CA2400786C - Data authentication system with reproduction device utilization restrictions - Google Patents

Data authentication system with reproduction device utilization restrictions Download PDF

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Publication number
CA2400786C
CA2400786C CA002400786A CA2400786A CA2400786C CA 2400786 C CA2400786 C CA 2400786C CA 002400786 A CA002400786 A CA 002400786A CA 2400786 A CA2400786 A CA 2400786A CA 2400786 C CA2400786 C CA 2400786C
Authority
CA
Canada
Prior art keywords
data
key
processing
encryption
recording device
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Fee Related
Application number
CA002400786A
Other languages
French (fr)
Other versions
CA2400786A1 (en
Inventor
Tomoyuki Asano
Yoshihito Ishibashi
Taizo Shirai
Toru Akishita
Masaharu Yoshimori
Makoto Tanaka
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Sony Interactive Entertainment Inc
Sony Corp
Original Assignee
Sony Corp
Sony Computer Entertainment Inc
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from JP2000013322A external-priority patent/JP2001203686A/en
Priority claimed from JP2000016292A external-priority patent/JP2001211080A/en
Priority claimed from JP2000016251A external-priority patent/JP2001211152A/en
Priority claimed from JP2000016029A external-priority patent/JP2001211149A/en
Priority claimed from JP2000015858A external-priority patent/JP2001209310A/en
Priority claimed from JP2000015551A external-priority patent/JP2001211148A/en
Priority claimed from JP2000016213A external-priority patent/JP2001211151A/en
Application filed by Sony Corp, Sony Computer Entertainment Inc filed Critical Sony Corp
Publication of CA2400786A1 publication Critical patent/CA2400786A1/en
Publication of CA2400786C publication Critical patent/CA2400786C/en
Application granted granted Critical
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Fee Related legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H04L9/3273—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/00094—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving measures which result in a restriction to authorised record carriers
    • G11B20/00123—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving measures which result in a restriction to authorised record carriers the record carrier being identified by recognising some of its unique characteristics, e.g. a unique defect pattern serving as a physical signature of the record carrier
    • G—PHYSICS
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    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/00166—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving measures which result in a restriction to authorised contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier, e.g. music or software
    • G11B20/00173—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving measures which result in a restriction to authorised contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier, e.g. music or software wherein the origin of the content is checked, e.g. determining whether the content has originally been retrieved from a legal disc copy or another trusted source
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/0021—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier
    • G—PHYSICS
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    • G11B20/0021—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier
    • G11B20/00217—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier the cryptographic key used for encryption and/or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from the record carrier being read from a specific source
    • G11B20/00224—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier the cryptographic key used for encryption and/or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from the record carrier being read from a specific source wherein the key is obtained from a remote server
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
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    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/0021—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier
    • G11B20/00217—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier the cryptographic key used for encryption and/or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from the record carrier being read from a specific source
    • G11B20/00246—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier the cryptographic key used for encryption and/or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from the record carrier being read from a specific source wherein the key is obtained from a local device, e.g. device key initially stored by the player or by the recorder
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
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    • G11B20/00485—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier characterised by a specific kind of data which is encrypted and recorded on and/or reproduced from the record carrier
    • G11B20/00492—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier characterised by a specific kind of data which is encrypted and recorded on and/or reproduced from the record carrier wherein content or user data is encrypted
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/0021—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier
    • G11B20/00485—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier characterised by a specific kind of data which is encrypted and recorded on and/or reproduced from the record carrier
    • G11B20/00492—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier characterised by a specific kind of data which is encrypted and recorded on and/or reproduced from the record carrier wherein content or user data is encrypted
    • G11B20/00507—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier characterised by a specific kind of data which is encrypted and recorded on and/or reproduced from the record carrier wherein content or user data is encrypted wherein consecutive physical data units of the record carrier are encrypted with separate encryption keys, e.g. the key changes on a cluster or sector basis
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/0021—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier
    • G11B20/00485—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier characterised by a specific kind of data which is encrypted and recorded on and/or reproduced from the record carrier
    • G11B20/00492—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier characterised by a specific kind of data which is encrypted and recorded on and/or reproduced from the record carrier wherein content or user data is encrypted
    • G11B20/00536—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier characterised by a specific kind of data which is encrypted and recorded on and/or reproduced from the record carrier wherein content or user data is encrypted wherein encrypted content data is subjected to a further, iterated encryption, e.g. interwoven encryption
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/0021—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier
    • G11B20/00485—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier characterised by a specific kind of data which is encrypted and recorded on and/or reproduced from the record carrier
    • G11B20/00557—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier characterised by a specific kind of data which is encrypted and recorded on and/or reproduced from the record carrier wherein further management data is encrypted, e.g. sector headers, TOC or the lead-in or lead-out areas
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/00731—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction
    • G11B20/00739—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction wherein the usage restriction is associated with a specific geographical region
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
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    • G11B20/00731—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction
    • G11B20/00746—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction wherein the usage restriction can be expressed as a specific number
    • G11B20/00753—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction wherein the usage restriction can be expressed as a specific number wherein the usage restriction limits the number of copies that can be made, e.g. CGMS, SCMS, or CCI flags
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
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    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/00731—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction
    • G11B20/00746—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction wherein the usage restriction can be expressed as a specific number
    • G11B20/00753—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction wherein the usage restriction can be expressed as a specific number wherein the usage restriction limits the number of copies that can be made, e.g. CGMS, SCMS, or CCI flags
    • G11B20/00768—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction wherein the usage restriction can be expressed as a specific number wherein the usage restriction limits the number of copies that can be made, e.g. CGMS, SCMS, or CCI flags wherein copy control information is used, e.g. for indicating whether a content may be copied freely, no more, once, or never, by setting CGMS, SCMS, or CCI flags
    • G11B20/00775—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a digital rights management system for enforcing a usage restriction wherein the usage restriction can be expressed as a specific number wherein the usage restriction limits the number of copies that can be made, e.g. CGMS, SCMS, or CCI flags wherein copy control information is used, e.g. for indicating whether a content may be copied freely, no more, once, or never, by setting CGMS, SCMS, or CCI flags wherein said copy control information is encoded in an encryption mode indicator [EMI]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
    • H04L9/0625—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation with splitting of the data block into left and right halves, e.g. Feistel based algorithms, DES, FEAL, IDEA or KASUMI
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
    • H04L9/0637—Modes of operation, e.g. cipher block chaining [CBC], electronic codebook [ECB] or Galois/counter mode [GCM]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
    • H04L9/0897—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/14—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
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    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00007—Time or data compression or expansion
    • G11B2020/00014—Time or data compression or expansion the compressed signal being an audio signal
    • G11B2020/00057—MPEG-1 or MPEG-2 audio layer III [MP3]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/60—Digital content management, e.g. content distribution

Abstract

A record reproducing player and save data processing methods capable of insuring security of save data are provided. Save data is stored in a recording device, encrypted with the use of a program's individual encryption key, e.g., a content key, or a save data encryption key created based the content key, and when reproducing the save data a decryption process is conducted on it with the use of the save data decryption key particular to the program. Furthermore, it is made possible to create save data encryption keys based on a variety of restriction information, such as performing the storing and reproducing of the save data by conducting encryption and decryption on the save data with the save data encryption keys and decryption keys created with the use of a record reproducing player's individual key or a user's password.

Description

DEMANDES OU BREVETS VOLUMINEUX
LA PRESENTS PARTIE DE CETTE DEMANDS OU CE BREVET
COMPREND PLUS D'UN TOME.
CECI EST LE TOME ~ DE
NOTE: ~ Pour les tames additionels, veuilfez contacter Ie Bureau canadien des brevets JUMBO APPLlCATIONSIPATENTS
THIS SECTION OF THE APP~ICATION/PATE1VT CONTAINS MORE
THAN ONE VOLUME
THIS IS VOLUME - I_ OF
NOTE: I=or additional volumes please contact the Canadian Patent Office DESCRIPTION
Data authentication-system with reproduction device utilization restrictions Technical Field The present invention relates to a data processing apparatus, a data processing method, and more particularly, to a method and apparatus for verifying that data constituting a data content are valid, that is, checking whether or not the data have been tampered, as well as a method for imparting verification values, and also to an apparatus and a method capable of enhancing security by generating individual keys necessary for encryption processing using master keys corresponding to their respective individual keys. Moreover the present invention provides a conf~.guration that eliminates illegal usage of contents data or more specifically, relates to an apparatus and a method capable of identifying illegal reproduction devices and eliminate illegal use of contents. Furthermore, the presera invention relates to an apparatus and a method capable of easily setting contents only available to the data processing apparatus using contents data and contents data also available to other data processing apparatuses ' based on information specific to the data processing apparatus, etc. Still further, the present invention relates to a method, apparatus and verification value assignment method for verifying the validity of data configuring data contents, that is, verifying the presence or absence of tampering.
Furthermore, the present invent=ion relates to a data processing apparatus, a content data generating method, and a data processing method that realizes a content data configuration enabling to provide and utilize content data under a high security management in a configuratior_ in which data including at least any one of voice information, image information and program data is applied encryption processing, the data is provided to a content user together with various kinds of header information, and the content user performs reproduction, execution, or storing processing in a recording device.
Still further, the present invention relates to a data processing apparatus, a data processing method and a content data generating method for providing a configuration for efficiently executing reproduction processing in the case in which data contents are compressed voice data, image data or the like, and more specifically for enabling to have a configuration of the content data in which compressed data ar~d an expansion processing program are combined, retrieve and extract an applicable expansion processing program based on header information of compressed data contents in which an applied expansion processing program is -stored as header information to execute reproduction processing.
Further yet, the present invenvion relates a configuration and method for reproducing various contents such as sounds, images, games, or programs which are available through recording media such as DVDs or CDs or wire or radio communication means such as CATV, the Internet, or satellite communication, in a recording and reproducing device owned by a user and storing the contents in an exclusive recording device, for example, a memory card, a hard disk, or a CD-R, realizing a configuration for imposing use limitations desired by a content distributor when a content stored in the recording device is used, and providing security such that the distributed content will not be illegally used by a third person other than regular users.
Background Art DESCRTPTT_ON OF THE RELATED AR.T
Various data such as game programs, sound data, image data, or documenting programs (these are hereafter referred to as "contents") are now distributed via a network such as the Internet or via distributable storage media such as DVDs or CDs. These distributed contents can be stored in a recording device such as a memory card or a hard disk which is attached to a recording and reproducing apparatus such as a Personal Computer (PC) or a game apparatus that is owned by a user so that once stored, the contents can be reproduced from the: storage media.
Main components of a memory card used in a conventional information apparatus such as a video game apparatus or a PC
include a connection means for controlling operations, a connector for connection to a slot connected to the connection means and formed in the information apparatus, a non-volatile memory connected to the control means for storing data, and others. The r:on-volatile memory provided in the memory card comprises an EEPROM, a flash memory, or the like.
Various contents such as data «r programs that are stored in the memory card are invoked from the non-volatile memory in response to a user's command from an information apparatus main body such as a game apparatus or a PC which is used as a reproduction apparatus or to a user's command provided via a connected input means, and are reproduced from the information apparatus main body or from a display, speakers, or the like which are connected thereto.
Many software contents such as game programs, music data, or image data generally have their distribution rights held by their creators or sellers. Thus, in distributing these contents, a configuration is generally used which places specified limitations on the usage; that is, the use of software is permitted only for regular users so as to prever;t unauthorized copying or the like;
that is, security is taken into consideration.
One method for realizing limitations on the use by a user is a process for encrypting a distributed r_ontent. This process comprises a means for distributing various contents such as sound data, image data, or game programs which are encrypted, for example, via the Internet and decrypting a distributed encrypted content only for people confirmed t:o be regular users, the means corresponding to a configuration for imparting a decryption key.
Encrypted data can be returned. to available decrypted data (plain text) obtained by a decryption process based on a predetermined procedure. Such a data encrypting and decrypting method that uses an encryption key for an information encrypting process while using a decryption key for such a decryption process is conventionally known.
There are various types of aspects of data encrypting and decrypting methods using an encr~rotion key and a decryption key;
an example is what is called a common key cryptosystem. The common key cryptosystem uses a common encryption key used for a data encrypting process and a common decryption key used for a data decrypting process and impart; these common keys used for the encryption and decryption processes, to regular users while excluding data accesses by illegal users that have no key. A
representative example of this cryptosystem is the DES (Data Encryption Standard).
The encryption and decr~,~ption keys used for the encryption and decryption processes are obtained, for example, by applying a one-way function such as a hash fur_ction based on a password or the like. The one-way function makes it difficult to determine its input from its output. For example, a password decided by a user is used as an input to -apply a one-way function so as to generate an encryption and a decryption keys based on an output from the function. Determining from the thus obtained encryption and decryption keys, the password, which is the original data for the keys, is substantially impossible.
In addition, a method called a ~~public key cryptosystem" uses different algorithms for a process based on an encryption key used for encryption and for a process based on a decryption key used for decryption. The public key cryptosystem uses a public key available to unspecified users so that an encrypted document for a particular individual is decrypted using a public key issued by this particular user. The document encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted with a secret key corresponding to the public key used for the decryption process. Since the secret key is owned by the individual that has issued the public key, the document encrypted with the public key can be decrypted only by individuals having the secret key. A representative public key cryptosystem is the RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) encryption.
The use of such a cryptosystem enables encrypted contents to be decrypted only for regular users. A conventional content distributing configuration employing such a cryptosystem will be described in brief with reference to Fig. 1.
Fig. 1 shows an example of a configuration in which a reproduction means 10 such as a PC (Personal Computer) or a game apparatus reproduces a program, sound or video data, or the like (content) obtained from a data providing means such as a DVD, a CD
30, or the Internet 40 and wherein data obtained from the DVD, CD

30, Internet 40, or the like are stored in a storage means 20 such as a floppy disk, a memory card, a hard disk, or the like.
The content such as a program or sound or video data are provided to a user having the reproduction means 10. A regular user obtains an encryption data as well as key data that are their encryption and decryption keys.
The reproduction means 10 has a CPU 12 to reproduce input data by means of a reproduction process section 14. The reproduction process section 14 decrypts encrypted data to reproduce a provided program and the content such as sound or image data.
The regular user saves the content such as the program and data to a storage means 20 in order to use the provided program again. The reproduction means 10 has a saving process section 13 for executing this content saving process. The saving process section 13 encrypts and saves the data in order to prevent the data stored in the storage means 20 from being illegally used.
A content encrypting key is used to encrypt the content. The saving process section 13 uses the content encrypting key to encrypt the content and then stores the encrypted content in a storage section 21 of the storage means 20 such as a FD (Floppy Disk), a memory card, or a hard disk.
To obtain and reproduce the stored content from the storage means 20, the user obtains encrypted data from the storage means 20 and causes the reproduction process section 14 of the reproduction means 10 to execute the decryption process using a content decrypting key, that is, the decryption key in order to cbtain and reproduce decrypted data from the encrypted data.
According to the convc=ntional example of configuration shown in Fig. l, the stored content is encrypted in the storage means 20 such as a floppy disk or memcry card and thus cannot be read externally. When, however, this floppy disk is to be reproduced by means of a reproduction means of another information apparatus such as PC or game apparatus, the reproduction is impossible unless the reproduction means has the same content key, that is, the same decryption key for decrypting the encrypted content.
Accordingly, to implement a form available to a plurality of information apparatuses, a common decryption key must be provided to users.
The use of a common content encrypting key, however, means that there will be a higher possibility of disorderly distributing the encryption process key to users not having a regular license.
Consequently, the illegal use of the content by users not having the regular license cannot be prevented, and it will be difficult to exclude the illegal use in PCs, game apparatuses, or the like which do not have the regular license.
In case that kev information leeks from one of the -apparatuses, the use of common content encrypting key and decryption key can cause damage to the whole system which utilizes the keys _ g _ Furthermore, in an enzrironme~:t using a common key as described above, it is possible to easily copy, for example, a content created on a certain PC and saved t:o a storage means such as a memory card or floppy disk, to another floppy disk.
Consequently, a use form using the copied floppy disk instead of the original content data wil.i be possible, so that a large number of copied content data available to information apparatuses such as game apparatuses or PCs may be created or tampered.
A method is conventionally used which contain a verifying integrity check value in content data for checking the validity of the data, that is, whether or not the data have been tampered and which then causes a recording and reproducing device to collate a integrity check value generated based on the data to be verified with the integrity check value contained in the content data to verify the data.
The integrity check value fo:r the data contents, however, is generally generated for the entire data, and collating the integrity check value generated for the en tire data requires a integrity check value to be generated for the entire data to be checked. If, for example, a integrity check value ICV is to be determined using a Message Authentication Code (MAC) generated in a DES-CBC mode, the DES CBC process must be executed on the entire -data. The amount of such calculations increases linearly with the data length, thereby disadvantageously reducing processing efficiency.

Description of the Invention The present invention selves above prcblems in a conventional art and is to provide, as a first object, a data processing apparatus and method and a data verifying value imparting method, which efficiently confirm the validity of data and efficiently execute a download process for a recording device executed after the Verification, a reproduction process executed after the verification, and other processes, as well as a program providing medium for use in this apparatus ar,.d these methods.
Furthermore, as techniques for limiting the use of contents data to authorized users, various kinds of encryption processing are available such as data encryption, data decryption, data verification, signature processing. However, executing these kinds of encryption processing requires common secret information, for example, key information applied to enr_ryption and decryption of contents data or an authentication key used for authentication to be shared between two apparatuses, that is, apparatuses between which contents data is transferred or apparatuses between which authentication processing is executed.
Therefore, in the case where key data, which is shared secret information, is leaked from either of the two apparatuses, the contents encryption data using the shared key information can also be decrypted by a third party who has no license, thus allowing illegal use of contents. The same is true for the case where an authentication key is leaked, which will lead to establish authentication for an apparatus with no license. Leakage of keys, therefore, has consequences threatening the entire system.
The present invention is intended to solve these problems.
The second object of the invention is to provide a data processing apparatus, data processing system and data processing method with enhanced security in encryption processing. The data processing apparatus of the present invention does not store individual keys necessary to execute encryption processing such as data encryption, data decryption, data verification, authentication processing and signature processing in a storage section, stores master keys to generate these individual keys in the storage section instead and allows an encryption processing section to generate necessary individual keys based on the master keys and identification data of the apparatus or data.
Furthermore, it is possible to maintain a certain degree of security by supplying contents data encrypted. However, in the case where various encryption keys stored in memory are read through illegal reading of memory, k:ey data, etc. is leaked and copied on a recorder/reproducer witr.out any authorized license, contents may be illegally used using the copied key information.
It is the third object of the present invention to provide a data processing apparatus, data processing method and contents data generation method in a configuration capable of excluding such illegal reproducers, that is, a configuration identifying illegal reproducers and not allowing the identified reproducers to execute processing such as reproduction and downloading of contents data.
Furthermore, techniques for limiting the use of contents data to authorized users include encryption processing using predetermined encryption keys, for. example, signature processing.
However, conventional encryption processing using signature generally has a signature key common to all entities using contents in a system and such a signature key allows different apparatuses to use common contents, which involves a problem of leading to illegal copies of contents.
It is possible to store contents encrypted using a unique password, etc., but the password may be stolen. It is also possible to decrypt a same encrypted contents data by entering a same password through different reproducers, but it is difficult for a conventional security configuration to implement a system that can identify a reproducer to a:~low only the reproducer to use the contents.
The present invention has been implemented to solve the above problems of the prior arts and it is the fourth object of the present invention to provide a data processing apparatus and data processing method capable of allowir~~g only a specific data -processing apparatus to reproduce contents according to contents utilization restrictions by making it possible to selectively use an apparatus-specific key, which is specific to a data processing _ 1~ _ apparatus and a system common key, which is common to other data processing apparatuses.
Furthermore, here is encryption processing of content data as a method of limiting utilization c;f content data to authorized users. However, there are various kinds of content data such as voice information, image information and program data, and there are various contents in cases such as a case in which all content data is required to be encrypted and a case in which a part requiring encryption processing and a part not requiring encryption processing are mixed.
Applying encryption processing uniformly to such various contents may generate unnecessary decryption processing in reproduction processing cf the contents, or may generate unfavorable situations in terms of processing efficiency and processing speed. For example, far data such as music data to which real time reproduction is essential, it is desirable to have a content data structure that can ba_ applied decryption processing in high processing speed.
The present invention solves such problems. It is the fifth object of the present invention to provide a data processing apparatus, a content data generat:in~~ method and a data processing method that enables to apply to a content various data structures -corresponding to types of content data, i.e., various different data formats corresponding to the content, and enables generation and processing of content data that has high security and easy to be utilized in reproduction, execution and the like.
Furthermore, voice data, image data and the like that are decrypted are outputted to AV output section to be reproduced.
Nowadays, often times, many cf contents are compressed and stored in a storage medium or dis~ributed. It is therefore necessary to expand the compressed data before reproducing. For example, if voice data is MP-3 compressed, the voice data is decrypted by a MP3 decoder to be output. And if content data is image data which is MP-3 compressed, the voice data is expanded by a MPEG2 decoder to be output.
However, as there are various kinds of compression processing and expansion processing programs, even if compressed data is provided from a content provider via a medium or a network, it is impossible to reproduce the data with a reproducing apparatus that does not have a compatible expansion program.
It is the sixth object of the present invention to provide a configuration for efficiently executing reproduction processing of compressed data, that is, a data processing apparatus, a data processing method and a content data generating method for efficiently executing reproduction processing in the case in which contents are compressed Voice data, image data or the like. -The foregoing objects and other objects of the invention have been achieved by the provision of a data processing apparatus and a data processing method.

~. first aspect of the present invention is: a data processing apparatus for processing content data provided by a recording or communication medium, characterized in that said apparatus comprises: a cryptography process section for executing a cryptography process on the content data; and a control section for executing control for 'the cryptography process section, and the cryptography process section: is configured to generate partial integrity check values as integrity check values for a partial data set containing one or more partial data obtained by a content data-constituting section into a plurality of parts, collate the generated integrity check values to verify the partial data, generates an intermediate integrity check value based on a partial integrity check value set data string containing at least one or more of the partial integrity check values, and use the generated intermediate integrity check value to verify the entirety of the plurality of partial data sets corresponding to the plurality of partial integrity check values constituting the partial integrity check value set.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing apparatus according to the present is characterized in that the partial integrity check value is generated by means of a cryptography process with a partial-check-va:Lue-~~enerating key applied thereto, using partial data to be checked, as a message, the intermediate integrity check value is generated by means of a cryptography process with an general-check-value-generating key applied thereto, using a partial integrity check value set data string to be checked, as a message, and the cryptography process section is configured to store the partial integrity check value-generating value and the general integrity check value-generating key.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing apparatus according to the present invention is characterized in that the cryptography process has plural types of partial-check-value-generating key corresponding to generated partial integrity check values.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing apparatus according to the present invention is characterized in that the cryptography process is a BES cryptography process, and the cryptography process section is configured to execute the DES
cryptography process.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing apparatus according to the present invention is characterized in that the partial integrity check value is a message authentication code (MAC) generated in a DES-CBC mode using partial data to be checked, as a message, the intermediate value is a message authentication code (MAC) generated in a BES-CBC mode using a partial integrity check value set data string to be checked, as a message, and the cryptography process section is configured to execute the -cryptography process in the DES-CBS mode.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing apparatus according to the present invention is characterized in that in the - Zb -DES-CBC mode-based cryptography pro~~ess configuration of the cryptography process section, Triple DES is applied only in part of a message string to be processed_ Further,. one embodiment of the data processing apparatus according to the present invention is characterized in that the data processing apparatus has a signature key, and the cryptography process section is configured to apply a value generated from the intermediate value by means of the signature key-applied cryptography process as a collation value for data verification.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing apparatus according to the present invention is characterized in that the data processing apparatus has a plurality of different signature keys as signature keys, and the cryptography process section is configured to apply one of the plurality of different signature keys which is selected depending on a localization of the content data, to the cryptography process for the intermediate integrity check value to obtain. the collation value for data verification.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing apparatus according to the present invention is characterized in that the data processing apparatus has a common signature key common to all entities of a system for executing a data verifying process and an -apparatus-specific signature key specific to each apparatus that executes a data verifying process.

Further, one embodiment of the data processing apparatus according to the present invention is characterised in that the partial integrity check value contains ene or more header section integrity check values generated for intra-header-section data partly constituting data and one or more content integrity check values generated for content block data partly constituting the data, and the cryptography process is configured to generate one or more header section integrity check values for a partial data set in the intra-header-section data to execute a collation process, generate one or more content integrity check values for a partial data set in the intra-content-section data to execute a collation process, and further generate a general integrity check value based on all the header section integrity check values and the content integrity check values generated, to execute a collation process in order to verify the data.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing apparatus according to the present invention is characterized in that the partial integrity check value contains one or more header section integrity check values generated for intra-header-section data partly constituting data, and the cryptography process is configured to generate one or more header section integrity check values for a partial data set in the intra-header-section data to -execute a collation process and further generate a general integrity check value based en the one or more header section integrity check values generated and on content block data constituting part of the data, to axecute a collation process in order to verify the data.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing apparatus according to the present invention is characterized by further comprising a recording device for si=oring data validated by the cryptography process section.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing apparatus according to the present invention is characterized in that the control section is configured so that if in the process executed by the cryptography process section to collate the partial integrity check value, the collation is not established, and the control section suspends the process for storing data in the recording device.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing apparatus according to the present invention -is characterized by further comprising a reproduction process section for reproducing data validated by the cryptography process section.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing apparatus according to the present invention .is characterized in that if in the process executed by the cryptography process section to collate the partial integrity check value, the collation is not established, and the control section suspends the reproduction process in the reproduction process section.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing apparatus according to the present invent~_on is characterized by comprising control means for collating c:nly the header section integrity check values in the data during the process executed by the cryptography process section to collate the partial integrity check values and transmitting data for which collation of the header section integrity c:Zeck values has been established, to the reproduction process section for reproduction.
Moreover, a second aspect of the present invention is a data processing apparatus for processing content data provided by a recording or communication medium, characterized in that said apparatus comprises: a cryptography process section for executing a cryptography process on the content data; and a control section for executing control for the cryptography process section, and the cryptography process section: is configured to generate, if data to be verified are encrypted, integrity check values for the data to be verified by means of a signature data-applied cryptography process from data on arithmetic operation results obtained by executing an arithmetic operation process on decrypted data obtained by executing a decryption process on the encrypted data.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing apparatus according to the present invention is characterized in that the arithmetic operation process comprises performing an exclusive-OR
operation on decrypted data every predetermined bytes, the decrypted data being obtainea by decrypting the encrypted data.

Moreover, a third emi~odiment of the present invention is a data processing method for processing content data provided by a recording or communication medium, the method being characterized in that said method: generates partial integrity check values as integrity check values for a partial data set containing one or more partial data obtained by a content data constituting section into a plura:iity of parts, and collates the generated integrity check values to verify the partial data, and generates an intermediate integrity check value based on a partial integrity check value set data string containing at least one or more of the partial integrity check values, and uses the generated intermediate integrity check value to verify the entirety of the plurality of partial data sets corresponding to the plurality of partial integrity check values constituting the partial integrity check value set.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing method according to the present invention is characterized in that the partial integrity check value is generated by means of a cryptography process with a partial-check-value-generating key applied thereto, using partial data to be checked, as a message, and the intermediate integrity check value is generated by means of a cryptography process with an general-check-value-generating --key applied thereto, using a partia'~. integrity check value set data string to be checked, as a message.

Further, one embodiment of the data processing method according to the present invention is characterized in that the partial integrity check value is generated by applying different types of partial-check-value-generating keys corresponding to generated partial integrity check values.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing method according to the present invention is characterized in that 'the cryptography process is a DES cryptography process.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing method according to the present invention is characterized in that the partial integrity check value is a message authentication code (MAC) generated in a DES-CBC mode using partial data to be checked, as a message, and the intermediate value is a message authentication code (MAC) generated in a DES-CBC mode using a partial integrity check value set data string to be checked, as a message.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing method according to the present invention is characterized in that a value generated from the intermediate value by means of a signature key-applied cryptography process is applied as a collation value for data verification.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing method according to the present invention is characterized in that different signature keys are applied to the cryptography process for the intermed~~ate integrity check value depending on a localization of the content data, to obtain the collation va~~.ue for data verificatior_.
Further, one embodiment cf the data processing method according to the present invention is characterized in that a common signature key common to all entities of a system for executing a data verifying process or an apparatus-specific signature key specific to each apparatus that executes a data verifying process is selected and used as the signature key depending on the localization of the content data.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing method according to the present invention is characterized in that the partial integrity check value contains one or more header section integrity check values generated for infra-header-section data partly constituting data and one or more content integrity check values generated for intra-content-section data partly constituting the data, and a data verifying process generates one or more header section integrity check values for a partial data set in the infra-header-section data to execute a collation process; generates one or more content integrity check values for a partial data set in the infra-ccntent-section data to execute a collation process; and further generates a general integrity check value based on all the header section integrity check values and -the content integrity check values generated, to execute a collation process in order to verify the data.

Further, one embodiment of the data processing method according to the present invention is characterized in that the partial integrity check value contains one or more header section integrity check values generated for intra-header-section data partly constituting data, the data vrerifying process comprises generating one or more header section integrity check values for a partial data set in the intra-header-section data to execute a collation process; and further generating a general integrity check value based on the one or more header section integrity check values generated and on content block data constituting part of the data, to execute a collation process in order to verify the data.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing method according to the present invention is characterized by further comprising a process for storing, after data verification, storing validated data.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing method according to the present invention is characterized in that if in the process for collating the partial integrity check value, the collation is not established, control is e:~ecuted such as to suspend the process for storing data in the recording device.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing method according to the present invention is characterized by further comprising a data reproducti:~n process for reproducing data after the data verification.

Further, one embodiment of the data processing method according to the present invention is characterized in that if in the process for collating the partial integrity check value, the collation is not established, control is executed such as to suspend the reproduction process executed in the reproduction process section.
Further, one embodiment of the data processing method according to the present invention is characterized in that said method collates only the header section integrity check values in the data during the process for collating the partial integrity check values and transmits data for ~~hich collation of the header section integrity check values has been established, to the reproduction process section for reproduction.
Moreover, a fourth aspect of the present invention is a data processing method for processing content data provided by a recording or communication medium, the method being characterized in that said method: if data to be verified are encrypted, executes an arithmetic operation process on decrypted data obtained by decrypting the encrypted data, executes a signature key-applied cryptography process on data on arithmetic operation results obtained by the arithmetic operation, to generate integrity check values for the data to be verified. -Further, one embodiment of the data processing method according to the present invention is characterized in that the arithmetic operation: process comprises performing an exclusive-OR

operation on decrypted data every predetermined bytes, the decrypted data being obtained by decrypting the encrypted data.
Moreover, a fifth aspect of the present invention is a data verifying value imparting method for a data verifying process, characterized in that said method: imparts partial integrity check values as integrity check values for a partial data set containing one or more partial data obtained by a content data constituting section into a plurality of parts, and imparts to da~a to verified, an intermediate integrity check value used to verify a partial integrity check value set data string containing at least one or more of the partial integrity check values.
Further, one embodiment of the data verifying value imparting method according to the present invention .is characterized in that the partial integrity check value is generated by means of a cryptography process with a partial-check-value-generating key applied thereto, using partial data to be checked, as a message, and the intermediate integrity check value is generated by means of a cryptography process with an general-check-value-generating key applied thereto, using a partial integrity check value set data string to be checked, as a message.
Further, one embodiment of the data verifying value imparting method according to the present invention is characterized in that the partial integrity check value is generated by applying different types of partial-check-value-generating keys corresponding to generated partial integrity check values.

Further, one embodiment of the data verifying value imparting methcd according to the present invention is characterized in that the cryptography process is a DES cryptography process.
Further, one embodiment of the data verifying value imparting method according to the present invention is characterized in that the partial integrity check value is a message authentication code (MAC) generated in a DES-CHC mode using partial data to be checked, as a message, and the intermediate value is a message authentication code (MAC) generated in a DES-CBC mode using a partial integrity check value set data string to be checked, as a message.
Further, one embodiment of the data verifying value imparting method according to the present invention is characterized in that a value generated from the intermediate value by means of a signature key-applied cryptography process is applied as a collation value for data verification.
Further, one embodiment of the data verifying value imparting method according to the present invention is characterized in that different signature keys are applied to the cryptography process for the intermediate integrity check value depending on a localization of the content data, to obtain the collation value for data verification. -Further, one embodiment of the data verifying value imparting method according to the present invention is characterized in that a common signature key commcn to all entities of a system for executing a data verifying process or an apparatus-specific signature key specific to each apparatus that executes a data verifying process is selected and used as the signature key depending on the localization o.f the content data.
Further, one embodiment of the data verifying value imparting method according to the present invention is characterized in that the partial integrity check value contains one or more header section integrity check values for in intra-header-section data partly constituting data and one or more content integrity check values for intra-content-section data partly constituting the data, and the method is set so that a general integrity check value is generated for all the header secticn integrity check values and the content integrity check values, to verity the data.
Further, one embodiment of the data verifying value imparting method according to the present invention is characterized in that the partial integrity check value contains one or more header section integrity check values for intra-header-section data partly constituting data, and the method is set so that a general integrity check value is generated for the one or more header section integrity check values and content block data partly constituting the data, to verify the data.
Moreover, a sixth aspect of the present invention is a w program providing medium for providing a computer program for causing a data veri~ying prccess to be executed on a computer system to verify that data are valid, the program providing medium _ ?g _ being characterized in that the computer program comprises steps of: executing a collation process using partial integrity check values generated as integrity check values for a partial data set containing one or more partial data obtained by dividing data a plurality of parts, and using an intermediate integrity check value based on a partial integrity check value set obtained by combining a plurality of the partial integrity check values together, to verify the entirety of a plurality of partial data sets corresponding to the plurality of partial integrity check values constituting the partial integrity check value set.
A seventr. aspect of the present invention is a data processing apparatus including encryption processing section that executes one encryption processing of at least one of data encryption, data decryption, data verification, authentication processing and signature processing and a storage section that stores master keys to generate keys used for the encryption processing, characterized in that the encryption processing section is configured to generate individual keys necessary to execute the encryption processing based or~ the master keys and identification data of the apparatus cr data subject to encryption processing.
According to another embodiment of the data processing -apparatus of the presenr in~rention, the data processing apparatus is a data processing apparatus that performs encryption processing on transfer data via a recoding medium or communication medium, characterized in that the storage section scores a distribution key generation master key MKdis for generating a distribution key Kdis used for encryption processing of the transfer data and the encryption processing section executes encryption processing based on the distribution key generation master key MKdis stored in the storage section and a data identifier, which is identification data of the transfer data and generates the transfer data distribution key Kdis.
Furthermore, according to another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention, the data processing apparatus is a data processing apparatus that performs authentication processing of an externally connected apparatus to/from which data is transferred, characterized in that the storage section stores an authentication key generation master key MKake for generating an authentication key Kake of the externally connected apparatus and the encryption processing section executes encryption processing based on the authentication key generation master key MKake stored in the storage section and an identifier of the externally connected apparatus, which is identification data of the externally connected apparatus and generates the authentication key Kake of the externally connected apparatus.
Furthermore, according to another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the preser_t invention, the data processing apparatus is a data process.ng apparatus that performs signature processing on data, characterized in that the storage section stores a signature key generation master key MKdev for generating a data processing apparatus signature key Kdev of the data processing apparatus and the encryption processing section executes encryption processing based on the signature key generation master key MKdev stored in the storage section and an identifier of the data processing apparatus, which is identification data of the data processing apparatus and generates the data processing apparatus signature key Kdev of the data processing apparatus.
Furthermore, according to another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention, individual key generation processing that generates an individual key necessary to execute encryption processing based on the master key and identification data of the apparatus or data subject to encryption processing is encryption processing that uses at least part of identification data of the apparatus or data subject to encryption processing as a message and applies the master key as the encryption key.
Furthermore, according to another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention, the encryption processing is encryption processing using a DES algorithm.
Furthermore, an eighth aspect of the present invention is a -data processing system configured by a plurality of data processing apparatuses, characterized in that each of the plurality of data processing apparatuses has a common master key to generate a key used for en;:ryption processing of at least one of data encryption, data decryption data verification, authentication processing and signature processing and each of the plurality of data processing apparatuses generates a common individual key necessary to execute the encryption processing based on the master key and i~rentification data of the apparatus or data subject to encryption processing.
Furthermore, according to another embodiment of the data processing system of the present invention, the pluralit~r of data processing apparatuses is cor_figured by a contents data providing apparatus that supplies contents data and a contents data utilization apparatus that utilizes the contents data, both the contents data providing apparatus and contents data utilization apparatus have a distribution key generation master key to generate a contents data distribution key used for encryption processing of circulation cor_tents data between the contents data providing apparatus and contents data utilization apparatus, the contents data providing apparatus generates a contents data distribution key based on the distribution key generation master key and contents identifier, which is an identifier of supplied contents data and executes encryption processing on the contents data, and the contents data utilization apparatus generates a -contents data distributior_ key based on the distribution key generation master key and contents identifier, which is an identifier of supplied contents data and executes decryption processing on the contents data.
Furthermore, according t~ another embodiment of the data processing system of the present invention, the contents data providing apparatus has a plurality of different distribution key generation master keys to generate a plurality of different contents data distribution keys, generates a plurality of different contents data distribution keys based on the plurality of distribution key generation master keys and the contents identifier, executes encryption processing using the plurality of distribution keys generated and generates encryption contents data cf a plurality of types, and the contents data utilization apparatus has at least one distribution key generation master key of the plurality of different distribution key generation master keys owned by the contents data providing apparatus and makes decodable only encryption contents data by a distribution key generated using the same distribution key generation master key as the distribution key generation master key owned by the own apparatus.
Furthermore, according too another embodiment of the data processing system of the present invention, each of said plurality of data processing apparatuses stores a same contents key -generation master key to generate a contents key applied to contents data encryption. processing, data processing apparatus A, which is one of the plura'_ity of data processing apparatuses, stores contents data encrypted by a contents key generated based on the contents key generation master key and the apparatus identifier of the data processing apparatus A in a storage medium, different data processing apparatus B generates a contents key based on the same contents key generation master key and the apparatus identifier of the data processing apparatus A and executes decryption processing on the encrypted contents data stored by said data processir:g apparatus A in said storage medium based on said contents key generated.
Furthermore, according to another embodiment of the data processing system of the present invention, the plurality of data processing apparatuses is configured by a host device and a slave device subject to authentication processing by the host device, both the host device and slave device have an authentication key generation master applied to authentication processing between the host device and slave device, the slave device generates an authentication key based on the authentication key generation master key and slave device identifier, which is the identifier of the slave device and stores in memory in the slave device, and the host device generates an authentication key based on the authentication key generation: master key and slave device identifier, which is the identifier of the slave device and executes authentication processing.
Furthermore, a ninth aspect of the present invention is a data processing method that executes encryption processing of at least one of data encryption, data decryption, data verification, authentication processing and signature processing, including a key generating step of generating individual keys necessary to execute the encryption processing based on master keys to generate the keys used for the encryption processing and identification data of the apparatus or data subject to encryption processing and an encryption processing step of executing encryption processing based on the key generated in the key generating step.
Furthermore, according to another embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention, data processing executed by the data processing method is encryption processing on transfer data via a storage medium or communication medium, the key generating step is a distribution key generating step of executing encryption processing based on a distribution key generation master key MKdis for generating a distribution key Kdis used for encryption processing of transfer data and a data identifier, which is identification data of the transfer data, and generating distribution key Kdis of the transfer data, and the encryption processing step is a step of executing encryption processing on transfer data based on the distribution key Kdis generated in the distribution key generating step.
Furthermore, according to another embodiment of the data -processing method of the present invention, the data processing executed by the data processing method is authentication processing of an ex~erna.liy connected apparatus to/from which data is transferred, the key generating step is an authentication key generating step of executing encryption processing based on an authentication key generation master key MKake for generating an authentication key Kake of the externally connected apparatus and an externally connected apparatus identifier, which is identification data of the externally connected apparatus, and generating the authentication key Kake of the externally connected apparatus, and the encryption processing step is a step of executing authentication processing of the externally connected apparatus based on the authentication key Kake generated in the authentication key generation step.
Furthermore, according to another embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention, data processing executed by the data processing apparatus is signature processing on data, the key generating step is a signature key generating step of executing encryption processing based on a signature key generation master key MKdev for generating a data processing apparatus signature key Kdev of the data processing apparatus and a data processing apparatus identifier, which is identification data of the data processing apparatus and generating the data processing apparatus signature key Kdev of the data processing apparatus, and the encryption processing step is a step of -executing signature processing on data based on the signature key KdeV generated in the signature key generating step.

Furthermore, according tc another embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention, the key generating step is encryption processing that uses at least part of data identification of the apparatus or data subject to encryption processing as a message and applies the master key as the encryption key.
Furthermore, according to another embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention, the encryption processing is encryption processing using a DES algorithm.
Furthermore, a tenth aspect of the present invention is a data processing method in a data processing system comprising a contents data providing apparatus that supplies contents data and a contents data utilization apparatus that utilizes the contents data, characterized in that the contents data providing apparatus gerxerates a contents data distribution key based on a distribution key generation master key for generating a contents data distribution key used for encryption processing on contents data and a contents identifier, which is the identifier of the provided contents data ar~d executes encryption processing on the contents data, and the contents data utilization apparatus generates a contents data distribution key based on the distribution key generation master key and a contents identifier, which is the -identifier of the provided contents data and executes decryption processing on the contents data.

Furthermore, according to another embodiment of the data processing method according to the present invention, the contents data providing apparatus has a plurality of different distribution key generation master keys tc generate a plurality of different contents data distribution keys, generates a plurality of different contents data distribution keys based on the plurality of distribution key generation master keys and the contents identifier, executes encryption processing using the plurality of distribution keys generated and generates encryption contents data of a plurality of types, and the contents data utilization apparatus has at least one distribution key generation master key of the plurality of different distribution key generation master keys owned by the contents data providing apparatus and decrypts only encryption contents data by a distribution key generated using the same distribution key generation master key as the distribution key generation master key owned by the own apparatus.
Furthermore, an eleventh aspect of the present invention is a data processing method in a data processing system comprising a step of storing, by data processing apparatus A, which is one of the plurality of data processing apparatuses, in a storage medium contents data encrypted using a contents key generated based on a contents key generation master key to generate a contents key used -for encryption processing of contents data and the apparatus identifier of the data processing apparatus A, a step of generating the same contents key as the contents key by different data processing apparatus B based on the same the contents key generation master key as that of the data processing apparatus A
and the apparatus identifier of the data processing apparatus A, and a step of decrypting the contents data stored in the storage medium using the contents key generated by said data processing apparatus B.
Furthermore, a twelfth aspect of the present invention is a data processing method in a data processing system comprising a host device, and a slave device subject to authentication processing by the host device, characterized in that the slave device generates an authentication key based on an authentication key generation master key to generate an authentication key used for authentication processing between the host device and slave device and a slave device identifier, which is the identifier of the slave device and stores the authentication key generated in memory in said slave device, and the host device generates an authentication key based on the authentication key generation master key and slave device identifier, which is the identifier of the slave device and executes authentication processing.
Furthermore, a thirteenth aspect of the present invention is a program providing medium that supplies a computer program to execute encryption processing of at least one of data encryption, data decryption, data verifir_ation, authentication processing and signature processing on a ccmputer system, the computer program comprising a key generating step of generating individual keys s necessary to execute the encryption processing based on the master key to generate the key used ~or the encryption processing and identification data of the apparatus or data subject to encryption processing, and an encryption processing step of executing encryption processing based on the keys generated in the key generating step.
A fourteenth aspect of the present invention is a data processing apparatus that processes contents data supplied from a storage medium or commur_ication medium, characterized by comprising a storage section that stores data processing apparatus identifiers, a list verification section that extracts an illegal device list included in the contents data and executes collation between entries of the list and the data processing apparatus identifiers stored in the storage section, and a control section that stops executing processing of at least either one of reproduction of the contents data or processing of storage ir~ a recording device when the result of the collation processing in the collation processing section shows that the illegal device list includes information that matches the data processing identifiers.
According to another embodiment of the data processing apparatus cf the present invention, the list verification section w comprises an encryption processing section that executes encryption processing on the contents data, and the encryption processing section Verifies the presence or absence of tampering in t~~e illegal device list based on check values of the illegal device list included in the contents data and executes the collation processing only when the verification proves no tampering.
Furthermore, another embodiment: of the data processing apparatus of the present invention further comprises an illegal device list check value generation key, characterized in that the encryption processing section executes encryption processing applying the illegal device list check value generation key to illegal device List configuration d<~ta to be verified, generates illegal device list check values, executes collation between the illegal device list check values and the illegal device list check values included in the contents data and thereby verifies the presence or absence of tampering in the illegal device list.
Furthermore, according to another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention, the list verification section comprises an encryption processing section that executes encryption processing on the contents data, the encryption processing section executes decryption processing of the encrypted illegal device list included in the contents data and executes the collation processing on the illegal device list resulting from the decryption processing.
Furthermore, according to another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention, the list verification section comprises an encryption processing section that executes mutual authentication processing with a recording device to/from which contents data is transferred, the list verification section extracts the illegal device list included in the contents data and executes collation with the da=a processing apparatus identifiers stored in the storage section on condition that authentication with the recording device has been established through mutual authenticatior_ processing executed by the encryption processing section.
A fifteenth aspect of the present invention is a data processing method that processes contents data supplied from a storage medium or communication medium, comprising a list extracting step of extracting an illegal device list included in the content data, a collation processing step of executing collation between entries included in the list extracted in the list extracting step and the data processing apparatus identifiers stored in a storage section in the data processing apparatus, and a step of stopping execution of: processing of at least either one of reproduction of the contents data or processing of storage in the recording device when the result of the collation processing in the collation processing step shows that the illegal device list includes information that matches the data processing identifiers.
Furthermore, according to another embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention, the data processing method further comprises a verificat=ion step of verifying the _ 4 -~ _ presence or absence cf tampering in the illegal device list based on check values of the illegal device list included in the contents data, and the collation processing step executes collation processing only when the verification step proves no tampering.
Furthermore, according to another embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention, the verification step comprises a step of executing encryption processing applying an illegal device list check value generation key to illegal device list configuration data to be verified and generating illegal device list check values, and a step of executing collation between the illegal device list check values generated and the illegal device list check values included in the contents data and thereby verifying the presence or absence of tampering in the illegal device list.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention further comprises a decrypting step of executing decrypting processing on the encrypted illegal device list included in the contents data and the collation processing step executes the collation processing on the illegal device list resulting from the decrypting step.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing method o,f the present invention further comprises a mutual authentication processing step of executing mutual authentication processing with a recording device to/from which contents data is transferred, and the collation processing step executes collation processing on condition that authentication with the recording device has been established through mutual authentication processing executed by the mutual authentication processing step.
A sixteenth aspect of the present invention is a contents data generation method that generates contents data supplied from a storage medium or communication medium to a plurality of recorders/reproducers, characterized in that an illegal device list whose component data comprises identifiers of recorders/reproducers, which will be excluded from the use of the contents data is stored as the header information of the contents data.
Furthermore, according to another embodiment of the contents data generation method of the present invention, the illegal device list check values for a tampering check of the illegal device list are also stored as the header information of the contents data.
Furthermore, according to another embodiment of the contents data generation method of the present invention, the illegal device list is encrypted and stored in the header information of the contents data.
Furthermore, a seventeenth aspect of the present invention is -a program supply medium that supplies a computer program that allows a computer system to execute processing of contents data supplied from a storage medium or communication medium, _ 4~ ._ characterized in that the computer program comprises a list extracting step of extracting an illegal. device list included in tre contents data, a collation proc~ssin.g step of executing collation between entries included in the list extracted in the list extracting step and the data processing apparatus identifiers stored in a storage section in the data processing apparatus, and a step of stopping execution of processing of either one of reproduction of the contents data oar processing of storage in a recording device when the result of the collation processing in the collation processing step shows that the illegal device list ir.ciudes informatior_ that matches the data processing identifiers.
An eighteenth aspect cf the present invention is a data processing apparatus that processes contents data supplied via a recording medium or communication medium, comprising an encryption processing section that executes encryption processing on the contents data, a control section that executes control over the encryption processing section, a system common key used for encryption processing in the encryption processing section, which is common to other data processing apparatuses using the contents data, and at least one of an apparatus-specific key, which is specific to the data processing apparatus used for encryption processing in the encryption proces~:ing section or an apparatus- -specific identifier to generate the apparatus-specific key, characterized in that the encryption processing section is configured to perform encrypt-lon processing by applying either one of the system common key or the apparatus-specific key according to the utilization mode of th.e contents data.
Furthermore, in another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention, the encryption processing section executes encryption processing by applying either one of t:~~e system common key or the apparatus-specific key according to utilization restriction information included in the contents data.
Furthermore, another embodiment. of the data processing apparatus of the present invention :Further comprises a recording device for recording contents data, characterized in that the encryption processing section, when imposed with a utilization restriction that the contents data should be used only for the own data processing apparatus, generates data to be stored in the recording device by executing encryption processing using the apparatus-specific key for the contents data, and in the case where the contents data is also made available to an apparatus other than the own data processing apparatus, data to be stored in the recording device is generated by executing encryption processing using the system common ~:ey on t:~.e contents data.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present ir_vention comprises a signature key Kdev specific to the data processing apparatus and a system signature key Ksys common to a plurality of data processing apparatuses, characterized in that the encryption. processing section, when the contents data is stored in the recording device imposed with a - q~ __ utilization restriction that the contents data should be used only for the own data process~~ng apparatus, generates an apparatus-specific check value through encryption processing applying the apparatus-specific signature key Kdev to the contents data and, when the contents data is stored in the recording device with the contents data also made available to an apparatus other than the own data processing apparatus, generates an. overall check value through encryption processing applying the system signature key Ksys to the contents data, and the control section performs control of storing either one of th~~ apparatus-specific check value generated by the encryption processing section or the overall check value together with the contents data in the recording device.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invent,lon cJomprises a signature key Kdev specific to the data processing app<~ratus and a system signature key Ksys common to a plurality of data processing apparatuses, characterized in that the enr_ryption processing section, when.
contents data imposed with a utilization restriction that the contents data should be used only for the own data processing apparatus is reproduced, generates an apparatus-specific check value applying the apparatus-specific signature key Kdev to the -contents data and executes collation processing on the apparatus-specific check value generated and, when contents data also made available to an apparatus other than the own data processing _ 4~ ._ apparatus is reproduced, generates an overall check value through encryption processing applyir_g the system signature key Ksys to the contents data and performs collation processing on the overall check value generated, and the control section generates reproducible decrypted data by continuing processing of contents data by the encryption processing section only when collation with the apparatus-specific check value is established or when collation with the overall check value is established.
Furthermore, another embodimen'= of the data processing apparatus of the present invention comprises a recording data processing apparatus signature key :master key MKdev and data processing apparatus identifier IDdev, characterized in that the encryption processing section generates a signature key Kdev as the data processing apparatus specific key through encryption processing based on the recording data processing apparatus signature key master key MKdev and the data processing apparatus identifier IDdev.
Furthermore, in another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention, the encryption processing section generates the signature key KdeV through DES encryption processing applying the recording data processing apparatus signature key master key MKdev to the data processing apparatus identifier IDdev.
Furthermore, in another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention, the encryption processing _ ~g _ t Section generates an intermediate integrity check value by executing encryption processing on the contents data and executes encryption processing appiyir:g the data processing apparatus specific key or system commcn key on the intermediate integrity check value.
Furthermore, in another embodi::nent of the data processing apparatus of the present invention, the encryption processing section generates a partial integrity check value through encryption processing on a partial data set containing at least one partial data item obtained by dividing the contents data into a plurality of parts and generates an intermediate integrity check value through encryption processing on a partial integrity check value set data string containing the partial integrity check value generated.
A nineteenth aspect of the present invention is a data processing method that processes contents data supplied via a recording medium or communication medium, characterized by selecting either one of an encryption processing system common key common to other data processing apparatuses using the contents data or an apparatus-specific key, which is specific to the data processing apparatus according to the utilization mode of the contents da=a, and execu'ing encryption processing by applying the -selected encryption processing key to the contents data.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention is characterized in that the encrypticn processing key selecting step is a step of selecting according to utilization restriction information. contained in the contents data.
Furthermore, another embodiment= of the data processing method of the present invention is characterized in that the processing of storing contents data in the recording device, when imposed with a utilization restricticn that the contents data should be used only for the own data processi:zg apparatus, generates data to be stored in the recording device by executing encryption processing applying the apparatus--specific key to the contents data, and in the case where the con~ents data is also made available to an apparatus other than the own data processing apparatus, data to be stored in the recording device is generated by executing encryption process~~ng using tine system common key on the contents data.
Furthermore, another embodiment: of the data processing method of the present invention is characterized in that when the contents data is stored in the reco:_ding device imposed with a utilization restriction that the contents data should be used only for the own data processing apparatus, the processing of recording contents data in the recording device generates an apparatus-specific check value through encryption processing applying the apparatus-specific signature key Kdev to tr.e contents data and, -when the contents data is stored in the recording device with the contents data also made available to an apparatus other than the own data processing apparatus, generates an overall check value through encryption processing applying the system signature key Ksys to the contents data, and either one of the apparatus-specific check value generated or t:he overall check value is stored together with the conter_ts data in the recording device.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention is characterized in that when contents data imposed with a utilization restriction that the contents data should be used only for the «wn dat:a processing apparatus is reproduced, the contents data reproducing processing generates an apparatus-specific check value trrough encryption processing applying the apparatus-specific signature key Kdev to the contents data and executes collation proces~~ing on the apparatus-specific check value generated and, when contents data imposed with a utilization restriction tr:at the contents data is also made available to an apparatus other than the own data processing apparatus is reproduced,generates an overall check value through encryption processing applying the system signature key Ksys to the contents data and performs collation processing on the overall check value generated, and contents data is reproduced only when collation with the apparatus-spec:if:ic check value is established or when collation with the overall check value is established.
Furthermore, another emx>odiment of the data processing method -of the present invention fur~her comprises a step of generating a signature key Kdev as the da~'_a processing apparatus specific key through encryption processing based on data processing apparatus signature key master key MKdev and the data processing apparatus identifier IDdev.
Furthermore, another embodimen~ of the data processing method of the present invention is characterized in that the signature key Kdev generating step is a step of generating the signature key Kdev through DES encryption processing applying the data processing apparatus signature key master key MKdev to the data processing apparatus identifier IDdev.
Furthermore, another embodimen~ of the data processing method of the present invention further comprises a step of generating an intermediate integrity check value by executing encryption processing on the contents data, characterized by executing encryption processing applying the data processing apparatus specific key or system common key to the intermediate integrity check value.
Furthermore, another embodimen~ of the data processing method cf the present invention is characterized by further generating a partial integrity check value through encryption processing on a partial data set containing at least one partial data item obtained by dividing the contents data into a plurality of parts and generating an intermediate integrity check value through encryption processing on a partial integrity check value set data string containing the partial integrity check value generated.
A twentieth aspect of the present invention is a program supply medium that supp lies a computer program allowing a computer _ ~, 2 _ system to execute data processing that processes contents data supplied via a recording medium or communication medium, and the computer program comprises the steps of selecting either encryption processing key, are encryption processing system common key common to other data processing apparatuses using the contents data or an apparatus-specific key, which is specific to the data processing apparatus according to the utilization mode of the contents data, and executing encryption processing applying the selected encryption processing key to the contents data.
A twenty first aspect of the present invention is a data processing apparatus that processes contents data supplied via a recording medium or communication medium, comprising an encryption processing section that executes encryption processing on the contents data, and a control section that executes control over the encryption processing section, characterized in that the encryption processing section: is configured to generate a contents check value in units of contents block data to be verified included in the data, execute collation on the contents check value generated and thereby execute verification processing on the validity of each contents block data in the data.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention comprises a contents check -value generation key and characterized :in that the encryption processing section generates a contents intermediate value based on contents block data to be verified and generate a contents check value by executing encryption processing applying the contents check value generation key to the contents intermediate value.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention is characterized in that when the contents block data to be verified is encrypted, the encryption processing section generates a contents intermediate value by executing predetermined operation processing on an entire decrypted statement obtained through decryption processing of the contents block data in units of a predetermined number of bytes, and when the contents block data to be verified is not encrypted, generates a contents intermediate value by executing predetermined operation processing on the entire contents block data in units of a predetermined number of bytes.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention is characterized in that the predetermined operation processing applied in the intermediate integrity check value generation processing by the encryption processing section is an exclusive-OR operation.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention is characterized in that the encryption processing section. has an encryption processing configuration in CBC mode and the c.ecryption processing applied to the content intermediate value generation processing when the contents block data to be verified is decryption processing in CBC
mode.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention is characterized in that the encryption processing configuration in CBC mode of the encryption processing section is a configuration in which common key encryption processing is applied a plurality of times only to part of a message string to be processed.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention is characterized in that when the contents block data contains a plurality of parts and some parts included in the contents block data are to be verified, the encryption processing section generates a contents check value based on the parts to be verified, executes collation processing on the contents check value generated and thereby executes verification processing on the validity in units of content block data in the data.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention is characterized in that when the contents block data contains a plurality of parts and it is one part that needs to be verified, the encryption processing section generates a contents check value by executing encryption -processing applying the contents check value genera tion key to a value obtained by carrying cut an exclusive-GR in units of a predetermined number of bytes on the entire decrypted statemer_t obtained by decryption processir:g of parts to be verified in the case where the parts to be verified is encrypted, and generates a contents check value by executing encryption processing applying the contents check value generation key to a value obtained by carrying out an exclusive-OR in units of a predetermined number of bytes on the entire part to be verified in the case where the parts to be verified is not encrypted.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention is characterized in that when the contents block data contains a plurality of parts and it is a plurality of parts that needs to be verified, the encryption processing section uses, as a contents check value, the result obtained by executing encryption processing applying the contents check value generation key to link data of a parts check value obtained by executing encryption processing applying a contents check value generation key to each part.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention is characterized in that the er_cryption processing section further comprises a recording device for storing contents data containing contents block data whose validity has been verified.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing -apparatus of the presen= invention is characterized in that when collation is not established in the collation processing on a contents check value in the encryption processing section, the control section. stops storage in the recording device.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention is characterized in that the encryption processing section further comprises a reproduction processing section for reproducing data whose validity has been verified.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention is characterized in that when collation is not established in the collation processing on a contents check value in the encryption processing section, the control section stops reproduction processing in the reproduction prccessing section.
A twenty second aspect of the present invention is a data processing method that processes contents data supplied via a recording medium or communication medium, characterized by generating a contents check value in units of contents block data to be verified included in the data, executing collation on the contents check value generated and thereby executing verification processing on the validity in units of contents block data in the data.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention is characterized by generating a contents intermediate value based on contents block data to be verified and generating a contents check value by executing encryption processing applying the contents check value generation key to the contents intermediate value generated.
Furthermore, another embodimen~ of the data processing method ef the present invention is characterized by generating, when the contents block data to be verified is encrypted, a contents intermediate value by executing predetermined operation processing on an entire decrypted statement obtained through decryption processing of the contents block data in units of a predetermined number of bytes, and generating, when the contents block data to be verified is not encrypted, a contents intermediate value by executing predetermined operation processing on the entire contents block data in units of a predetermined number of bytes.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention. is characterized in that the predetermined operation processing applied in the intermediate integrity check value generation processing is an exclusive-OR
operation.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention: is characterized in that in the contents intermediate value generation processing, the decryption processing applied to the content intermediate value generation processing when the contents block data to be verified is w encrypted is decryption processing in CBC mode.
Furthermore, another e_mbodime.nt of the data processing method of the present invention is characterized in that in the decryption processing configuration in CBC mode, common key encryption processing is applied a plurality of times only to part of a message string to be processed.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention is characterized by generating, when the contents block data contains a plurality of parts and some parts included in the contents block data are to be verified, a contents check value based on the parts to be verified, executing collation processing on the contents check value generated and thereby executing verification processing on the validity in units of content block data in the data.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention is characterized by generating when the contents block data contains a plurality of parts and it is one part that needs to be ver'_fied, a r_ontents check value by executing encryption processing applying the contents check value generation key to a value obtained by carrying out an exclusive-OR
in units of a predetermined number of bytes on the entire decrypted statement obtained by decryption. processing of parts to be verified in the case where the parts tc be verified is encrypted, ar~d generating a contents check value by executing encryption processing applying the contents check value generation -key to a value obtained by carrying out an exclusive-OR in units of a predetermined number of bytes. on the entire part to be verified in the case where the part to be verified is not encrypted.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention is characterized by using, when the contents block data contains a plurality of parts and it is a plurality of parts that needs to be verified, as a contents check value, the result obtained by executing encryption processing further applying the contents check: value generation key to Link data of a parts check value obtained by executing encryption processing applying the contents check value generation key to each part.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention further comprises a step of storing contents data containing contents block data whose validity has been verified.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention is characterized in that when collation is not established in the collation processing on a contents check value, the control section stops storage in the recording device.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention further comprises a step of reproducing data whose validity has been verified.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention is characterized by stopping reproduction processing when collation is not established in the collation processing on a contents check value.
A twenty third aspect of the present invention is a contents data verification value assignment method for contents data verification processing, characterized by generating a contents check value in units of cements block data to be verified included in the data, assigning the contents check value generated to contents data containing the contents block data to be verified.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the contents data verification value assignment method of the present invention is characterized in that the contents check value is generated through encryption processing applying the contents check value generation key using the contents block data to be checked as a message.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the contents data verification value assignment method of the present invention is characterized in that the contents check value is generated by generating a contents intermediate value based on the contents block data to be verified arid executing encryption processing applying the contents check value generation key to the contents intermediate value.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the contents data verification value assignment method of the present invention is characterized in that the contents check value is generated by executing encryption processing in CBC mode on the contents block data to be verified.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the contents data verification value assignment method of the present invention is characterized in that the encryption processing configuration in CBC mode is a configuration in which common key encryption processing is applied a plurality of times only to part of a message string to be processed.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the contents data verification. value assignment method of the present invention is characterized by generatir_g, when t:he contents block data contains a plurality of parts and some parts included in the contents block data are to be verified, a contents check value based on the parts to be ~.rerified and assigning the contents check value generated to contents data containing the content block data to be verified.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the contents data verification value assignment method of the present invention is characterized by generating, when the contents block data contains a plurality of parts and it is one part that needs to be verified, a contents check value by executing encryption processing applying the contents check value generation key to a value obtained by carrying out an exclusive-OF in units of a predetermined number of bytes on the entire decrypted statement obtained by decryption processing of parts to be Verified in the case where the parts to be verified is encrypted, generating a contents check value by - 6a? -executing encryption processing applying the contents check value generation key to a value obtained by carrying out an exclusive-OR
in units of a predetermined number of bytes on the entire part tc be verified in the case where the parts to be verified is not encrypted and assigning the contents check value generated to the contents data containing the contents block data to be verified.
Furthermore, another embodiment of the contents data verification value assignment method of the present invention is characterized by using, when the conten_s block data contains a plurality of parts and it is a plurality of parts that needs to be verified, as a contents check value, the result obtained by executing encryption process.ng further applying the contents check value generation key to link data or a parts check value obtained by executing encryption processing applying the contents check value generation key to each part and assigning the contents check value generated to contents data containing the contents block data to be verified.
A twenty fourth aspect of the present invention is a program supply medium that supplies a computer program to execute data processing on contents data supplied via a recording medium or communication medium, with the computer program comprising a step of generating a contents check value in units of contents block -data to be verified included in the data, and a step of executing collation processing on the contents check value generated and thereby executing verification processing on the Validity in units of contents block data in the data.
A twenty fifth aspect of the present invention is a data processing apparatus for executing processing for generating storing data with respect to a recording device of content data, which has a plurality of content blocks in which at least a part of the blocks are encrypted and a header section storing information on the contents blocks, which is characterized in that in the case in which content data to be an object of storage in the recording device is structured by data stored in the header section, which is an encryption key data Kdis[Kcon] that is an encryption key Kcon of the content block applied encryption processing by an encryption key Kdis, the data processing apparatus has a structure for executing processing for taking out the encryption key data Kdis[Kcon] from the header section and executing decrypticn processing to generate decryption data Kcon, generating a new encryption key data Kstr[Kcon] that is applied encryption processing by an encryption key Kstr and storing the new encryption key data Kstr[Kcon] in the header section of the content data, and applying a different encryption key Kstr to the generated decryption data Kcon to execute encryption processing. -A twenty sixth aspect cf the present invention is a data processing apparatus for executing processing for generating storing data with resper~t to a recording device of content data, - 6~ -which has a plurality of content blocks in which at least a part of the blocks are encrypted and a header section storing information on the contents blocks, which is characterized in that: in the case in which the content block included in content data to be an object of storage with respect to the recording device is composed of contents encrypted by an encryption key Kblc and encryption key data Kcon[Kblc] that is encrypted by the encryption key Kcon, and has a structure in which encryption key data Kdis[Kcon] that is the encryption key Kcon applied encryption processing by an encryption key Kdis is stored in the header section, the data processing apparatus has a structure for executing processing for taking out the encryption key data Kdis[Kcon] from the header section and executing decryption processing to generate decryption data Kccn, generating an encryption key data Kstr[Kcon] that is applied encryption processing by an encryption key Kstr and storing the encryption key data Kstr[Kcon] in the header section of the content data, and applying a different encryption key Kstr to the generated decryption data Kcor~ to execute encryption processing.
In addition, a twenty seventh aspect of the present invention is a data processing apparatus for executing processing for generating storing data with respect to a recording device of -content data, which has a plurality of content blocks in which at least a part of the blocks are encrypted and a header section storing information on the contents blocks, characterized in that:

in the case in which the content block included in content data to be an object of storage with respect to the recording device is composed of contents encrypted by an encry~>tion key Kblc and encryption key data Kdis[Kblc] that is encrypted by the encryption key Kdis, the data processing apparatus has a structure for executing processing for taking out. the encryption key data Kdis[Kblc] from the content block ~;ection and executing decryption processing of the encryption key Kblc to generate decryption data Kblc, generating an encryption key data Kstr[Kblc] that is applied encryption processing by an encryption key Kstr and storing the encryption key data Kstr[Kblc] in <3 contents block section, and applying a different encryption key Kstr to the generated decryption data Kblc to execute encryption processing.
In addition, a twenty eighth aspect of the present invention is a content data generating method for generating content data, which comprises: coupling a plurality of content blocks composed of data including at least any one of voice information, image information and program data; applying encryption processing to at least a part of content blocks included in the plurality of content blocks by an encryption key Kcon; generating encryption key data Kdis[Kcon] that is the encryption key Kcon applied encryption processing by an encryption key Kdis and storing the -encryption key Kdis in a header section of the content data; and generating content data including the plurality of content blocks and the header section.

In addition, an embodiment of the content data generating method of the present inventv~on is characterized by further comprising processing for generating block information storing information including identi~ication information of content data, data length of content data, usage policy information including data types of content data, data length of the content block, and presence or absence of encryption processing, and storing the block information in the header section.
In addition, an embodiment of the content data generating method of the present invention is characterized in that the content data generating method comprises processing for further generating a part check value based on a part of information composing the header section and storing the part check value in the header section, and further generating a total check value based on the part check value and storing the total check value in the header section.
In addition, an embodiment of the content data generating method of the present invention is characterized in that the generation processing o' the part check value and the generation processing of the total cher_k value applies and executes a DES
encryption processing algoritrm with data to be an object of check as a message and a check value generating key as an encryption key.w In addition, an embodiment of the content data generating method of the present invention is characterized in that the content data generating method further applies encryption processing to the block information by the encryption key Kbit, and stores the encryption key data Kdis[Kbit] that is the encryption key Kbit generated by the encryption key Kdis in the header section.
In addition, an embodiment of the content data generating method of the present invention is characterized in that each block of the plurality of blccks in the content block is generated as a common fixed data length.
In addition, an embodiment of l~he content data generating method of the present invention is characterized in that each block of the plurality of blocks in the content block is generated with a structure in which an encryption data section and a non-encryption section are arranged regularly.
A twenty ninth aspect of the present invention is the content data generating method for generati:zg content data which comprises: coupling a plurality of ~~ontent blocks including at least any one of voice information, image information and program data; composing at least a part of the plurality of content blocks by an encryption data section that is data including at least any one of voice information, image information and program data by an encryption key Kblc, and a set of encryption key data Kcon[Kblc]
that is the encryption key Kblc of 1=he encryption data section -applied encryption processing by an encryption key Kcon;
generating encr,,rption key data Kd;~s[Kcon] that is the encryption key Kcon applied encryption processing by an encryption key Kdis t and storing the generated the encryption key data Kdis[Kcon] in a header of the content data; and generating content data including a plurality of content blocks and a header section.
A thirtieth aspect of the present invention is the content data generating method for generating content data which comprises: coupling a plurality of content blocks including at least any one of voice information, image information and program data; composing at least a part of the plurality of content blocks by an encryption data section that is data including at least one of voice information, image information and program data by an encryption key Kblc, and a set of encryption key data Kdis[Kblc]
that is the encryption key Kblc of the encryption data section applied encryption processing by an encryption key Kdis; and generating content data including a plurality of content blocks and a header section.
A thirty first aspect of the present invention is a data processing method for executing processing for storing in a recording device content data having a plurality of content blocks in which at least a part of blocks are encrypted, and a header in which information on the content blocks is stored, which comprises: in the case in which content data to be an object of storage in the recording device is structured by data stored in the header section, which is an en~~ryption key data Kdis[Kcon) that is an encryption key Kcon of the content block applied encryption processing by an encryption key Kdis, taking out the _ 6a _ encryption key data Kdis[Kcon] from the header section and executing decryption processing to generate decryption data Kcon;
generating a new encryption l~:ey data Kstr[Kcon~ that is applied encryption processing by an encryption key Kstr by applying a different encryption key Kstr to the generated decryption. data Kcon to execute encryption. processing; and storing the generated encryption key data Kstr[Kcon] in a header section of the content data, and storing the header sectic>n in the recording device together with the plurality of content blocks.
A thirty second aspect of the present invention is a data processing method for executing processing for storing in a recording device content data having a plurality of content blocks in which at least a part of blocks are encrypted, and a header in which information on the content b7_ocks is stored, which comprises: in the case in which the content block included in content data to be an object of storage with respect to the recording device is composed of contents encrypted by an encryption key Kblc and encryption key data Kcon[Kblc] that is encrypted by the encryption key Kcon, and has a structure in which encryption key data Kdis[Kco~] that is the encryption key Kcon applied encryption processing by an encryption key Kdis is stored in the header section, taking out l.he encryption key data -Kdis[Kcon] from the header section and executing decryption processing to generate decryption data Kcon; generating a new encryption key data Kstr[Kcon] that is applied encryption processing by an encryption key Kst:r by applying a different encryption key Kstr to the generated decryption data Kcon to execute decryption processing; and storing the generated encryption key data Kstr[Kcon] in a header section of the content data, and storing the header section in the recording device together with the plurality of content blocks.
A thirty third aspect of the present invention is a data processing method for executing processing for storing in a recording device content data having a plurality of content blocks in which at least a part of blocks are encrypted, and a header in which information on the content blocks is stored, which comprises: in the case in which the content block included in content data to be an object of storage with respect to the recording device is composed of contents encrypted by an encryption key Kblc and encryption key data Kdis[Kblc] that is encrypted by the encryption key Kdis, taking out the encryption key data Kdis[Kblc] from the content block section and executing decryption processir:g of the encryption key Kblc to generate decryption data Kblc; generating an encryption key data Kstr[Kblc]
that is applied encryption processing by an encryption key Kstr by applying a different encryption key Kstr to the generated decryption data Kblc to execute decr,,~ption processing; and storing the generated encryption ke~_r data Kstr[Kblc] in a content block section, and storing the content block section in the recording device together with the plurality of content blocks.

A thirty fourth aspec= of she present invention is a program providing medium for providir~~g a computer program causing generation processing of storing data with respect to a recording device of content data, which has a. pluralv~ty of content blocks in which at least a part of the blocks are encrypted and a header section storing information on the contents blocks, to be executed on a computer system, which is characterised in that: the computer program comprises: in the case in which content data to be an object of storage in the recording device is structured by data stored in the header section, which is an encryption key data Kdis[Kcon] that is an encryption key Kcon of the content block applied encryption processing by am encryption key Kdis, a step of taking out the encryption key data Kdis[KCOn] from the header section and executing decryption processing to generate decryption data Kcon; generating a new encryption key data Kstr[Kcon] that is applied encryption processing by an encryption key Kstr by applying a different encryption key Kstr to the generated decryption data Kcon to e:~ecute decryption processing; and storing the generated encryption key data Kstr[Kcon] in a header section of tre content data.
A thirty fifth aspect of the present invention is a data processing apparatus for performing reproduction processing of content data provided by a storage medium or a communication medium, which is characterized by comprising: a content data analyzing section for executing cement data analysis of content _ 7 -; _ data including compressed contents and an expansion processing program of the compressed contents, and executing extraction processing of the compressed contents and the expansion processing program from the content data; and an expansion processing section for executing expansion processing of the content data included in the content data using an expansion processing program included in the content data obtained as a result of the analysis of the content data analyzing section.
In addition, in one embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention, the data processing apparatus is characterized by further comprising: a data storing section for storing the compressed contents that are extracted by the content data analyzing section; and a prog~_am storing section for storing the expansion processing program e;~tracted by the content data analyzing section, and characterized in that the expansion processing section has a configuration for executing expansion processing with respect to the compressed contents stored in the data storing section by applying the expansion processing program stored in the program storing section to the compressed contents.
In addition, in one embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention, the data processing apparatus is characterized in that the contents data analyzing section has a configuration for obtaining a configuration information of content data based on header information included in the content data and performing analysis of the content data.

In addition, in one embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention, the data processing apparatus is characterized in that reproduction priority information of the compressed contents is included in the header information and, if there are a plurality of compressed contents that is objects of expansion processing in the expansion processing section, the expansion processing section has a configuration for sequentially executing content expansion processing in accordance with the priority based on the priority information. in the header information obtained in the content data analyzing section.
In addition, in one embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention, the data processing apparatus is characterized by further comprising: displaying means for displaying information of the compressed r_entents that are objects of expansion processing; and inputting means for inputting reproduction contents identification data selected from the content information displayed on the displaying means, and characterized in that the e:~pansicn processing section has a configuration for executing expansion processing of the compressed contents corresponding to the identification data based on the reproduction contents identification data inputted from the inputting means.
In addition, a thirty sixth aspect of the present invention is a data processing apparatus for performing reproduction processing of content data provided by a storage medium or a communication medium, which is characterized by comprising: a content data analyzing section for receiving content data including either compressed contents or expansion processing program, distinguishing whether the content data has the compressed contents or the expansion processing program from header information included in the received content data and, at the same time, if the content data has the compressed contents, obtaining a type of a compressing processing program applied to the compressed contents from the header information of the content data, and if the content data has the expansion processing program, obtaining a type of the expansion processing program from the header information of the content data; an expansion processing section for executing expansion processing of the compressed contents, characterized in that the expansion processing section has a configuration for selecting an expansion processing program applicable to the type of the compression processing program of the compressed contents analyzed by the content data analyzing section based on the type of the expansion processing program analyzed by the content data analyzing section, and executing expansion processing by the selected expansion processing program.
In addition, in one embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention., the data processing apparatus is characterized by fur'~her comprising: a data storing section for storing the compressed contents that are extracted by the content data analyzing section; and a program sto=ing section for storing the expansion processing program extracted by the content data analyzing section, and characterized in that the ex_pansicn processing section has a configuration for executing expansion processing with respect tc the compressed contents stored in the data storing section by applying the expansion processing program stored in the program storin~~ section to the compressed contents.
In addition, in one embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention,. the data processing apparatus is characterized in that reproduction priority information of the compressed contents is included in the header information and, if there are a plurality of compressed contents that is objects of expansion processing, content expansion processing in the expansion. processing section. has a configuration for sequentially executing content expansion processing in accordance with the priority based on the priority information in the header information obtained in the content data analyzing section.
In addition, in one embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present inventior_, the data processing apparatus is characterized by further ccmpri.sing retrieving means for retrieving an expansion processing program, and characterized in that the retrieving means has a configuration for retrieving an expansion processing program applicable to a type of the w compression processing program of the compressed contents analyzed by the content data analyzing section wir_h program storing means _ 76 _ accessible by the data processing apparatus as an object of retrieval.
In addition, in one embodiment of the data processing apparatus of the present invention, the data processing apparatus is characterized by further comprising: displaying means for displaying information of the compressed contents that are objects of expansion processing; and inputting means for inputting reproduction contents identification data selected from the content information displayed on the displaying means, and characterized in that the expansion processing section has a configuration for executing expansion processing of the compressed contents corresponding to the identification data based on the reproduction contents identification data inputted from the inputting means.
In addition, a thirty seventh aspect of the present invention is a data processing method for performing reproduction processing of content data provided by a storage medium or a communication medium, which is characterived by comprising: a content data analyzing step of executing content data analysis of content data including compressed contents and an expansion processing program of the compressed contents, and executing extraction processing of the compressed contents and the expansion processing program from -the content data; and an expansion processing step of executing expansion processing of the cont:emt data included in the content data using an expansion. processing program included in the content 77 _ data obtained as a resul~ of the analysis of the content data analyzing section.
In addition, in one embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention, the data processing method is characterized by further comprising: a data storing step of storing the compressed contents that are extracted by the content data analyzing section; and a program storing step of storing the expansion processing program extracted by the content data analyzing section, and characterized in that the expansion processing section has a configuration for executing expansion processing with respect to the compressed contents stored in the data storing step by applying the expansion processing program stored in the program storing step to the compressed contents.
Tn addition, in one embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention, the data processing method is characterized in that the contents data analyzing step obtains a configuration information of content data based on header information included in the content data and performs analysis of the content data.
In addition, in one embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention, the data processing method is characterized in that reproduction priority information of the compressed contents is included in the header informar_ion and, if there are a plurality of compressed contents that is objects of expansion processing in the expansion processing section, the yg _ expansion processing step sequentially executes content expansion processing in accordance witr~: the priority based on the priority information in the heade information obtained in the content data analyzing step.
In addition, in one embcdiment of the data processing method of the present invention, the data processing method is characterized by further comprising: displaying step of displaying information of the compressed contents that are objects of expansion processing on displaying means; and inputting step of inputting reproduction. contents identification data selected from the content information displayed on the displaying means, and characterized in that the expansion processing step executes expansion processing of the compressed contents corresponding to the identification data based on the reprcduction contents identification data inputted from the inputting step.
In addition, a thirty eighth .aspect of the present invention is a data processing method for performing reproduction processing of content data provided by a storage medium or a communication medium, which is characterized by comprising: a content data analyzing step of receiving content data including either compressed contents or expansion processing program, distinguishing whether the content: data has the compressed -contents cr the expansion processvng program from header information included in the receijied content data and, at the same time, if the content data has the compressed contents, obtaining a type of a compressing processing program applied to the compressed contents from the header information of the content data, and if the content data has the expansion processing program, obtaining a type of the expansion processing program from the header information of the content data; a selecting step of selecting an expansion processing program applicable to the type of the compression processing program of the compressed contents analyzed in the content data analyzing step based on the type of the expansion processing program analysed in the content data analyzing step; and an expansion processing step of executing expansion processing by the expansion processing program selected in the selecting step.
In addition, in one embodiment: of the data processing method of the present invention, the data processing method is characterized by further comprising: a data storing step of storing the compressed contents that are extracted by the content data analyzing section; and a program storing step of storing the expansion processing program extracted by the content data analyzing section, and characterized in that the expansion processing step executes expansion processing with respect to the compressed contents stored in the data storing step by applying the expansion processing program stored in the program storing w step to the compressed contents.
In addition, in one emi~odiment of the data processing method of the present invention, the data processing method is characterized in that reproduction priority information of the compressed contents is included in the header information and, if there are a plurality of compressed contents that is objects of expansion processing, the content expansion processing step sequentially executes content expansion processing in accordance with the priority based or. the priority information in the header information obtained in the content. data analyzing step.
In addition, in one embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention, the data processing method is characterized by comprising a retrieving step of retrieving an expansion processing program, and characterized in that the retrieving step retrieves an expansion processing program applicable to a type of the compression processing program of the compressed contents analyzed in the content data analyzing step with program storing means accessible by the data processing apparatus as an object of retrieval.
In addition, in one embodiment of the data processing method of the present invention, the data processing method is characterized by further comprising: a displaying step of displaying information of the compressed contents that are objects of expansion processing; and an inputting step of inputting reproduction contents identification data selected from the --content information displayed en the displaying means, and characterized in that the expansion processing step executes expansion processing of the compressed contents corresponding to _ gl _ t:~e identification data based on the reproduction contents identification data inputted from the inputting means.
In addition, a thirty ninth aspect of the present invention is a content data generating method for performing generation processing of content data provided by a storage medium or a communication medium, which :s characterized by generating content data in which compressed contents and an expansion processing program of the compressed contents are combined.
In addition, in one embodiment of the content data generating method of the present invention, the content data generating method is characterized in that a configuration information of the content data is added as header information of the content data.
In addition, in one embodiment of the content data generating method of the present invention, the content data generating method is characterized in that reproduction priority information of contents included in the content data as header information of the content data.
In addition, a fortieth aspect of the present invention is a content data generating method for performing generation processing of content data provided by a storage medium or a communication medium, which is craracter~yzed in that content data is generated in which a type of content data for identifying -whether the content data has compressed contents or an expansion processing program is added as header information; if the content data has compressed contents, a type of a compression processing program applied to the compressed contents is added as header information; and if the content data has an expansion processing program, a type of an expansion processing program is added as header information.
In addition, in one embodiment of the content data generating method of the present invention, the content data generating method is characterized in that reproduction priority information of contents included in the content data is added as header information of the content data.
In addition, a forty first aspect of the present invention is a program providing medium for providing a computer program that causes a computer system to execute reproduction processing of content data provided by a storage medium or a communication medium, which is characterized by comprising: a content data analyzing step of executing content data analysis of content data including compressed contents and an expansion processing program of the compressed contents, and executing extraction processing of the compressed contents and she expansion processing program from the content data; and an expansion processing step of executing expansion processing of the conten= data included in the content data using an expansion processing program included in the content data obtained as a result of the analysis of the content data -analyzing section.
The program providing medium in accordance with the present invention is, for example, a medium for providing a computer program in a computer readable form to a general purpose computer system that can execute various program codes. A form of the medium is a storage medium such as a CD, ar~ FD or an M0, or a transmission medium such as a network, and is not specifically limited.
Such a program providing medium defines a structural or functional cooperative relationship between a computer program and a providing medium for realising a predetermined function of the computer program on a computer system. In other words, a cooperative operation is shown on the computer system by installing the computer program in the computer system via the providing medium, and operatvyonal Effects similar to other aspects of the present invention can be obtained.
Other objects, features, and advantages of the present invention will be seen from the detailed explanation based on the embodiment and attached drawings of the present invention described later.
As described above, according to the data processing apparatus and method and da~a-verifying-value-imparting method of the present invention, partial integrity check values generated as integrity check values for a partial data set containing one or more partial data obtained by dividing content data into a -plurality of pieces are used for a collation process to verify the partial data, and a partial-integrity-check-value -verifying integrity check values used to uerity a partial integrity check - g4 -value set comprising a ccmbination of a plurality of partial integrity check values are used for a collation process to verify the entirety of a plurality of partial data sets corresponding to a plurality of partial integrity check values constituting a partial integrity check value set. Consequently, compared to a configuration for imparting a single integrity check value to the entire content data, partial verification is achieved and the entire verification process is efficient due to the use of the partial integrity check values.
Further, according to the data processing apparatus and method and data-verifying-vaiue-imparting method of the present invention, the verification process; can be executed depending on how content data are used, for example, whether the data are to be downloaded or reproduced; for example, a verification process for a data portion that is unlikely to be tampered can be omitted.
Therefore, efficient verification is achieved depending on how data are used.
Furthermore, the data processing apparatus and data processing method of the present invention are configured in such a way that individual keys necessary to execute encryption processing such as data encryption, data decryption, data verification, authentication processing and signature processing are not stored in a storage section, master keys to generate these individual keys are stored in the storage section instead, the encryption processing section of the data processing apparatus _ 8 i _ extracts the master keys corresponding to these individual keys such as encryption keys and authentication keys from the storage section as required, executes encryption processing applying a DES
algorithm, etc. based on the extracted master keys and identification data of the apparatus or data and generates individual keys such as an encryption key and authentication key, and therefore the present invention eliminates the possibility of the individual keys themselves leaking from the storage section and enhances the security of an encryption processing system because acquiring the individual keys will require a plurality of information pieces such as information of both individual key generation algorithm and mas'~er keys, identification data of the apparatus or data. Moreover, even if an individual '.~ey is leaked for some reasons, the range of damage is limited to the range of the individual key, which will not lead to collapse of the entire system.
Furthermore, the data processing apparatus, data processing system and data processing method of the present invention is configured in such a way that individual keys are sequentially generated based on the identification data of the apparatus or data, which eliminates the need to maintain the list of keys applied to individual apparatuses in a control apparatus, facilitating system control as well as enhancing the security.
Furthermore, according to the data processing apparatus, data processing method and conter;ts data generation method of the present invention, illegal deUice identification data information is stored in contents data, collation between an illegal device list and the recorder/reproducer identifier of the recorder/reproducer attempting to use the contents is executed prior to the use of the contents by the recorder/reproducer, and in the case where the collation result shows trat some entries of the illegal device list mater the recorder/reproducer identifier, the subsequent processing, for example, contents data decryption, downloading or reproduction processing, etc. is stopped, thus making it possible to prevent a reproducer, etc. that has illegally acquired a key from illegally using contents.
Furthermore, the data processing apparatus, data processing method and contents data generation method of the present invention adopt a configuration allowing the contents data to include check values together for the illegal device list in the content data, making it possible to prevent tampering of the list itself and provide a contents data utilization configuration with enhanced security.
Furthermore, the data processing apparatus and data processing metrod of the present invention allows a data processing apparatus such as a recorder/reproducer and PC to store an apparatus-specific key, which is specific to the data processing apparatus and a system common F:ey, which is common to other data processing apparatuses usir~~ contents data, making it possible to process contents according to contents utilization _ g i _ restrictions. The data processing apparatus selectively uses these two keys according to contents utili~atien restrictions.
For example, in the case where the contents are only available to the data processing apparatus, the key specific to the data processing apparatus is used, while in the case where the contents are also available to other systems, a check value far the contents data is generated a::d collation processing is performed using the system common key. It is possible to decrypt arid reproduce the encrypted data only when the collation. is established, thus allowing processing according to contents utilization restrictions suc:~ as contents only available to the data processing apparatus or contents commonly available to the system, etc.
Furthermore, the data processing apparatus, data processing method ar~d contents data verification value assignment method of the present invention is configured to generate a contents check value in units of contents block data, execute collation processing on the cor~ten~s check value generated, generate a contents intermediate value based on the contents block data to be verified and generate a contents check value through encryption processing applying a contexts check value generation key, thus allowing efficient verifica~ion compared to conventional processing on entire data.
Furthermore, the data processing apparatus, data processing method and contents data verification value assignment method of _ 88 _ the present invention allows verification in contents block units and simplified verification processing according to download processing and reproduction processing, etc. providing efficient verification according to the mode of use.
Furthermore, since the data processing apparatus, the content data generating method, and the data processing method of the present invention is made to have the configuration that is provided with the plurality of content blocks in the content data and enables encryption processing for a unit of each content block, and also have the configuration in which the key used for content encryption is further encrypted and stored in the header section, even if, for example, a plurality of content blocks exist and blocks requiring encryption processing and blocks not requiring encryption processing are mixed, ii= becomes possible to have an arbitrary data structure that coup:Les each block.
In addition, according to the data processing apparatus, the data processing system, and the data processing method of the present invention, by making the configuration of the content block to be a regular configuration, for example, a configuration having a uniform data length, or a configuration in which the encryption block and the non-encryption (plaintext) block are alternately disposed, decryption processing and the like of the content block can be prompt~y executed, and encryption content data suitable for processing corresponding to contents of the _ 89 _ t content data, for example, reproduction and the like of music data can be provided.
Furthermore, the data processing apparatus, the data processing method and the content data generating method can efficiently execute reproduction processing in the case in which contents are compressed voice data, image data or the like. That is, by making a configuration of conten!= data to be one in which compressed data and an expansion processing program are combined, expansion processing, to whir_h an expansion processing program incidental to compressed content data is applied, is made possible in the reproduction processing apparatus, and a situation in which the expansion processing pro<~ram does not exist in the reproduction processing apparatus and reproduction cannot be performed can be avoided.
Moreover, according to the data processing apparatus, the data processing method and the coni~ent data generating means, since a configuration of content data has a configuration in which the reproduction processing apparatus determines the expansion processing program applicable to the compressed content data based or. the header information, and the reproduction processing apparatus further retrieves a program applicable from accessible recording media or the ~~.ike and executes expansion processing by making content data to be a combination of compressed data and the header section scoring the type of the compression processing program, or, if the contents has the expar_sion processing program, _ gp _ a combinat;~on of the expansion processing program and the header storing the type cf the program, program retrieving processing does not need to be executed by a user, and efficient reproduction processing becomes possible.
Brief Description of the Drawings Fig. 1 is a view showin~~ the configuration of a conventional data processing system.
Fig. 2 is a view showing the configuration of a data processing apparatus to which the present invention is applied.
Fig. 3 is a view showing the configuration of a data processing apparatus to which the present invention is applied.
Fig. 4 is a view showing a data format of content data on a medium or a communication path.
Fig. 5 is a view showir:g a usage policy contained in a header of content data.
Fig. 6 is a view showing block information contained in a header of content data.
Fig. 7 is a view shcwing an electronic signature generating method using the DES.
Fig. 8 is a view showi~.g an electron'~c signature generating method using the Triple DES. -Fig. 9 is a view useful in explaining the aspect of the Triple DES.

Fig. 10 is a view showing an electronic signature generating method partly using the Triple DES.
Fig. 11 is a view showing a process flow of electronic signature generation.
Fig. 12 is a view showing a process flow of electronic signature generation.
Fig. 13 is a view useful in explaining a mutual authentication process sequence using a symmetrical cryptography technique.
Fig. 14 is a view useful in explaining a public key certificate.
Fig. 15 is a view useful in explaining a mutual authentication process sequence using an asymmetrical cryptography technique.
Fig. 16 is a view showing a process flow of an encryption process using elliptic curve cryptography.
Fig. 17 is a view showwng a process flow of a decryption process using elliptic curve cryptography.
Fig. ls3 is a view showing how data are held on a recording and reproducing device.
Fig. 19 is a view showing how data are held on a recording device.
Fig. 20 is a view showing a process flow of mutual authentication between the recording and reproducing device and the recording device.
_ g2 _ Fig. 21 is a view shcwing the relatior_ship between a master key of the recording and reproducing device and a corresponding master key of the recording device.
Fig. 22 is a view showing a process flow of a content download process.
Fig. 23 is a view useful in explaining a method for generating an integrity <:heck value A: ICVa.
Fig. 24 is a view useful in explaining a method for generating an integrity check value B: ICVb.
Fig. 25 is a view useful in explaining a method .for generating a total integrity check value ar~d an integrity check value unique to the recording and reproducing device.
Fig. 26 is a view showing a format of content data stored in the recording device (localization field = 0).
Fig. 27 is a view showing a format cf content data stored in the recording device (localization f;~eld = 1).
Fig. 28 is a view showing a process flow of a content reproduction process.
Fig. 29 is a view useful in explaining a method by which the recording device executes commands.
Fig. 30 is a view useful in explaining a method by which the recording device executes commands in a content storage process. -Fig. 31 is a view useful in explaining a method by whicr. the recordir~g device executes commands in a content reproduction prOCeSS.

Fig. 32 is a view useful in explaining the configuration of a content data format type 0.
Fig. 33 is a view useful in explaining the configuration of a content data format type 1.
Fig. 34 is a view useful in explaining the configuration of a content data format type 2.
Fig. 35 is a view useful in explaining the configuration of a content data format type 3.
Fig. 36 is a view useful in explaining a method for generating a content integrity check value IDVi for the format type 0.
Fig. 37 is a view useful in explaining a method for generating a content integrity check value IDVi for the form<~t type 1.
Fig. 38 is a view useful in explaining a total integrity check value and an integrity check value unique to the recording and reproducing device for the format types 2 and 3.
Fig. 39 is a View showing a process for downloading a content of the format type 0 or 1.
Fig. 40 is a view showing a process for downloading a content of tine format type 2.
Fig. 41 is a view showing a process for downloading a content -of the format type 3.
Fig. 42 is a View showing a process for reproducing a ccntent of the format type 0.

Fig. 43 is a view showing a process for reproducing a content of the format type 1.
Fig. 44 is a view showing a process for reproduc::ing a content of the format type 2.
Fig. 45 is a view showing a process for reproducing a content of the format type 3.
Fig. 46 is a view (1) useful in explaining a method by which a content generator and a content verifier generate integrity check values and execute verification using them.
Fig. 47 is a view (2) useful ir~ explaining a method by which the content generator and the content verifier generate integrity check values and execute verification using them.
Fig. 48 is a view (3) useful in explaining a method by which the content generator and the content verifier generate integrity check values and execute verification using them.
Fig. 49 is a view useful in explaining a method for individually generating various keys using master keys.
Fig. 50 is a view (example 1) showing an example of a process executed by a content provider and a user in conjunction with the method for individually generating various keys using master keys.
Fig. 5I is a view (example 2) showing an example of a process executed by the content provider and the user in conjunction with the method for individually generating various keys using master keys.

Fig. 52 is a view useful in explaining a configuration for executing localization using different master keys.
Fig. 53 is a view (example 3) showing an example of a process executed by the content pro eider and the user in conjunction with the method for individually generating various keys using master keys.
Fig. 54 is a view (example 4) showing an example of a process executed by the content provider and the user in conjunction with the method for individually generating various keys using master keys.
Fig. 55 is a view (example 5) showing an example of a process executed by the content provider and the user in conjunction with the method for individually generating various keys using master keys.
Fig. 56 is a view showing a flow of a process for storing a cryptography key with the Triple DES applied thereto, using t=he Single DES algorithm.
Fig. 57 is a view showing a content reproduction process flow (example 1) based on priority.
Fig. 58 is a view showin:~ a content reproduction process flow (example 2) based on priority.
Fig. 59 is a view showing a content reproduction process flow (example 3) based on priority.

Fig. 60 is a view useful in explaining a configuration for executing a process for decrypting (decompressing) compressed data during the content reproc_~uction process.
Fig. 61 is a view showing an example of the configuration of a content (example 1).
Fig. 62 is a view showing a reproduction process flow in the example 1 of the configuration of the content.
Fig. 63 is a view showing an example of the configuration of a content (example 2).
Fig. 64 is a view showing a reproduction process flow in the example 2 of the configuration of the content.
Fig. 65 is a view showing arL example of the configuration of a content (example 3j.
Fig. 66 is a view showing a reproduction process flow in the example 3 of the configuration of the content.
Fig. 67 is a view showing an example of the configuration of a content (example 4).
Fig. 68 is a view showing a reproduction process flow in the example 4 of the configuration of the content.
Fig. 69 is a view useful in explaining a process for generating and storing save data.
Fig. 70 is a view showing a process flow for an example (example 1) of the process fer storing save data.

Fig. 71 is a view showing the configuration of a data managing file (example 1) used during a process for storing and reproducing save data.
Fig. 72 is a view showing a process flow for an example (example i) of the process for reproducing save data.
Fig. 73 is a view showing a process flow for an example (example 2) of the process fcr storing save data.
Fig. 74 is a view showing a process flow for an example (example 2) of the process fo.r reproducing save data.
Fig. 75 is a view showir_g a process flow for an example (example 3) of the process for storing save data.
Fig. 76 is a view showing the configuration of a data managing file (example 2) used during the process for storing and reproducing save data.
Fig. 77 is a view showing a process flow for an example (example 3) of the process for reproducing save data.
Fig. 78 is a view showing a process flow for an example (example 4) of the process for storing save data.
Fig. 79 is a view showing a process flow for an example (example 4) of the process for reproducing save data.
Fig. 80 is a view showin~~ a process flow for an example (ex_ample 5) of the process for storing save data. -Fig. 81 is a view showing the configuration of a data managing file (example 3) used during the process for storing and reproducing save data.

Fig. 82 is a view showing a process flow for an example (example 5) of the process for reproducing save data.
Fig. 83 is a view showing a process flow for an example (example 6) of the process for storing save data.
Fig. 84 is a view showing the configuration of a data managing file (example 4) used during the process for storing and reproducing save data.
Fig. 85 is a view showing a process flow for an example (example 6) of the process for reproducing save data.
Fig. 86 is a view useful in explaining a configuration for excluding invalid content users (revocation).
Fig. 87 is a view showing a flow of a process (example 1) for excluding invalid content users (revocation).
Fig. 88 is a view showing a flow cf a process (example 2) for excluding invalid content users (revocation).
Fig. 89 is a view useful in explaining the configuration of the security chip (example 1).
Fig. 90 is a view showing a process flow for a method for manufacturing a security chip.
Fig. 91 is a view useful in explaining the configuration of the security chip (example 2).
Fig. 92 is a view showing a flew of a process for writir_g data in the security chip (example 2).
Fig. 93 is a view showin~~ a flow of a process for checking written data in the security chip (example 2).
99 _ Best Mode for Carrying out tr~.a Invention The embodiments of the present invention will be described below. The description will proceed in the order of the following items:
(1) Configuration of Data Processing apparatus (2) Content Data Format (3) Outline of Cryptography Processes Applicable to Present Data Processing Apparatus (4) Configuration of Data Stored in Recording and Reproducing Apparatus (5) Configuration of Data Stored in Recording Device !6) Mutual Authentication Process between Recording and Reproducing Device and Recording Device ;6-1) Outline of Mutual Authentication Prccess s (6-2) Switching to Key Block during Mutual Authentication (7) Process for Downloading from Recording and Reproducing Device to Recording Device (8) Process Executed by Recording and Reproducing Device to Reproduce Information from Recording Device (9) Key Exchanging Process after Mutual Authentication (IO) Plural Content Data Formats and Download and Reproduction --Processes Corresponding to Each Format (11) Aspect of Process Executed by Content Provider to Generate Check Values (ACV) (12) Cryptography Process Key Generating Configuration Based on Master Key (13) Controlling Cryptography Intensity in Cryptography Procass (14) Program Activating Process Based on Activation Priority in Handling Policy in Content Data (15) Content Configuration and Reproduction (Decompression) Process (16) Process for Generating and storing Saved Data in Recording Device and Reproducing the Same therefrom (17) Configuration for Excluding (Revoking) Illegal Apparatuses (18) Secure Chip Configuration and Manufacturing Method therefor (1) Configuration of Data Processing Apparatus Fig. 2 shows a block diagram showing the general ccnfiguration of one embodiment of a data processing apparatus according to the present invention. Main components of the data processing apparatus are a recording and reproducing device 300 and a recording device 400.
The recording and reproducing device 300 comprises, for example, a personal computer (PC), a game apparatus, or the like.
The recording and reproducing device 300 has a control section 301 for carrying out unifying control including the control of -communication between the recording and reproducing device 300 and the recording device 400 dur=~ng a cryptography process in the recording and reproducing de~.Tice 300, a record;~ng and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 responsible for the whole cryptography process, a recording device controller 303 for executir:g an authentication process with the recording device 400 connected to the recording and reproducing device to read and write data, a read section 304 for at least reading data from a medium 500 such as a DVD, and a communication section 305 for transmitting and receiving data to and from the exterior, as shown in Fig. 2.
The recording and reproducing device 300 downloads and reproduces content data to and from the recording device 400 controlled by the control section 301. The recording device 400 is a storage medium that can preferably be installed in and removed from the recording and reproducing device 300, for example, a memory card, and has an external memory 402 comprising a non-volatile memory such as an EEPROM or a flash memory, a hard disk, or a RAM with batteries.
The reccrding and reproducing device 300 has a read section 304 as an interface to which content data stored in the storage medium shown at the left end of Fig. 2, that is, a DVD, a CD, an FD, or an HDD can be ir_put, and a communication section 305 as an interface to which content data distributed from a network such as the Internet can be input, in order to receive an input of a -ccntent from the exterior.
The recording and reproducing device 300 has a cryptography process section 302 to execute an authentication process, an.

encryption and a decryption processes, a data verifi~~ation process, and other processes in downloading content data externally input Via the read section 304 or the communication section 305, to the recording device 400 or reproducing and executing content data from the recording device 400. The cryptography process section 302 comprises a control section 306 for controlling the entire cryptography process section 302, an internal memory 307 holding information such as keys for the cryptography process and which has been processed so as to prevent data from being externally read out therefrom easily, and an encrypticn/decryption section 308 for executing the encryption and decryption processes, generating and verifying authentication data, generating random numbers, etc.
The control section 301 transmits an initialization command to the recording device 400 via the recording device controller 303 when, for example, the recording device 400 is installed in the recording and reproducing device 300, or execute a mediation process for various processes such as a mutual authentication between the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 and the encryption/decryption section 406 of the recording device cryptography process section 401, a integrity check value -collating process, and encryption and decryption processes. Each of these processes will be described in detail in the latter part.

The cryptography process section 302 executes the authentication process, the encryption and decryption processes, the data verifying process, and other processes, as previously described, and has tie cryptography process control section 306, the internal memory 307, and the encryption/decryption section 308.
The cryptography process control section 306 executes control of the whole cryptography process such as the authentication.
process and the encryption/decryption processes executed by the recording and reproducing device 300, for example, processes of setting an authentication completion flag when the authentication process executed between the recording and reproducing device 300 and the recording device 400 has completed, commanding the execution of various processes executed iiz the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing section cryptography process section 302, for example, a download process and a process for generating integrity check values for reproduced content data, and commanding the execution of a process for generating various key data.
The internal memory 307 stores key da_a, identification data, and ether data required for various processes such as the mutual authentication process, the integrity check value collating process, and the encryption and decryption processes which are executed in the recording and reproducing device 300, as described later in detail.

The encryptior:/decryption section 308 uses key data and the like stored in the internal memory 307 to execute the authentication process, the encryption and decryption processes, the generation and verification of predetermined integrity check values or electronic signatures, the verification of data, the generation of random numbers, etc. in downloading externally input content data to the recording device 400 or reproducing and executing content data stored .in the recording devir_e 400.
In this case, the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 holds important information such as cryptography keys and must thus be configured so as r_ot to have its data externally read out easily.
Thus, the cryptography process section is configured as a tamper resistant memory characterized to restrain external invalid reads in that it comprises a semiconductor chip that essentially rejects external accesses and has a multilayer structure, an internal memory sandwiched between dummy layers of aluminum or the like or arranged in the lowest layer, and a narrow range of operating voltages and/or frequencies. This configuration will be described later in detail.
In addition to these cryptography process functions, the recording and reproducing device 300 comprises a main Central --Processing Unit (CPU) 106, a RAM (Random Access Memory) 107, a ROM
(Read Only Memory) 108, an AV process section 209, an input interface 110, a PIO (Parallel I/0) interface 111, and a SIO
(Serial I/0) interface 1~2.
The main Central Prccessir~g Unit (CPU) 106, the RAM (Random Access Memory) 107, and the ROM (Read Only Memory) 108 are a component functioning as a control system for the main body of the recording and reproducing deTrice 300, and principally functions as a reproduction process section for reproducing data decrypted by the recording and reproducin~~ device cryptography process section 302. For example, the main Central Processing Unit (CPU) 106 executes control for the reproduction and execution of contents, such as output of content data read out from the recording device and then decrypted, to the AV process section 109 under the control of the control section 3!71.
The RA1'~I 107 is used as a main storage memory for various processes executed by the CPU 106 and as a working area for these processes. The ROM I08 stores a basic program for starting up an OS or the like activated by the CPU 106, and other data.
The AV process section 109 has a data compression and decompression process mechanism, specifically, an MPEG2 decoder, an ATRAC decoder, an MP3 decoder, or the like, to execute processes for data outputs to a data output apparatus such as a display or speakers (not shown) attached or connected to the -recording and reproducing device main body.
The input interface lIU outputs input data from various connected input means such as a controller, a keyboard, and a mouse, to the maim CPU 106. The main CPU 106 executes a process in accordance with a command issued by a user via the controller, based on a game program being executed or the like.
The PIO (Parallel I/0) interface 111 and the SIO (Serial I/0) interface i12 are used as storage devices for a memory card or a game cartridge and as a connection interface to a portable electronic device or the like.
The main CPU 106 also executes control in storing as saved data, setting data or the like for a game being executed or the like. During this process, stored data are transferred to the control section 301, whi~~h causes the cryptography process section 302 to execute a cryptography process for the saved data as required and then stores the encrypted data in the recording device 400. These cryptography processes will be described later in detail.
The recording device 400 is a storage medium that can preferably be installed in and removed from the recording and reproducing device 300, and comprises, for example, a memory card.
The recording device 400 has the cryptography process section 401 and the external memory 402.
The recording device cryptography process section 401 executes the mutual authentication process, encryption and decryption processes, data irerification process, and other processes between the recording ar_d reproducing device 300 and the recording device 400 in downloading content data from the recording and reproducing device 30~~ or reproducing content data frcm the recording device 400 to the recording and reproducing device 300, and has a control section, an internal memory, an encryption/decryption section, and others similarly to the cryptography process section of the recording and reproducing device 300. The details will be shown in Fig. 3. The external memory 402 comprises a non-volatile memory comprising a flash memory such as an EEPROM, a hard disk, or a RAM with batteries, or the like, to store encrypted content data or the like.
Fig, 3 is a view schematically showing the configuration of data input from a medium 500 and a communication means 600 that are data providing means from which the data processing apparatus according to the present invention receives data, and focusing on the configurations of the recording and reproducing device 300 receiving an input of a content from the content providing means 500 or 600 and of arrangements for the cryptcgraphy process in the recording device 400.
The medium 500 is, for example, an optical disk medium, a magnetic disk medium, a magnetic tape medium, a semiconductor medium, or the like. The cc:mmunication means 600 is capable cf data communication such as Internet, cable, or satellite communication .
In Fig. 3, the recording and reproducing device 300 verifies data input by the medium 5c),7 or the communication means 600, that 3.s, a content meeting a predetermined format as shown in Fig. 3, and stored the verified content in the recc~rdyng device 400.
As shown in the sections of the medium 500 and communication means 600 in Fig. 3, the con=ent data has the following components:
Content ID: content ID as an identifier for content data.
Usage policy: a usage policy containing constituent information of content data, for e:~ample, the sizes of a header section and a ccntent section constituting the content data, a format version, a content type indir_ating whether the content is a program or data, a localization field indicating whether the content can be used only in an apparatus that has downloaded the content or also in other apparatuses.
Block information table: block information table comprising the number of content blocks, a block size, an encryption flag indicating the presence of encryption, and others.
Key data: key data comprising an encryption key for encrypting the above described block information table, a content key for encrypting a content block, or the like.
Content bloc: content block comprising program data, music or image data, or other data to be actually reproduced.
The content data will be explained later in further detail -with reference to Fig. 4 and subsequent figures.
The content data are e:~crypted by the content key (hereafter referred to as the "Knon") and then provided to the recording and reproducing device 300 from the medium S00 or the communication means 600. The content can be stored in the external memory of the recording device 400 via the recording and reproducing device 300.
For example, the reccrding device 400 uses a key (hereafter referred to as a "storage key" (Kstr)) unique thereto stored in the internal memory 405 thereof to encrypt the content contained in the content data, the block information table contained in the content data as header information, information on various keys such as the content key Kcon before storing these data in the external memory 402. To download ~he content data from the recording and reproducing device 300 to the recording device 400 cr allow the recording and reproducing device 300 to reproduce the content data stored in the recording device 400, predetermined procedures such as a mutual authentication process between the apparatuses and content data encrypting a:.d decrypting processes are required. These processes will be explained later in detail.
The recording device 400 has the cryptography process section 401 and the external memory 402, and the cryptography process section 401 has a control section 403, a communication section 404, the internal memory 405, an encryption/decryption section 406, and an external memory control section 407. -The recording device 400 is responsible for the whole cryptography process, controls the external memory 402, and comprises the recording de~rice cryptography process section 401 for interpreting a command from the recording and reproducing device 3e70 and executing a process, and the external memory 402 holding contents or the like, The recording device cryptography process section 401 has the control section 403 for controlling the entire recording device cryptography process section 401, the communication section 404 for transmitting and receiving data to and from the recording and reproducing device 300, the internal memory 405 holding information such as keys for t;~e cryptography process and which has been processed so as to prevent data from being externally read out therefrom easily, the encryption/decryption section 406 for executing the encryption and decryption processes, generating and verifying authentication data, generating random numbers, etc, and the external memory control section 407 for reading and writing data from and to the external memory 402.
The control section 403 executes control of the whole cryptography process such as the authentication process and the encryption/decryption processes executed by the recording device 400, for example, processes of setting an authentication completion flag when the authentication process executed between the recording and reproducing device 300 and the recording device 400 has completed, commanding the execution of various processes -executed in the encryption/decryption section 406 of the cryptography process section 4~~1, for example, a download process and a process for generating integrity check values for reproduced content data, and commanding the execution of a process for generating various key data.
The internal memory 405 compr_ses a memory having a plurality of blocks to store a plurality of sets of key data, identification data, or other data which are required for various processes such as the mutual authentication process, integrity check value collating process, and encryption and decryption process which are executed by the recording device 400, as described later in detail.
The internal memory 405 of the recording device cryptography process section 401, like the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 previously described, holds important information such as cryptography keys and must thus be configured so as not to nave its data externally read out easily. Thus, the cryptography process section 401 of the recording and reproducing device 400 is characterized to restrain external invalid reads in that it comprises a semiconductor chip thar_ essentially rejects external accesses and has a multilayer structure, an internal memory sandwiched between dummy layers of aluminum or the ~ike or arranged in the lowest layer, and a narrow range of operating voltages and/or frequencies.
In this regard, the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 may be software configured so as to prevent w secret information for keys from leaking easily to the exterior.
The encryption/decryption section 406 uses key data or the like stored in the internal memory 405 to execute the data verifying process, the encryption and decryption processes, the generation and verification of predetermined integrity check values or electronic signatures, the generation of random numbers, etc. in downloading content data from the recording and reproducing device 300, reproducing content data stored in the external memory 402 of the recording device 400, or executing mutual authentication between the recording and reproducing device 300 and the recording device 400.
The communication section 404 is connected to the recording device controller 303 of t'r:e recording and reproducing device 300 to download or reproduce content data or communicate transfer data between the recording and reproducing device 300 and the recording device 400 during the mutual authentication process according to the control of the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300, or the control of the control section 403 of the recording device 400.
(2) Content Data Format Next, by using Fig. 4 to Fig. 6, the data format of data stored in the medium 500 of the system according to the present invention or communicated on the data communication means 600 will be explained. -The configuration shown, in Fig. 4 shows the format of the entire content data, the configuration shown in Fig. 5 shows details of the "usage policy" partly constituting the header - li3 -section of the content data, and the configuration shown in Fig. 6 shows details of the "block information table" partly constituting the header section of the content.
A representative example of the data format applied to the system according to the present intention will be explained, but different types of data formats such as formats corresponding to game programs and formats suitable for real-time processing of music data or the like can be used for the present system. The aspects of these formats will be described later in further detail, in "(10) Plural Content Data Formats and Download and Reproduction Processes Corresponding to Each Format".
In the data format shown in fig. 4, items shown in gray indicate encrypted data, items enclosed by double frames indicate tamper check data, and the other items shown in white indicate plain text data that are not encrypted. Encryption keys of the encryption section are shown en the left of the frames. In the example shown in Fig. ~, some of the blocks (content block data) of the content section contain encrypted data, while the others contain non-encrypted data_ This form varies depending on the content data, and all the content block data contained in the data may be encrypted.
As shown in Fig. 4, the data format is divided into the header section and the content section, and the header section comprises a content ID, a usage policy, an integrity check value A
(hereafter referred to as "ICVa";, a block information table key (hereafter referred to as "Kbit"~, a content key Kcon, a block information table (hereafter referred to as "BiT"), an integrity check value B (ICVb), and a total integrity check value (ICVt), and the content section comprises a plurality of content blocks (for example, encrypted and non-encrypted contents).
In this case, the individual information indicates a content ID for identifying a content. The usage policy comprises a header length indicating the size of the header section, a content length indicating the size of the r_ontent: section, a format version indicating version information fog the format, a format type indicating the type of the format, a content type indicating the type of the content, that is, whether it is a program or data, an operation priority indicating a priority for activation if the content type is a program, a localization field indicating whether the content downloaded in accordance with this format can be used only in an apparatus that has downloaded the content or also in other similar apparatuses, a copy permission indicating whether the content downloaded in accordance with this format can be copied from the apparatus that has downloaded the content to another similar apparatus, a move permission indicating whether the content downloaded in accordance with this format can be moved from the apparatus that has downloaded the content to another w-similar apparatus, an encryption algorithm indicating an algorithm used to encrypt content blocks in the content section, an encryption mode indicating a method for operating the algorithm used to encrypt the content in the content section, and an integrity check method indicating a method for generating integrity check values, as shown i:~ detail in Fig. 5.
The above described data ,stems recorded in the usage policy are only exemplary and varicus usage policy information can be recorded depending on the aspect of corresponding content data.
The identifier as described later in detail in, for example, "(17) Configuration for Excluding (Revoking) Illegal Apparatuses". It is also possible to make a configuration so as to exclude the use of content caused by the illegal apparatus by recording the content of an illegal recording and reproducing apparatus as data and by checking the time of starting the use.
The integrity check value A ICVa is used to verify that the content ID or the usage policy has not been tampered. It functions as a check value for partia'~ data instead of the entire content data, that is, as a partial integrity check value. The data block information table key Kbit is used to encrypt a block information table, and the content key Kcon is used to encrypt content blocks. The blcck information table key Kbit and the content key Kcon are encrypted with a distribution key (hereafter referred to as "Kdis") on the medium 500 and the communication means 600.
Fig. 6 shows the block information table in detail. The block information table in Fig. 6 comprises data ail encrypted with the block information table key Kbit as seen in Fig. 4. The block information table comprises a block number indicating the number of content blocks and information on N content blocks, as showr_ in Fig. 6. The content block information table comprises a block length, an encryption flag indicating whether or not the block ash been encrypted, an ICV flag indicating whether or not integrity check. values must be calculated, and a content integrity check value ( ICVi ) .
The content integrity check value is used to verify that each content block has not been tampered. A specific example of a method for generating a content integrity check value will be explained later in "(10) Plural Content Data Formats and Download and Reproduction Processes Correspondir_g to Each Format". The block information table key Kbit used to encrypt the block information table is further encrypted with the distribution key Kdis.
The data format in Fig. 4 will be continuously described. The integrity check value B IC~Ib is used to verify that the block information table key Kbit, the content key Kcon, and the block information table have not been tampered. It functions as a check value for partial data instead o~ the entire content data, that is, as a partial integrity check 'value. The total integrity check value ICVt is used to verify the integrity check values ICVa and ICVb, integrity check values ICVi for each content block (if this has been set?, partial integrity check values thereof, ar all the data to be checked have not been tampered.

In Fig. 6, the block length, the encryption flag, and the ICV
flag can be arbitrarily set, but cE=_rtain rules may be established.
For example, encrypted- and plain-text areas may be repeated over a fixed length, all the content data may be encrypted, or the block information table BIT may be compressed. Additionally, to allow different content keys Kcon to be used for different content blocks, the content key Kcon may be contained in the content block instead of the header section. Examples of the content data format will be described in further detail in "(10) Plural Content Data Formats and Download and Reproduction Processes Corresponding to Each Format".
(3) Outline of Cryptography Processes Applicable to Present Data Processing Apparatus Next, the aspects of various cryptography processes applicable to the data processing apparatus according to the present invention will be explained. The description of the cryptography processes shown in "(3) Outlir_e of Cryptography Processes Applicable to Present Data Processing Apparatus"
correspond to an outline of the aspect of a cryptography process on which are based various processes executed by the present data processing apparatus which will be specifically described later, --for example, "a. authentication process between recording ar~d reproducing device and recording device", "b. download process for device for loading contents", and "c~. process for reproducing con_ent stored in recording device". Specific processes executed by the recording and reproducing device 300 and the recording device 400 will be each described in detail in the item (4) and subsequent items.
An outline of the cryptography process applicable to the data processing apparatus will be described in the following order:
(3-1) Message Authentication Based on Common Key Cryptosystem (3-2) Electronic Signature Based on Public Key Cryptosystem (3-3) Verification of Electraric Signature Based on Public Key Cryptosystem (3-4) Mutual Authentication Based on Common Key Cryptosystem (3-5) Public Key Certificate (3-6) Mutual Authentication Based on Public Key Cryptosystem (3-7) Encryption Process Using Ecliptic Curve Cryptography (3-8) Decryption Process Using Ecliptic Curve Cryptography (3-9) Random Number Generating Process (3-1) Message Authentication Based on Common Key Cryptosystem First, a process for generating tamper detecting data using a common key cryptography method will be explained. the tamper detecting data are added to data to be detected for tamper ir~
order to check for tamper and authenticate a creator. w For example, the integrity check values A and B and total integrity check value in the ~:~ata structure described in Fig.
which are enclosed by double frames, the content check value - il9 -stored in each block in the block information table shown in Fig.
6, and the like are generated as the tamper detecting data.
here, the use of the DES, which is a common key cryptosystem, will be explained as an example of a method for generating and processing electronic signature data. In addition to the DES, the present invention may use, for example, the FEAL (Fast Encipherment Algorithm or the AES (Advance Encryption Standard) (U. S. next-term standard cryptography) as a similar process based cn a common key cryptosystem.
A method for generating an electronic signature using a general DES will be explained with reference to Fig. 7. First, before generating an electronic signature, a message to which the electronic signature is to be added is divided into sets of 8 bytes (the pieces of the divided message are hereafter referred to as "M1, M2, ... , MN"). An initial value (hereafter referred to as "IV") and the M1 are exclusive-GRed (the result is referred to as "I1"). Next, the Il is input to a DES encrypting section, which encrypts it using a key (hereafter referred to as "K1") (the output is referred to as "E1"). Subsequently, the E1 and the M2 are exclusive-CRed, and the output I2 is input to the DES
encrypting section, which encrypts it using the key Kl (the output is referred to as "E2"). This process is repeated to encrypt all the messages obtained by means of the division. The final output EN is an electronic signature. This value is generally called a "MAC (Message Authentication Code)" used to check a message for _ 1~~ _ tamper. In addition, such a system for chaining encrypted texts is called a "CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode".
The MAC value output in the example cf generation shown in Fig. 7 can be used as the integrity check value A or B or total integrity check value in the data structure shown in Fig. 4 which is enclosed by double frames and the content check value ICVl to ICJN stored in each block in the block information table shown in Fig. 6. In verifying the MAC value, a verifier generates it using a method similar to that used to originally generate it, and the verification is determined tc be successful. if the same value is obtained.
Moreover, in the example shown in Fig. 7, the initial value IV is exclusive-ORed with the first 8-byte message Ml, but the initial value IV may be zero and not exclusive-ORed.
Fig. 8 shows the configuration of a method for generating the MAC value which has improved securi~y compared to the MAC value generating method shown in Fig. 7. Fig. 8 shows an example where instead of the Single DES in Fig. 7, the Triple DES is used to generate the MAC value.
Figs. 9A and 9B show an example of a detailed configuration of each of tr:e Triple DES component shown in Fig. 8. There are two different aspects of the configuration of the Triple DES as shown in Fig. 9. Fig. 9(a) shows an example using two crypr_ography keys where processing is carried out in the order of an encryption process with a key 1, a decryption process with a _ ~?1 _ key 2, and an encryption process with the key 1. The two types of keys are used in the order of k;l, F:2, and K1. Fig. 9(b) shows an example using three cryptography keys where processing is carried out in the order of an encryptior_ process with the key l, an encryption process with the key 2, and an encryption process with a key 3. The three types of keys are used in the order of K1, K2, and K3. The plurality of processes are thus continuously executed to improve security intensity compared to the Single DES. The Tripled DES configuration, however, has the disadvantage of requiring an amount of processing time three times as large as that for the Single DES.
Fig. 10 shows an example of a MAC value generating configuration obtained by improving the Triple DES configuration described in Figs. 8 and 9. In Fig. 10, the encryption process for each of the messages from beginning to end of a message string to which a signature is to be added is based on the Single DES, while only the encryption process for the last message is based on the Triple DES configuration shown in Fig. 9(a).
The configuration shown in Fig. 10 reduces the time required to generate the MAC value for the message down to a value almost equal to the time required for the MAC value generating process based on the Single DES, with security improved compared to the MAC value based on the Single DES. Moreover, the Triple DES
configuration for the last message may be as shown in Fig. 9(b).
(3-2) Electronic Signature Based on Public Key Cryptosystem The method for generating electronic signature data if the common key encryption system is used as the encryption system has been described, but a method for generating electronic signature data if a common key cryptosystem is used as the encryption system will be described with reference to Fig. 11. The process shown in Fig. 11 corresponds to a process flow of generation of electronic signature data using the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EC-DSA), IEEE P1363/D3. An example using the Elliptic Curve CryptographT,r (hereafter referred as "ECC") as public key cryptography will be explained. In addition to the elliptic curve cryptography, the data processing apparatus according to the present invention may use, for example, the RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman; ANSI X9.31) cryptography, which is a similar public cryptosystem.
Each step in Fig. 11 will be described. At step S1, the following definitions are set: reference symbol p denotes a characteristic, a and b denote coefficients of an elliptic curve (elliptic curve: y~ - x.' + ax + b), G denotes a base point on the elliptic curve, r denotes the digit of the G, and Ks denotes a secret key (0 < Ks < r). At step S2, a hash value for the message M is calculated to obtain f = Hash(M).
Then, a method for determining a hash Value using a hash function will be explained. The hash function receives a message as an input, compresses it into data of a predetermined bit length, ar_d outputs the compressed data as a hash value. The hash value is characterized in that it is difficult tc predict an input from a hash value (output;i, in that when one bit of data input to the hash function changes, many bits of the hash value change, and in tha= it is difficult to find different input data with the same hash value. The hash fur~cticn may be MD4, MD5, or SHA-1, or DES-CBC similar to that described in Fi.g. 7 or other figures. In this case, the MAC (corresponding to the integrity check Value ICV), which is the final output value, is. the hash value.
Subsequently, at step 5:~, a random number a (0 < a < r) is generated, and at step S4, the base point is multiplied by a to obtain coordinates V (Xv, Yv). An addition and a multiplication by two on the elliptic curve are defined as follows:
If P= (Xa, Ya) , Q= (Xb, Yb) , R= (Xc, YC) =P+Q.
When P~Q (addition), Xc=~.'-Xa-Xb Yc=~,x (Xa-Xc) -Ya ~,_ (Yb-Ya) / (Xb-Xa) When P=Q (multiplication by two), Xc=~,''-2Xa Yc=~,x ( Xa-Xc ) -Ya ~,=(3(Xa)z+a)/(2Ya) ...... (1) These are used to multiply the point G by a (although the calculation speed is low, the most easy-to-understand calculation method is shown below. G, 2xG, 4xG, ... is calculated, the a is binary-expanded, and corresponding 2-x G (value obtained by multiplying G by 2 i times) is added to bits of I (i denotes a bit position as counted from an LSB).
At step S5, c=Xvmod r is calculated, and at step S6, is determined whether the result is zero. If the result is not zero, then at step S7, d=[(f+cKs)/u]mod r is calculated, and at step S8, it is determined whether d is zero. If the d is not zero, then at step S9; the c and d are output as electronic signature data.
When r is assumed to denote the length of I60 bits, the electronic signature data have a length of 320 bits.
If the c is 0 at step S6, the process returns to step S3 to regenerate a new random number. Similarly, if the d is 0 at step S8, the process also returns to step S3 to regenerate a new random number.
(3-3) Verification of Electronic Signature Based on Public Key Cryptosystem Next, a method for verifying an electronic signature using the public key cryptosystem will be described with reference to ~'ig. 12. At step S11, the following definitions are set:
reference symbol M denotes a message, reference symbol p denotes a characteristic, reference symbols a and b denote elliptic curve -coefficients (elliptic curve: y - xi + ax + b), reference symbol G
denotes a base point on the elliptic cur~Te, reference symbol r denotes the digit of G, and reference symbols G and Ks x G denote _ 1:3 _ public keys (0 < Ks <r). At step 512, it is verified that the electronic signature data c and d meet 0 < c < r and 0 < d < r.
If the data meet these condi=ions, then at step 513, a hash value for the message M is calculated to obtain f = Hash (M). Next, at step 514, h = 1/d mod r is calculated, and at step 515, hl = fh mod r and h2 = ch mod r are calculated.
At step S16, the already calculated hl and h2 are used to calculate P = (Xp, Yp) - hl ~ G + h2 ~ Ks x G. An electronic-signature verifier knows the public. keys G and Ks x G and can thus calculate a scalar multiplication of a point on the elliptic curve similarly as step S4 in Fig. 11. Then, at step 517, it is determined whether the P is a point: at infinity, and if not, the process proceeds to step S18 (the determination of whether the P
is a point at infinity can actually be made at step 516. That is, when P = (X, Y) and Q = (X, -Y) are: added together, the ~, cannot be calculated, indicating that P + Q is a point at infinity). At step S18, Xp mod r is calculated and compared with the electronic signature data c. Finally, if these values are equal, the process proceeds to step S19 to determine that the electronic signature is correct.
If it is determined that the electronic signature is correct, the data have not been tampered and. that a person holding the -secret key corresponding to the public keys has generated the electronic signature.

If the signature data c or d do nct meet 0 < c < r or 0 < d <
r at step 512, the process proceeds to step 520. Additionally, if the P is a point at infinity at step 517, the process also proceeds to step S20. Further, if the value of Xp mod r does not equal the signature data c at step 518, the process proceeds to step 520.
If it is determined at step S20 that the signature to be incorrect, this indicates that the received data have been tampered or have not been generated by the person holding the secret key corresponding to the public keys.
(3-4) Mutual Authentication Based on Common Key Cryptosystem Next, a mutual authentication method using a common key cryptosystem will be explained with reference to Fig. 13. In this figure, the common key cryptosystem is the DES, but any common key cryptosystem similar to that previously described may be used. In Fig. 13, B first generates a 64-bit random number Rb and transmits the Rb and its own ID ID(b) to A. On receiving the data, the A
generates a new 64-bit random number Ra, encrypts the data in the DES CBC mode in the order of the Ra, Rb, and ID(b) using a key Kab, ar~d returns them to the B. According to the DES CBC mode process configuration shown in Fig. 7, the Ra, Rb, and ID(b) correspond to M1, M2, and M3, and outputs E1, E2, and E3 are encrypted texts when an initial value: IV = 0.
On receiving the data, the B decrypts the received data with the key Kab. To decrypt the received data, the encrypted test E1 is first decrypted with the :_ey Kab to obtain the random number Ra.
Then, the encrypted test E2 ~s decrypted with the key Kab, and the result and the E1 are exclusive-OR.ed to obtain the Rb. Finally, the encrypted test E3 is decrypted with the key Kab, and the result and the E2 are exclusive-ORed to obtain the ID(b). Of the Ra, Rb, and ID(b) thus obtained, the Rb and ID(b) are checked for equality to those transmitted by the B. If they are successfully verified, the B authenticates the A.
Then, the B generates a session key (hereafter referred to as "Kses") used after the authentication (this is generated using a random number). The Rb, Ra, and Kses are encrypted in the DES CBC
mode in this order using the key Kab and then returned to the A.
On receiving the data, the A decrypts the received data with the key Kab. The method for decrypting the received data is similar to that executed by the B, so detailed description thereof is omitted. Of the Rb, Ra, and Kses thus obtained, the Rb and Ra are checked for equality to those transmitted by the A. If they are successfully verified, the A authenticates the B. After the A
and B have authenticated each other, the session key Kses is used as a common key for secret communication after the authentication.
If illegality or inequality is found during the verification of the received data, the mutual authenticaticn is considered to --have failed and the process is aborted.
(3-5) Public Key Certificate Next, the public key certificate will be explained with reference to Fig. I4. The public k~~y certificate is issued by a Certificate Authority (CA) far the public key cryptosystem. When a user submits his or her owr. ID, a public key, and others to the certificate authority, it adds infcrmation such as its own ID and valid term to the data submitted by the user and further adds its signature thereto to generate a public key certificate.
The public key certificate shown in Fig. 14 contains the version number of the certificate, the sequential number of the certificate allotted to the certificate user by the certificate authority, an algorithm arid parameters used for the electronic signature, the name of the certificate authority, the valid term of the certificate, the name (user ID) of the certificate user, and the public key and electronic signature of the certificate user.
The electronic signature is data generated by applying the hash function to the entirety of the version number of the certificate, the sequential number of the certificate allotted to the certificate user by the certificate authority, the algorithm and parameter used for the electronic signature, the name of the certificate authority, the valid term of the certificate, the name of the certificate user, and t:~e public key of the certificate user, to generate a hash value, and then using the secret key of the certificate authority for this value. For example, the process flow described in Fig. 11 is applied to the generation of the electronic signature.
The certificate authorit~_~ issues the public key certificate shown in Fig. 14, updates a public key certificate for which the valid term has expired, and create , manages, and distributes an illegal user list to exclude users who has committed an injustice (this is called ~~revocatien"). It also generates public and secret keys as required.
On the other hand, to use this public key certificate, the user uses the public key of the certificate authority held by itself to verify the electronic signature on the public key certificate, and after the electronic signature has been successfully verified, it takes the public key out from the public key certificate and uses it. Thus, all users who use the public key certificate must hold a common public key of the certificate authority. The method for verifying the electronic authority has been described in Fig. 12, so detailed description thereof is omitted.
(3-6) Mutual Authentication. Based on Public Key Cryptosystem Next, a method for mutual authentication using a 160-bit elliptic curve cryptography, which is a public key cryptography, will be described with reference to Fig. 15. Tn this figure, the public key cryptosystem is the ECC, but any similar public key cryptosystem may be used as previously described. In addition, the key size is not limited to 160 bits. In Fig. 15, the B first t generates and transmits the 64-bit random number Rb to the A. On receiving the data, the A generates a new 64-bit random number Ra and a random number Ak smaller than the characteristic p. It then multiplies a base point G by Ak to determine a point Av = Ak x G, generates an electronic signature A. Sig for the Ra, Rb, and Av (X
and Y coordinates), and returns these data to the B together with the A's public key certificai~e. In this case, since the Ra and Rb each contain 64 bits and the X and Y coordinates of the Av each contain 160 bits, the electronic signature is for the total of 448 bits. The method for generating th.e electronic signature has been described in Fig. 11, so detailed description thereof is omitted.
The public key certificate has also been explained in Fig. 14, so detailed description thereof is omitted.
On receiving the A's public key certificate, Ra, Rb, Av, and electronic signature A. Sig, the B verifies that the Rb transmitted by the A matches that generated by the B. If they are determined to match, the B verifiea the electronic signature in the A's public key certificate using the public key of the certificate authority, and takes out the A's public key. The verification of the public key certificate has been explained with reference to Fig. 14, so detailed description thereof is omitted.
The B then uses the A's public key obtained to verify the electronic signature A. Sig. The method for verifying the electronic signature has been explained ir_ Fig. 12, so detailed description thereof is omitted. Once the electronic signature has been successfully verified, the B authenticates the A.
Next, the B generates a new random number Bk smaller than the characteristic p. It then multiplies the base point G by Bk to determine a point Bv = Bk x G, generates an electronic signature B.
Sig for the Rb, Ra, and Bv (X and Y' coordinates), and returns these data to the A together with the B's public key certificate.
On receiving the B's public key certificate, Rb, Ra, Av, and electronic signature B. Sig, the A verifies that the Ra transmitted by the B matches that generated by the A. If they are determined to match, the A verifies the electronic signature in the B's public key certificate using the public key of the certificate authority, and takes out the B's public key. The A
then uses the B's public key obtained to verify the electronic signature B. Sig. Once the electronic signature has been successfully verified, the A authenticates the B.
If both the A and B have successfully authenticated each other, the B calculates Bk x Av (since the Bk is a random number but the Av is a point or. the elli.pt=ic curve, the point on the elliptic curve must be subjected to scalar multiplication), and the A calculates Ak x Bv so that lower 64 bits of each of the X
coordinates of these points are used as the session key for subsequent communicatior_ (if the common key cryptography uses a 64-bit key length). Of course, the session key may be generated from the Y coordinates, or the lowE=_r 64 bits may not be used. In - 13<? -secret communication after the mutual authentication, not only transmitted data are encrypted with the session key but an electronic signature may be added thereto.
If illegality or inequality is found during the verification of the electronic signature or received data, the mutual authentication is considered to have failed and the process is aborted.
(3-7) Encryption Prccess Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography Next, encryption using elliptic curve cryptography will be explained with reference to Fig. I6. At step S2I, the following definitions are set: referenr_e symbols Mx and My denote messages, reference symbol p denotes a charac:teristi~~, reference symbols a and b denote elliptic curve ;=oefficients (elliptic curve: y' - x' +
ax + b), reference symbol G denotes a base point on the elliptic curve, reference symbol r denotes the digit of G, and reference symbols G and Ks x G denote public keys-(0 < Ks <r). At step S22, the random number a is generated so that t7 < a < r. At step 523, coordinates V are calculated by mu:Ltiplying the public key Ks x G
by the u. The scalar multiplication on the elliptic curve has been explained at step S4 in Fig. 11, and description thereof is thus omitted. At step S24, the X coordinate of the V is multiplied by the Mx and _hen divided by the p to determine a -remainder X0. At step 525, the ~ coordinate of the V is multiplied by the My and then divided by the p to determine a remainder Y0. If the length of the message is smaller than the number of the hits, the My comprises a random number, and the decryption section discards it. At step 526, a x G is calculated and at step 52~, an encrypted text a x G, (X0, YO) is obtained.
~;3-8) Decryption Process Jsing Elliptic Curve Cryptography Next, decryption using the elliptic curve cryptograhy will be described with reference to Fig. li. At step S3'~, the following definitions are set: reference sym~>ols a x G and (X0, YO) denote encrypted text data, reference symbol p denotes a characteristic, reference symbols a and b denote el_lipt.ic curve coefficients (elliptic curve: y2 = x3 + ax + b), reference symbol G denotes a base point on the elliptic curve, reference symbol r denotes the digit of G, and reference symbol Ks denotes a secret key (0 < Ks <r). At step 532, the encrypted data a x G are multiplied by a value corresponding to the secret key Ks to determine coordinates v (Xv, Yv). At step 533, the X coordinate of (X0, YO) is taken out from the encrypted data and Xl = XO / Xv mod p is calculated.
At step 534, the Y coordinate is taken out and Y1 = YO / Yv mod p is calculated. At step S35, X1 is determined to be Mx and YI is determined to be My to cbtai.n a message. At this point, if the My is not used for the message, Y1 is discarded.
In this manner, when the secret key is Ks, the public key is G, and Ks x G is calculated, the key used for encryption and the -key used fer decryption may be different.

Another known example of the public key cryptography is the RSA, but detailed description thereof is omitted (details thereof are described in PKCS #1 Versicn 2).
(3-9) Random Number Generating Process Next, a method for generating a random number will be explained. Known random-number generating methods include an intrinsic random-number generating method that amplifies thermal noise to generate a random number from the resulting A/D output and a pseudo random-number generating method that combines together a plurality of linear circuits such as M sequences. A
method is also known-which uses common key cryptography such as the DES. In this example, the pseudo random-number generating method using the DES will be described (ANSI X9.17 base}.
First, the value of 64 bits (for a smaller number of bits, higher bits are set to 0) obtained from data such as time is defined as D,.key information used for .the Triple-DES is defined as Kr, and a seed fo.r generating a random number is defined as S.
Then, the random number R is calculated as follows:
I=Triple-DES(Kr, D) ...... (2-1) I=Triple-DES (Kr, S'~I) . . . . . . (2-2) I=Triple-DES ( Kr, R'pI ) . . . . . , c; 2-3 ) In this case, Triple-DES() is a function that uses a first argument as cryptography ke;r information and that encrypts the value of a second argument based on the Triple-DES. The operation 'a is an exclusive OR executed every 64 bits. The last value S is updated as a new seed.
If random numbers are continuously generated, Equations (2-2) and (2-3) are repeated.
The aspects of various cryptography processes applicable to the data processing apparatus acr_o.rding to the present invention hale been described. Next, specific processes executed in the present data processing apparatus will be described in detail.
(4) Configuration of Data Stored in Recording and Reproducing Device Fig. 18 is a view useful in explaining the contents of data held in the internal memory 307 configured in the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 shown in Fig. 3.
As shown in Fig. 18, the internal memory 307 stores the following keys arid data:
MKake: recording device authenticating master key for generating an authentication and key exchange key (hereafter referred to as "Katie") required for a mutual authentication process executed be=weep the recording and reproducing device 300 and recording device 400 (see Fig.. 3).
IVake: initial Value for the recording device authenticating key.

MKdis: master key for a distribution key for generating a distribution key Kdis.
IVdis: distribution-key-generating initial value.
Kicva: integrity-check-value-~-generating key for generating the integrity check value ICVa.
Kicvb: integrity-check-value-B-generating key for generating the integrity check value ICVb.
Kicvc: content-integrity-check-value-generating key for generating the integrity check value ICVi (i=1 to N) for each content block.
Kicvt: total-integrity check value-generating key for generating the total integrity check value ICVt.
Ksys: system signature key used to add a common signature or ICV to a distribution system.
Kdev: recording and reproducing device signature key that varies depending on recording and reproducing device and that is used by the recording and reproducing device to add a signature or ICV.
IVmem: initial value that is used for a cryptography process for mutual authentication, or tree like. This is shared by the recording device.
These keys and data are stored ir~ the internal memory 307 -configured in the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302.

(5) Configuration of Data Stored in Recording Device Fig. 19 is a view showing how data are held on the recording device. In this figure, the internal memory 405 is divided into a plurality of (in this example, N) blocks each storing the following keys anc; data:
IDmem: recording device identification information that is unique to the recording device.
Kake: authentication key that is used for mutual authentication with the recording and reproducing device 300.
IVmem: initial value that is used for a cryptography process for mutual authentication, or the like.
Kstr: storage key that is a cryptography key for the block information table and other content data.
Kr: random number generating key.
S: seed.
These data are each held in the corresponding block. An external memory 402 holds a plurality of (in this example, M) content data; it holds the data described in Fig. 4 as shown, for example, in Fig. 26 or 27. The difference in configuration between Figs. 26 and 27 will be described later.
(6) Mutual Authentication Process between recording and reproducing device and recording device (6-1) Outline cf Mutual Authentication Process Fig. 20 is a flew chart showing a procedure for an authentication between the reccrding and reproducing device 300 and the recording device 400. At step 541, the user inserted the recording device 400 into the recording and reproducing device 300.
If, however, the recording device 4C0 is capable of communication in a non-contact manner, it need not be inserted thereinto.
rNher~ the recording device 400 is set in the recording and reproducing device 300, a recording device detecting means (not shown) in the recording and reproducing device 300 shown in Fig. 3 notifies the control section 301 that the recording device 400 has been installed. Then at step 54~, the control section 301 of the recordir:g and reproducing device 300 transmits an initialization command to the recording device 400 via tire recording device controller 303. On receiving the command, the recording device 400 causes the control section 403 of the recording device cryptography process section 401 to receive the command via the communication section 404 and clear an authentication completion flag if it has been set. That is, unauthenticated state is set.
Then, at step 543, the control. section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 transmits an initialization command to the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302. At this point, it also tran:~mits a recording device insertion port number. When the recording device insertion port number is transmitted, even if a plurality of recording devices 400 are connected to the recording and reproducing device 300, the recording and reproducing device 300 can simultaneously execute authentication with these recording devices 400 and transmit and receive data thereto and r_herefrom.
On receiving the initialization command, the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 causes the control section 306 thereof to clear the authentication complete flag corresponding to the recording device insertion port number if it has been set. That is, the unauthenticated state is set.
Then at step 544, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 specifies a key block number used by the recording device cryptography process section 401 of the recording device 400. Details of the key block number will be described later. At step 545, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 reads out the recording device identification information IDmem stored in the specified key block in the internal memory 405 of the recording device 400.
At step S46, the control section 30i of the recording and reproducing device 300 transmits the recording device identification information ICmem to the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to generate the authentication key Kake based on the recording device identification information IDmem. The authentication key Kake is generated, for example, as follows:
- i40 -Kake=DES (MKake, IDmem'aIVake ) . . . . . . ( 3 ) In this case, the MKake denotes the master key for the recording device authentication key used to generate the authentication key Kake required fir the mutual authentication process executed between the recording and reproducing device 300 and the recording device 400 (see Fig. 3), the master key being stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device 300 as described above. Additionally, the IDmem denotes the recording device identification information unique to the recording device 400. Furthermore, the IVake denotes the initial key for the recording dev-_ce authentication key. In addition, in the above equation, the DES() denotes a function that uses a first argument as cryptography key and that encrypts the value of a second argument based on the DES. The operation 'a denotes an exclusive OR executed every 64 bits.
If, for example, the DES configuration shown in Fig. 7 or 8 is applied, the message M sht~wn in Figs. 7 and 8 corresponds to the recording device identification information: IDmem, the key K1 corresponds to the master key for t=he device authentication key:
MKake, the initial value IV corresponds to the value: IVake, and r_he output obtained is the a;~thentvication key Kake.
Then at step 547, the mutual authentication process and the process for generating the session key Kses are carried out. The mutual authentication is exe~~uted between the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 and the encryptior./decryption sec~ion 406 of the recording device cryptography process section 401; the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 mediates therebetween.
The mutual authentication process car. be executed as previously described in Fig. 13. In the configuration shown in Fig. 13, the A and B correspond to the recording and reproducing device 300 and the recording device 400, respectively. First, the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 generates the random number Rb and transmits the Rb and the recording and reproducing device identification. information IDdev, which is its own ID, to the recording device cryptography process section 401 of the recording device 400. The recording and reproducing device identification information IDdev is an identifier unique to a reproducing device stored in a memory section configured in the recording and reproducing device 300. The recording and reproducing device identification information IDdev may be recorded in the internal memory of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302.
On receiving the radom number Rb and the recording and -reproducing device identification. information IDdev, the recording device cryptography process section 401 of the recording device 400 generates a new 64-bit random number Ra, encrypts the data in __ 14~' _ the DES CBC mode in the order of the Ra, Rb, and recording and reproducing device identification information IDdev using the authentication key Kake, and returns them to the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300. For example, according to the DES CBC mode process confi~~uration shown. in Fig. 7, the R.a, Rb, and IDdev correspond to the M1, M2, and M3, respectively, and when the initial value . IV=IVmem, the outputs El, E2, and E3 are encrypted texts.
On receiving the encrypted texts EI, E2, and E3, the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recordir_~g and reproducing device 300 decrypts the received data with the authentication key Kake. To decrypt the received data, the encrypted text EI is first decrypted with the key Kake and the result and the IVmem are exclusive-ORed to obtain the random number Ra. Then, the encrypted text E2 is decrypted with the key Kake, and the result and the EI are exclusive-ORed to obtain the Rb. Finally, the encrypted text E3 is decrypted with the key Kake, and the result and the E2 are exclusive-ORed to obtain the recordir_g and reproducing device identification information IDdev. Of the Ra, Rb, and recording and reproducing device identification information IDdev thus obtained, the Rb and -recording and reproducing device identification information IDdev are checked for equality to these transmitted by the recording and reproducing device 300. If they are successfully verified, the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 authenticates the recording device 400.
Then, the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 generates a session key (hereafter referred to as ~~Kses") used after the authentication (this is generated using a random number).
The Rb, Ra, and Kses are encrypted in the DES CBC mode in this order using the key Kake and the initial value IVmem and then returned to the recording device cryptography process section 40I
of the recording device 400.
On receiving the data, the recording device cryptography prccess section 401 of the recording device 400 decrypts the received data with tr~e key Kake. mhe method for decrypting the received data is similar to that executed by the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300, so detailed description thereof is omitted. Of the Ra, Rb, and Kses thus obtained, the Rb and Ra are checked for equality to those transmitted by the recording device 400. If they are successfully verified, the recording device cryptography process section 401 of the recording device 400 authenticates the recording and reproducing device 300.
After these devices have authenticated each other, the session key Kses is used as a common key for secret communication after the authentication.

If illegality or inequality is found during the verification.
cf the received data, the mutual authentication is considered to have failed and the process is aborted.
If the mutual authentication has been successful, the process proceeds from step S48 to step S~I9 where the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 3c)0 holds the session key Kses and where the authentication complete flag is set, indicating that the mutual authentication has been completed. Additionally, if the mutual authentication has failed, the process proceeds to step 550, the session key Kses is discarded and the authentication complete flag is cleared. If the flag has already been cleared, the clearing process is not necessarily required.
If the recording device 400 is removed from the recording device insertion port, the recording device detecting means in the recording and reproducing device 300 notifies the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 that the recording device 400 has been removed. In response to this, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 commands the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 to clear the authentication complete fla~I corresponding to the recording device -insertion port number. In response to this, the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 clears the authentication complete flag corresper_ding to the recording device insertion port number.
The example has beer described. where t:he mutual authentication process is executed in accordance with the procedure shown in Fig. 13, but the present invention is not limited to the above described example of authentication process but the process may be executed, for example, in accordance with the above described mutual authentication procedure in Fig. 15.
Alternatively, in the procedure shown in Fig. 13, the A in Fig. 13 may be set as the recording and reproducing device 300, the B may be set as the recording device 400, and the ID that the B:
recording device 400 first delivers to the A: recording and reproducing device 300 may be set as the recording device identification infcrmation in the key block in the recording device. Various processes are applicable to the authentication process procedure executed in the present invention, and the present invention is not limited to the above described authentication process.
(6-2) Switching Key Block during Mutual Authentication The mutual authentication process in the data processing apparatus according to the present. invention is partly characterized in that the authentication process is executed by -configuring a plurality of (fcr example, N) key blocks on the recording device 400 side and allowing the recording and reproducing device 300 to specify one of them (step S44 in the - 1 ~: 6 -process flow in Fig. 20). As previously described in Fig. 19, the internal memory 405 configured in the cryptography process section 401 of the recording device 400 has a plurality of key blocks formed therein which store various different data such as key data and ID information. The mutual authentication process executed between the recording and reproducing device 300 and the recording de~rice 400 as described in Fig. 20 is carried out on one of the plurality of key blocks of the recording device 400 in Fig. 19.
Conventional ccnfigurations for executing a mutual authentication process between a recording medium and a reproducing device therefor generally use a common authentication key for the mutual authenti;:ation. Thus, when the authentication key is to be changed for each product destination (country) or each product, key data required for authentication processes for the recording and reproducing device side and the recording device side must be changed or. both devices. Accordingly, key data required for an authentication process stored in a newly sold recording and reproducing device do not correspond to key data required for an authentication process stored in a previously sold recording and reproducing dev,~ce, so the new recording and reproducing device cannot access an o:Ld version of recording device. On contrary, a similar situation occurs in the relationship between a r_ew version of recording device and the old version of recording and reproducing device.

s In the data processing apparatus according to the present invention, key blocks are stared ir_ the recording device 400 as a plurality of different key sets as shown in Fig. 19. The recording and reproducing device has a keyu block to be applied to the authentication. process, that is, a specified key block set, for example, for each produce destination (country), product, device type, version, or application.. This set information is stored in the memory section o~ the recording and reproducing device, for example, the internal memory 307 in Fig. 3 or other storage elements of the recording and reproducing device 300, and is accessed by the control section 301 in Fig. 3 during the authentication process to specify a key block in accordance therewith.
The master key Mkake for the recording device authentication key in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device 300 is set in accordance with settings for a specified key block and can correspond only to that specified key block; it does not establish mutual authentication with any key blocks other than the specified one.
As is seen in Fig. 19, the internal memory 405 of the recording device 400 has N key bl~~cks (1 to N) set which each store recording device identification information, an -authentication key, an initial value, a storage key, a random-number generating key, and a seed; each key block stores at least authenticating key data as data varying depending on the block.

In this manner, the key data configuration of the key block in the recording device 4Ci0 caries depending on the block. Thus, for example, a key block with which a certain recording and reproducing device A car execute the authentication process using the master key MKake for the recording device authentication key stored in the internal memory can be set as a key block No. 1, and a key block with which a recording and reproducing device B with a different specification can execute the authentication process can be set as another key block, for example, a key block No. 2.
Although described later in detail, when a content is stored in the external memory 402 ef the recording device 400, the storage key Kstr stored in each key block is used to encrypt and store the content. More specifically, the storage key is used to encrypt a content key for encrypting a content block.
As shown in Fig. I9, the storage key is configured as a key that varies depending on the block. Thus, a content stored in a memory of a recording device is prevented from being shared by two different recording and reproducing devices set to specify different key blocks. That is, differently set recording and reproducing devices can each use only the contents stored in a recording device that is compatible with its settings.
Data that can be made common to each key block can be made so, -while, for example, only the authenticating key data and the storage key data may vary depending on the k_ey block.
_ 149 -In a specific example where key blocks comprising a plurality of different key data are configured in the recording device, for example, different key block numbers to be specified are set for different types of recording and reproducing device 300 (an installed type, a portable type, and the like), or different specified key blocks are set for different applications.
Furthermore, different key blocks :may be set for different territories; for example, the key block No. 1 is specified for recording and reproducing devices sold in Japan, and the key block No. 2 is specified for recording and reproducing devices sold in the U.S. With such a configuration, a content that is used in different territories and that is stored in each recording device with a different storage key cannot be used in a recording and reproducing device with different key settings even if a recording device such as a memory card is transferred from the U.S. to Japan or vice versa, thereby preventing the illegal or disorderly distribution of the content stored in the memory. Specifically, this serves to exclude a state where a content key Kcon encrypted with different storage keys Kstr can be mutually used in two different countries.
Moreover, at least one of the key blocks 1 to N in the internal memory 405 of the recording device 400 shown in Fig. 19, -for example, the No. N key block may be shared by any recording and reproducing device 300.
- ISO -For example, when the key block No. N and the master key MKake for the recording device authentication key, which is capable of authentication, are stored in all apparatuses, contents can be distributed irrespective of the type of the recording and reproducing device 300, the type of the application, or the destined country. For example, an encrypted content stored in a memory card with the storagE key stored in the key block No. N can be used in any apparatuses. For e:~ample, music data or the like can be decrypted and reproduced from a memory card by encrypting the data with the storage key in a shared key block, storing them in the memory card, and setting the memory card in, for example, a portable sound reproducing device storing the master key MKake for the recording device authen=ication key, which is also shared.
Fig. 21 shows an example of the usage of the recording device of the present data processing apparatus, which has a plurality of key blocks. A recording and .reproducing device 2101 is a product sold in Japan and has a master key that establishes an auther_tication process with the key blocks No. 1 and No. 4 in the recording device. A recording and reproducing device 2102 is a product sold in the U.S. and has a master key that establishes an authentication process wit'.1 the key blocks No. 2 and No. 4 in the recording device. A recording ar..d reproducing device 2103 is a -product sold in the EU and has a master key that establishes an authentication process with the key blocks No. 3 and No. 4 in the recording device.

For example, the recording and reproducing device 2101 establishes authentication with the key block 1 or 4 in the recording device A 2104 to store, in the external memory, contents encrypted via the storage key stored in that key block. The recording and reproducing device 2102 establishes authentication with the key block 2 or 4 in the recording device B 2105 to store, in the external memory, contents encrypted via the storage key stored in that key block. The recording and reproducing device 2103 establishes authentication with the key block 3 or 4 in the recording device C 2106 to store, in the external memory, contents encrypted via the storage key stored in that key block. Then, if the recording device A 2104 is installed in the recording and reproducing device 2102 or 2103, a content encrypted with the storage key in the key block 1 is unavailable because authentication is not established. between the recording and reproducing device 2102 or 2103 and the key block 1. On the other hand, a content encrypted with the storage key in the key block 4 is available because authentication is established between the recording and reproducing device 2102 or 2103 and the key block 4.
As described above, in the data processing apparatus according to the present invention, the key blocks comprising the plurality of different key sets are configured in the recording device, while the recording and reproducing device stores the master key enabling authentication for a particular key block, thereby enabling the setting of restrictions on the use of contents depending on different use form.
Moreover, a plurality of key b:Locks, for example, 1 to k may be specified in one recording a:~d reproducing device, while a plurality of key blocks p and q may be specified in the other recording and reproducing devices. Additionally, a plurality of sharable key blocks may be provided.
(7) Process for Downloading from Recording and Reproducing Device to Recording Device Next, a process for downloadi_nc~ a content from the recording and reproducing device 300 to the e:~ternal memory of the recording device 400 in the present data processing apparatus will be explained.
Fig. 22 is a flow chart useful in explaining a procedure for downloading a content from the recording and reproducing device 300 to the recording device 400. In this figure, the above described mutual authentication process is assumed to have been completed between the recordi:~g and reproducing device 300 and the recording device 400.
At step S51, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 uses t:~e read section 304 to read data of a -predetermined format out from the medium 500 storing contents or uses the communication section 305 t:o receive data from the communication means 600 in accordance with a predetermined format.

Then, the control section. 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 transmits the header section (see Fig. 4) of the data to the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300.
Next, at step 552, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302, which has received the header at step S51, causes the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and re:producir..g device cryptography process section 302 to calculate the integrity check value A. The integrity check value A is calculated in accordance with the ICV
calculation method described in Fig. 7, using as a key the integrity-check-value-A-generating key Kicva stored in the internal memory 307 of the recordin~~ and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 and using the content ID and the usage policy as a message, as shown in Fig. 23. The initial value may be IV = 0 or may be the integri-~y-check-value-A-generating initial value IVa may be used which is stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302. Finally, the integrity check value A and the check value: ICVa stored in the header are compared together, and if they are equal, the process proceeds to step S53.
As previously described in Fig. 4, the check value A, ICVa is -used to verify that the content ID and the usage policy have not been tampered. If the integrity check value A calculated in accordance with the ICV calculation method described in Fig. 7, _ 1~~4 _ using as a key the integrity-check--value-A-generating key Kicva stored in the internal memorv_~ 30~' of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 and using the content ID
and the usage policy as a me;:sage, equals the check value: ICVa stored in the header, it is determined that the content ID and the usage policy have not beer. tampered.
Next, at step 5~3, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 causes the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording arid reproducing device cryptography process section. 302 to generate the distribution key Kdis. The distribution key Kdis is generated, for example, as follows:
Kdis=DES (MKdis, ContentID'~IVdi:>) . . . . . . (4) In this case, the MKdis denotes the master key for the distribution key for generating the distribution key Kdis, the master key being stored ~n the internal memory of the recording and reproducing device 300 as described above. In addition, the content ID is identification information for the header section of content data, and the IVdis denotes the initial value for the distribution key. Addi~~onaliy, in the above equation, the DES() -denotes a fur~cticn that uses a first argument as cryptography key and that encrypts the value cf a second argument. The operation '°
denotes an exclusive OR executed every 64 r;its.
_ I3~ _ At step 554, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 uses the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 as well as the distribution key Kdis generated at step 553, to decrypt the block information table key Kbit and content key Knon (see Fig. 4) stored in the header section of the data obtained from the medium 500 via the read section 304 or received from the communication means 600 via the communication section 305. As shown in Fig. 4, the block information table key Kbit and the content key Kcon are encrypted beforehand with the distribution key Kdis on the medium such as a DVD or CD or on a communication path such as the Internet.
Further, at step 555, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 uses the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to decrypt the block information table (BIT) with the block information table key Kbit decrypted at step 554. The block information table (BIT) as shown in Fig. 4 is encrypted beforehand with the block information table key Kbit on the medium such as the DVD or CD or the communication path such as the Internet.
Further, at step 556, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 divides the block information table key Kbit, the content key Kcon, and the block information table (BIT) into 8-b-ate pieces, which are ail exclusive-CRed (ar~y <~perati_on such as an addition or subtraction may be used). Next, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 causes the encryption/decryp~~ion section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to calculate the integrity check value B (ICVb). The integrity check value B
is generated by using as a key tr:e integrity-check-value-B-generating key Kicvb stored 1n the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing de~.rice cryptography process section 302, to decrypt the previously calculated exclusive-ORed value based on the DES, as shown in Fig. 24. Finally, the integrity check value B and the ICVb in the header are compared together, and if they are equal, the process proceeds to step 557.
As previously described in Fig. 4, the check value B, ICVb is used to verify that the block information table key Kbit, the content key Kcon, and the block information table (BIT) have not beer. tampered. If the integrity check value B generated by using as a key the integrity-check-value--B-generating key Kicvb stored in the internal memory 307 0~' the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302, dividing the block information table key Kbit, the content key Kcon, and the block information table (BIT) into 8-byte pieces, exclusive-Orir~g these data, and encrypting the exclusive-CRed data based on the DES, equals the check value: ICVb stored in the header, it is determined that the block information table key Kbit, t:he content key Kcon, and the block information table have not bE:en tampered.
At step 557, the control section 306 cf the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 causes the encryption/decryption section 308 c>f the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to calculate an intermediate integrity check value. The intermediate value is calculated in accordance with the I:CV calculation method described in Fig. 7, using as a key the total.-integrity-check-value generating key Kicvt stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 and using the integrity check values A and B and all the held content integrity check values as a message. The initial value may be IV=0 or the total-integrity-check-value-generating initial value IVt may be used which is stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302. Additionally, the intermediate integrity check value generated is stored in the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 as required.
This intermediate integrity check value is generated using the integrity check values A and B and all the content integrity -check values as a message, and data verified by each of these integrity check values may be verified by collating them with the intermediate integrity check Value. In this embodiment, however, a plurality of different integrity check values, that is, total integrity check values ICVt and the check value ICVdev unique to the recording and reproducing device 300 can be separately generated based on the intermediate integrity check value so that the process for verifying the absence of tamper which process is executed for shared data for the entire system and the verification process for identifying occupied data occupied only by each recording and reproducing device 300 after the download process can be distingui5hab_~y executed. These integrity check values will be described later.
The control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section. 302 causes the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process sectior_ 302 to calculate the total integrity check value ICVt. The total integrity check value ICVt is generated by using as a key a system signature key Ksys stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302, t:o decrypt the intermediate integrity check value based on the DES. Finally, the total integrity check value ICVt generated and the ICVt in the header stored at step SS1 are compared together, and if they are equal, the process proceeds to step SS8. The system signature key Ksys --is common to a plurality of recording and reproducing devices, that is, the entire system executing the process of recording and reproducing certain data.

As previously described in Fig. 4, the total integrity check value ICVt is used to verify that all of the integrity check values IC'Ja and ICVb and the integrity check value for each content block have not been tampered. Thus, if the total integrity check value generated by means of the above described process equals the integrity check value: ICVt, stored in the Header it is determined that all of the integrity check values ICVa and ICVb and the integrity check value for each content block have not been tampered.
Then at step 558, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 takes content block information out from the block information table (BIT) and checks whether any content block is to be verified. If any content block is to be verified, the content integrity check value has been stored in the block information ir: the header.
If any content block is to be verified, the control section 301 reads this content block out from the medium 500 by using the read section 304 of the recording and reproducing device 300 or received from communicating means 600 by using the communication section 305 of the recording and reproducing device 300, and transmits the content block to the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300. On receiving the content block, the control section~306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 causes the encryption/decryption - ,~6() -section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to calculate the content intermediate value.
The content intermediate value is generated by using the content key Kcon decrypted at step S54 to decrypt an input content block in the DES CBC mode, separating the resulting data into 8-byte pieces, and exclusive-ORing all these pieces (any operation such as an addition or subtraction may be used).
Then, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 causes the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to calculate the content integrity check value. The cor_tent integrity check value is generated by using as a key the content-integrity-check-value-generating key Kicvc stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302, to decrypt the content intermediate value based on the DES. Then, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device crlptography process section 302 compares this content integrity check value with the ICV in the content block received from the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 at step 551, and passes the result to the cor_trol section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300. On receiving the result and -if the verification has been successful, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 takes out the next content block to be verified and causes the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 to verify this content block.
Similar verification processes are repeated until all the content blocks are verified. The initial value may be IV=0 or the content-integrity-check-value-generating initial value IVc may be used which is stored in the intern<il memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302, if the header generating side uses the same settings. Additionally, all the checked content integrity check values are held in the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300. Furthermore, the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording ar_d reproducing device 300 monitors the order in which the content blocks are verified to consider the authentication to have failed if the order is incorrect or if it is caused to verify the same content block twice or more. If all the content blocks have been successfully verified, the process proceeds to step 559.
Then at step S59, the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 causes the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 -to encrypt the block information table key Kbit and content key Kcon decrypted at step 554, using the session key Kses made srarable during the mutual authentication. The control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 reads the block information table key Kbit and content key Kcon from the recording and reproducing device cryptcgraphy process section 302 of the recording and reproducing detrice 300, the block information table key Kbit and content key Kcan being decrypted using the session key Kses. The control secticn 301 then transmits these data to the recording device 400 via the recording device controller 303 of the recording and reproducing device 300.
Then at step 560, on receiving the block information table key Kbit and content key Kcon transmitted from the recording and reproducing device 300, the recording device 400 causes the encryption/decryption section 406 of the recording device cryptography process section 40I to decrypt the received data using the session key Kses made sharable during the mutual authentication and to reencrypt the decrypted data with the storage key Kstr unique to the recording device which is stored in the internal memory 405 of the recording device cryptography process 401. Finally, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 reads the block information key Kbit and the content key Kcon out from the recording device 400 via the recording device controller 303 of the recording and reproducing device 300, the block infarmation key Kbit and the content key -Kcon being reencrypted with the storage key Kstr. These are then substituted with the block ~.nformation key Kbit and content key Kcon encrypted with the distribution key Kdis.

At step S6I, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 takes the localization field out from the usage policy in the header section of the data to determine whether the downloaded content can be used only in this recording and reproducing device 300 (in this case, the localization field is set to 1) or also by other similar recording and reproducing devices 300 (in this case, the localization field is set to 0).
If the result of the determination shows that the localization field is set to 1, the process proceeds to step S62.
At step 562, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 causes the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 to calculate the integrity check value unique to the recording and reproducing device. The integrity check value unique to the recording and reproducing device is generated by using as a key a recording and reproducing device signature key Kdev stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302, to decrypt the intermediate integrity check value based on the DES, the intermediate integrity check value being held at step 558. The calculated integrity check value ICVdev unique to the recording and reproducing device substitutes for the total integrity check value ICVt.
As previously described, the system signature key Ksys is used to add a common signature or ICV to the distribution system, - lb4 -and the recording and reproducing device signature key Kdev varies depending on the recording and reproducing device and is used by the recording and reproducing device to add a signature or ICV.
That is, data signed with the system signature key Ksys are successfully checked by a system (recording and reproducing device) having the same system s:ig:zature key, that is, such data have the same total integrity check value ICVt so as to be sharable. If, however, data are signed with the recording and reproducing device signature key Kdev, since this signature key is unique to the recording and reproducing device, the data signed with the recording and reproducing device signature key Kdev, that is, the data stored in a recording device after the signing cannot be reproduced if an attempt is mace to reproduce them after this recording device has been inserted in another recording and reproducing device; than is, an error occurs due to the unequal integrity check values ICVdev unique to the recording and reproducing device.
Thus, in the data processing apparatus according to the present invention, the setting of the localization field enables contents to be arbitrarily set so as to be shared throughout the entire system or used only by particular recording and reproducing devices. -At step 563, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 stores the content in the external memory 402 of the recording device 400.

Fig. 26 is a view showing how the content is stored in the recording device if the localization field is set to 0. Fig. 27 is a view showing how the content is stored in the recording device if the localization field is set to 1. Only the difference between Figs. 26 and 4 is whether the content block information key Kbit and the content key Kcon a:re encrypted with the distribution key Kdis or the storage key Kstr. The difference between Figs. 27 and 26 is that the integrity check value calculated from the intermediate integrity check value is encrypted with the system signature key Ksys in Fig. 26, whereas it is encrypted with the recording and reproducing device signature key Kdev unique to the recording and reproducing device in Fig. 27.
In the process flow in Fig. 22, if the verification of the integrity check value A has failed at step 552, if the verification of the integrity check value B has failed at step 556, if the verification of the total integrity check value ICVt has failed at step 557, or if the verification of the content block content integrity check value has failed at step 558, then the process proceeds to step S64 to provide a predetermined error display.
In addition, if the localization field is 0 at step 561, the -process skips step S62 to ad~Tance to step S63.
(8) Process Executed by Recording and Reproducing Device to Reproduce Information Stored in Recording Device Next, a process executed by the recording and reproducing device 300 to reproduce content information stored in the external memory 402 of the recording device 400.
Fig. 28 is a flow chart useful in explaining a procedure executed by the recording and reproducing device 300 to read a content out from the recording device 400 and use it. In Fig. 28, the mutual authentication is assumed to have been completed between the recording and reproducing device 300 and the recording device 400.
At step S7I, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 uses the recording device controller 303 to read the content out from the external memory 402 of the recording device 400. The control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 then transmits the header section of the data to the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300. Step S72 is similar to step S52 described in "(7) Process for Downloading from Recording and Reproducing Device to Recording Device"; at this step, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302, which has -received the header, causes the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to calculate the integrity check value A. The integrity check value A is calculated in accordance with an TCV
calculation method similar to that described in Fig. 7, using as a key the integrity-check-value-A-generating key Kicva stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 and using the content ID and the usage policy as a message, as shown in the previously described Fig. 23.
As previously described, the check value A, ICVa is used to verify that the content ID and the usage policy have not been tampered. If the integrity check value A calculated in accordance with the ICV calculation method described in Fig. 7, using as a key the integrity-check-value-A-generating key Kicva stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 and using the content ID and the usage policy as a message, equals the check value: ICVa stored in the reader, it is determined that the content ID and usage policy stored in the recording device 400 have not been tampered.
Then at step 573, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 3C0 takes the block information table key Kbit and the content key Kcon out from the read-out header section and then transmits them to the recording device 400 via the recording device controller 303 of the recording and reproducing device 300. On receiving the block information table key Kbit and the content key Kcon transmitted .from the recording and reproducing device 300, the recording device 400 causes the s encryption/decryption section 406 of the recording device cryptography process section 401 to decrypt the received data with the storage key Kstr unique to the recording device which is stored in the internal memory 405 of the recording device cryptography process 401 and to then reencrypt the decrypted data using the session key Kses made sharable during the mutual authentication. 'Then, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 reads the block information key Kbit and the content key Kcon out from the recording device 400 via the recording device controller 303 of the recording and reproducing device 300, the block information key Kbit and the content key Kcon being reencrypted with the session key Kses from the recording device 400.
Then at step S74, the control section 30I of the recording and reproducing device 300 transmits the received block information key Kbit and content key Kcon to the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300, the block information key Kbit and content key Kcon being reencrypted with the session key Kses.
On receiving the block information key Kbit and content key Kcon reencrypted with t:~e session key Kses, the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 causes the encryption/decryption secti~~r~ 308 of the recording and reproducing r device cryptography process section. 302 to decrypt the block information key Kbit and content key Kcon encrypted with the session key Kses, using tre session key Kses made sharable during the mutual authentication. The recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 then causes the encryption/decryption section 308 to decrypt the block information table received at step 571, using the decrypted block information table key Kbit.
The recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 substitutes the decrypted block information table key Kbit, content key Kcon, and block information table BIT with those received at step S7I for retention.. In addition, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 reads the decrypted block information table BIT out from the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300.
At step S75 is similar to step S56 described in "(7) Process for Downloading from Recording and Reproducing Device to Recording Device". The control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 divides the block information table key Kbit, content key Kcon, and block information table (BIT) read out from the recording device 400, into 8-byte pieces and they: exclusive-ORs ail of them. The control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 then causes the encryption/decryption section 308 ef the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section. 302 to calculate the integrity check value B(ICVb). The integrity check value B is generated by using as a key the integrity-check--value-B-generating key Kicvb stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302, to encrypt the previously calculated exclusive-ORed value based on the DES, as shown in the previously described Fig. 24. Finally, the check value B and the ICVb in the header are compared together, and if they are equal, the process proceeds to step 576.
As previously described, the check value B, ICVb is used to verify that the block information table key Kbit, the content key Kcon, and the block information table have not been tampered. If the integrity check value B generated by using as a key the integrity-check-value-B-generating key Kicvb stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302, dividing the block information table key Kbit, the content key Kcon, and the block information table (BTT) read from the recording device 400 into 8-byte pieces, exclusive-Oring these data, and encrypting the exclusive-ORed data based on the DES, equals the check value: ICVb stored in the header of the data read out from the recording device 400, it is determined that the block information table key Kbit, the content key Kcon, and the block information table have not been tampered.

At step 576, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 causes the encrvption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 3e)2 to calculate the intermediate integrity check value. The intermediate value is calculated in accordance with the ICV calculation method described in Fig. 7 or the like, using as a key the total-integrity-check-value-generating key Kicvt stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 and using the integrity check values A and B and all the held content integrity check values as a message. The initial value may be IV=0 or the total-integrity-check-value-generating initial value IVt may be used which is stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302. Additionally, the intermediate integrity check value generated is stored in the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 as required.
Then at step S77, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 takes the localization field out from the usage policy conta.i.ned in the header section of the data read out from the external memory 402 of the recording device 400, to determine whether the down.~oaded content can be used only in this recording and reproducing device 300 (in this case, the localization field is set to 1) or also by other similar recording and reproducing devices 300 (in this case, the localization field is set to 0). If the result of the determination shows that the localization field is set to 1, that is, it is set such that the downloaded content can be used only in this recording and reproducing device 300, the pror_ess proceeds to step 580. If the localization is set to 0, that is, it is set such that the content can also be used by other similar recording and reproducing device 300, then the process proceeds to step 578. Step S77 may be processed by the cryptography process section 302.
At step 578, the total integrity check_ value ICVt is calculated in the same manner as step S58 described in "(7) Process for Downlcadir~g from Recording and Reproducing Device to Recording Device". That is, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 causes the encrvption/decryption section 3~)8 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to calculate the total integrity check value ICVt. The total integrity check value ICVt is generated by using as a key a system signature key Ksys stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302, to encrypt the intermediate integrity check value based on the DES, as shown in the previously described cig. 25.
The, the process proceeds to step S'79 to compare the total integrity check value ICVt generated at step S78 with the ICVt in - 1.73 -the header stored at step 57~.. If the values are equal, the process proceeds to step 582.
As previously described, the total integrity check value ICVt is used to verify that the integrity check values ICVa and ICVb ar~d all the content block integrity check Values have not been tampered. Thus, if the total integrity check value generated by means of the above described process equals the integrity check value: ICVt stored in the header, it is determined that the integrity check values ICVa and ICVb and all the content block integrity check values have not been tampered in the data stored in the recording device 400.
If the result of the determination at step S77 shows that the localization field is set such that the downloaded content can be used only in this recording and reproducing device 300, that is, it is set to l, the process proceeds to step 580.
At step 580, the contro'~ section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 causes the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to calculate the integrity check value ICVdev unique to the recording and reproducing device.
The integrity check value ICVdev unique to the recording and reproducing device is generated, as shown in the previously --described Fig. 2~, by using as a key a recording and reproducing device signature key Kdev unique to the recording and reproducing device stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography pro~~ess section 302, to encrypt the intermediate integrity ch~ec:s value based on the DES, the intermediate integrity check value being held at step 558. At step 581, the check value ICVdev unique to the recording and reproducing device calculated at step S80 is compared with the ICVdev stored at step 571, and .if they are equal, the process proceeds to step S82.
Thus, data signed with the same system signature key Ksys are successfully checked by a system (recording and reproducing device) having the same system signature key, that is, such data have the same total integrity check value ICVt so as to be sharable. If, however, data are signed with the recording and reproducing device signature key Kdev, since this signature key is unique to the recording and reproducing device, the data signed with the recording and reproducing device signature key Kdev, that s is, the data stored in a recording device after the signing cannot be reproduced if an attempt is made to reproduce them after this recording device has been inserted in another recording and reproducing device; that is, an error occurs due to a mismatch in the ir_tegrity check value ICVdev unique to the recording and reproducing device. Accordingly, tze setting of the localization field enables contents to be arbitrarily set so as to be shared -throughout the entire system or used only by particular recording and reproducing devices.

At step 582, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 takes content block information out from the block information table !BIT) read out at step S74 and checks whether any content block is to be encrypted. If any content block is to be encrypted, the control section 301 reads this content block out from the external. memory 402 of the recording device 400 via the recording device controller 303 of the recording and reproducing device 300 and then transmits the content block to the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300.
Cn receiving the content block, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 causes the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to decrypt the content, while causing the encryption/decryption section 308 to calculate the content integrity check value at step S83 if the content block is to be verified.
Step S83 is similar to step S_'i8 described in "(7) Process for Downloading from Recording and Reproducing Device to Recording Device". The contro_ section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 takes content block information out from the block information table (BIT) and determines from the stored content -integrity check value whether any content block is to be verified.
If any content block is to be verified, the control section 301 receives this content block from t_~e external memory 402 of the recording device 400 and transmits it to the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300. On receiving the content block, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section. 302 causes the encryption/decryption sect10T1 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to calculate the content intermediate value.
The content intermediate value is generated by using the content key Kcon decrypted at step S74 to decrypt the input content block in the DES CBC mode, separating the resulting data into 8-byte pieces, and exclusive-ORing all these pieces.
Then, the control secticn 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 causes the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to calculate the content integrity check value. The content integrity check value is generated by using as a key the content-integrity-check-value-generating key Kicvc stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302, to encrypt the content intermediate value based on the DES. Then, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device --cryptography process section 302 compares this content integrity check value with the iCV in the content block received from the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 at _ 17~ _ step 571, and passes the result to the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300. On recei~Jing the result and if the verification has been successful, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 takes out the next content block to be verified and causes the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 to verify this content block.
Similar verification processes are repeated until all the content blocks are verified. The initial value may be IV=0 or the content-integrity-check-value-generating initial value IVc may be used which is stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302.
additionally, all the checked content integrity check values are held in the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300.
Furthermore, the reccrding and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 cf the recording and reproducing device 300 monitors the order in which the content blocks are verified to consider the authentication to have failed if the order is incorrect or if it is caused to verify the same content block twice or more.
The control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 receives the result of the comparison of the content integrity Check Value (if no content block is to be verified, all the results of comparisons will be successful), and if the verification has been successful, it takes the decrypted content from the recording ar_d reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300. It then takes out next conter_t block to be verified and causes the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 cf the recording and reproducing device 300 to decrypt this content block. Similar verification processes are repeated until all the content blocks are decrypted.
At step S83, if the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 determines after the verification process that the content integrity check *ralues are not equal, it considers the verification to have failed and avcids decrypting the remaining contents. In addition, the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 monitors the order in which the content blocks are decrypted to consider the decryption to have failed if the order is incorrect or if it is caused to decrypt the same content block twice or more.
If the Verification of the integrity check value A has failed Gt step 572, if the veri~ication of the integrity check value B
has failed at step 575, if the verification of the total integrity -check value IC~It has failed at step 579, if the verification of the integrity check value ICVdev unique to the recording and reproducing device has failed at step 531, or if the verification of the content block content integrity check value has failed at step 581, then the process proceeds to step S84 to provide a predetermined error display.
As described above, not only important data or content can be encrypted, concealed, or checked for tamper when the content is dowr:loaded or used, but even if data on a recording medium are simply copied to another recording medium, the content can be prevented from being correctly decrypted because the block information table key Kbit for decrypting the block information table BIT and the content key Kcon for decrypting the content are stored with the storage key Kstr unique to the recording medium.
More specifically, for example, at step S74 in Fig. 28, the ancther recording device cannot decrypt the data correctly because each recording device decrypts data encrypted with a different storage key Kstr.
(9) Key Exchanging Process after Mutual Authentication The data processing apparatus according to the present invention is partly characterized in that the recording device 400 can be used only after the above described mutual authentication process between the recording and reproducing device 300 and the recording device 400 and in that the use form of the recording dev~~ce is limited.
For example, to prevent a user from generating a recording device such as a memory card in which a content is stored by means of illegal copying or the like and setting this recording device in a recording and reproducing device for use, the mutual authentication process is executed between the recording and reproducing device 300 and the recording device 400 and (encrypted) contents can be transferred between the recording and reproducing device 300 and the recording device 400 only if they have been mutually authenticated.
To achieve the above restrictive process, according to the present data processing apparatus, all the processes in the cryptography process section 401 of the recording device 400 are executed based on preset command strings. That is, the recording device has such a command process configuration that it sequentially obtains commands from a register based on command numbers. Fig. 29 is a view useful in explaining the command process configuration of the recording device.
As shown in Fig. 29, between the recording and reproducing device 300 having he recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 and the recording device 400 having the recording device cr~.~ptography process section 401, command numbers (No.) are output from the recording device controller 303 to the communication section (including a reception register) 404 of the recording device 400 under the control of the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300.
The recording device 400 has a command number managing section 2901 in the control section 403 in the - l81 -cryptography process section 401. The command number managing section 2901 holds a command register 2902 to store command strings corresponding to command numbers output from the recording and reprcdur_ing device 300. In the command strings, command numbers 0 to y are sequentia-Lly as~;ociated with execution commands, as shown in the right of Fig. 29. The command number managing section 2901 monitors command numbers output from the recording and reproducing device 300 to take corresponding commands out from a command register 2902 for execution.
In command sequences stored in the command register 2902, a command string for an authentication process sequence is associated with the leading command numbers 0 to k, as shown in the right of Fig. 29. Furthermore, command numbers p to s following the command string for the authentication process sequence are associated with a decryption, key exchange, and encryption, process command sequence l, and the following command numbers a to y are associated with a decryption, key exchange, and encryption process command sequence 2.
As previously described for the authentication process flow in Fig. 20, when the recording device 400 is installed in the recording and reproducing device 300, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 transmits an initialization command to the recording device 400 via the recording device controller 303. 0n receiving the command, the recording device 40U causes the co~trol section 403 of the - 182 _ recording device cryptography process section 401 to receive the command via the communication section 404 and clear an authentication flag 2903. That is, unauthenticated state is set.
Alternatively, in such a case that power is supplied from the recording and reproducing device 300 to the recording device 400, the unauthenticated state may be set on power-on.
Then, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 transmits an initialization command to the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302.
At this point, it also transmits a :recording device insertion port number. when the recording device insertion port number is transmitted, even if a plurality of recording devices 400 are connected to the recording and reproducing device 300, the recording and reproducing device 300 can simultaneously execute authentication with these recording devices 400 and transmit and receive data thereto and therefrom.
On receiving the initialization command, the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 causes the control section thereof to clear the authentication flag 2904 corresponding to the recording device insertion port number. That is, the unauthenticated state is set.
Once this initialization process has been completed, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 sequentially outputs command numbers via the recording device controller 303 in an ascending order starting with the command number 0. The command number managing section 2901 of the recording device 400 monitors the command numbers input from the recording and reproducing device 3c:10 to ascertain that they are sequentially input starting with the commar_d number 0, and obtains the corresponding commands from the command register 2902 to execute various processes such as the authentication process. If the input command numbers are not in a specified order, an error occurs and a command number accept<ince value is reset to an initial state, that is, an executable command number is reset at 0.
In the command sequences stored in the command register 2902 as shown in Fig. 29, the command nmnbers are imparted so as to carry out the authentication process first, and following this process sequence, decryption the key exchange, and encryption process sequence is stored.
A specific example of the decryption the key exchange, and the encryption.process sequence will be explained with reference to Figs. 30 and 31.
Fig. 30 shows part of the process executed in downloading a content from the recording and reproducing device 300 to the recording device 400 as previously described in Fig. 22.
Specifically, this process is executed between steps 59 and 60 in Fig. 22.
In Fig. 30, at step S3001, th~~ recording device receives data (ex. the block information table Kbit and the content key Kcon) encrypted with the session key Kses, from the recording and reproducing device. Thereafter, the comm«nd strings p to s shown in the above described Fig. ?9 are started. The command strings p to s are started after the authentication process commands 0 to k have been completed to cause authentication flags 2903 and 2904 shown in Fig. 29 to be set to indicate the completion. This is ensured by the command number managing section 2901 by accepting the command numbers only in the ascending order starting with 0.
At step 53002, the recording device stores in the register the data (ex. the block information table Kbit and the content key Kcon) received from the recording and reproducing device and encrypted with the session key Kses.
At step 53003, a process is e:~ecuted which takes the data (ex.
the block information table Kbit and the content key Kcon) encrypted with the session key Kses, out from the register and decrypts them with the session key Kses.
At step 53004, a process is executed which encrypts the data (ex. the block information table Kbit and the content key Kcon) decrypted with the session key Kses, using the storage key Kstr.
The above process steps 3002 to 3004 correspond to processes included in the command numbers p to s in the command register previously described in Fig. 29. These processes are sequentially executed by the recording device cryptography process section 401 in accordance with the ccmmand numbers p to s received by the - 1~,5 -command number managing section 2901 of the recording device 40C
from the recording and reproducing device 300.
At the next step S3005, the data (ex. the block information table Kbit and the content key Kconj encrypted with the storage key Kstr are stored in the external memory of the recording device.
At this step, the recording and reproducing device 300 may read the data encrypted with the storage key Kstr, out from the recording device cryptography process section 401 and then store them in the external memcry 402 of the recording device 400.
The above described steps 53002 to 53004 constitute an uninterruptible continuously-executed execution sequence; even if, for example, the recording and reproducing device 300 issues a data read command at the end of the decryption process at step 53003, since this read command differs from the command numbers p to s set in the command register 2902 in the ascending order, the command number managing section 2901 does not accept execution of the read. Accordingly, the decrypted data resulting from the key exchange in the recording device 400 cannot be read out by an external device, for example, the recording and reproducing device 300, thereby preventing key data or contents from being illegally read out.
Fig. 31 shows part of the content reproducing process -previously described in Fig. 28 in which a content is read out from the recording device 400 and reproduced by the recording and reproducing device 300. Specifically, this process is executed at step S73 in Fig. 28.
In Fig. 31, at step 53101, the data (ex. the block information table Kbit and the content key Kcon) encrypted with the storage key Kstr are read out from the external memory 402 of the recording device 400.
At step 53102, the data (ex. the block information table Kbit and the content key Kcon) read out from the memory cf the recording device and encrypted with the storage key Kstr are stored in the register. At this step, the recording and reproducing device 300 may read the data encrypted with the storage key Kstr, out from the external memory 402 of the recording device 400 and then store them in the register of the recording device 400.
At step 53103, the data (ex. the block information table Kbit and the content key Kcon) encrypted with the storage key Ks~r are taken out from the register and decrypted with the storage key Kstr.
At step S3104, the data (ex. the block information table Kbit and the content key Kcon) decrypted with the storage key Kstr are encrypted with the sess~~on key Kses.
The above process steps 3102 to 3104 correspond to processes included in the command numbers a to y in the command register previously described in Fig. 29. These processes are sequentially executed by the recording device cryptography process section 406 in accordance with the command numbers a to y received by the command number managing section 2901 of the recording device from the recording and reproducing device 300.
At the next step S3105, the data (ex. the block information table Kbit and the content key Kcon) encrypted with the session key Kses are transmitted from the recording device to the recording and reproducing device.
The above described steps S3102 to S3I04 constitute an uninterruptible continuously-executed execution sequence; even if, for example, the recording and reproducing device 300 issues a data read command at the end of the decryption process at step 53103, since this read command differs from the command numbers a to y set in the command register 2902 in the ascending order, the command number managing section 2901 does not accept execution of the read. Accordingly, the decrypted data resulting from the key exchange in the recording device 400 cannot be read out by an external device, for example, the recording and reproducing device 300, thereby preventing key data or contents from being illegally read out.
For the process shown ir_ Figs. 3t) and 31, the example is shown where the block information table key Kbit and the content key Kccn are decrypted and encrypted by means of key exchange, but these command sequences s'_ored ir. the command register 2902 shown in Fig. 29 may include decryption and encryption processes involvir_g key exchanges for the content itself. The object to be decrypted or er_crypted by means of key excr~anges is not limited to the above described example.
The key exchange process after the mutual authentication in the present data process:Lng apparatus has been described. Thus, the key exchange process in the present data processing apparatus can be carried out only after the authentication process between the recording and reproducing device and the recording device has been completed. Further, decrypted data can be prevented from being externally accessed during the key exchange process, thereby ensuring the improved security of contents and key data.
(101 Plural Content Data Formats and Download and Reproduction Processes Corresponding to Each. Format In the above described embodiment, for example, the data format for the medium S00 or communication means 600 shown in Fig.
3 is of the type shown in Fig. 4. The data format for the medium 500 or the communication means 600 is not limited to the one shown in Fig. 4 but preferably depends on the content, that is, whether the content is music, image data, a program such as a game, or the like. A plurality of data formats as well as processes for downloading and reproducing data from and to the recording device 400 will be explained.
Figs. 32 to 35 show four different data formats. A data format used on the medium 500 or the communication means 600 shown in Fig. 3 is shown in tre left of each figure, while a data format used in storing data in the external memory 402 of the recording device 400 is shown in the rfight of each figure. An outline ef the data formas shown in Figs. 32 to 35 will first be provided, and the contents of each data in each format and differences among data in each format will be e~tplained.
Fig. 32 shows a format type 0, which is of the same type as that shown as an example in the above description. The format type 0 is characterized in that the entire data are divided into N
data blocks each having an arbitrary size, that is, blocks 1 to N, each of which is arbitrarily encrypted so that data can be configured by mixing together encrypted blocks and non-encrypted blocks, that is, plain. text blocks. The blocks are encrypted with she content key Kcon, which is encrypted with the distribution key Kdis on the medium or with t:~e storage key Kstr stored in the internal memory of the recording device when it is stored in the recording device. The block information key Kbit is also encrypted with the distribution key Kdis on the medium or with the storage key Kstr stored in the internal memory of the recording device when it is stores in the recording device. These key exchanges are carried out in accordance with the process described in "(9) Key Exchange Process after Mutual Authentication".
Fig. 33 shows a format type I, in which the entire data are divided into N data blocks, that is, blocks 1 to N, as in the format type 0 but which differs from the format type 0 in that the N blocks are all of the same size. The aspect of the process for _ 19,7 _ encrypting blocks with the content key Kcon is similar to that in the format type 0. Additionally, as in the above described format type 0, the content key icon and the block information table key Kbit are encrypted with the distribution key Kdis on the medium or with the storage key Kst.r stored in the internal memory of the recording device when it is stored in the recording device.
Unlike the format type 0, the format type 1 has a fixed block configuration to simplify configuration data such as data length for each block, thereby enabling a memory size for block information to be reduced compared to the format type 0.
In the example of configuration in Fig. 33, each block comprises a set of an encrypted part and a non-encrypted (plain text) part. If the length and configuration of the block are thus regular, each block length or configuration need not be checked during the decryption process or the like, thereby enabling efficient decryption and encryption processes. In the format 1, the parts constituting each block, that is, the encrypted part and the non-encrypted (plain text) part can each be defined as an object to be checked, so that the content integrity check value ICVi is defined for a block containing a part that must be checked.
Fig. 34 snows a format type 2, which is characterized in that the data are divided into N data b:Locks all having the same size, --that is, blocks 1 to N, each of which is encrypted with an individual block key Kb~ac. Each block key Kblc is encrypted with the content key Kcon, which is encrypted with the distribution key k_dis on the medium or with the storage key Kstr stored in the internal memory of the recording device when it is stored in the recording device. The block informar_ion table key Kbit is also encrypted with the distribution key Kdis on the medium or with the storage key Kstr stored it t:~e internal memory of the recording device when it is stored in the recording device.
Fig. 35 shows a format type 3, which is characterized in that the data are divided into N data blocks all having the same size, that is, blocks 1 to N, each of which is encrypted with an individual block key Kblc, as in the format type 2, and in that each block key Kblc is encrypted with the distribution key Kdis on the medium or with the storage key Kstr on the recording device, without the use of the content key. No content key Kcon is present on the medium or on the device. The block information table key Kbit is encrypted with the distribution key Kdis on the medium or with the storage key Kstr stored in the internal memory of the recording device when it is stored in the recording device.
Next, the contents of the data in the above format types 0 to 3 will be described. As preJiously described, the data are roughly divided into two, that is, the header section and the content section. The header section contains the content ID, the usage policy, the integrity check values A and B, the total -integrity check value, the block information table key, the content key, and the block information table.
_ 19.0 _ The usage policy stores the data length of a content, its reader length, its format type (formats 0 to 3 described below), a content type indicating whether the content is a program or data, a localization flag that determines whet:-~er the content can be used only by a particular recording and reproducing device as described in the section relating to the processes for downloading and reproducing a conten~ to and from the recording device, a permission flag for a content copying or moving process, and various localization and process information for the content such as a content encryption algorithm and a mode.
The integrity check value A: ICVa is used to check the content ID and the usage policy and generated using, for example, the method described in the above described Fig. 23.
The block information table key Kbit is used to encrypt block information table and is encrypted with the distribution key Kdis on the medium or with the storage key Kstr stored in the internal memory of the recording device when it is stored in the recording device, as previously described.
The content key Kccn is used to encrypt a content. For the format types 0 and l, it is encrypted with the distribution key Kdis on the medium or with the storage key Kstr stored in the internal memory of the recording device when it is stored in the recording device, similarly to the block information table key Kbit. For the format type 2, the content key Kcon is also used to encrypt the bloc: key Kblc configured for each cement block.

Additionally, for the format type 3, no content key Kcon is present.
The block information table describes information on the individual blocks and stores the size of each block and a flag indicating whether the block has been encrypted, that is, information indicating whether or not the block is to be checked (ICV). If the block is to be checked, the block. integrity check value ICVi (the integrity check value for the block i) is defined and stored in the table. This block information tabla is encrypted with the block information table key Kbit.
If the block has been encrypted, the block integrity check value, that is, the content integrity check value ICVi is generated by exclusive-ORing the entire plain text (decrypted text) every 8 bytes and then encrypting the obtained value with the content-integrity-check-value-generating key Kicvc stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device 300, Additionally, if the block has not been encrypted, the block integrity check value is generated by sequentially inputting the entire block data (plain text) to a tamper-check-value-generating function shown in Fig. 36 (DES-CBC-MAC using the content-integrity-check-value-generating key Kicvc) in such a manner that ~ bytes are input each time. Fig. 36 shows an example of a configuration for generating the content block integrity check value ICVi. Each message M constitutes each set of 8 bytes of decrypted text data or plain text data.

For the format type i, if at least one of the parts in =he block is data to be processed with the integrity check Value ICVi, that is, a part to be checked, the content integrity check value IC'di is defined for that block. An integrity check value P-ICVij for a part j of a block i is generated by exclusive GRing the entire plain text (decrypted text) every 8 bytes and then encrypting the obtained data with the content-integrity-check-value-generating value Kicvc. In addition, if a part j has not bee encrypted, the integrity check value P-ICVij is generated by sequentially inputting the entire block data (plain text) to the tamper-check-value-generating function shown in Fig. 36 (DES-CBC-MAC using the content-integrity-check-value-generating key K1CVC) in such a manner that 8 bytes are input each time.
Further, if the block i contains one part having [ICV flag =
subject of ICV] indicating that it is to be checked, the integrity check value P-ICVij generated using the above method is directly used as the block integrity check value ICVi. Tf the block i contains a plurality of parts having [ICV flag = subject of ICV]
indicating that they are to be checked, the integrity check value P-ICVij is generated by connecting a plurality of parts integrity check values P-ICVij together in accordance with part numbers to cbtain data and sequentially inputting the entire data (plain -data) to the temper-check-value-generating function shown in Fig.
37 (DES-CBC-MAC using the content-integrity-check-value-generating key Kicvc) in such a manner that 8 bytes are input each time. Fig.

37 shows an example of configuration for generating the content block content inte~~rity check value ICVi.
The block integrity check value ICVi is not defined for the format types 2 or 3.
The integrity check value B:ICVb is used to check the block information table key, the content key, and the entire block information table and generated using, for example, the method described in the previously described Fig. 24.
The total integrity check value ICVt is used to check the entirety of the previously described integrity check values A:
ICVa and B: ICVb and the integrity check value ICVi contained in each block of the content to be checked and is generated by applying the system signature key Ksys to the intermediate integrity check value generated from each integrity check value such as the integrity check value A: ICVa to execute the encryption process as descr,~bed in the previously described Fig.
25.
For the format types 2 and 3, the total integrity check value ICVt is generated by applying the system signature key Ksys to the intermediate integrity check value generated by connecting the previously described integrity check values A: ICVa and B: ICVb to the content data, that is, the entire content data between the block key in block = and the final block, to execute the encryption process. Fig. 38 shows an example of configuration for generating the total integrity check value ICVt for the format types 2 and 3.
The unique integrity check value ICVdev is substituted with the total integrity check value ICVt if the previously described localization flag is set to 1, that is, indicates that the content can be used only by a particular recording and reproducing device.
For the format types 0 and 1, the unique integrity check Value ICVdev is generated to check the previously described integrity check values A: ICVa and B: ICVb and the iraegrity check value ICVi contained in each block of the content to be checked.
Specifically, the unique integrity check value ICVdev is generated by applying the recording and reproducing device signature key Kdev to the intermediate integrity check value generated from the integrity check values such as the integrity check value A: ICVa, as explained in the previously described Fig. 25 or 38.
Next, processes for downloading a content of each of the format types 0 to 3 from the recording and reproducing device 300 to the recording device 400 and processes executed by the recording and reproducing device 300 to reproduce a content cf each of the format types 0 to 3 from the recording device 400 will be described with reference to the flow charts in Figs. 39 to 44.
First, the process for downloading a content of the format type 0 or I will be explained with reference to Fig. 39.
The process shown in Fig. 39 is started, for example, by installing the recording device 40C into the recording and reproducing device 300 shown in Fig. 3. At step 5101, authentication is executed between the recording and reproducing device and the recording device, and this step is carried out in accordance with the aut'r.er_ti.cation process flow previously described in Fig. 20.
If the authentication process at step 5101 has been completed tc set the authentication flag, then at step S 102, the recording and reproducing device 300 reads data of a predetermined format from the medium 500 via the read section 304, the medium 500 storing content data, or uses the ~~ommunication section 305 to receive data from the communication means 600 in accordance with a predetermined format. Then, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 transmits the header sectior_ of the data to the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300.
Next, at step 5103, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptograpr.y process section 302 causes the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to calculate the integrity check value A. The integrity check value A is calculated in accordance with the ICV ca'~~:ulation method described in Fig. 7, using as a key the integrity-check-value-A-generating key Kicva stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 and using the content ID
and the usage policy as a message, as shown in Fig. 23. Then at step 5104, the integrity check value A and the check value: ICVa stored in the header are compared together, and if they are equal, the process proceeds to step S105.
As previously described, the check value P., ICVa is used to verify that the content ID and the usage policy have not been tampered. If the integrity check value A calculated, for example, ir~ accordance with the ICV calculat=ion, using as a key the integrity-check-value-A-generating key Kicva stored in the internal memory 307 of the .recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 and using the content ID and the usage policy as a message, equals the check value: ICVa stored in the header, it is determined that the content ID and the usage policy have not been tampered.
Next, at step 5105, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 causes the encryption/decryption section 3C8 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to obtain or generate the distribution key Kdis. The distribution key Kdis is generated using, for example, the master ~;ey MKdis for the distribution key, as in step S53 in the previousl~.r described Fig. 22.
Then at step 5106, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 uses the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cr~rptography process section 302 as well as the generated distribution key Kdis, to decrypt the block information table key Kbit and content key Kno.n stored in the header section of the data obtained from the medium G00 via the read section 304 or received prom the communication means 600 via the communication section 305.
Further, at step 510, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 uses the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to decrypt the block information table with the decrypted block information table key Kbit.
Further, at step 5108, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 calculates the integrity check value B (ICVb') from the block information table key Kbit, the content key Kcon, and the block information table (BIT). Tre integrity check value B is generated, as shown in Fig. 24, by using as G key the integrity-check-value-B-generating key Kicvb stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302, to decrypt an exclusive-ORed value based on the DES, the exclusive-ORed value comprising the block information table key Kbit, the content key Kcon, and the block information table (BIT).
Then at step 5109, the integrity check value B and the ICVb in the header are compared together, and if they are equal, the process proceeds to step 5110.
As previously described, the check value B, ICVb is used to verify that the block information. table key Kbit, the content key Kcon, and the block information table have not been tampered. If the integrity check value B generated by using as a key the integrity-check-value-B-generating key Kicvb stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302, dividing the block information table key :obit, the contera key Kcon, and the block information table (BIT) into 8-byte pieces, exclusive-Oring these data, and encrypting the exclusive-ORed data based on the DES, equals the check value: ICVb stored in the header, it is determined that the block information table key Kbit, she content key Kcon, and the block information table have not been tampered, At step 5110, the control sec'=ion 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 causes the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process secticn 302 to calculate the intermediate integrity check value. The intermediate value is calculated in accordance with the ICV calculation method described in Fig. 7 or the like, using as a key the total-integrity-check-value-generating key Kicvt stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 and using the integrity check values A and H and all the held content integrity check values as a message. The intermediate -integrity check value generated is stared in the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 as required.
- 20i -Next, at step Slli, t_~e control secticn 306 of the recording and reproduc;~ng device cryptography process section 302 causes the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to calculate the total integrity check value ICVt'. As shown in Fig. 25, the total integrity check value ICVt is generated by using as a key a system Signature key Ksys stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302, to encrypt the intermediate integrity check value based on the DES.
Then at step 5112, the total integrity check value ICVt generated and the ICVt' in the header stored at step 5112 are compared together, and if they are equal, the process proceeds to step 5213.
As previously described in Fig. 4, the total integrity check value ICVt is used to verify that all of the integrity check values ICVa and ICVb and the integrity check value for each content block have not been tampered. Thus, if the total integrity check value generated by means of the above described process equals the integrity chec k value: ICVt stored in the Header, it is determined that all of the integrity check values ICVa and ICVb and the integrity check value for each content block have not been tampered.
Them at step 5113, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 takes content block information out from the block information table (BITj and checks whether any content block is to be verified. If any cor:tent block is to be " G02 -verified, the content integrity check value has been stored in the block information in the header.
If any content block is to be verified, then at step SI14, the control section 30I reads this content block out from the medium 500 using the read section 304 of the recording and reproducing device 300 or received from the communicating means 600 by using the commur~icatiJn section 305 of the recording and reproducing device 300, and transmits the content block to the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300. On receiving the content block, the control section 306 of the recording and reprod~~cing device cryptography process section 302 causes the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 30'~ to calculate the content integrity check value ICVi'.
If the block has been encrypted, the content integrity check value ICVi is generated by decrypting the input content block in the DES CBC mode using the content key Kcon, exclusive-ORing all of the decrypted text every 8 bytes, and then encrypting the generated content intermediate value with the content-integrity-check-value-generating key Kicvc stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device 300. Additionally, if the -block has not been encrypted, the content integrity check value is generated by sequentially :inputti.ng the entire block data (plain text) to the tamper-check-value-generating function shown in Fig.
- a'_ 0 3 -36 (DES-CBC-MAC using the content-integrit~r-check-value-generating key Kicvc) in such a manner that 8 bytes are input each time.
Then at step SIIS, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 compares this content integrity check value with the ICV in the content block received from the control- section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 at step 510.', and passes the result to the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300.
On receiving the result and if the verification has been successful, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 takes out the next content block to be verified and causes the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 cf the recording and reproducing device 300 to verify this content block. Similar verification processes are repeated ur.tii all the content blocks are verified (step 5116) .
In this regard, if the check values are not equal at any of steps 104, 109, 112, and 115, an error occurs to end the download process.
Then at step 5117, the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 causes the encryption/decrypti.on section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to encrypt the block information key Kbit and content key Kcon decrypted at step S106, using the session key Kses made sharable during the mutual authentication. 'rhe control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 reads the block information table key Kbit and the content key Kcon ou= from the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 and then transmits them to she recording device 400 via the recording device controller 303 of the recording and reproducing device 300.
Then at step S118, on receiving the block information table key Kbit and the content key Kcon transmitted from the recording and reproducing device 300, the recording device 400 causes the encryption/decryption section 406 of the recording device cryptography process section 401 to decrypt the received data with the session key Kses made sharable during the mutual authentication and to then reencrypt the decrypted data using the storage key Kstr unique to the recording device which is stored in the internal memory 405 of ~he recording device cryptography process 401. Then, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 reads the block information key Kbit and the content key Kcen out from the recording device 400 via the recording device controller 303 of the recording and reproducing device 300, the block information key Kbit and the content key Kcon being reencrypted with the storage key Kstr. That is, the block information table key Kbit encrypted with the distribution key Kdis is exchanged with the content key Kcon.

Then at step 5119, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 takes the localization field out from the usage policy in the header section of the data, to determine whether the downloaded content can be used only in this recording and reproducing device 300. If the localization field is set to 1, the downloaded content can be used only by the recording and reproducing device 300, if the localization field is set to 0, the downloaded content can also be used by other similar recording and reproducing devices 300. If the result of the determination shows that the localization field is set to 1, the process proceeds to step S120.
At step S120, the control sec~ion 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 causes the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 to calculate the integrity check value unique to the recording and reproducing device. The integrity check value unique to the recording and reproducing device is generated by using as a key a recording and reproducing device signature key Kdev stored in the internal memorvy 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302, to encrypt the intermediate integrity check value based on the DES, the intermediate integrity check value being generated at step 5110.
The calculated integrity check value ICVdev unique to the recording and reproducing device substitutes for the total integrity check va:Lue ICVt:.

As previously described, the system signature key Ksys is used to add a common signature or ICV to the distribution system, and the recording and reproducing device signature key Kdev varies depending on the recording and reproducing device and is used by the recording and reproducin~~ device to add a signature or ICV.
That is, data signed with the system signature key Ksys are successfully checked by a system (.recording and reproducing device) having the same system signature key, that is, such data have the same total integrity check value ICVt so as to be sharable. If, however, data are signed with the recording and reproducing device signature key Kdev, since this signature key is unique to the recording and reproducing device, the data signed with the recording and reproducing device signature key Kdev, that is, the data stored in a recording device after the signing cannot be reproduced if an attempt is made to reproduce them after this recording device has been inserted in another recording and reproducing device; that is, an error occurs due to the unequal integrity check values ICVdev unique to the recording and reproducing device. In the data processing apparatus according to the present invention, the settir_g of the localization field enables contents to be arbitrarily set so as to be shared throughout the entire system or used only by particular recording and reproducing devices.
Next, at step 5121, the cant:rol section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 causes the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to form a storage data format. As previously described, one of the three format types 0 to 3 is set in the usage policy (see Fig. 5) in the header so that data are formed in accordance with the storage format in the right of one of the previously described Figs. 32 to 35 depending on the set type. The flow shown in Fig. 39 is for the format 0 or 1, so that the data are formed into one of the formats in Figs. 32 and 33.
Once the storage data f.~rmat has been completed at step 5121, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 stores the content in tr:e external memory 402 of the recording device 400 at step 5122.
How the prccess for downloading content data of the format type 0 or 1 is carried out has been described.
The process for downloading content data of the format type 2 will be explained with reference to Fig. 40. Differences from the above described process for downloading data of the format type 0 or 1 will be focused on.
Steps 5101 to SI09 are similar to the above described process for downloading data of the format type 0 or l, so description thereof is omitted.
Since the format type 2 has no content integrity check value ICVi defined therefor as previously described, the block information table contains no content integrity check value ICVi.
The intermediate integrity check value i.n the format type 2 is generated by applying the system signature key Ksys to the intermediate integrity check value generated by connecting the integrity check values A and B to the entire content data between the leading data of the first block (the block key in the block 1) and the final block, to execute the encryption process.
Thus, in the process for downloading data of the format type 2, the content data are read out at step 5151, and the intermediate integrity check value is generated based on the integrity check values A and B and the read-out content data at step SI52. In this regard, the content data are not decrypted even if they have been encrypted.
For the format type 2, the processes for decrypting the block data and collating the content intE:grity check values are omitted contrary to the previously described process for the format type 0 or 1, thereby increasing the processing speed.
The processing at step S111 and subsequent steps is similar to that for the format type 0 or lr so description thereof is omitted.
How the process for downloading content data of the format type 2 is carried out has been described. As described above, the process for downloading data o_' the format type 2 omits the processes for decrypting the block data and collating the content integrity check values contrary to the process for the format type 0 or l, thereby increasing the processing speed; this format is thus suitable for processing of mus_c data or the like which must be executed in real time.
Next, the process for downloading content data of format type 3 will be described with reference to Fig. 41. The following description will focus on differences from the above described download process for the format types 0, l, and 2.
Steps S101 to S105 are similar to those of the above described download process for the format types 0, 1, and 2.
The process for the format type 3 essentially has many characteristics in common with that for the format type 2, but differs therefrom in that the format type 3 has no content key in that the block key itblc is stored in the recording device after encryption with the storage key Kstr.
The following description will focus on the differences between the download process for the format type 3 and that for the format type 2. With the format type 3, at step 5161, following step S105, the block information table key is decrypted.
The control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 uses the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 as well as the distribution key Kdis generated at step 5105 to decrypt the block_ information table key Kbit stored in the header section of the data obtained from the medium 500 via the read sec~ion 304 or received from the communication means 600 via the communication section 305. With the format type -' G 10 -3, data contains no content key Kcon, so that the process for decrypting the content key Kcon is not executed.
At the next step SI07, the block information table key Kbit decrypted at step Sl6i is used to decrypt the block information table, and at step 5162, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 generates integrity check value B(ICVb') from the block information table key Kbit and block information table (BIT). The integrity check value B is generated by using as a key the integrity-check-value-B-generating key Kicvb stored in th.e internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302, to encrypt the exclusive-GRed value comprising the block information table kev Kbit and block information table (BIT), based on the DES. Next, at step 5109, the integrity check value B
and the ICVb in the header are compared together, and if they are equal, the process proceeds to step 5151.
With the format type 3, the check value B, ICVb functions to verify that the block information gable key Kbit and the block information table have not been tampered. If the integrity check value B generated equals the check value: ICVb stored in the header, it is determined that the block information table key Kbit and the block informatics table have not been tampered.
Steps SI51 to SI12 are similar to those of the process for the format type 2, and description thereof is omitted.

At step 5163, the block key Kblc contained in the content data read out at step S15I is decrypted with the distribution key Kdis generated at step 5105.
Then at step S164, the recording and reproducing device cryptography process secr_ion 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 causes the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to encrypt the block information ke:y Kb:it decrypted at step S16I
and the block key Kblock decrypted at step 5163, using the session key Kses made sharable during the mutual authentication. The control section 301 of the recording and rf~producing device 300 reads the block information able key Kbit and the block key Kblc out from the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 and then transmits these data to the recording device 400 via the recording device controller 303 of the recording and reproducing device 300.
Then at step 5165, on receiving the block information table key Kbit and the block key Kblc transmitted from the recording and reproducing device 300, the recording device 400 causes the encryption/decryption section 406 of the recording device cryptography process section 401 to decrypt the received data with the session key Kses made sharable during the mutual authentication and to then reencrypt the decrypted data using the storage key Kstr unique to the recording device which is stored in the internal memory 405 of the recording device cryptography process 40I. The control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 reads the block information table key Kbit and the block key Kblc reencryted b:y a storage key Kstr from the recording device 400 via the recording device controller of the recording and reproducing device 300. That is, the block information table key Kbit and block key Kblc initially encrypted with the distribution key Kdis are replaced with 'the block information table key Kbit and block key Kblc reencrypted with the storage key Kstr.
The subsequent steps 5119 to S:L22 are similar to those for the format types 0, l, and 2, so description thereof is omitted.
The aspect of the process for downloading content data of the format type 3 has been described. E~s described above, the download process for the format type 3 omits the decryption of the block data and the process for collating the content integrity check value as for the format type ?, thereby enabling prompt processing; the format type 3 is thus suitable for processing data such as music data which requires real-tile processing. In addition, since the range within which the encrypted content is protected is localized by the block key Kblc, advanced security is achieved compared to the format type 2.
Next, processes for reproducing data of each of the format types 0 to 3 from the reccrding device 400 of the recording and reproducing device 300 will be explained with reference to the flow charts in Figs. 42 to 45.

First, a process for reproducing a content of the format type 0 well be explained with reference to Fig. 42.
Step S201 corresponds to an authentication process between the recording and reproducing device and the recording device and is executed in accordance with the authentication process flow previously described in Fig. 20.
Once the authentication process at step S201 has been completed to set the authentication flag, at step S202, the reccrding and reproducing device 300 reads the header of data of a predetermined format out from the recording device 400 and transmits it to the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300.
Then at step 5203, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptographer process section 302 causes the encryption/decryption section 308 ef the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to calculate the integrity check value A. The integrity check value A is calculated using as a key the integrity-check-value-A-generating key Kicva stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 and using the content ID and the usage policy as a message, as shown in the previously described Fig. 23. Then, the integrity check: value A and the check value:
ICVa stored in the header are compared together at step S204, and if they are equal, the process proceeds to step S2e)5.

The check value A, ICVa is used to verify that the content ID
and the usage policy have not been tampered. If the calculated integrity check value A equa',s the check value: ICVa stored in the header, it is determined that the content ID and the usage policy have not been tampered.
Then at step 5205, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 takes out, from the read-out header section, the block information table key Kbit and content key Kcon encrypted with the storage key Kstr unique to the recording device and then transmits them to the recording device 400 via the recording device controller 303 of the recording and reproducing device 300.
On receiving the block information table key Kbit and the content key Kcon transmitted from the recording and reproducing device 300, the recording device 400 causes the encryption/decryption section 406 of the recording device cryptography process section 40I tc> decrypt the received data with the storage key Kstr unique to the recording device which is stored in the internal memory 40S of the recording device cryptography process and to then reencrypt the decrypted data using the session key Kses made sharable during the mutual authentication. This process is as previously described in detail -in (9) Key Exchange Process after Mutual Authentication.
At step 5206, the control section 301 of the recording and ~Yeproducing device 300 receives t:he block information table key Kbit and content key Kcon reencrypt.ed with the session key Kses, from the recording device 400 via the recording device controller 303 of the recording and reproducing device 300.
Then at step 5207, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 transmits the received block information table key Kbit and content key Kcon which are reencrypted with the session key Kses, to the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300. On receiving the block information table ke~r Kbit and content key Kcon reencrypted with the session key Kses the content block, the cryptography process section 302 of the recording and rE:producing device 300 causes the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to decrypt these keys Kbit and Kcon with the session key Kses made sharable during the mutual authentication.
Further at step 5203, the decrypted block information table key Kbit is used to decrypt the block information read out at step S202. The recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording ar~d reproducing device 300 replaces the decrypted block information table key Kbit, content key Kcon, and block informaticn table BIT with the block information table key Kbit, content key Kcon, and block information table BIT
contained in the header read out at step S202, to hold the latter.
Additionally, the control sect~~on 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 reads the decrypted block information table BI~_' out from the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recordir~.g and reproducing device 300.
Further, at step 5209, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 generates the integrity check value B(ICVb') from the block information table key Kbit, the content key Kcon, and the block information table (BIT). The integrity check value B is generated, as shown in Fig. 24, by using as a key the integrity-check-value-B-generating key Kicvb stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302, to decrypt the exclusive-ORed value comprising the block information table key Kbit, the content key Kcon, and the block information table (BIT), based on the DE5. Then at step 5210, the integrity check value B and the ICVb ir~ the header are compared together, and if they are equal, the process proceeds to step S211.
The check value B, ICVb is used to verify that the block information table key Kbit, the content key Kcon, and the block information table have not been tampered. If the integrity check value B generated equals the check value: ICVb stored in the header, it is determined that the block information table key Kbit, the content key Kcon, and the block information table stored in the recording device 400 ha~~e not been tampered.
At step 5211, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 causes the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to calculate the intermediate integrity check value. The intermediate value is calculated in accordance with the ..CV calculation method described in Fig. 7, using as a key the total-integrity-check-value generating key Kicvt stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 and using the integrity check values A and B in the verified header and all the conten_ integrity check values in the block information table as a message as shown in Fig. 25. In this regard, the intermediate integrity check value generated is stored in the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 as required.
Next, at step 5212, the control section 30I of the recording and reproducing device 300 takes the localization field out from the usage policy contained in the header section of the data read from the external memory 402 of tr:e recording device 400 to determine whether the content to be reproduced can be used only by this recording and reproduc~nc device 300 (in this case, the localization field is set to 1) or also by other similar recording and reproducing devices 300 (in this case, the localization field is set to 0). If the result of the determination shows that the localization field is set tv l, that is, the reproduced content can be used only by this recording and reproducing device 300, the process proceeds to step S213. If the loca=ization field is set to 0, that is, the reproduced content can also be used by other similar recording and reproducing devices 300, the process proceeds to step 5215. The processing at step 5211 may be executed by the cryptography process section 302.
At step 5213, the contro' section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 causes the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 30'? of the recording and reproducing device 300 to calculate the integrity check value ICVdev' unique to the recording and reproducing device. The integrity check value ICVdev' unique to the recording and reproducing device is generated, as shown in Fig. 25, by using as a key a recording and reproducing device signature key Kdev stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302, to decrypt the. intermediate integrity check value based on the DES, the intermediate integrity check value being held at step 558.
Then at step 5214, the integrity check value ICVdev' unique to the recording and reproducing device calculated at step S213 and the ICVdev in tre header read out at step S202 are compared together, and if they are equal, the process proceeds to step S217.
On the other hand, at s"=ep S215, the control section 306 of -the recording and reproducing device r_ryptography process section 302 causes the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to _ 21:a _ calc~.:late the total integrity check value ICVt. The total integrity check value ICVt' is generated by using as a key the system signature key Ksys stcred in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302, to decrypt the intermediate integrity check value based on the DES, as shown in Fig. 25. Then at step 5216, the total integrity check value ICVt' generated and the ICVt in the header are compared together, and if they are equal, the process proceeds to step S217.
The total integrity check value ICVt and the integrity check value ICVdev unique to the recording and reproducing device are used to verify that all of the integrity check values ICVa and ICVb and the integrity check value for each content block have not been tampered. Thus, if the total integri~y check value generated by means of the above described process equals the integrity check value: ICVt or ICVdev stored in the header, it is determined that all of the integrity check values for eacr; content block have not been tampered.
Next, at step 5217, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing dev~~.ce 300 reads the block data out from the recording device 400. Furthermore, at step 5218, it is determined whether or not the data hare been encrypted, and if the data have been encrypted, the cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 decrypts the block data. If the data have not been encrypted, the process skips step 5219 and advances to step 5220.

Then at step 5220, the control section 301 of the recording and reproduc;~ng device 300 checks whether any content block is to be verified, based on the content block information table in the block information table (BIT). If any content block is to be verified, the content integrity check value has been stored in the block information in the header. I:n this case, the content integrity check value ICVi for this content block is calculated at step S221. If no content block is to be verified, the process skips steps S221 and 5222 to advance to step 5223.
If the block has been encrypted as previously described in Fig. 36, the content integrity check value ICVi' is generated by decrypting the input content block with the content key Kcon in the DES CBC mode, exclusive-ORing all of the result every 8 bytes to generate the content intermediate value, and then encrypting the obtained value with the content-integrity-check-value-generating key Kicvc stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device 300. Additionally, if the block has not been encrypted, the content integrity check value is generated by sequentially inputting the entire data (plain text) to the tamper-check-value-generating function shown in Fig. 36 (DES-CBC-MA.C using the content-integrity-check-value-generating key KicVC) in such a manner that 8 bytes are input each time.
At step 5222, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 compares the generated content integrity check value ICVi' with the ICVi stored - ~2 in the content block receives from the recording device 400 at step S202, and passes the result to the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300. Cn receiving the result and if the verification has beer successful, the content plain data for execution (reproduction) on the RAM of the recording and reproducing device system at step 5223. The control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 takes out the next content block to be verified and causes the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 to verify this content block.
Similar verification processes and RAM storage processes are repeated until all the content blocks are verified (step 5224).
If the check values do not match at any of steps 5204, S210, 5214, 5216, and 5222, an error occurs to end the reproduction process.
When it is determined at step S224 that all the blocks have been read out, the process proceeds to step 5225 to start executing and reproducing the content (program or data).
The aspect of the process for reproducing content data of the format type 0 has been explained.
Next, the process for downloading content data of the format type 1 will be explained with reference to Fig. 43. The following description will focus on differences from the above described download process for the format type 0.
- L. 2 '7 -The processing from steps S201 to 5217 is Similar to that in the above described download process for the format type 0, so description thereof is omitted.
For the format type 1, at step 5231, encrypted parts are decrypted to generate a part ICV. Further at step S232, the block ICVi' is generated. As previously described, with the format type ~, if at least one of the parts in a block contains data to be verified with the integrity check value IC~Ji, the content integrity check value ICVi is defined for this block. If the part j has been encrypted, an integrity check value P-ICVij for a part j of a block i is generated by exclusive-ORing the entire plain text (decrypted text) every 8 bytes and decrypting the obtained value with the content-integrity-check-value-generating key Kicvc.
Additionally, if the part j has not been encrypted, the integrity check value P-ICVij is generated by sequentially inputting the entire data (plain text) to the tamper-check-value-generating function shown in Fig. 36 (DES-CBC-MAC using the content-integrity-check-value-generating key Kicvc) ir_ such a manner that 8 bytes are input each time.
Further, if the block i contains only one part having [ICV
flag = subject of ICV] indicating that it is to be checked, the integrity check value P-ICVij generated using the above method is directly used as the block integrity check value ICVi. If the block i contains a plurality of parts having [ICV flag = subject of ICV] indicating that They are to be checked, the integrity 2.23 -check value P-ICVij is generated by connecting a plurality of parts integrity check va:Lues P-ICVij together in accordance with part numbers to obtain data and sequentially inputting the entire data (plain text) to the tamper-check-Value-generating function shown in Fig. 36 (DES-CBC-MAC using the content-integrity-check-value-generating key Kicvc) in such a manner that 8 bytes are input each time. This is the same as explained in Fig. 37.
For the format type l, the content integrity check value generated by means of the above described procedure undergoes comparison at step S222. Processing at the next step S223 and the subsequent steps is similar to that for the format type 0, so description thereof is omitted.
Next, the process for reproducing content data of the format type 2 will be explained with reference to Fig. 44. The following description will focus on differences from the above described reproduction processes for the format types 0 and 2.
Steps 5201 to 5210 is similar to that in the above described reproduction processes far the format types 0 and 1, so description thereof is omitted.
For the format type 2, the processing at steps S211 to S216, which is executed for the format types 0 and 1, is not executed.
In addition, the format type 2 has no content integrity check value, so that verification of tre content integrity check value, which is executed for tre format types 0 and 1, is not executed.

In the data reproduction process for the format type 2, after step S220 for verifying the integrity check value B, the process proceeds to step S2I7 where the block data are read out under the control of the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300. Further, at step S'241, the cryptography process section 306 of the recording and reproducing device 300 decrypts the block key Kblc contained in the block data. The block key Kblc stored in the recording device 400 has been encrypted with the content key Kr_on as shown in Fig. 34 and is thus decrypted with the content key Kcon decrypted at the previous step S207.
Tr,en at step 5242, the block key Kblc decrypted at step S241 is used to decrypt the block data. Furthermore, at step 5243, the content (program or data) is executed and reproduced. The processing from steps S217 to 524 is repeated for all the blocks.
When it is determined at step 5244 that all the blocks have been read out, the reproduction process is ended.
As described above, the process for the format type 2 omits the process for verifying the integrity check value such as the total integrity check value. It t=hus provides a configuration suitable for executing the decryption process at a high speed and a format suitable for processing data such as music data which requires real-time processing.
Next, the process for reproducing content data of format type 3 will be described with reference to Fig. 45. The following description will focus on differences from the above described reproduction process for the format. types 0, 1, and 2.
The process for the format type 3 essentially has many characteristics in common with that for the format type 2, but differs therefrom in that, as described in Fig. 35, the format type 3 has no content key in that the block key Kblc is stored in the recording device after encryption with the storage key Kstr.
Between steps S201 and S2I0, processing at steps 5251, 5252, 5253, and S254 is configured to omit the use of the content key contrary to the corresponding processing for the formats 0, 1, and 2.
At step S251; the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 takes out, from the read-out header, the block information table key Kbit encrypted with the storage key Kstr unique to the recording device and then transmits this key to the recording device 400 via the recording device controller 303 of the recording and reproducing device 300.
On receiving the block information table key Kbit transmitted from the recording and reproducing device 300, the recording device 400 causes the encryption/decryption section 406 of the recording device cryptography process section 401 to decrypt the received data with the storage key Kstr unique to the recording device which is stored in the internal memory 405 of the recording device cryptography process section 401 and to then reencrypt the decrypted data using the session key Kses made sharable during the mutual authentication. This process is as previously described in detail in (9) Key Exchange Process after Mutual Authentication.
At step 5252, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 receives the block information table key Kbit reencrypted with the session key Kses, from the recording device 400 via the recording device controller 303 of the recording and reproducing device 300.
Then at step 5253, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 transmits the received block information table key Kbit reencrypted with the session key Kses, to the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300. On receiving the block information table key Kbit reencrypted with the session key Kses the content block, the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300 causes the encryption/decryption section 308 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 to decrypt this block information table key Kbit with the session key Kses made sharable during the mutual authentication.
Further at step 5208, the decrypted block information table key Kbit is used to decrypr_ the block information read out at step -5202. The recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 ef the recording and reproducing device 300 replaces the decrypted blcck information table key Kbit and block _ .y7 _ s G

information table BIT with tre block information table key Kbit and block information table BIT contained in the header read out at step 5202, to hold the latter. :additionally, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 reads the decrypted block informaticn table BIT out from the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 of the recording and reproducing device 300.
Further, at step S254, the control section 306 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302 generates the integrity check value B(ICVb') from the block information table key Kbit and the block information table (BIT).
The integrity check value B is generated, as shown in Fig. 24, by using as a key the integrity-check-value-B-generating key Kicvb stored in the internal memory 307 of the recording and reproducing device cryptography process section 302, to decrypt the exclusive-ORed value comprising the block information table key Kbit and the block information table ~;BIT), based on the DES. Then at step S210, the integrity check value B and the ICVb in the header are compared together, and if they are equal, the process proceeds to step 5211.
With the format type 3, the block key is further encrypted with the storage key when stored in the recording device, thereby --requiring the recording device 400 to execute a decryption processes with the storage key ar,d the session key Kses and also requiring the recording an<~ reproducing device 300 to execute a >;,8 _ G. .~

decryption process with the session key. This series of steps ccrrespond to the process steps shown as steps 5255 and 5256.
At step 5255, the central section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 takes out, from the read-out header, the block key Kbic encrypted with the storage key Kstr unique to the recording device which has been read out at step S217 and then transmits this key to the recording device 400 via the recording device controller 303 of the recording and reproducing device 300.
On receiving the block key Kblc transmitted from the recording and reproducing device 300, the recording device 400 causes the encryption/decryption section 406 of the recording device cryptography process section 401 to decrypt the received data with the storage key Kstr unique to the recording device which is stored in the internal memory 405 of the recording device cryptography process section 401 and to then reencrypt the decrypted data using the session key Kses made sharable during the mutual authentication. This process is as previously described in detail in (9) Key Exchange Process after Mutual Authentication.
At step 5256, the control section 301 of the recording and reproducing device 300 receives the block key Kblc reencrypted with the session key Kses, from the recording device 400 via the recording device contro~ler 303 of the recording and reproducing --device 300.

Then, at step 5257, the cryptography process section 306 of the recording and reproducing device 30c) decrypts the block key Kblc using the session key Kses.
Then at step 5242, the block key Kblc decrypted at step 5257 is used to decrypt the block data. Furthermore, at step 5243, the content (program or data] is executed and reproduced. The processing from steps 5217 to 5243 is repeated for all the blocks.
When it is determined at step 5244 that all the blocks have been read out, the reproduction process is ended.
The process for reproducing a content of the format type 3 has been described. The format type 3 is similar to the format type 2 in that the process for verifying the total integrity check value is omitted, but provides a processing configuration with a higher security level due to the inclusion of the process for exchanging the block key.
(II) Process Executed by Content Provider to Generate Integrity Check Value (ICV) In the above described embodiments, the verification processes with the various integrity check values ICV are executed during downloading or reproduction of a content. Aspects of the process for generating the integrity check values ICV and the verification process will be described below.
First, each of the integrity check value explained in the embodiments will be described in brief. The following integrity _ .730 _ check values ICV are used in the data processing apparatus according to the present invention.
Integrity check value A, ICVa: integrity check value for verifying that the content ID and usage policy in the content data have not been tampered.
Integrity check value B, ICVb: integrity check value for verifying that the block information table key Kbit, the content key Kcon, and the block information table have not been tampered.
Content integrity check value ICVi: integrity check value for verifying that each content block of the content has not been tampered.
Total integrity check value ICVt: integrity check value for verifying that the integrity check value ICVa, the integrity check value ICVb, and all the integrity check values for the content blocks have not been tampered.
Integrity check value ICVdev unique to the recording and reproducing device: integrity check value that is replaced with the total integrity check value ICVt if the localization flag is set to 1, that is, the content can be used only by a particular recording and reproducing device and that is generated as an integrity check value for the previously described integrity check value A: ICVa, integrity check value B: ICVb, and integrity check value TCVi contained in each block: of the content to be checked.
- 2~1 -. Depending on the format, not the check value for each content block but the content itself is checked by the integrity check values ICVt and ICVdev.
Each of the above integrity check value is used in the data processing apparatus according to the present invention. Of these integrity check values, the -ntegrity check values A and B, the total integrity check value, and the content integrity check value are generated by a content provider for providing content data or a content manager based on data to be verified, as shown, for example, in Figs. 32 to 35 and 6 ar;d are stored in the data together with th.e content before~be:ing provided to a user of the recording and reproducing device 300. When downloading or reproducing the content to or from the recording device, the user of the recording and reproducing device, that is, the content user generates verifying ICVs based on each data to be verified, to compare them with the stored ICVs. Additionally, the integrity check value ICVdev unique to the reproducing device is replaced with the total integrity check value ICVt and then stored in the recording device if it is shown that the content can be used only by this recording and reproducing device.
In the above described embodiments, the processes for generating the integrity check values are principally based on the DES-CBC. The present invention, however, is not limited to the above described method but includes various ICV-generating and -verifying process aspects, in particular, for the relationship _ -~ 3 ~ _ between the content provider or manager and the content user, the following various ICV-generating and -verifying process configurations are possible.
Figs. 46 to 48 are views useful in explaining a generation process executed by a generator o~ the integrity check value ICV
and a verification process executed by a verifier.
Fig. 46 shows a configuration wherein, for example, an ICV
generator who is a content provider or manager executes the process for generating the ICV based on the DES-CBC as described in the above embodiments and then provides the generated ICV to a recording and reproducing device user, that is, a verifier together with the content. In this case, for the verification process, the recording and reproducing device user, that is, the verifier requires, for example, the keys stored in the internal memory 307 shown in Fig. 18, for generating the corresponding integrity check values. The verifier (recording and reproducing device user) who is the content user uses the integrity-check-value-generating key stored in the internal memory 307 to apply the DES-CBC to data to be verified in order to generate the integrity check values and then compares these values with stored integrity check values. Tn this case, each integrity-check-value-generating key is configured so as to be secretly shared by the -ICV creator and the verifier.
Fig. 47 shows a configuration wherein the ICV creator who is the content provider or manager generates ICVs using a digital signature of a public key cryptosystem and then provides the generated ICVs to the content user, that is, the verifier together with the content and wherein the content user, that is, the verifier stores the public key of the ICV ~~reator and uses this key to verify the ICVs. In this case, the public key of the ICV
creator which is held by the content user (recording and reproducing device user), that is, the Verifier need not be secret, resulting in easier management. This aspect is thus suitable for ICV generation and management executed at a high security management level, for example, that executed in one entity.
In Fig. 48, the ICV creator who is the content provider or manager generates ICVs using a digital signature of a public key cryptosystem, then provides the generated ICVs to the content user, that is, the verifier together with the content, further stores a public key used by the verifier for verification, in a public key certificate (see, for example, Fig. 14), and then provides this key to the recording and reproducing device user, that is, the verifier. With a plurality of ICV creators, each creator has a key managing center create data (a public key certificate) for certifying the validity of the public key.
The content user who is the ICV verifier has a public key of the key managing center. The verifier verifies the public key -certificate using the public key of the key managing center, and takes out the public key of the ICV creator stored in the public key certificate if its validity has been ascertained. The verifier further verifies the ICVs using the taken-out public key of the ICV creator.
This method is an aspect useful if a plurality of ICV
creators are present and if a center for managing these creators has an established management system.
(12) Configuration for Generate-ng Cryptography Process Keys Based on Master Keys A configuration for generating various cryptography process keys based on the master keys, which configuration. is characteristic of the present data processing system, will be described below.
As previously described with reference to Fig. 18, the internal memory of the recording and reproducing device 300 in the present data processing apparatus stores the various master keys, each cf which is used, for example, to generate the authentication key Kake (see Equation 3) or the distribution key Kdis (see Equation 4).
when cryptography communicatior_, mutual authentication, MAC
generation, verification, or the like is carried out between two entities, that is, the content provider and the content provider, or the recording and reproducing device 300 and the recording device 400 in the present data processing apparatus, these entities ccnventionallv hold secret information common to them, for example, key infcrmation. Additionally, when the above process is carried out between one and many entities,. for example, one content provider and many content users, or one recording and reproducing device and many recording media, these entities conventionally store and hold secret information common to all the entities, that is, secret information common to many content users or many recording media, or one co:ztent provider individually manages and uses secret informat.io.n (ex. key) for each of many content users.
With the one-to-many relationship as described above, however, the configuration owning secret information (key) shared by all the entities is disadvantageous in that leakage of the secret from one entity affects ail the other entities using the same secret information (ex, key). In addition, when one manager, for example, a content provider indi~Tidually manages and uses secret information for each content user, a list is required which serves to identify all the users and which associates this identification data with unique secret information (ex. keys), thereby .
advantageously increasing list maintaining and managing burdens in proportion to the number of users.
The data processing apparatus accord~_ng to the present invention has solved such a conventional problem with the sharing of secret information between entities using a configuration for -holding the master keys and generating various individual keys therefrom. This configuration will be described below.

In the data prccessing apparatus according to the present invention, if different individual keys are required for various cryptography processes, authentication processes, and the like between recording devices, media storing contents, or recording and reproducing devices, these individual keys are generated using individual information such as identifier data (ID) unique to the devices or media and an individual-key generating method previously determined in the recording and reproducing device 300.
With this configuration, if any individual key generated should be identified, damage to the entire system can be precluded by preventing the corresponding master. key from leaking. In addition, the configuration for generating the keys from the master keys eliminates the needs for the association list.
A specific example of configuration will be described with reference to the drawings. Fig. 49 is a view useful in explaining the configuration for generating various keys using the various master keys held by the recording and reproducing device 300. The medium 500 and the communication means 600 in Fig. 49 input contents as in the already described embodiments. The content is encrypted by the content key Kcon, which is in turn encrypted by the distribution key Kdis.
For example, if the recording and reproducing device 300 attempts to take a content out from the medium S00 cr the communication means 600 and download it to the recording device 400, the recording and reproducing device 300 must obtain the distribution key Kdis that has encrypted the content key as previously described in Figs. 2 and 39 to 41. Although the key Kdis can be directly obtained from the medium 500 or the communication means 600 or the recording and reproducing device 300 can obtain and store it in its memory beforehand, the configuration for distributing sucr. a key to many users may be subjected to leakage, which may affect the entire system, as described above.
The data processing system according to the present invention is configured to generate the distribution key Kdis by applying a master key MKdis for the distribution key stored in the memory of the recording and reproducing device 300 as well as a process based on the content ID, that is, Kdis = DES (MKdis, content ID), as shown in the lower part of Fig. 49. In a content distributing configuration between a content provider providing contents from the medium 500 or the communication means 600 and the recording and reproducing device 300, which is a content user, despite a large number of content providers, this configuration enables advanced security to be maintained without the need to distribute the individual distribution keys Kdis via the medium, the communication means, or the like or to store them in each recording and reproducing device 300. -Next, the generation of the authentication key Kake will be explained. In downloading a content from the recording and reproducing device 300 to the recording medium 400 as previously described in Figs. 22 and 39 to 41 or causing the recording and reproducing device 300 to execute and reproduce a content stored in the recording medium 400 as des~~ribed in Figs. 42 to 45, the recording and reproducing device 3!JO and the recording medium 400 must execute the mutual authentication process (see Fig. 20).
As described ir: Fig. 20, this authentication process requires the recording and reproducing device 300 to have the authentication key Kake. Although the recording and reproducing device 300 can obtain the authentication key directly from, for example, the recording medium 400 or can obtain and store it in its memory beforehand, the r_onfiguration for distributing such a key to many users may be subjected to leakage, which may affect the entire system, as in the above described configuration for the distribution key.
The data processing system according to the present invention is configured to obtain the authentication key Kake by applying a master key MKake for the distribution key stored in the memory of the recording and reproducing device 300 as well as a process based on the recording device ID: IDmem, that is, Kake = DES
(MKake, IDmem), as shown in the lower part of Fig. 49.
Further, in downloading a content from the recording and reproducing device 300 to the recording medium 400 as previously described in Figs. 22 and ~9 to 4I or causing the recording and reproducing device 300 to execute and reproduce a content stored in the recording medium 400 as described in Fig. 23, Figs. 42 to 45, a configuration similar to that for the distribution or authentication key described abcve can be used for the recording and reproducing device signature key Kdev requ'red to generate the integrity check value ICVdev unique to the recording and reproducing device if the content can be used only by a particular recording and reproducing device. In the above described embodimenr_s, the recording and reproducing device signature key Kdev is stored in the internal memory, but if the master key Mkdev for the recording and reproducing ~~evice signature key is stored in the memory whereas the recording and reproducing device signature key Kdev is not stored therein and if the recording and reproducing device signature key Kdev is obtained by means of Kdes - DES (MKdev, IDdev) based on the recording and reproducing device identifier: IDdev and the master key MKdev for the recording and reproducing device signature key, as required, as shown in the lower part of Fig. 49, then it advantageously becomes unnecessary for each apparatus to have the recording and reproducing device signature key Kdev.
In this manner, the data processing apparatus according to the present invention is configured to sequentially generate from the master keys and each ID, information such as a key which is required for the cryptography information process between two entities such as the provider and the recording and reproducing device or the recording and reproducing device and the recording device. Consequently, even if the key in~ormation leaks from each entity, the range of damage incurred by the individual keys is further limited, and it also becomes unnecessary to manage key lists for the individual entities a.s described above.
A plurality of examples of processes relating to this configuration will be explained by showing a flow. Fig. 50 shows examples of a process executed by the content producer or manager to decryp~ a content or the like wing a master key and a process executed by a user device, for example, the recording and reproducing device 300 in the above: described embodiment to decrypt the encrypted data using tr_e master key.
At step S50I, a content producer or manager imparts an identifier (content identifier) to a content. At step 5502, the content producer or manager generates a key for encrypting a content or the like based on its owned master key and a content ID.
At this step, if the distribution k;ey Kdis is to be generated, it is generated based on the above described Kdis = DES (MKdis, medium ID). Then at step 5503, the content producer or manager uses a key (for example, the distri.butian key Kdis) to encrypt part or all of the content stored in the medium. The content producer supplies the content encrypted through these steps, via the medium such as a DVD, the communication means, or the like.
On the other hand, at step 5504, a user device such as the recording and reproducing device 300 reads the content ID from the content data received via the medium such as a DVD, the communication means, or the like. Then at step 5505, the user - 24~. -device generates a key applied to decryption of the encrypted content based on the read-out medium ID and its owned master key.
if the distribution key Kdis is to be obtained, this generation process corresponds te, fcr example, the distribution key Kdis =
DES (MKdis, medium ID). At step 5506, the user device uses this key to decrypt the content, and at step 5507, uses, that is, reproduces the decrypted content or execute the program.
In this example, as shown in the lower. part of Fig. 50, both the content producer or manager and the user device have the master key (for example, the distribution-key-generating master key MKdis) to sequentially generate the distribution key required to encrypt or decrypt the content based on their owned master key and each ID (medium ID).
With this system, if the distribution key leaks to a third person, the third person can decrypt that content, but contents stored in other media with different content IDs can be prevented from decryption, thereby minimizing the adverse effects of the leakage of one content key on the entire system. Additionally, this system does not require the user device, that is, the recording and reproducing devi.~e t~~ hold a key associating list for each medium.
An example where the content producer or manager holds a -plurality of master keys to execute a process depending on a content distribution destination with reference to Fig. 52.

Step S511 executed by the content prcducer or manager comprises imparting an i~ient,ifier (content ID) to the content.
Step 5512 comprises selecting one of a plurality of master keys (for example, a plurality of distribution-key-generating master keys MKdis) held by the content producer or manager. Although described in further detail with reference to Fig. 52, this selection process comprises setting an applied master key beforehand for each of the countries to which content users belong, each apparatus type, or each apparatus version and executing the master keys in accordance with the settings.
Then at step 5513, the content producer or manager generates an encryption key based on the master key selected at step 5512 and the content ID determined at step S5I1. If, for example, the distribution key Kdis is to be generated, it is generated based on the above described Kdis = DES (MKdis, medium ID). Then at step 5514, the content producer or manager uses a key (for example, the distribution key Kdisi) to encrypt part or all of the content stored in the medium. At step 5515, the content producer distributes the encrypted content via the medium such as a DVD, the communication means, or the like, using a distribution unit comprising the content ID, the master-key-generating information used, and the encrypted content, -On the other hand, at step S5l_6, for example, the user device such as a recording and reproducing device 300 determines whether or not its holds the master key corresponding the master key ID in the content data distributed by the medium such as a DVD or by the communication means. If it does not have the master key corresponding to the mas =er key ID in the c~onter.t data, the distributed content cannot be used by this user device and the process is ended.
If the user device has the master key corresponding to the master key ID in the content data, then at step S5i7, it reads the content ID out from the content data received via the medium, the communication means, or the like. Then at step S518, the user device generates a key applied to decryption of the encrypted content based on the read-out content ID and its held master key.
This process is a distribution-key Kdisi = DES (Mkdisi, contents IDj if it intends to get a distribution key Kdisi. At step 5519 r_ontents are decrypted by means of the key. At step 5520 decrypted contents are used, that is, reproduction or program is performed.
In this example, as shown in the lower part of Fig. 51, the content producer or manager ':as a master key set comprising a plurality of master keys, for example, distribution-key-generating master keys MKdis 1 to n. On the c>ther hand, the user device has one master key, for sxamp~.e, one distribution-key-generating master key KKdisi so that it can decrypt the content only when the -content producer or manager has used the key KKdisi for the encryption.
_ 24.~ -Fig. 52 shows an example where master keys varying depending on the country is applied, as a specific example of the aspect shown in the flow in Fig. S:L. The content provider has master keys MK1 to n, of which the key MK. is used to generate keys for encrypting contents distributed to user devices for Japar~. For example, ar_ encryption key KL is generated from a content ID and the key MKl and then user to encrypt a content. The master keys MKl to n are further set such that the key MK2 is used to generate keys for encrypting contents distributed to user devices for the U.S., and the key MK3 is used to generate keys for encrypting contents distributed to user devices for the EU (Europe).
On the other hand, for user devices ~or Japan, specifically, recording and reproducing devices such as PCs or game apparatuses which are sold in Japan, the master key MK? is stored in their internal memories, for user devices for the U.S., the master key MK2 is stored in their internal memories, and for user devices for the EU, the master key MK3 is stored in their internal memories.
With this configuration, the content provider selectively uses one of the master keys MKl to n depending on user devices that can use a content, in order to encrypt the content to be distributed to the user devices. For example, to allow the content to be used cnly by the user devices for Japan, the master -key K1 generated using the master key MK1 is used to encrypt the content. This encrypted content can be decrypted using the master key MKl stored in the user devices for Japan, that is, allows a ' L4J -decryption key to be generated, whereas the key K1 cannot be obtained from the master keys MK2 and MK3 stored in the user devices for the U.S. and EU, respectively, thereby preventing the encrypted content from being decrypted.
In this manner, the content provider can selectively use a plurality of master keys to set localization for various contents.
Fig. 52 shows an example where the different master keys are used for the different countries to which. the user devices belong, but various use forms are possible; for example, the master key can be switched depending on the type cf the user device or its version, as described above.
Next, Fig. 53 shows an example of a process where an identifier unique to a medium, that is, a medium ID and a master key are combined together. Here, the medium refers to, for example, DVDs or CDs in which contents are stored. The medium ID
may be unique to individual media, the titles of contents such as movies, or individual medium manufacturing lots. In this manner;
medium IDs may be assigned in various manners.
At step 521, a medium producer or manager determines an identifier (medium identifier) for a medium. At step 5522, the medium producer or manager generates a key for encrypting a content stored in the medium based on its owned master key and a -medium ID. At this step, if, for example, the distribution key Kdis is to be generated, it is generated based on the above described Kdis = DES (MKdis, medium ID). Then at step 5523, the medium producer or manager uses a k:ey (for example, the distribution key Kdi.s) to en~~rypt part or all of the content stored in the medium. The medium producer supplies the medium storing the content ericryptec~ through these steps.
On the other hand, at step 5524, a user device such as the recording and reproducing device 300 reads the medium ID from the supplied medium. Then at step 5525, the user device generates a key applied to decryption of the encrypted content based on the read-out medium iD and its owned master key. If the distribution key Kdis is to be obtained, this generation process corresponds to, for example, the distribution key ~:dis = DES (MKdis, medium ID) .
At step 5526, the user device uses this key to decrypt the content, and at step 5527, uses, that is, reproduces the decrypted content or execute the program.
In this example, as shown in the lower part of Fig. 53, both the medium producer or manager and the user device have the master key (for example, the distribution--key-generating master key MKdis) to sequentially generate the distribution key required to encrypt or decrypt the content based on their owned master key and each ID (medium ID) .
With this system, if any medium key leaks to a third person, the third person can decrypt the content in the medium, but -contents stored in other media with different medium IDs can be prevented from decryption, thereby minimizing the adverse effects of the leakage of one medium key or~ the entire system.
- 24i -Additionally, this system does not require the user device, that is, the recording and reproducing device to hold a key associating list for each medium. Further, the sire of a content encrypted with one medium key is limited to a capacity that can be stored within that medium, so that there is a slim possibility that the content reaches the amount of information required to attack the encrypted text, thereby reducing the possibility of decrypting the encrypted text.
Next, Fig. 54 shows an example of a process where an identifier unique to the recording and reproducing device, that is, a recording and reproducing device ID and a master key are combined together.
At step 5531, a recording and reproducing device user generates a key for encrypting a content or the like based on a master key and a recording and reproducing device ID stored, for example, in the internal memory of the recording and reproducing device. If, for example, the content key Kcon is to be obtained, this generation process correspcnds to Kcon = DES (MKcon, recording and reproducing device ID). Then at step 5532, the user uses a key (form example, the distribution key Kcon) to decrypt the content. At step 5533, the user stores the encrypted content in the recording and reproducing device such as a hard disk. -On the other hand, when the recording and reproducing device user that has stored the content requests the stored data to be recovered, a system manager for managing the recording and - 2~8 -DEMANDES OU BREVETS VOLUMlNEUX
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Claims (71)

What is claimed is:
1. A data processing system comprising a recorder/reproducer and a recording device for executing transmission of encryption data to each other, characterized in that:
said recording device has a data storage section for storing content data that is transferable between the recorder/reproducer and the recording device, and at the same time, has a plurality of key blocks storing key data applicable at least to authentication processing between the recorder/reproducer and the recording device, wherein a different key is stored in each block;
said recorder/reproducer having a control unit for supervising the authentication processing between the recorder/reproducer and the recording device, and based on a key block designation information, designating one key block out of the plurality of key blocks held by said recording device, and executing the authentication processing with said recording device based on the key data stored in the designated key block.
2. The data processing system according to Claim 1, characterized in that an authentication key that is applicable at least to the authentication processing is included in each of the plurality of key blocks of said recording device, and the authentication key of each key block is configured as key data different from one another.
3. The data processing system according to Claim 1, wherein said recorder/reproducer holds setting information stored in a memory in which a key block to be applied to the authentication processing is the designated key block;
and said recorder/reproducer designates one key block out of the plurality of key blocks held by said recording device based on the setting information when the authentication processing between the recorder/reproducer and the recording device is performed, and executes the authentication processing.
4. The data processing system according to Claim 3, wherein the settings of the designated key block of said recorder/reproducer and the key data stored in said recording device are different for each predetermined product unit for selectively validating downloading and reproduction processes based on a model of the recorder/reproducer, a content version, a localization permission, a moving permission, a territorial restriction, or combinations thereof.
5. The data processing system according to Claim 1, wherein key data required for the authentication processing with said recording device is stored in a memory in the recorder/reproducer; and authentication of the key data stored in said memory in the recorder/reproducer is only established using a key data in a block stored in said recording device, and is not established when using a key data in other key blocks.
6. The data processing system according to Claim 1, wherein said recorder/reproducer stores a master key Mkake for recording device authentication in a memory of the recorder/reproducer; and an authentication key Kake generated based on said master key Mkake for recording device authentication is a key whose authentication is only established using key data in the designated key block in the recorder/reproducer, and is not established when using key data in other key blocks.
7. The data processing system according to Claim 6, wherein said recording device for storing a recording device identification information IDmem in said memory in the recording device and, at the same time, an authentication key Kake that is different for each key block is stored in each of said plurality of key blocks; and said recorder/reproducer has means for generating the authentication key Kake by encryption processing of said recording device identification information IDmem based on the master key Mkake for recording device authentication stored in the memory of the recorder/reproducer, and performing the authentication processing with the designated key block of said recording device using the generated authentication key Kake.
8. The data processing system according to Claim 1, wherein each key block of said recording device includes recording device identifier information that is peculiar information of the recording device, an authentication key and a random number generation key to be used in the authentication processing with the recorder/reproducer, and a storing key to be used in encryption processing of storage data in said data storage section.
9. The data processing system according to Claim 8, wherein said storing key stored in each of the plurality of key blocks of said recording device is key data that is different for each key block and, at the same time, is a key to be used in encryption processing with respect to stored data of said data storage section; and said recording device has means for executing key exchange processing of the storing key in the recording device, and outputting encryption data using a key different from the storing key if a utilization request of data is encrypted by a storing key received from outside the recording device.
10. The data processing system according to Claim 1, wherein said recording device has an encryption processing section; and the encryption processing section has means for selecting one key block of the plurality of key blocks of the recording device in accordance with a key block designation information received from said recorder/reproducer, and executing the authentication processing with said recorder/reproducer using the key data in the designated key block.
11. The data processing system according to Claim 10, wherein the encryption processing section of said recording device has means for executing the encryption processing executed during data storing processing in the data storage section storing content data transferable between the recorder/reproducer and the recording device, and during data transfer processing from the data storage section, using the key data in one key block that is selected in accordance with the key block designation information received from said recorder/reproducer.
12. The data processing system according to Claim 1, wherein there are a plurality of designatable key blocks in said recording device and in said recorder/reproducer, and at least one key block in the plurality of designatable key blocks is configured as a commonly designatable key block that is also designatable in other recorder/reproducers.
13. A recording device having a data storage section for storing content data transferable with an external apparatus, characterized by having a plurality of key blocks storing key data applicable at least to mutual authentication processing between the recording device and said external device, and each block for storing key data for each block in a data storage section.
14. The recording device according to Claim 13, wherein each of the plurality of key blocks of said recording device includes an authentication key applicable at least to the authentication processing, and the authentication key for each key block is configured as key data that is different from one another.
15. The recording device according to Claim 13, wherein said recording device has a memory for recording device identification information IDmem and, at the same time, a different authentication key Kake for each key block is stored in each of the plurality of key blocks.
16. The recording device according to Claim 13, wherein each key block of said recording device includes recording device identifier information that is peculiar information of the recording device, the authentication key and a random number generation key to be used in the authentication processing with said external apparatus, and a storing key to be used in encryption processing of storage data in said data storage section.
17. The recording device according to Claim 16, wherein said storing key stored in each of the plurality of key blocks of said recording device is key data that is different for each key block and, at the same time, is a key to be used in encryption processing with respect to stored data of said data storage section; and said recording device has means for executing key exchange processing of the storing key in the recording device, and outputting encryption data by a key different from the storing key if a utilization request of data is encrypted by a storing key received from outside the recording device.
18. The recording device according to Claim 13, wherein said recording device has an encryption processing section; and the encryption processing section has means for selecting one key block of the plurality of key blocks of the recording device in accordance with the key block designation information received from said external apparatus, and executing the authentication processing with said recorder/reproducer using the key data in the designated key block.
19. The recording device according to Claim 18, wherein the encryption processing section of said recording device has means for executing the encryption processing executed in the data storing processing during the data storage section storing content data transferable between said external apparatus and the recording device, and during the data transfer processing from the data storage section, using the key data in one key block that is selected in accordance with the key block designation information received from said external apparatus.
20. A data processing method in a data processing system comprising a recorder/reproducer and a recording device for executing transmission of encryption data to each other, comprising:

based on a key block designation information designating, by the recorder/reproducer one key block out of a plurality of key blocks held by the recording device, and executing authentication processing with said recording device based on key data stored in the designated key block.
21. The data processing method according to Claim 20, further comprising using an authentication key applicable at least to the authentication processing, said authentication key being included in each of the plurality of key blocks of said recording device, the authentication key of each key block configured as key data different from one another.
22. The data processing method according to Claim 20, wherein designation by said recorder/reproducer is based on setting information held in a memory in the recorder/reproducer.
23. The data processing method according to Claim 20 further comprising storing in a memory of said recorder/reproducer a master key Mkake for recording device authentication, generating an authentication key Kake based on said master key Mkake for performing recording device authentication, and executing authentication processing using key data in the designated key block using the generated authentication key Kake.
24. The data processing method according to Claim 20, further comprising, storing in a memory of said recording device a recording device identification information IDmem and, at the same time, a master key MKake is stored in each of said plurality of key blocks; and generating by said recorder/reproducer the authentication key Kake by executing encryption processing of said recording device identification information IDmem based on the master key Mkake for performing recording device authentication, storing the key Kake in a memory of the recorder/reproducer, and performing the authentication processing with the designated key block of said recording device using the generated authentication key Kake.
25. The data processing method according to Claim 20, further comprising selecting by said recording device one key block of the plurality of key blocks of the recording device in accordance with the key block designation information received from said recorder/reproducer, and executing the authentication processing with said recorder/reproducer using the key data in the designated key block.
26. The data processing method according to Claim 20, further comprising executing by said recording device the encryption processing during a data storing processing in a data storage section storing content data transferred between the recorder/reproducer and the recording device, and during a data transfer processing from the data storage section using the key data in one key block that is selected in accordance with the key block designation information received from said recorder/reproducer.
27. The data processing method according to Claim 20, further comprising:
including a storing key in each of the plurality of key blocks of said recording device, said storing key used in encryption processing of stored data in the data storage section of said recording device; and executing in said recording device a key exchange processing of the storing key, and outputting encryption data by a key different from the storing key if a utilization request of data is encrypted by a storing key received from outside the recording device.
28. A computer program product including a memory containing computer readable code embodied therein causing a computer to execute a data processing method in a data processing system comprising a recorder/reproducer and a recording device for executing transmission of encryption data to each other, said computer performing the steps of designating by the recorder/reproducer one key block out of a plurality of key blocks held by the recording device, and executing authentication processing with said recording device based on key data stored in the designated key block.
29. A data processing system comprising a first apparatus and a second apparatus for executing transmission of encryption data to each other according to claim 1, wherein said second apparatus has an encryption processing section for executing encryption processing for transmission data with said first apparatus;
said encryption processing section has a control section for receiving a command identifier transferred from said first apparatus in accordance with a sequence of steps defined in advance, retrieving from a register a sequence of commands corresponding to the received command identifier, and executing the sequence of commands;
whereby if the command identifier transferred from the first apparatus is a command identifier different from the sequence of steps, cancelling processing of commands corresponding to the command identifier.
30. The data processing system according to Claim 29, wherein the sequence of steps associated with the command identifier received from the first apparatus and stored in the control section is a command number setting sequence in which numbers are sequentially incremented; and said control section for storing a value of the command number received from said first apparatus in a memory, comparing a new command number received from said first apparatus with the sequence of steps based on the received command number stored in said memory, and if it is determined that the new command number is different from the stored sequence of steps, resetting the command number stored in said memory without performing processing corresponding to the new command number.
31. The data processing system according to Claim 29, wherein said encryption processing section storing an authentication processing command sequence for executing authentication processing between said first apparatus and said second apparatus, and an encryption processing command sequence for executing encryption processing relating to transferred data between said first apparatus and said second apparatus; and wherein said authentication processing command sequence is executed before said encryption processing.
32. The data processing system according to Claim 31, wherein said encryption processing command sequence includes at least one of:
a command sequence including encryption key exchange processing for encryption of data that is transferred from said first apparatus to said second apparatus and stored in a data storage section in said second apparatus, and a command sequence including an encryption key exchange processing for encryption of data that is stored in the storing means in said second apparatus and transferred from said second apparatus to said first apparatus.
33. The data processing system according to Claim 31, wherein said control section sets an authentication flag indicating that authentication is done if authentication is established by the authentication processing between said first apparatus and said second apparatus, and thereafter executes command management control that enables execution of said encryption processing command sequence when authentication flag is set, and following authentication, said control section resets said authentication flag in executing said authentication processing command sequence anew.
34. The data processing system according to Claim 32, wherein said control section does not accept command processing that is different from said sequence of steps from an external apparatus, including said first apparatus, during execution of commands associated with said key exchange processing.
35. The data processing system according to Claim 29, wherein said second apparatus is a storage device having a data storage section for storing encryption data;
said first apparatus is a recorder/reproducer for controlling authentication and recording of data in said storage device, and taking out data stored in said storage device for reproduction; and said recorder/reproducer having an encryption processing section for executing encryption processing of transferred data with said recording device.
36. The data processing system according to Claim 35, wherein said recording device has a key block storing an authentication key applied to authentication processing between said recorder/reproducer and said recording device and a storing key used as an encryption key of data stored in a data storage section in said recording device; and said control section [in an encryption processing section for receiving a command identifier from said recorder/reproducer and executing authentication processing using the authentication key stored in said key blocks and in accordance with said sequence of steps, whereby encryption processing of data associated with the key exchange processing using said storing key is performed after completing the authentication processing.
37. The data processing system according to Claim 36, wherein said key blocks storing authentication keys and storing keys that are different from one another; and said recorder/reproducer notifies said recording device of one key block used in authentication processing and encryption processing of data as a designated key block out of said plurality of key blocks, and said recording device executes authentication processing using the authentication key stored in the designated key block and encryption processing of data using the storing key.
38. A recording device having a data storage section for storing content data that is transferable with an external apparatus according to claim 13, said recording device having an encryption processing section for executing encryption processing for transmission of data with the external apparatus;
said encryption processing section having a control section for receiving a command identifier transferred from said external apparatus in accordance with a sequence of steps defined in advance, taking out a sequence of commands corresponding to the received command identifier from a register, and executing the sequence of commands; and if the command identifier transferred from said external apparatus is a command identifier different from the sequence of steps, cancelling processing of commands corresponding to the command identifier.
39. The recording device according to Claim 38, wherein said control section has a command number setting sequence in which numbers are sequentially incremented as in said sequence of steps; and said control section for storing a value of a command number received from said external apparatus in a memory, comparing a new command number received from said external apparatus with the sequence of steps determined based on the command number stored in said memory, and if it is determined that the new command number indicates a new sequence of steps different from the stored sequence of steps, resetting the command number stored in said memory without performing processing corresponding to the new received command number.
40. The recording device according to Claim 38, wherein an authentication processing command sequence executes authentication processing between said external apparatus and said recording device, and an encryption processing command sequence executes encryption processing relating to transferred data between said external apparatus and said recording device;
and whereby said authentication processing command sequence is executed before said encryption processing command sequence.
41. The recording device according to Claim 40, wherein said encryption processing command sequence includes at least one of:
a command sequence including encryption key exchange processing for encryption data that is transferred from said external apparatus to said recording device and stored in a storage section in said recording device, and a command sequence including an encryption key exchange processing for encryption of data that is stored in the storage section in said recording device and transferred from said storing device to said external apparatus.
42. The recording device according to Claim 40, wherein said control section sets an authentication flag indicating that authentication is done if authentication is established by the authentication processing of said external apparatus and said recording device, and executes said encryption processing command sequence when the authentication flag is set, and thereafter said control section resets said authentication flag in executing said authentication processing command sequence anew.
43. The recording device according to Claim 41, wherein said control section manages an order of command execution based on said sequence of steps and said command identifier in said encryption key exchange processing, and said control section does not accept command processing that is different from said sequence of steps from an external device, including said external apparatus, during a series of command execution associated with said key exchange processing.
44. The recording device according to Claim 38, wherein said recording device having a key block storing an authentication key applied to authentication processing between said external apparatus and said recording device, and a storing key used as an encryption key of data stored in a data storage section in said recording device; and said control section having said encryption processing section of said recording device for receiving a command identifier from said external apparatus and executing authentication processing using the authentication key stored in said key block whereby encryption processing of data accompanying key exchange processing using said storing key is performed after completing the authentication processing.
45. The recording device according to Claim 44, wherein said key block is composed of a plurality of key blocks storing authentication keys and storing keys that are different from one another; and said external apparatus notifies said recording device of one key block used in authentication processing and encryption processing of data as a designated key block out of said plurality of key blocks, and said recording device executes authentication processing using the authentication key stored in the designated key block and encryption processing of data using the storing key.
46. A data processing method in a data processing system comprising a first apparatus and a second apparatus for executing transmission of encryption data to each other as in claim 20, said second apparatus executing a command processing controlling step comprising receiving a command identifier transferred from said first apparatus in accordance with a sequence of steps defined in advance, taking out a command number corresponding to the received command identifier from a register, and executing the command number, and if the command identifier transferred from the first apparatus is a command identifier different from the sequence of steps, processing corresponding to the command identifier is cancelled.
47. The data processing method according to Claim 46, the sequence of steps relating to the command identifier received from the first apparatus is a command number setting sequence in which numbers are sequentially incremented; and said command processing controlling step comprises:
storing a value of a received command number from said first apparatus in a memory;
comparing a new command number received from said first apparatus with the sequence of steps based on the received command number stored in said memory, and if it is determined that the new received command number is different from the sequence of steps in said determining step, resetting the command number stored in said memory without performing command processing corresponding to the new command number.
48. The data processing method according to Claim 46, wherein said command processing controlling step for executing:
an authentication processing command sequence performing authentication processing between said first apparatus and said second apparatus; and an encryption processing command sequence for executing encryption processing relating to transferred data between said first apparatus and said second apparatus;
whereby said authentication processing command sequence is performed prior to said encryption processing command sequence.
49. The data processing method according to Claim 48, wherein said encryption processing command sequence includes at least one of:

a command sequence including encryption key exchange processing for encryption of data that is transferred from said first apparatus to said second apparatus and stored in a storage section in said second apparatus, and a command sequence including an encryption key exchange processing for encryption of data that is stored in the storage section in said second apparatus and transferred from said second apparatus to said first apparatus.
50. The data processing method according to Claim 48, further comprising setting an authentication flag indicating that authentication is done if authentication is established by the authentication processing of said first apparatus and said second apparatus, and performing said encryption processing command sequence when the authentication flag is set.
51. The data processing method according to Claim 50, further comprising resetting said authentication flag in executing said authentication processing command sequence anew.
52. The data processing method according to Claim 49, wherein during execution of a series of commands relating to said key exchange processing, denying any additional command processing from an external device, including said first apparatus, that is different from said sequence of steps.
53. A computer program product having computer readable code embodied therein for causing a computer system to execute data processing in a data processing system that comprises a first apparatus and a second apparatus for executing transmission of encryption data to each other, by performing the steps of (a) receiving a command identifier transferred from said first apparatus to said second apparatus in accordance with a sequence of steps defined in advance, (b) taking out a command number corresponding to the received command identifier from a register, and (c) executing the command number; and (d) cancelling processing if the command identifier transferred from the first apparatus is different from the sequence of steps identified in step (a).
54. A data recorder/ reproducer for reproduction of a program content from a recording device containing save data of said program content; said recorder/
reproducer comprising an encryption processing unit to execute an encryption process on save data before storage in said recording device, and a decryption process on said save data retrieved from said recording device before reproduction;
a control unit to determine an encryption processing method or a decryption processing method for said save data, wherein said control unit for determining an encryption processing method for data to be stored in said recording device together with a utilization restriction information, and to determine a decryption processing method for said save data retrieved from said recording device for selective reproduction taking into account the utilization restriction information set up in a data management file stored in a memory of the recording device accessed by said control unit wherein said encryption processing unit executes encryption processing or decryption processing on said save data with the use of different encryption keys suitable to an encryption processing method or a decryption processing method determined by said control unit as recited in claim 1.
55. The data recording/reproducer of claim 54, further comprising input means to enter external use restriction information on save data.
56. The data recorder/ reproducer according to claim 55, wherein said utilization restriction information is a program restriction allowing the use of save data following authentication of a content program, and said data management file is structured as a table storing program restriction information oriented to the identifier of the content program, and wherein said encryption processing unit, when the external use restriction information from said input means or the utilization restriction information set up in said data management file is set to restrict a content program, executes encryption processing or decryption processing on said save data with the use of a program's individual save data encryption key created based on said content program's individual encryption key; and when the external use restriction information from said input means or utilization restriction information set up in said data management file is set not to restrict a program, executes encryption processing or decryption processing on said save data with the use of a system-shared encryption key stored in said data recorder/
reproducer, or a system save data encryption key created based on the system shared encryption key.
57. The data recorder/ reproducer according to claim 56 wherein said content program's individual encryption key is a content key Kcon stored in a header portion of content data; and said system-shared encryption key is a system signature key Ksys stored in common into a plurality of different data recording reproducing devices.
58. The data recorder/ reproducer according to claim 55, wherein said utilization restriction information is a recorder/ reproducer device utilization restriction allowing the use of said save data following validation of a data recording/
reproducer, and said data management file is structured as a table storing said device utilization restriction information, and wherein said encryption processing unit, when the external use restriction information from said input means or the device utilization restriction information set up in said data management file is set to restrict the recorder/ reproducer from reproducing a program content, executes encryption processing or decryption processing on said save data with the use of a device individual save data encryption key created based on device-specific encryption key, and when the external use restriction information from said input means or the device utilization restriction information set up in said data management file is set not to restrict the recorder/ reproducer from reproducing a program content, executes encryption processing or decryption processing on save data with the use of a system-shared encryption key stored in said data record reproducing player or a shared save data encryption key created based on the system-shared encryption key.
59. The data recording/reproducer according to claim 58, wherein said device specific encryption key is a device signature key Kdev stored in said data recording/ reproducer, and said system-shared encryption key is a system signature key Ksys stored in a plurality of data recording reproducing devices.
60. The data recording/reproducer according to claim 55, wherein said external use restriction information is a user restriction allowing the use of save data following a user identification, and said data management file is structured as a table storing the user restriction information, and wherein said encryption processing unit, when the external use restriction information from said input means or the utilization restriction information set up in said data management file is set to restrict a user, executes encryption processing or decryption processing on said save data with the use of a user's individual save data encryption key created based on a password input from said input means, or a user's individual save data encryption key created based on said password, and when the external restriction information from said input means or the utilization restriction information set up in said data management file is set not to restrict a user, executes encryption processing or decryption processing on said save data with the use of a system-shared encryption key stored in said record reproducing player or a shared save data encryption key created based on the system-shared encryption key.
61. The data recording/reproducer according to claim 60, wherein said system-shared encryption key is a system signature key Ksys stored in a plurality of devices.
62. A save data processing method in the data recorder/ reproducer device of claim 55, comprising:
determining an encryption processing mode to store save data into the recording device according to utilization restriction information in a header of content data; and an encryption key selection step to select an encryption key applied to encryption processing according to the encryption processing mode determined at said encryption processing mode determining step, and wherein encryption processing is performed on save data with the use of the encryption key selected at said encryption key selection step.
63. The save data processing method according to claim 62 wherein said utilization restriction information is a program restriction allowing the use of save data of a content program, and in the case of restricting a program, selecting an encryption key applied in encryption processing based on a content program's individual encryption key, and in the case of not restricting a program, selecting as an encryption key applied in encryption processing a system-shared encryption key stored in said data recorder/
reproducer, or a shared save data encryption key created based the system-shared key.
64. The save data processing method according to claim 62, wherein said utilization restriction information is a recording reproducing device restriction allowing the use of save data following validation of the data recording reproducing device, and in the case of restricting the recording reproducing device, selecting an encryption key applied to encryption processing based on a device-specific encryption key; and in the case of not restricting the record reproducing player, selecting as an encryption key a system-shared encryption key stored in said data recording reproducing device, or a shared save data encryption key created based on the system shared encryption key as the key applied to encryption processing.
65. The save data processing method according to claim 62, wherein said utilization restriction information is a user restriction information received from said input means allowing the use of save data following validation of a user, and in the case of restricting a user, selecting an encryption key applied to encryption processing based on a password, or a user's individual save data encryption key created based on said password; and in the case of not restricting a record reproducing player, selecting as an encryption key applied in encryption processing a system-shared encryption key stored in said data recording reproducing device, or a shared save data encryption key created based on the system shared encryption key.
66. A save data processing method in the data recorder/reproducer of claim 55 for reproducing a program content comprising;
(a) determining a decryption processing mode to reproduce save data retrieved from the recording device, according to utilization restriction information set up in a data management file stored in a memory of the recording device; and (b) selecting a decryption key according to the decryption processing mode determined at step (a), and (c) executing decryption processing on save data using the decryption key selected step (b).
67. The save data processing method according to claim 66, wherein said utilization restriction information is a program restriction allowing the use of save data following authentication of a content program, and in the case of restricting a program, selecting a decryption key applied to decryption processing based on the content program's individual encryption key; and in the case of not restricting the program, selecting as a decryption key applied in decryption processing is selected out of a system-shared encryption key stored in said data recorder/ reproducer, or a shared save data encryption key created based on the system-shared encryption key.
68. The save data processing method according to claim 66, wherein said utilization restriction information is a recording reproducing device restriction allowing the use of save data following validation of the data recording reproducing device, and in case the of restricting the recording reproducing device, selecting a decryption key applied in decryption processing based on the data recording reproducing device individual encryption key; and in the case of not restricting the recording reproduction, selecting as a decryption key applied in decryption processing a system-shared encryption key stored in said data record reproducing player, or a shared save data decryption key created based on the system-shared encryption key.
69. The save data processing method described in claim 66, wherein said utilization restriction information is a user restriction information received from the input means allowing the use of save data following validation of a user, and in the case of restricting the user, selecting a decryption key applied to a decryption process based on a the password, or the user's individual save data decryption key created based on said password; and in the case of not restricting the user, selecting as a decryption key applied in decryption processing a system-shared encryption key stared in said data recording reproducing device, or a shared save data decryption key created based on the system-shared encryption key.
70. A computer program product having a memory containing computer readable code causing a computer in the data recorder/ reproducer of claim 55 to reproduce a program content by performing the steps of:
(a) determining an encryption processing mode to store save data into the recording device according to utilization restriction information, (b) selecting an encryption key based on the encryption processing mode determined at step (a); and (c) executing save data encryption processing using the encryption key selected at step (b).
71. A computer program product having a memory containing readable code causing a computer in the data recorder/ reproducer of claim 55 to reproduce the program content by performing the steps:
(a) determining a decryption processing mode to reproduce save data retrieved from a recording device, according to utilization restriction information set up in a data management file stored in a memory of the recording device;
(b) selecting a decryption key based on the decryption processing mode determined at step (a); and (c) executing save data decryption processing using the decryption key selected at step (b).
CA002400786A 2000-01-21 2001-01-19 Data authentication system with reproduction device utilization restrictions Expired - Fee Related CA2400786C (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (15)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
JP2000013322A JP2001203686A (en) 2000-01-21 2000-01-21 Data processing unit, data processing method and method for providing data verification value, and program service medium
JP2000-013322 2000-01-21
JP2000016251A JP2001211152A (en) 2000-01-25 2000-01-25 Data processor, contents data generating method, data processing method, and program providing medium
JP2000-015551 2000-01-25
JP2000016029A JP2001211149A (en) 2000-01-25 2000-01-25 Device and method for data processing and program providing medium
JP2000015858A JP2001209310A (en) 2000-01-25 2000-01-25 Data processor, data processing method, contents data generating method and program providing medium
JP2000-016292 2000-01-25
JP2000015551A JP2001211148A (en) 2000-01-25 2000-01-25 Device, system, and method for data processing and program providing medium
JP2000-015858 2000-01-25
JP2000-016213 2000-01-25
JP2000-016251 2000-01-25
JP2000-016029 2000-01-25
JP2000016292A JP2001211080A (en) 2000-01-25 2000-01-25 Data processor, data processing method and contents data creating method, and program providing media
JP2000016213A JP2001211151A (en) 2000-01-25 2000-01-25 Device and method for data processing contents data verification value imparting method, and program providing medium
CA002365236A CA2365236A1 (en) 2000-01-21 2001-01-19 Data authentication system

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CA2400786C true CA2400786C (en) 2007-04-10

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