CA2350029A1 - Sustainable digital watermarking via tamper-resistant software - Google Patents
Sustainable digital watermarking via tamper-resistant software Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CA2350029A1 CA2350029A1 CA002350029A CA2350029A CA2350029A1 CA 2350029 A1 CA2350029 A1 CA 2350029A1 CA 002350029 A CA002350029 A CA 002350029A CA 2350029 A CA2350029 A CA 2350029A CA 2350029 A1 CA2350029 A1 CA 2350029A1
- Authority
- CA
- Canada
- Prior art keywords
- data
- address
- data value
- virtual address
- steps
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Abandoned
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims abstract 41
- 238000013507 mapping Methods 0.000 claims abstract 23
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 claims 6
- 230000009466 transformation Effects 0.000 claims 3
- 238000000844 transformation Methods 0.000 claims 3
- 239000013598 vector Substances 0.000 claims 3
- 230000005055 memory storage Effects 0.000 claims 2
- 235000008247 Echinochloa frumentacea Nutrition 0.000 claims 1
- 240000004072 Panicum sumatrense Species 0.000 claims 1
- 230000010387 memory retrieval Effects 0.000 claims 1
- 238000009877 rendering Methods 0.000 claims 1
- 238000003491 array Methods 0.000 abstract 1
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
- G06F21/12—Protecting executable software
- G06F21/14—Protecting executable software against software analysis or reverse engineering, e.g. by obfuscation
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
- G06F21/106—Enforcing content protection by specific content processing
- G06F21/1063—Personalisation
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
- G06F21/16—Program or content traceability, e.g. by watermarking
Abstract
Mass data (the contents of arrays, large data structures, linked data structures and similar data structures stored in memory) are common targets for attack. The invention presents a method and system of protecting mass data by mapping virtual addresses onto randomly or pseudo-randomly selected actual addresses. This mapping distributes data values throughout the memory so an attacker cannot locate the data he is seeking, or identify patterns which might allow him to obtain information about his target (such as how the software operates, encryption keys, biometric data or passwords stored therein, or algorithms it uses). Additional layers of protection are described, as well as efficient techniques for generating the necessary transforms to perform the invention.
Claims (39)
1. A method of obscuring memory contents comprising the steps of:
responding to a request to store a data value at a virtual address by:
mapping said virtual address onto a randomly selected actual address; and storing said data value in a memory location indexed by said actual address.
responding to a request to store a data value at a virtual address by:
mapping said virtual address onto a randomly selected actual address; and storing said data value in a memory location indexed by said actual address.
2. A method of memory storage which is tamper-resistant and obscure, comprising the steps of:
responding to a request to store a data value at a virtual address by:
calculating a hash of said virtual address to generate an actual address; and storing said data value in a memory location indexed by said actual address.
responding to a request to store a data value at a virtual address by:
calculating a hash of said virtual address to generate an actual address; and storing said data value in a memory location indexed by said actual address.
3. A method of reducing the amount of information which can be derived from a memory comprising the steps of:
mapping virtual data addresses onto actual data addresses;
said mapping altering the pattern of memory accesses during execution of a program.
mapping virtual data addresses onto actual data addresses;
said mapping altering the pattern of memory accesses during execution of a program.
4. A method of obscuring mass data comprising the steps of:
responding to a request to store a data value at a virtual address by:
storing said data value at an actual memory location indexed by a hash of said virtual address.
responding to a request to store a data value at a virtual address by:
storing said data value at an actual memory location indexed by a hash of said virtual address.
5. A method of obscuring mass data comprising the steps of:
storing data in pseudo-random addresses;
thereby distributing data sets throughout a memory space.
storing data in pseudo-random addresses;
thereby distributing data sets throughout a memory space.
6. A method of obscuring mass data comprising the steps of:
responding to a request to store a data value by:
storing said data in a pseudo-randomly selected memory location.
responding to a request to store a data value by:
storing said data in a pseudo-randomly selected memory location.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein said step of mapping comprises the prior step of selecting one of a plurality of different mappings.
8. The method of claim 1, further comprising the steps of:
varying said address mappings over time;
whereby any information obtained by an attacker will have a very short useful life.
varying said address mappings over time;
whereby any information obtained by an attacker will have a very short useful life.
9. The method of claim 1, further comprising the prior step of encrypting said data value being stored.
10. The method of claim 1, further comprising the prior step of:
encoding said input data with a data flow encoding technique;
whereby only encoded data is processed and unprotected data is not exposed.
encoding said input data with a data flow encoding technique;
whereby only encoded data is processed and unprotected data is not exposed.
11. The method of claim 1, wherein all steps are cloaked using tamper-resistant secret-hiding software; thereby rendering the corresponding computer code enormously complex and resistant to reverse engineering.
12. The method of claim 8, wherein said step of varying said address mappings comprises the step of:
varying said address mappings randomly or pseudo-randomly, on the basis of other addresses and data.
varying said address mappings randomly or pseudo-randomly, on the basis of other addresses and data.
13. The method of claim 12, wherein said step of varying said address mappings comprises the step of:
varying said address mappings randomly or pseudo-randomly, each time a store or fetch is performed.
varying said address mappings randomly or pseudo-randomly, each time a store or fetch is performed.
14. The method of claim 13, further comprising the steps of:
executing a separate, background routine which atomically changes the locations and data encoding while said application program is running.
executing a separate, background routine which atomically changes the locations and data encoding while said application program is running.
15. The method of claim 14, wherein said step of executing a separate, background routine comprises the steps of:
executing a separate, background routine which:
suspends execution of the main program;
changes the encoding of said data by changing a tag which indexes an encryption key stored in an associated recoding vector; and allows execution of the main program to resume.
executing a separate, background routine which:
suspends execution of the main program;
changes the encoding of said data by changing a tag which indexes an encryption key stored in an associated recoding vector; and allows execution of the main program to resume.
16. The method of claim 14, wherein said step of executing a separate, background routine comprises the steps of:
executing a separate, background routine which:
suspends execution of the main program;
changes the encoding of said data by changing the actual read/write R/W
encryption pairs within recoding vectors, with associated changes to the data affected, so that there is no stable association between particular tags and particular cell encodings in a software actual memory array (SAMA); and allows execution of the main program to resume.
executing a separate, background routine which:
suspends execution of the main program;
changes the encoding of said data by changing the actual read/write R/W
encryption pairs within recoding vectors, with associated changes to the data affected, so that there is no stable association between particular tags and particular cell encodings in a software actual memory array (SAMA); and allows execution of the main program to resume.
17. The method of claim 14, wherein said step of executing a separate, background routine comprises the steps of:
executing a separate, background routine which:
suspends execution of the main program;
changes the encoding of data within cells of a SAMA by changing the hash function encoding said data, so that no given piece of data has a fixed address within said SAMA for a long period of time; and allows execution of the main program to resume.
executing a separate, background routine which:
suspends execution of the main program;
changes the encoding of data within cells of a SAMA by changing the hash function encoding said data, so that no given piece of data has a fixed address within said SAMA for a long period of time; and allows execution of the main program to resume.
18. The method of claim 9, further comprising the step of:
varying the encoding of said data in said mass storage device over time.
varying the encoding of said data in said mass storage device over time.
19. The method of claim 10, further comprising the prior step of:
performing "maze" encoding transformations on data being input.
performing "maze" encoding transformations on data being input.
20. The method of claim 10, further comprising the step of:
performing "maze" encoding transformations on data being output.
performing "maze" encoding transformations on data being output.
21. The method of claim 11, wherein said tamper-resistant secret-hiding software comprises data flow encoding.
22. The method of claim 11, wherein said tamper-resistant secret-hiding software comprises control flow encoding.
23. The method of claim 7 wherein said actual address is pseudo-randomly selected.
24. The method of claim 7 wherein said mapping comprises a composition of composable hash functions.
25. The method of claim 7 wherein said step of mapping comprises the steps of:
determining necessary number of cell data encodings, based on degree of security required;
generating tags to index said cell data encodings;
generating recoding vectors containing read/write (R/W) data encryption pairs, said R/W pairs indexed by values of said tags;
storing said tag values in a tag array, at a location indexed by said hash of said virtual address;
encrypting input data value using said write data encryption key; and storing said encrypted data value in a SAMA array indexed by said hash of said virtual address.
determining necessary number of cell data encodings, based on degree of security required;
generating tags to index said cell data encodings;
generating recoding vectors containing read/write (R/W) data encryption pairs, said R/W pairs indexed by values of said tags;
storing said tag values in a tag array, at a location indexed by said hash of said virtual address;
encrypting input data value using said write data encryption key; and storing said encrypted data value in a SAMA array indexed by said hash of said virtual address.
26. The method of claim 7, further comprising the step of:
converting said virtual address to an actual address using a Pointwise Linear Partitioned Bijection (PLPB) transform.
converting said virtual address to an actual address using a Pointwise Linear Partitioned Bijection (PLPB) transform.
27. The method of claim 7, wherein multiple SAMAs mapping onto multiple SVMAs.
28. The method of claim 7, wherein said mapping comprises a concealed hash.
29. The method of claim 28, wherein said hash is concealed because the hash function itself is never computed, rather it comprises two functions:
a concealed data coding as a "half-way point" in the computation; and a "hasher" function applied to the output of the concealed data coding to produce the hashed value.
a concealed data coding as a "half-way point" in the computation; and a "hasher" function applied to the output of the concealed data coding to produce the hashed value.
30. The method of claim 7, wherein said step of mapping further comprises the step of:
composing transforms which perform both data encoding and hash functions (Pointwise Linear Partitioned Bijections, or PLPBs);
said PLPBs:
composing seamlessly with linear data encoding transformations; and being table-driven, making them highly suited to incremental changes over time as may be required to generate a flexibly sized address space (extensible hashing) or to change the address mapping incrementally over time by a "scrambler" process.
composing transforms which perform both data encoding and hash functions (Pointwise Linear Partitioned Bijections, or PLPBs);
said PLPBs:
composing seamlessly with linear data encoding transformations; and being table-driven, making them highly suited to incremental changes over time as may be required to generate a flexibly sized address space (extensible hashing) or to change the address mapping incrementally over time by a "scrambler" process.
31. A method of retrieving data from a tamper-resistant memory storage system comprising the steps of:
responding to a request to retrieve a data value at a virtual address by:
calculating a hash of said virtual address to generate an actual address; and fetching said data value at said actual address.
responding to a request to retrieve a data value at a virtual address by:
calculating a hash of said virtual address to generate an actual address; and fetching said data value at said actual address.
32. A method of obscuring memory contents comprising the steps of:
responding to a request to fetch a data value from a virtual address by:
mapping said virtual address onto a predetermined, pseudo-randomly selected actual address; and fetching said data value from a memory location indexed by said actual address.
responding to a request to fetch a data value from a virtual address by:
mapping said virtual address onto a predetermined, pseudo-randomly selected actual address; and fetching said data value from a memory location indexed by said actual address.
33. A method of memory retrieval which is tamper-resistant and obscure comprising the steps of:
responding to a request to fetch a data value from a virtual address by:
calculating a hash of said virtual address to generate an actual address; and fetching said data value from a memory location indexed by said actual address.
responding to a request to fetch a data value from a virtual address by:
calculating a hash of said virtual address to generate an actual address; and fetching said data value from a memory location indexed by said actual address.
34. A method of obscuring mass data comprising the steps of:
responding to a request to fetch a data value at a virtual address by:
fetching said data value from an actual memory location indexed by a hash of said virtual address.
responding to a request to fetch a data value at a virtual address by:
fetching said data value from an actual memory location indexed by a hash of said virtual address.
35. A method of obscuring mass data comprising the steps of:
responding to a request to fetch a data value by:
fetching said data from a pseudo-randomly selected memory location.
responding to a request to fetch a data value by:
fetching said data from a pseudo-randomly selected memory location.
36. A system for obscuring memory contents comprising:
a computer;
said computer being operable to:
respond to a request to store a data value at a virtual address by:
mapping said virtual address onto a randomly selected actual address; and storing said data value in a memory location indexed by said actual address.
a computer;
said computer being operable to:
respond to a request to store a data value at a virtual address by:
mapping said virtual address onto a randomly selected actual address; and storing said data value in a memory location indexed by said actual address.
37. An apparatus for obscuring memory contents comprising:
means for responding to a request to store a data value at a virtual address by:
mapping said virtual address onto a randomly selected actual address; and storing said data value in a memory location indexed by said actual address.
means for responding to a request to store a data value at a virtual address by:
mapping said virtual address onto a randomly selected actual address; and storing said data value in a memory location indexed by said actual address.
38. A computer readable memory medium for storing software code executable to perform the method steps of:
responding to a request to store a data value at a virtual address by:
mapping said virtual address onto a randomly selected actual address; and storing said data value in a memory location indexed by said actual address.
responding to a request to store a data value at a virtual address by:
mapping said virtual address onto a randomly selected actual address; and storing said data value in a memory location indexed by said actual address.
39. A carrier signal incorporating software code executable to perform the method steps of:
responding to a request to store a data value at a virtual address by:
mapping said virtual address onto a randomly selected actual address; and storing said data value in a memory location indexed by said actual address.
responding to a request to store a data value at a virtual address by:
mapping said virtual address onto a randomly selected actual address; and storing said data value in a memory location indexed by said actual address.
Priority Applications (6)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CA002350029A CA2350029A1 (en) | 2001-06-08 | 2001-06-08 | Sustainable digital watermarking via tamper-resistant software |
| AU2002312670A AU2002312670A1 (en) | 2001-06-08 | 2002-06-10 | Method and system for generating sustainable digital watermarks |
| US10/478,696 US7395433B2 (en) | 2001-06-08 | 2002-06-10 | Method and system for sustainable digital watermarking |
| EP02737682A EP1421457A2 (en) | 2001-06-08 | 2002-06-10 | Method and system for generating sustainable digital watermarks |
| CA002449595A CA2449595A1 (en) | 2001-06-08 | 2002-06-10 | Method and system for sustainable digital watermarking |
| PCT/CA2002/000847 WO2002101519A2 (en) | 2001-06-08 | 2002-06-10 | Method and system for generating sustainable digital watermarks |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CA002350029A CA2350029A1 (en) | 2001-06-08 | 2001-06-08 | Sustainable digital watermarking via tamper-resistant software |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CA2350029A1 true CA2350029A1 (en) | 2002-12-08 |
Family
ID=4169233
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CA002350029A Abandoned CA2350029A1 (en) | 2001-06-08 | 2001-06-08 | Sustainable digital watermarking via tamper-resistant software |
Country Status (5)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| US (1) | US7395433B2 (en) |
| EP (1) | EP1421457A2 (en) |
| AU (1) | AU2002312670A1 (en) |
| CA (1) | CA2350029A1 (en) |
| WO (1) | WO2002101519A2 (en) |
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2010055171A1 (en) * | 2008-11-17 | 2010-05-20 | Intrinsic-Id B.V. | Distributed puf |
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| US7770016B2 (en) * | 1999-07-29 | 2010-08-03 | Intertrust Technologies Corporation | Systems and methods for watermarking software and other media |
| JP2004362532A (en) * | 2002-10-25 | 2004-12-24 | Matsushita Electric Ind Co Ltd | Watermark insertion device and watermark extraction device |
| US8510571B1 (en) | 2003-03-24 | 2013-08-13 | Hoi Chang | System and method for inserting security mechanisms into a software program |
| US8661559B2 (en) | 2003-08-18 | 2014-02-25 | Riverside Research Institute | Software control flow watermarking |
| CN100428107C (en) * | 2004-02-11 | 2008-10-22 | 北京邮电大学 | Digital watermarking infrastructure |
| WO2005122114A1 (en) * | 2004-06-10 | 2005-12-22 | Protection Technology Limited | Water marks injector |
| CN1322433C (en) * | 2004-08-12 | 2007-06-20 | 西南交通大学 | Positioning vulnerable water print generating and recognizing method capable of distigushing image and watermark distortion |
| KR100611989B1 (en) * | 2004-08-31 | 2006-08-11 | 삼성전자주식회사 | Method and apparatus for generating fingerprint codes |
| US8887287B2 (en) * | 2004-10-27 | 2014-11-11 | Alcatel Lucent | Method and apparatus for software integrity protection using timed executable agents |
| EP1715436A3 (en) * | 2005-04-21 | 2007-03-28 | St Microelectronics S.A. | Protection of program execution performed by an integrated circuit or the data stored in this circuit |
| US20060259903A1 (en) * | 2005-05-12 | 2006-11-16 | Xerox Corporation | Method for creating unique identification for copies of executable code and management thereof |
| US20060259900A1 (en) * | 2005-05-12 | 2006-11-16 | Xerox Corporation | Method for creating unique identification for copies of executable code and management thereof |
| US7760903B2 (en) * | 2005-08-30 | 2010-07-20 | Microsoft Corporation | Tamper-resistant text stream watermarking |
| EP1934877A2 (en) | 2005-09-30 | 2008-06-25 | Nxp B.V. | Watermarking of a processing module |
| FR2903508B1 (en) * | 2006-07-10 | 2008-10-17 | Sagem Defense Securite | PROTECTION OF A PROGRAM INTERPRETED BY A VIRTUAL MACHINE |
| CN101690233A (en) * | 2007-07-06 | 2010-03-31 | 皇家飞利浦电子股份有限公司 | Use additional huffman table that the data of entropy coding are added watermark and encryption |
| JP5346024B2 (en) * | 2007-09-13 | 2013-11-20 | イルデト・コーポレート・ビー・ヴイ | Content encryption |
| EP2240849B1 (en) | 2008-02-06 | 2016-01-27 | Nxp B.V. | Data processing device and method for executing obfuscated programs |
| WO2009101562A2 (en) | 2008-02-11 | 2009-08-20 | Nxp B.V. | Method of program obfuscation and processing device for executing obfuscated programs |
| US20100095376A1 (en) * | 2008-03-07 | 2010-04-15 | Rodriguez Tony F | Software watermarking |
| KR101597251B1 (en) * | 2008-05-23 | 2016-02-24 | 이르데토 비.브이. | System and method for generating whitebox implementations of software applications |
| CN102598017B (en) | 2009-11-13 | 2016-03-09 | 爱迪德技术有限公司 | Improve the system and method for its tamper-proof capabilities of Java bytecode |
| EP2828782A1 (en) | 2012-03-23 | 2015-01-28 | Irdeto B.V. | Software fingerprinting |
| WO2015149826A1 (en) | 2014-03-31 | 2015-10-08 | Irdeto B.V. | Protecting an item of software |
| GB201405755D0 (en) | 2014-03-31 | 2014-05-14 | Irdeto Bv | Optimizing and protecting software |
| WO2016118216A2 (en) | 2014-11-06 | 2016-07-28 | Intertrust Technologies Corporation | Secure application distribution systems and methods |
| GB201505553D0 (en) | 2015-03-31 | 2015-05-13 | Irdeto Bv | Online advertisements |
| US10223511B2 (en) * | 2016-03-30 | 2019-03-05 | Nxp B.V. | Watermarking input and output of a white-box implementation |
| CA3047009A1 (en) | 2016-12-15 | 2018-06-21 | Irdeto B.V. | Software integrity verification |
| GB201703864D0 (en) | 2017-03-10 | 2017-04-26 | Irdeto Bv | Secured system operation |
| CN111316315B (en) | 2017-09-12 | 2023-03-28 | 爱迪德有限公司 | Watermarking equipment and method based on GPU |
| CN108491698B (en) * | 2018-03-22 | 2020-03-10 | 维沃移动通信有限公司 | Watermark generation method and mobile terminal |
| US10797868B2 (en) | 2018-05-31 | 2020-10-06 | Irdeto B.V. | Shared secret establishment |
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| US11263316B2 (en) | 2019-08-20 | 2022-03-01 | Irdeto B.V. | Securing software routines |
| US11481678B2 (en) * | 2019-11-14 | 2022-10-25 | Baidu Usa Llc | Systems and methods for learning new watermark algorithms for a data processing accelerator |
| US11574032B2 (en) | 2019-11-14 | 2023-02-07 | Baidu Usa Llc | Systems and methods for signing an AI model with a watermark for a data processing accelerator |
| US11582260B2 (en) | 2019-11-14 | 2023-02-14 | Baidu Usa Llc | Systems and methods for verifying a watermark of an AI model for a data processing accelerator |
| US11579928B2 (en) | 2019-11-14 | 2023-02-14 | Baidu Usa Llc | Systems and methods for configuring a watermark unit with watermark algorithms for a data processing accelerator |
| EP4339835A1 (en) | 2022-09-16 | 2024-03-20 | Irdeto B.V. | Machine learning model protection |
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| US5889868A (en) * | 1996-07-02 | 1999-03-30 | The Dice Company | Optimization methods for the insertion, protection, and detection of digital watermarks in digitized data |
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| JP3654077B2 (en) * | 1999-09-07 | 2005-06-02 | 日本電気株式会社 | Online digital watermark detection system, online digital watermark detection method, and recording medium on which online digital watermark detection program is recorded |
-
2001
- 2001-06-08 CA CA002350029A patent/CA2350029A1/en not_active Abandoned
-
2002
- 2002-06-10 AU AU2002312670A patent/AU2002312670A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2002-06-10 EP EP02737682A patent/EP1421457A2/en not_active Withdrawn
- 2002-06-10 WO PCT/CA2002/000847 patent/WO2002101519A2/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2002-06-10 US US10/478,696 patent/US7395433B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2010055171A1 (en) * | 2008-11-17 | 2010-05-20 | Intrinsic-Id B.V. | Distributed puf |
| US8699714B2 (en) | 2008-11-17 | 2014-04-15 | Intrinsic Id B.V. | Distributed PUF |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| WO2002101519A3 (en) | 2004-02-05 |
| AU2002312670A1 (en) | 2002-12-23 |
| WO2002101519A2 (en) | 2002-12-19 |
| EP1421457A2 (en) | 2004-05-26 |
| US20050021966A1 (en) | 2005-01-27 |
| US7395433B2 (en) | 2008-07-01 |
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