said smart eard means inrlurling means for storing a random key on a smart eard, means for encrypting said random key on the basis of a publie key, and means for deerypting data enerypted on the basis of said random key; and said eentral station including:
means for deerypting the encrypted random key on the basis of a seeret key, and means for cncrvpting data on the basis of said random key and transmitting the encrypted data to said smart card.
The present invention further provides a method of initi~ ing a smart card co",yl i~i"g:
generating a random key;
storing said random key in a memory area of said smart eard which is not e~ternally addressable;
encrypting said random key on the basis of a publie key;
providing a central processing station with the encrypted random key;
decrypting said encrypted random key at said central station on the basis of a secret key;
encrypting sécret data at said central station on the basis of said random key;
tr~n~mitting the encrypted secret data to said smart eard; and deerypting said encrypted seeret data at said smart eard on the basis of said random key.
The present invention also provides a smart eard eo~ ing read proteeted memory for storing a random key and a publie key;
''O means for enerypting said random key on the basis of said publie key; and means for decrypting encrypted data on the basis of said random key.
A preferred embodiment of the present invention is hereinafter described with referenee to the aeeompanyine drawing, wherein:
''S Figure 1 is a block diagram of a preferred col~J~I~u~ieation system accolding to the present invention.
A eommunieations system ~, as shown in Figure 1, includes a key generation eentre 4 and a smart card 6. The key generation centre (KGC) 4 is a central host station 30 and includes a processing s,vstem 8 connected to a memory storage unit 10. The KGC
may be implemented by a pe~onal computer 9. The proeessing unit 8 is adapted to be conne~led to the smart card 6 by a public switched telecommunications n~l-volk (PSTN) 2 0 0 ~
1~ on a tclccommunic~tiOns line 1~ The KGC ~ stores in the unit 10 information on all of thc smart cards 6 which can bc conrlcctcd to thc processing svstem 8, and theinformation is stored with refe~cnce to the serial nllmbers of thc eards 6. The smart cards 6 cach ineludc an 8 bit microprocessor 16, EEPROM II.C.I10l~ 18, a true random number S genc.~,tor 19, and a eommunications interfaee ~0 for co,~.-ec~ion to the line 14 or to an intermediary tcnninal, sueh as a smart card reader '1, cQ~ ed to the line 14 and whieh is able to co.-- ~-uniC3tc with the computer 9 of thc KGC 4. Thc EEPROM 18 ineludes an area ~3 of read proteeted memorv and another area ~S for the storage of eode ~o be e~ecuted from the EEPROM 18. The arca '5 is also preferably rcad protceted. The read 10 proteeted are~ ~3 cannot bc addressed by an extcrnal deviee. Thç eard 6 also includes a l~ ccli~c scrial number stored thercin. Thc eard rcadcr '1 may bc part of a point-of-sale (POS) terminal. The card 6 and the KGC 4 ma~ be ~Csoci~ted with a b~nking systcm or a mobile telecou~llullir~tio~c systcm whcrcin mobile t~leeo.. ~ ie~tio~c tcrminals are provided whieh can only bc uscd when a smart card 15 6 with app.o~liate a~th~ntiratinP data is inserted in a termin~l The eo...r~ 9 of thc KGC ~ and the smart eard 6 inelude sOf~walc to eompute a Mont_powcr ~mrtio~ defined as follows:
Mont_power(a,b,m) = a b * (2-R)~b-1) (mod m) wherc in thc pi~f~ ,d implc~r~ on R = 51'~. The r l~nr ~t b for e~lcl~tion on the ''O smart eard 6 is s~lce~ to be small and equal to 3. The Mont_power fimrtjon is a validtion of the RSA algolilhul which impro~es the ~C~V~ ee and ~o~u size of theRSA algolilLIll by using the Mont~rncry modulo ~ n ~eth~ ssc~l in P.L.
Mor~lg~ t, ~, ~Modular Multiplir~tion without Trial Division", M~1h~ of Co~ulalion, Vol. 44, No. 170, pp 519-521, April 1985. The article ~ c~lsses an efficient algorithm for e~ lting the Mont power function. The modulo red~lction step can be i~col~ul~led in a multi-precision multiplication loop to calculate the Mont_power function. The modulo reduction step involves setting least signifir~nt bits to zero and shifting the res~llt~nt bits at each multiplication step. This is particularly advantageous as it removes the need to perform conlL u~lionally illlensive long division.
WO 93/20538 PCr/AU93/00137 3~ - 6-The computer 9 also includcs software to generate the large composite number, m, which is difficult to factorise, ~511 < m < 7512, from the product of two primes, p and q, each of which produces a rem~inder of ' when divided by 3, i.e. p mod 3 - 2, and q mod 3 _ 7, and are such that (p-1)(q-1) is not divisible by 3.
The EEPROM 18 of the smart card 6 is loaded with executable program code to extend the standard application and communications functions of the card 6 to include the following routines: ' 1. A C1 routine to generate a 512 bit random number, r, using the random number 10 generator 19, such that '51' S r < m, and store r in the read protected part 23 of the EEPROM 18.
2. A C7 routine to calculate and output on the col~llllLnications interface 20 x = Mont_power (r,3,m), which is r encrypted by the Mont_power function using anexponent of 3.
15 3. A C3 routine which inputs 512 bits of data and exclusive-ORs the data with r, and stores the result in the read protected area 23. The routine then deletes m, r and oulilles C1, C and C3.
To establish the communications system 2, the KGC 4 generates the two primes, ~0 p and q, as ~li.ccucsed previously, such that factorisation of the product of p and q is infeasible. The primes are generated for each card 6, or for a batch 22 of cards 6 which would make the m~nllfarturing process simpler. The KGC 4 is then able to calculate m = p.q, ~ = (p-1)(q-1) and the decryption key d, where 3d . 1 mod ~. Plaintext z encrypted using Mont_power (z,3,m) can then be decrypted using the Mont_power 75 function as follows:
MOn:t_pOWer(MOIIt_pOWer~Z,3.m).d.m) _ ((Z3) * (2-R)2)d * (2-R)(t-l) mod(m) _ z3d * (2-R)2d * (2-R)(d-l) mod(m) z 3d * (7 -R)3d-1 mod(m) - z mod (m) as Z3d _ Z mod m for any integer Z, 0 s Z < m.
The RSA encrvption al_orithm normally utilises large exponents, and the use of WO 93/20538 PCl /AU93/00137 21~%0~
a small c~ponent of 3 is particularl~ advantageous as it enablcs the smart card 6 to execute the public encryption function of RSA, using the Mont_power function, in a reasonable amount of time with small program size and memory usage, notwith~t~nding the limited power of the processor 16.
The KGC 4 providcs the serial numbers and the products m to a card m~nuf~r,tllrer (CM) who makes a batch '~'~ of cards 6. The product m is given confidentially to the card manufacturer as it can be used as a basis for determining the ~uthenticity or validity of the card 6 during subsequent communications with the KGC
10 4 at a POS outlet, as discusscd hereinaftcr. The primes p and q, ~ and the secret key d are all kept secret and are stored in the storage unit 10 of the KGC 4 against a serial number of a card 6.
The card manufacturer stores m in the read protected part ''3 of the EEPROM 18, 15 and stores the program code, including the loulilles C1, C~ and C3, in the area 25.
FY.ocution of the program code may be protected by a re4uilc,lle.~t that a pel~onal serial number (PIN) be provided for execution to occur.
Following m~nufarture, the CM distributes the cards to the point of sale (POS) '~O outlets where a card 6 can be sold to a customer. On having sold a card 6 to a customer, it is col..-ectcd to a pbint of sale terminal ''1 and the card 6 OpCldt~S to execute the C1 routine and generate internally a random number r. The card 6 then çxecutes the C2 public key encryption routine and outputs x and the serial number to the KGC 4 on the line 14. The random number r and the serial number are stored at the KGC 4 after''5 decrypting x using r = Mont_power (x,d,m). The KGC 4 then produces an application, master or authentication key ~ as a random value for the card and this is tr~n~mitted with any other sensitive and secrct information, such as a GSM subscriber identifier number for a GSM digital telecommunications network, to the card 6. The application kcy Kj and thc other scnsitive information are encrypted for tr:ln~mi~sion to the card 6 30 on the basis of thc random number r. The e..cl ~ytion tcr~lnique is simply exclusive-ORing r with ~ and the other sensitive data to obtain ciphertext X. The card 6 is able to dccrypt X to obtain thc application key and the other data on the basis of the WO 93/20538 ~ PCl /AU93/00137 key r stored therein which is simpiy exclusive-ORed with X using the C3 routine. Once the application key and the other data have been stored on the card 6 and the routine C3 completed the card can be allowed to leave the point of sale. The application key is used in applications which are loaded on the smart card 6, and can be used as a basis for S generation of session keys for subsequçnt collm~ ications.
The routines C1, C~ and C3 and m and r are erased by the routine C3 after the ~uthentication key and the othèr data has been stored on the card 6 so as to advantageously allow the card 6 to use the memory space previously occupied by the 10 loutines and m and r. Therefore the card 6 which receives the initial secret data only needs to pelrullll the public encryption part of the RSA algolilhlll and the memory used to execute this part is recovered after the secret data is received. Public key cryptosystems are not conventionally used in this manner.
The above method of sending the sensitive data from the KGC 4 to the card 6 is also particularly advantageous as the modulus m can be given to the card m~nllf~ctllrer for placement on the card without the m~nl)f~ctlJrer gaining any additional information which would assist in recovering any secret data to be passed to the card 6. Theenc~ ion key r is genc.ated and stored intemally within the card without requiring the ''O key r to be divulged to any third party, such as the card m~nllf~rtllrer, the personnel at the point of sale outlet or the customer. As r is internally generated and stored it can only be obtained by destroying the integrity of the card 6.
Alternatively, the card m~nufactllrer can be asked to execute the routines C1 and ''S C~ once the card has been m~rluf~rtured so as to store the key r in the cards prior to ~liCpatch to POS outlets. The cipher value x produced by the routine C~ is sent to the KGC 4 with the col,-,sl)onding serial number of each card 6. The serial numbers and corresponding x values of the cards 6 are placed in a secure file which is protected from modifications and passed to thc KGC 4 for storage therein. The cards 6 are then 30 distributed, and on connecting the card 6 to a card reader '~1 at a POS terminal, the card 6 sends its serial numbcr to the KGC 4. The KGC 4 accesses the coll~s~ollding x value on the basis of thc serial numbcr, and decrypts the x value to obtain r using WO 93/20538 PCr/A~93/00137 213320l) _ _ 9 _ r = Mont_power (x,d,m). Secrct information can then be sent to the card 6 by exclusivc-ORing the secret data with r, and then receiving and decrvpting the secret data using the card routine C3, as di~cllcsed previously. Information generated internally by the card 6, such as the value x, can be used to authenticate the card instead of the modulus m. The CM and POS outlets are still not able to obtain the random key r without destroying the intcgritv of the card 6.
When the CM executes the routine C1 and C_, they may, instead of being executed on the card, be executed on a device connectecl to the card which has a secure 10 communications environment with the card 6. This, of course, does significantly reduce the security of the system as the random number r is not generated on the card 6.
A CRYPI OGR~PHIC COMMUNICATIONS
METHOD AND SYSTEM
The present invention relates to a cryptographic method and system and, in particular to a smart card and method of initialising a smart card.
Cryptographic techniques are used to enerypt and deerypt sensitive communications between two terminals. A particular problem exists in ensuring secure eomml-nications between credit eards and a central proeessin~ station, or host, and the problem beeomes more acute with respect to smart eards whieh are intçnde~ to transmit 15 and reeeive sensitive data. Conventional eneryption te~hni.lues require that the smart eard have a secret key before any sensitive data can be loaded onto the card. Present solutions for smart eards are usually based around one of two teehniques. The first involves loading the eard with secret information through a physieally secure colulllunications ch~nnPl, whieh unfortunately is not always practical. The second teehnique involves '~0 relying on the eard mAnufA~ tnrer to plaee an initial seeret key on the card, and the eard owner then uses the secret key to load the sensitive data required for eard applieations.
Ul~follullately, the eard manufaeturer then has at its disposal all of the information neceSs~ry to decipher communications with the card and to recover any secret information loaded on the eard.
''5 Eulopeall patent publieation 138,386 deseribes a system for smart eard eo~ .l-...ie~tion with a host where the eneryption and deeryption keys are ge~ ated internally by the eard and the host on the basis of a random number generated by the host and a pre-assigned eode number PN allocated to the eard. The system, however, again 30 suffers from the disadvantage that the pre-assigned eode number needs to be stored in the card on m~nllf~rture or else it must be plaeed on the eard in a physieally secure el~vi~ullll~nt If the pre-assigned eode number PN eannot be llallsf~lled in a physieally W O 93/20538 ~33~Q PC~r/AU93/00137 securc environmcnt, thcn there is a risk it may become known to someone other than an authorised user. The card could then be used in an lln~uthorised manner by simply providing an applo~u~iate random number to the card, once the PN and logic used to generated the encryption key are known. It is therefore advantageous to provide a system 5 which could be used for smart cards, and which does not require any third party to be provided with inforrnation from which an encryption key can be simply derived or a secure environment within which a pre-assigned code number must be transferred.
Most encryption techniques use a key which is generally a large number on which 10 the encryption and decryption processes are based. Public key encryption tccl-niques~
where the transmitting terminal employs a public key to encrypt the tr~n~mitted data, and the receiving terrninal uses a secrct key to decrypt the data, have been found to be particularly advantageous. Data can be readily encrypted without requiring a secret key, yet encrypted communications cannot be intercepted and then decrypted without 15 knowledge of the secret key. The secret key needs to be such that it is related to the public ke~ but cannot be efficiently derived from the public key. An encryption method which uses such a public key and secret key technique is known as the RSA method, and is described in U.S. patent specification 4,405,829. According to the RSA method, a message M is encrypted into ciphertext C using the following:
C -- M '(mod n) 20 where n = p.q, p and q are prime numbers and e is a number relatively prime to (p-1)(q-1). The message, or plaintext, is reconstructed from the transmitted ciphertext using the following:
M -- C d(mod n) where d is dctermined from p,q and e bv the following relationship:
e.d - 1 (mod (lcm (p-l),(q-1))) Icm being the acronym for least common multiple. The e~l.on._"l e and the modulus n '5 are used as the public key and thc primes p and q and exponent d are kept secret and constitute the secret kcy. Providcd n is made sufficiently largc, such as 512 bits, the WO 93/20538 è~ 32 o oPCr/AU93/oO137 primes cannot be cfficicntl~ dctcrmincd from n. The RSA method, however, is computationally intensive and is primarily suitable for powerful processing systems.
Public key techniques, or algorithms, being computationally intensive have been 5 considered too slow to execute and rcquiring too much memory in order to be practieal for use on smart cards without additional specialised hardware. Most smart eards have very limited memory for both data and program storage, and employ microprocessors, such as 8 bit microprocessor, which are very slow col,.pa,~d with more powerful processors employed in personal computers and computer wolh~ ions. Many smart eard 10 applieations require all of the program memory available on the eard, and as much memory as possible for data, which renders permanent hard~ e and software implementations of public kev algorithms impractieal.
The present invention provides a cryptographic col...~.~..ieations method ~5 Collll lisil~g:
storing a random key on a smart eard;
enerypting said random key on the basis of a public key and providing the enerypted random key to a central processing station;
decrypting said encrypted random key at said central station on the basis of a~O seeret key;
enerypting data on the basis of said random key and transmitting the ell. .ylJted data from said eentral station to said smart eard; and decl~lJtillg the encrypted data at said smart eard on the basis of said l~lldGIII key.
~5 The present invention also provides a eo.. n~nir~tions system CGIII~IiSillg smart eard means and a eentral processing station, said smart eard means inrlurling means for storing a random key on a smart eard, means for encrypting said random key on the basis of a publie key, and means for deerypting data enerypted on the basis of said random key; and said eentral station including:
means for deerypting the encrypted random key on the basis of a seeret key, and means for cncrvpting data on the basis of said random key and transmitting the encrypted data to said smart card.
The present invention further provides a method of initi~ ing a smart card co",yl i~i"g:
generating a random key;
storing said random key in a memory area of said smart eard which is not e~ternally addressable;
encrypting said random key on the basis of a publie key;
providing a central processing station with the encrypted random key;
decrypting said encrypted random key at said central station on the basis of a secret key;
encrypting sécret data at said central station on the basis of said random key;
tr~n~mitting the encrypted secret data to said smart eard; and deerypting said encrypted seeret data at said smart eard on the basis of said random key.
The present invention also provides a smart eard eo~ ing read proteeted memory for storing a random key and a publie key;
''O means for enerypting said random key on the basis of said publie key; and means for decrypting encrypted data on the basis of said random key.
A preferred embodiment of the present invention is hereinafter described with referenee to the aeeompanyine drawing, wherein:
''S Figure 1 is a block diagram of a preferred col~J~I~u~ieation system accolding to the present invention.
A eommunieations system ~, as shown in Figure 1, includes a key generation eentre 4 and a smart card 6. The key generation centre (KGC) 4 is a central host station 30 and includes a processing s,vstem 8 connected to a memory storage unit 10. The KGC
may be implemented by a pe~onal computer 9. The proeessing unit 8 is adapted to be conne~led to the smart card 6 by a public switched telecommunications n~l-volk (PSTN) 2 0 0 ~
1~ on a tclccommunic~tiOns line 1~ The KGC ~ stores in the unit 10 information on all of thc smart cards 6 which can bc conrlcctcd to thc processing svstem 8, and theinformation is stored with refe~cnce to the serial nllmbers of thc eards 6. The smart cards 6 cach ineludc an 8 bit microprocessor 16, EEPROM II.C.I10l~ 18, a true random number S genc.~,tor 19, and a eommunications interfaee ~0 for co,~.-ec~ion to the line 14 or to an intermediary tcnninal, sueh as a smart card reader '1, cQ~ ed to the line 14 and whieh is able to co.-- ~-uniC3tc with the computer 9 of thc KGC 4. Thc EEPROM 18 ineludes an area ~3 of read proteeted memorv and another area ~S for the storage of eode ~o be e~ecuted from the EEPROM 18. The arca '5 is also preferably rcad protceted. The read 10 proteeted are~ ~3 cannot bc addressed by an extcrnal deviee. Thç eard 6 also includes a l~ ccli~c scrial number stored thercin. Thc eard rcadcr '1 may bc part of a point-of-sale (POS) terminal. The card 6 and the KGC 4 ma~ be ~Csoci~ted with a b~nking systcm or a mobile telecou~llullir~tio~c systcm whcrcin mobile t~leeo.. ~ ie~tio~c tcrminals are provided whieh can only bc uscd when a smart card 15 6 with app.o~liate a~th~ntiratinP data is inserted in a termin~l The eo...r~ 9 of thc KGC ~ and the smart eard 6 inelude sOf~walc to eompute a Mont_powcr ~mrtio~ defined as follows:
Mont_power(a,b,m) = a b * (2-R)~b-1) (mod m) wherc in thc pi~f~ ,d implc~r~ on R = 51'~. The r l~nr ~t b for e~lcl~tion on the ''O smart eard 6 is s~lce~ to be small and equal to 3. The Mont_power fimrtjon is a validtion of the RSA algolilhul which impro~es the ~C~V~ ee and ~o~u size of theRSA algolilLIll by using the Mont~rncry modulo ~ n ~eth~ ssc~l in P.L.
Mor~lg~ t, ~, ~Modular Multiplir~tion without Trial Division", M~1h~ of Co~ulalion, Vol. 44, No. 170, pp 519-521, April 1985. The article ~ c~lsses an efficient algorithm for e~ lting the Mont power function. The modulo red~lction step can be i~col~ul~led in a multi-precision multiplication loop to calculate the Mont_power function. The modulo reduction step involves setting least signifir~nt bits to zero and shifting the res~llt~nt bits at each multiplication step. This is particularly advantageous as it removes the need to perform conlL u~lionally illlensive long division.
WO 93/20538 PCr/AU93/00137 3~ - 6-The computer 9 also includcs software to generate the large composite number, m, which is difficult to factorise, ~511 < m < 7512, from the product of two primes, p and q, each of which produces a rem~inder of ' when divided by 3, i.e. p mod 3 - 2, and q mod 3 _ 7, and are such that (p-1)(q-1) is not divisible by 3.
The EEPROM 18 of the smart card 6 is loaded with executable program code to extend the standard application and communications functions of the card 6 to include the following routines: ' 1. A C1 routine to generate a 512 bit random number, r, using the random number 10 generator 19, such that '51' S r < m, and store r in the read protected part 23 of the EEPROM 18.
2. A C7 routine to calculate and output on the col~llllLnications interface 20 x = Mont_power (r,3,m), which is r encrypted by the Mont_power function using anexponent of 3.
15 3. A C3 routine which inputs 512 bits of data and exclusive-ORs the data with r, and stores the result in the read protected area 23. The routine then deletes m, r and oulilles C1, C and C3.
To establish the communications system 2, the KGC 4 generates the two primes, ~0 p and q, as ~li.ccucsed previously, such that factorisation of the product of p and q is infeasible. The primes are generated for each card 6, or for a batch 22 of cards 6 which would make the m~nllfarturing process simpler. The KGC 4 is then able to calculate m = p.q, ~ = (p-1)(q-1) and the decryption key d, where 3d . 1 mod ~. Plaintext z encrypted using Mont_power (z,3,m) can then be decrypted using the Mont_power 75 function as follows:
MOn:t_pOWer(MOIIt_pOWer~Z,3.m).d.m) _ ((Z3) * (2-R)2)d * (2-R)(t-l) mod(m) _ z3d * (2-R)2d * (2-R)(d-l) mod(m) z 3d * (7 -R)3d-1 mod(m) - z mod (m) as Z3d _ Z mod m for any integer Z, 0 s Z < m.
The RSA encrvption al_orithm normally utilises large exponents, and the use of WO 93/20538 PCl /AU93/00137 21~%0~
a small c~ponent of 3 is particularl~ advantageous as it enablcs the smart card 6 to execute the public encryption function of RSA, using the Mont_power function, in a reasonable amount of time with small program size and memory usage, notwith~t~nding the limited power of the processor 16.
The KGC 4 providcs the serial numbers and the products m to a card m~nuf~r,tllrer (CM) who makes a batch '~'~ of cards 6. The product m is given confidentially to the card manufacturer as it can be used as a basis for determining the ~uthenticity or validity of the card 6 during subsequent communications with the KGC
10 4 at a POS outlet, as discusscd hereinaftcr. The primes p and q, ~ and the secret key d are all kept secret and are stored in the storage unit 10 of the KGC 4 against a serial number of a card 6.
The card manufacturer stores m in the read protected part ''3 of the EEPROM 18, 15 and stores the program code, including the loulilles C1, C~ and C3, in the area 25.
FY.ocution of the program code may be protected by a re4uilc,lle.~t that a pel~onal serial number (PIN) be provided for execution to occur.
Following m~nufarture, the CM distributes the cards to the point of sale (POS) '~O outlets where a card 6 can be sold to a customer. On having sold a card 6 to a customer, it is col..-ectcd to a pbint of sale terminal ''1 and the card 6 OpCldt~S to execute the C1 routine and generate internally a random number r. The card 6 then çxecutes the C2 public key encryption routine and outputs x and the serial number to the KGC 4 on the line 14. The random number r and the serial number are stored at the KGC 4 after''5 decrypting x using r = Mont_power (x,d,m). The KGC 4 then produces an application, master or authentication key ~ as a random value for the card and this is tr~n~mitted with any other sensitive and secrct information, such as a GSM subscriber identifier number for a GSM digital telecommunications network, to the card 6. The application kcy Kj and thc other scnsitive information are encrypted for tr:ln~mi~sion to the card 6 30 on the basis of thc random number r. The e..cl ~ytion tcr~lnique is simply exclusive-ORing r with ~ and the other sensitive data to obtain ciphertext X. The card 6 is able to dccrypt X to obtain thc application key and the other data on the basis of the WO 93/20538 ~ PCl /AU93/00137 key r stored therein which is simpiy exclusive-ORed with X using the C3 routine. Once the application key and the other data have been stored on the card 6 and the routine C3 completed the card can be allowed to leave the point of sale. The application key is used in applications which are loaded on the smart card 6, and can be used as a basis for S generation of session keys for subsequçnt collm~ ications.
The routines C1, C~ and C3 and m and r are erased by the routine C3 after the ~uthentication key and the othèr data has been stored on the card 6 so as to advantageously allow the card 6 to use the memory space previously occupied by the 10 loutines and m and r. Therefore the card 6 which receives the initial secret data only needs to pelrullll the public encryption part of the RSA algolilhlll and the memory used to execute this part is recovered after the secret data is received. Public key cryptosystems are not conventionally used in this manner.
The above method of sending the sensitive data from the KGC 4 to the card 6 is also particularly advantageous as the modulus m can be given to the card m~nllf~ctllrer for placement on the card without the m~nl)f~ctlJrer gaining any additional information which would assist in recovering any secret data to be passed to the card 6. Theenc~ ion key r is genc.ated and stored intemally within the card without requiring the ''O key r to be divulged to any third party, such as the card m~nllf~rtllrer, the personnel at the point of sale outlet or the customer. As r is internally generated and stored it can only be obtained by destroying the integrity of the card 6.
Alternatively, the card m~nufactllrer can be asked to execute the routines C1 and ''S C~ once the card has been m~rluf~rtured so as to store the key r in the cards prior to ~liCpatch to POS outlets. The cipher value x produced by the routine C~ is sent to the KGC 4 with the col,-,sl)onding serial number of each card 6. The serial numbers and corresponding x values of the cards 6 are placed in a secure file which is protected from modifications and passed to thc KGC 4 for storage therein. The cards 6 are then 30 distributed, and on connecting the card 6 to a card reader '~1 at a POS terminal, the card 6 sends its serial numbcr to the KGC 4. The KGC 4 accesses the coll~s~ollding x value on the basis of thc serial numbcr, and decrypts the x value to obtain r using WO 93/20538 PCr/A~93/00137 213320l) _ _ 9 _ r = Mont_power (x,d,m). Secrct information can then be sent to the card 6 by exclusivc-ORing the secret data with r, and then receiving and decrvpting the secret data using the card routine C3, as di~cllcsed previously. Information generated internally by the card 6, such as the value x, can be used to authenticate the card instead of the modulus m. The CM and POS outlets are still not able to obtain the random key r without destroying the intcgritv of the card 6.
When the CM executes the routine C1 and C_, they may, instead of being executed on the card, be executed on a device connectecl to the card which has a secure 10 communications environment with the card 6. This, of course, does significantly reduce the security of the system as the random number r is not generated on the card 6.
Claims (39)
1. A cryptographic communications method comprising:
storing a random key on a smart card;
encrypting said random key on the basis of a public key and providing the encrypted random key to a central processing station;
decrypting said encrypted random key at said central station on the basis of a secret key;
encrypting data on the basis of said random key and transmitting the encrypted data from said central station to said smart card; and decrypting the encrypted data at said smart card on the basis of said random key.
storing a random key on a smart card;
encrypting said random key on the basis of a public key and providing the encrypted random key to a central processing station;
decrypting said encrypted random key at said central station on the basis of a secret key;
encrypting data on the basis of said random key and transmitting the encrypted data from said central station to said smart card; and decrypting the encrypted data at said smart card on the basis of said random key.
2. A communications method as claimed in claim 1, wherein said random key is stored in a memory area of said smart card which is not externally addressable.
3. A communications method as claimed in claim 2, wherein said data includes an application key for said card.
4. A communications method as claimed in claim 3, including generating said random key on said smart card.
5. A communications method as claimed in claim 4, including deleting at least one said random key, said public key and program code for encrypting on the basis of said public key, after receiving said data.
6. A communications method as claimed in claim 5, including storing an identification number on said smart card, transmitting said identification number to said central station, and accessing said secret key at said central station on the basis of said identification number.
7. A communications method as claimed in claim 6. including generating said public and secret keys at said station and storing said secret key on the basis of said identification number.
8. A communications method as claimed in claim 7, wherein said public and secretkeys are unique for said smart card.
9. A communications method as claimed in claim 7, wherein said public and secretkeys are unique for a batch of smart cards.
10. A communications method as claimed in claim 7, wherein the pubic key encrypting and secret key decrypting steps comprise an RSA based algorithm, using a modulus m and a small encryption exponent.
11. A communications method as claimed in claim 10, wherein said exponent is three.
12. A communications method as claimed in claim 10, including keeping said modulus secret and using said modulus as a basis for authenticating said smart card.
13. A communications method as claimed in claim 10, including using said encrypted random key as a basis for authenticating said smart card.
14. A communications method as claimed in claim 10, wherein said algorithm comprises encrypting and decrypting a value Z using:
Z b * (2-R)(b-1) (mod m) where b is the exponent and R is a constant.
Z b * (2-R)(b-1) (mod m) where b is the exponent and R is a constant.
15. A communications system comprising smart card means and a central processingstation, said smart card means including:
means for storing a random key on a smart card, means for encrypting said random key on the basis of a public key, and means for decrypting data encrypted on the basis of said random key; and said central station including:
means for decrypting the encrypted random key on the basis of a secret key and means for encrypting data on the basis of said random key and transmitting the encrypted data to said smart card.
means for storing a random key on a smart card, means for encrypting said random key on the basis of a public key, and means for decrypting data encrypted on the basis of said random key; and said central station including:
means for decrypting the encrypted random key on the basis of a secret key and means for encrypting data on the basis of said random key and transmitting the encrypted data to said smart card.
16. A communications system as claimed in claim 15, wherein said storing means is not externally addressable.
17. A communications system as claimed in claim 16, wherein said data includes an application key for said card.
18. A communications system as claimed in claim 17, wherein said smart card means includes means for generating said random key on said smart card.
19. A communications system as claimed in claim 18, wherein said smart card includes program code for encrypting on the basis of said public key, and at least one of said program code, said public key and said random key are deleted after said smart card receives said data.
20. A communications system as claimed in claim 19, wherein said smart card includes a identification number, and means for transmitting said identification number to said central station, said central station including means for accessing said secret key on the basis of said identification number.
21. A communications system as claimed in claim 20, wherein said central stationincludes means for generating said public and secret keys and storing said secret key on the basis of said identification number.
22. A communications system as claimed in claim 21 wherein said public and secret keys are unique for said smart card.
23. A communications system as claimed in claim 21, wherein said public and secret keys are unique for a batch of smart cards.
24. A communications system as claimed in claim 21, wherein said public key encrypting means and said secret key decrypting means execute an RSA based algorithm, using a modulus m and a small encryption exponent.
25. A communications system as claimed in claim 24, wherein said exponent is three.
26. A communications system as claimed in claim 24, wherein said modulus is keptsecret and used as a basis for authenticating said smart card.
27. A communications system as claimed in claim 24, wherein said encrypted random key is used as a basis for authenticating said smart card.
28. A communications system as claimed in claim 24, wherein said algorithm comprises encrypting and decrypting a value Z using:
Z b * (2-R)(b-1) (mod m) where b is the exponent and R is a constant.
Z b * (2-R)(b-1) (mod m) where b is the exponent and R is a constant.
29. A method of initialising a smart card comprising:
generating a random key;
storing said random key in a memory area of said smart card which is not externally addressable;
encrypting said random key on the basis of a public key;
providing a central processing station with the encrypted random key;
decrypting said encrypted random key at said central station on the basis of a secret key;
encrypting secret data at said central station on the basis of said random key;
transmitting the encrypted secret data to said smart card; and decrypting said encrypted secret data at said smart card on the basis of said random key.
generating a random key;
storing said random key in a memory area of said smart card which is not externally addressable;
encrypting said random key on the basis of a public key;
providing a central processing station with the encrypted random key;
decrypting said encrypted random key at said central station on the basis of a secret key;
encrypting secret data at said central station on the basis of said random key;
transmitting the encrypted secret data to said smart card; and decrypting said encrypted secret data at said smart card on the basis of said random key.
30. A method as claimed in claim 29, wherein said secret data includes an application key for said smart card.
31. A method as claimed in claim 30, wherein said random key is generated on said card.
32. A method as claimed in claim 30, including deleting at least one of said random key, said public key and program code for encrypting on the basis of said public key from said smart card after receiving said secret data.
33. A method as claimed in claim 30, including generating said public and secret keys for said smart card at said central station.
34. A method as claimed in claim 30, wherein said public key encrypting and secret key decrypting steps comprise a Montgomery modulo reduced RSA based algorithm, using a modulus m and a small encryption exponent.
35. A smart card comprising:
read protected memory for storing a random key and a public key;
means for encrypting said random key on the basis of said public key; and means for decrypting encrypted data on the basis of said random key.
read protected memory for storing a random key and a public key;
means for encrypting said random key on the basis of said public key; and means for decrypting encrypted data on the basis of said random key.
36. A smart card as claimed in claim 35, wherein said data includes an application key.
37. A smart card as claimed in claim 35, including means for generating said random key.
38. A smart card as claimed in claim 35, including means for deleting at least one of said keys and program code for encrypting on the basis of said public key after receiving said data.
39. A smart card as claimed in claim 35, wherein said means for encrypting executes a public key component of a Montgomery modulo reduced RSA based algorithm, usinga modulus m and a small encryption exponent.
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| AUPL1602/92 | 1992-03-30 |
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| EP (1) | EP0634038B1 (en) |
| JP (1) | JPH07505270A (en) |
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-
1993
- 1993-03-30 EP EP93907642A patent/EP0634038B1/en not_active Revoked
- 1993-03-30 AT AT93907642T patent/ATE207642T1/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 1993-03-30 CA CA002133200A patent/CA2133200C/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 1993-03-30 DE DE69331006T patent/DE69331006D1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1993-03-30 SG SG1996008460A patent/SG46692A1/en unknown
- 1993-03-30 AU AU38180/93A patent/AU671986B2/en not_active Ceased
- 1993-03-30 US US08/313,214 patent/US5745571A/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1993-03-30 WO PCT/AU1993/000137 patent/WO1993020538A1/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 1993-03-30 JP JP5516900A patent/JPH07505270A/en active Pending
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| DE69331006D1 (en) | 2001-11-29 |
| AU3818093A (en) | 1993-11-08 |
| JPH07505270A (en) | 1995-06-08 |
| SG46692A1 (en) | 1998-02-20 |
| AU671986B2 (en) | 1996-09-19 |
| EP0634038A1 (en) | 1995-01-18 |
| ATE207642T1 (en) | 2001-11-15 |
| CA2133200A1 (en) | 1993-10-14 |
| WO1993020538A1 (en) | 1993-10-14 |
| EP0634038A4 (en) | 2000-04-05 |
| EP0634038B1 (en) | 2001-10-24 |
| US5745571A (en) | 1998-04-28 |
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| EEER | Examination request | ||
| MKLA | Lapsed |