CA2399097A1 - Method, system and mobile terminal for checking the integrity of data - Google Patents

Method, system and mobile terminal for checking the integrity of data

Info

Publication number
CA2399097A1
CA2399097A1 CA002399097A CA2399097A CA2399097A1 CA 2399097 A1 CA2399097 A1 CA 2399097A1 CA 002399097 A CA002399097 A CA 002399097A CA 2399097 A CA2399097 A CA 2399097A CA 2399097 A1 CA2399097 A1 CA 2399097A1
Authority
CA
Canada
Prior art keywords
message
random string
authentication
authentication value
check
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
CA002399097A
Other languages
French (fr)
Other versions
CA2399097C (en
Inventor
Olli Immonen
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Nokia Technologies Oy
Original Assignee
Individual
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Individual filed Critical Individual
Publication of CA2399097A1 publication Critical patent/CA2399097A1/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of CA2399097C publication Critical patent/CA2399097C/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/18—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security using different networks or channels, e.g. using out of band channels
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3215—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a plurality of channels
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless

Abstract

The invention relates to a method for checking the integrity of a message transmitted between a sender in a transmitting end and a recipient in a receiving end, in which method an authentication value is calculated for the first message and a random string is generated. According to a method in the transmitting end an authentication value is generated from a message to be sent and the random string. A check code is formed from the authentication value and the random string. The first message is transferred from a sender to a recipient through a first channel, and the check code is transferred through a second secure channel. In the receiving end a message is received through a first channel and the check code is received through a second secure channel.
In the receiving end an authentication check formed at least based of the received message. The integrity of the received message is checked by comparing the predetermined check values in the receiving end.

Claims (14)

1. A method for checking the integrity of a first message transmitted between a sender in a transmitting end and a recipient in a receiving end, in which method an authentication value is calculated for the first message and a random string is generated, characterized in that - the first message is transmitted from the sender to the recipient through a first channel and - the authentication value and the random string are transmitted to the recipient through a second secure channel for checking the integrity of a received message in the receiving end.
2. A method according to claim 1, characterized in that the authentication value is generated from the first message and the random string in the transmitting end.
3. A method according to claim 1, characterized in that the authentication value and the random string are combined as a check code in the transmitting end.
4. A method according to claim 3, characterized in that the authentication value and the random string are separated from the check code in the receiving end.
5. A method according to claim 1, characterized in that in the receiving end an authentication check is generated from the received message and from either the random string or the authentication value.
6. A method according to claim 5, characterized in that in the receiving end the authentication check is compared with either the authentication value or the random string not used in the generation of the authentication check for checking the integrity of the received message compared to the transmitted message.
7. A method according to claim 1, characterized in that the second secure channel is out-of-band.
8. A method according to claim 1, characterized in that in the transmitting end - a first message is formed, - a random string is generated, - an authentication value is generated from said first message and said random string, - a check code is formed by combining said authentication value and said random string, - said first message is transferred from the sender to the recipient through the first channel, and - said check code is transferred from said sender to said recipient through the second secure channel.
9. A method according to claim 8, characterized in that in the receiving end - a message is received through a first channel, - the check code is received through a second secure channel, - the authentication value and the random string are separated from said check code, - an authentication check is generated from the received message and from either said random string or said authentication value, and said authentication check is compared with either said authentication value or said random string not used in the generation of said authentication check for checking the integrity of said received message compared to the first message.
10. A method according to claim 1, characterized in that the message contains bootstrap information.
11. A system for checking the integrity of a first message transmitted between a sender in a transmitting end and a recipient in a receiving end, in which the system comprises means for calculating an authentication value for the first message and means for generating a random string, characterized in that in the transmitting end the system comprises - means for forming a check code by combining the authentication value and the random string, - means for transferring the first message from the sender to the recipient through the first channel, and - means for transferring said check code from said sender to said recipient through the second secure channel, and in the receiving end the system comprises - means for separating said authentication value and said random string from said check code, - means for generating an authentication check from the received message and from either said random string or said authentication value, and - means for comparing said authentication check with either said authentication value or said random string not used in the generation of said authentication check for checking the integrity of said received message compared to the first message.
12. A system according to claim 11, characterized in that the system comprises the operations of the WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) system.
13. A mobile terminal for checking the integrity of a message received, into which mobile terminal a first message is sent, characterized in that the mobile terminal comprises - means for receiving a message, - input means for inputting a check code of the first message received through a secure channel into said mobile terminal, - means for separating an authentication value and a random string from said check code of said first message, - means for generating an authentication check from said received message and from either said authentication value or said random string, and - means for comparing said authentication check with either said authentication value or said random string not used in the generation of said authentication check for checking the integrity of said received message compared to the first message.
14. A mobile terminal according to claim 13, characterized in that it is WAP
(Wireless Application Protocol) terminal.
CA2399097A 2000-02-01 2001-02-01 Method, system and mobile terminal for checking the integrity of data Expired - Lifetime CA2399097C (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
FI20000203 2000-02-01
FI20000203A FI112418B (en) 2000-02-01 2000-02-01 Method for checking data integrity, system and mobile
PCT/FI2001/000093 WO2001058081A1 (en) 2000-02-01 2001-02-01 Method for checking the integrity of data, system and mobile terminal

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
CA2399097A1 true CA2399097A1 (en) 2001-08-09
CA2399097C CA2399097C (en) 2011-07-05

Family

ID=8557289

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
CA2399097A Expired - Lifetime CA2399097C (en) 2000-02-01 2001-02-01 Method, system and mobile terminal for checking the integrity of data

Country Status (14)

Country Link
US (2) US7725714B2 (en)
EP (1) EP1252739B1 (en)
JP (4) JP4377100B2 (en)
KR (1) KR100465443B1 (en)
CN (1) CN100409612C (en)
AT (1) ATE326091T1 (en)
AU (1) AU3180901A (en)
BR (1) BRPI0107925B1 (en)
CA (1) CA2399097C (en)
DE (1) DE60119489T2 (en)
ES (1) ES2261376T3 (en)
FI (1) FI112418B (en)
HK (1) HK1049079B (en)
WO (1) WO2001058081A1 (en)

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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
AU3180901A (en) 2001-08-14
CA2399097C (en) 2011-07-05
FI112418B (en) 2003-11-28
EP1252739A1 (en) 2002-10-30
ES2261376T3 (en) 2006-11-16
US8171291B2 (en) 2012-05-01
BR0107925A (en) 2002-12-10
EP1252739B1 (en) 2006-05-10
CN100409612C (en) 2008-08-06
US20100191966A1 (en) 2010-07-29
CN1397124A (en) 2003-02-12
FI20000203A (en) 2001-08-02
JP2006136003A (en) 2006-05-25
JP2006352904A (en) 2006-12-28
US7725714B2 (en) 2010-05-25
FI20000203A0 (en) 2000-02-01
HK1049079B (en) 2006-10-20
DE60119489D1 (en) 2006-06-14
DE60119489T2 (en) 2006-09-28
US20030120924A1 (en) 2003-06-26
JP2003522475A (en) 2003-07-22
HK1049079A1 (en) 2003-04-25
BRPI0107925B1 (en) 2015-09-08
ATE326091T1 (en) 2006-06-15
WO2001058081A1 (en) 2001-08-09
KR100465443B1 (en) 2005-01-13
JP2011010313A (en) 2011-01-13
JP4377100B2 (en) 2009-12-02
KR20030009342A (en) 2003-01-29

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Effective date: 20210201