EP0228830B1 - Communications network - Google Patents

Communications network Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0228830B1
EP0228830B1 EP86309490A EP86309490A EP0228830B1 EP 0228830 B1 EP0228830 B1 EP 0228830B1 EP 86309490 A EP86309490 A EP 86309490A EP 86309490 A EP86309490 A EP 86309490A EP 0228830 B1 EP0228830 B1 EP 0228830B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
signal
station
network
encrypted
store
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP86309490A
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German (de)
French (fr)
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EP0228830A3 (en
EP0228830A2 (en
Inventor
Remo Giovanni Andrea Marzolini
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
EMI Group Electronics Ltd
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Thorn EMI Electronics Ltd
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Publication date
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Publication of EP0228830A2 publication Critical patent/EP0228830A2/en
Publication of EP0228830A3 publication Critical patent/EP0228830A3/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP0228830B1 publication Critical patent/EP0228830B1/en
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a communications network for the transfer of data in encrypted form.
  • One type of conventional communications system for encrypted digital data for example as disclosed in Electronics International Vol.53, No.25, Pp76-78 has a source of digital data (e.g. a keyboard) which feeds plain text data to a cryptographic unit whose output, now encrypted is stored and then is applied to a transmitter for sending out to the remainder of the system.
  • the transmitter input may also pick up some of the plain text data output from the source (whether by direct radiation or by transfer along the supply lines), and so this unencrypted signal is also sent out onto the system. Accordingly, it is possible for someone to obtain both encrypted and plain text signals and thereby derive the crypto key, whereupon the security of the system is breached. This can have further serious effects if this same crypto key is used in a number of installations or systems, especially as not all installations using a given crypto key may be vulnerable to this problem.
  • An object of the invention is to provide a communications network for encrypted signals which does not incorporate the aforementioned disadvantages.
  • the present invention provides a communications network having a plurality of stations, at least one station having: a source of signals, means to encrypt a signal from the signal source, means to store an encrypted signal, means to transmit an encrypted signal into the network, and characterised by switch means to render the transmission means incapable of transmitting while the encryption means is in use, whereby to prevent leakage of an unencrypted signal to the network.
  • the transmission means cannot send out an encrypted signal together with the plain text signal, because the transmission means is incapable of transmitting whenever there is any possibility of an unencrypted signal reaching the input of the transmission means.
  • the present invention also provides a communications network having a plurality of stations, at least one station having: means to receive an encrypted signal from the network, means to store an encrypted signal, means to decrypt an encrypted signal, and characterised by switch means to render the reception means incapable of receiving while the decryption means is in use whereby to prevent leakage of an unencrypted signal to the network.
  • reception means is incapable of receiving whenever any unencrypted signal is passing out of the decryption means, thereby preventing anyone obtaining simultaneously an encrypted signal and an unencrypted signal.
  • At least one station in the communications network has both transmission means of the form indicated above, and means to receive an encrypted signal from the network, means to store an encrypted signal, means to decrypt a received signal, and switch means to render the transmission means incapable of transmitting and the reception means incapable of receiving while the decryption means is in use; advantageously the transmission means and reception means are operable simultaneously.
  • This arrangement is particularly suited to a fully duplex system.
  • the switch means in a station in the communications network defined above is arranged to supply power to the transmission means (and/or as appropriate, the reception means) only when the encryption means (and/or as appropriate, the decryption means) is not in operation.
  • the signal storage means located intermediate the encryption means and the transmission means ensures that the output signal of the encryption means can be held for a while before being input to the transmission means, thereby enabling the operation of the encryption means to be separated temporally (with no overlap) from operation of the transmission means.
  • the storage means may have a data-input rate differing from the data-output rate, this being particularly appropriate if error-coding is provided adjacent the encryption/decryption step.
  • the present invention is particularly suited to communications networks incorporating burst mode transmissions; it is also applicable to those incorporating continuous processing of data, if the data source provides the data in block form and the encrypted data is input to the transmission means at high speed.
  • the type of protocol used in a network embodying the present invention is dependent on the characteristics of the network.
  • One protocol which is particularly suited to a half-duplex system to prevent both stations transmitting at the same time, ensures that both stations are in a "standby receive" mode when their encryption means are not operational.
  • One station commences transmission for a predetermined time, and thereafter the other responds with an acknowledgement; failure to receive the correct reply leads the first station to repeat the transmission, the repetition interval being larger than the time required for the storage means to off-load into the decryption means (this being the interval during which the reception means is inoperative).
  • one station transmits during even time divisions, and the other at odd time divisions according to the same routine.
  • a suitable protocol provides for the receivers always to be in a "receive” mode and the transmitters to be in a "standby” mode, except when the storage means are interacting with the encryption means or decryption means as appropriate; in this exempted instance, if one station intended transmitting data, it would use a "handshake" mode whereby it transmits a query signal and awaits an acknowledgement before passing on the data signal.
  • a network embodying the present invention can utilise any one of a number of protocols for establishing the completion of a burst transmission.
  • all bursts are of an equal duration, and the receiving station is aware of the number of bits contained in the message (i.e. all those bits following the sync pattern).
  • the messages are of varying lengths and the end of the message is identified by a distinctive pattern. In either case, the carrier signal ceases at the end of burst, so that the lack of a carrier is an indication that the burst has been completed.
  • the present invention also embodies a station for use in a communications network as defined herein.
  • the simplex communications network partly shown in Figure 1 has a number of transmitter stations (only one, referenced 1, is illustrated) and a number of receiver stations (only one, referenced 2, is illustrated).
  • Transmitter station 1 has a data source (for example a digital processor or computer), a crypto unit 4 for converting input signals into encrypted format, a buffer store 5 for holding encrypted signals and a transmitter 6 with an aerial 7 to send out to the network signals from store 5, all these components sharing a common power supply 8.
  • the station also has a switching control unit 9 which is arranged so that it has two separate switch positions, in one of which it connects data source 3 and crypto unit 4 to the power supply 8 but isolates transmitter 6 therefrom; in the other switch position, transmitter 6 is connected to the power supply 8 while data source 3 and crypto unit 4 are isolated therefrom.
  • a switching control unit 9 which is arranged so that it has two separate switch positions, in one of which it connects data source 3 and crypto unit 4 to the power supply 8 but isolates transmitter 6 therefrom; in the other switch position, transmitter 6 is connected to the power supply 8 while data source 3 and crypto unit 4 are isolated therefrom.
  • the station 1 operates in the following manner when a data signal is to be sent out on the network.
  • Switching control unit 9 takes up the position illustrated in Figure 1 whereby data source 3 and crypto unit 4 are simultaneously energised, so that the appropriate data signal is output from source 3, is encrypted by unit 4 and then passes to store 5. Once the entire signal in encrypted form is held in store 5, switching control unit 9 reverts to its other position thereby de-activating source 3 and unit 4 while activating transmitter 6 which then receives the encrypted signal from store 5. Once the signal has been fully transmitted, the cycle can be repeated if appropriate.
  • the unit 9 is in each of its positions for predetermined intervals of time (whether equal or not), irrespective of the duration of the message signal to be conveyed.
  • unit 9 is modified such as to selectively instruct operation of the components for example by issuing enabling/disabling signals.
  • Receiver station 2 has a number of components which operate together in an analagous way to those of transmitter station 1; these components include an aerial 10, a receiver 11, a buffer store 12, a crypto unit 13 to decrypt signals output from store 12, a digital processor 14, a power supply 15 common to station 2 and a switching control unit 16. Accordingly when receiving a data signal, initially the receiver 11 and store 12 are energised so that the signal passes to store 12. Once all the signal is in the store 12, the unit 16 acts to de-energise receiver 11 while energising crypto unit 13 and digital processor 14, so that the signal in store 12 can be duly decrypted and passed to processor 14 for appropriate action.
  • FIG. 2 shows a station for use in a fully-duplex communications network of the present invention.
  • the station has a digital processor 20 which acts as a source of data signals for those to be sent out onto the network from the station, and as a destination for signals sent into the station.
  • the "transmitting channel” of the station has a transmit crypto unit 21, a buffer store 22 and a transmitter 23; the “receiving channel” has a receiver 24, a bit synchroniser 25, a receive buffer store 26 and a receive crypto unit 27.
  • These two channels share a number of facilities including aerial 28, power supply 29, the internal clocks 30 and 31, the switch control unit 32 and switches 33 to 38.
  • This station essentially operates in the same manner as the network of figure 1, with the additional requirement that, although simultaneous transmission and reception is possible, there is neither transmission nor reception while any crypto unit in the station is in use.
  • the receiver buffer store 26 cannot read into receive crypto unit 27 while the transmit buffer store 22 is read out, so as to avoid receiver-channel plain text leakage into the transmitter channel.
  • the protocol ensures that, while transmit buffer store 22 reads out into transmitter 23, the receiver 24 reads into the receive buffer store 26; thereafter, both channels are switched over into the "crypto" mode and the data is decoded.
  • the station has error correction to overcome the effect of chance errors on the crypto units, and appropriate devices can be provided on either side of one or both stores.
  • one or more optical isolators may be used to provide or enhance the selective operation of the crypto unit(s) and the transmitter(s)/receiver(s).
  • optical isolators may be located between the digital processor and the crypto unit(s), or between the crypto unit(s) and the buffer store(s), or between the store(s) and the receiver/transmitter.
  • the isolators are switched into operation (either by powering on/off or by enabling/disabling) such as to accord with the operation of the crypto unit(s) and the transmitter(s)/receiver(s) mentioned in relation to the illustrated examples.

Description

  • The present invention relates to a communications network for the transfer of data in encrypted form.
  • One type of conventional communications system for encrypted digital data for example as disclosed in Electronics International Vol.53, No.25, Pp76-78 has a source of digital data (e.g. a keyboard) which feeds plain text data to a cryptographic unit whose output, now encrypted is stored and then is applied to a transmitter for sending out to the remainder of the system. However, the transmitter input may also pick up some of the plain text data output from the source (whether by direct radiation or by transfer along the supply lines), and so this unencrypted signal is also sent out onto the system.
    Accordingly, it is possible for someone to obtain both encrypted and plain text signals and thereby derive the crypto key, whereupon the security of the system is breached. This can have further serious effects if this same crypto key is used in a number of installations or systems, especially as not all installations using a given crypto key may be vulnerable to this problem.
  • One known method of attempting to solve this problem is to minimise the incidence of radiation of the plain text data, by screening and/or by utilising appropriate circuit design techniques. However effective screening may be expensive, cumbersome and inappropriate or inconvenient in many instances. Moreover the necessary circuit design techniques are contrary to those techniques required for nuclear hardening, and are often unsatisfactory or impractical in the applications relevant to these communications systems. Another attempted solution is disclosed in European Patent Specification A 0069832 (U.S. Patent Specification 4563546) in which encrypted data is processed in parallel with an inversion of the data in the hope that stray emissions will be self-cancelling. However, the transmitter remains active during encryption and is still liable to pick-up earth currents in the system which may contain unencrypted data.
  • An object of the invention is to provide a communications network for encrypted signals which does not incorporate the aforementioned disadvantages.
  • The present invention provides a communications network having a plurality of stations, at least one station having: a source of signals, means to encrypt a signal from the signal source, means to store an encrypted signal, means to transmit an encrypted signal into the network, and characterised by switch means to render the transmission means incapable of transmitting while the encryption means is in use, whereby to prevent leakage of an unencrypted signal to the network.
  • Accordingly the transmission means cannot send out an encrypted signal together with the plain text signal, because the transmission means is incapable of transmitting whenever there is any possibility of an unencrypted signal reaching the input of the transmission means.
  • Likewise the present invention also provides a communications network having a plurality of stations, at least one station having: means to receive an encrypted signal from the network, means to store an encrypted signal, means to decrypt an encrypted signal, and characterised by switch means to render the reception means incapable of receiving while the decryption means is in use whereby to prevent leakage of an unencrypted signal to the network.
  • Thus also the reception means is incapable of receiving whenever any unencrypted signal is passing out of the decryption means, thereby preventing anyone obtaining simultaneously an encrypted signal and an unencrypted signal.
  • Preferably, at least one station in the communications network has both transmission means of the form indicated above, and means to receive an encrypted signal from the network, means to store an encrypted signal, means to decrypt a received signal, and switch means to render the transmission means incapable of transmitting and the reception means incapable of receiving while the decryption means is in use; advantageously the transmission means and reception means are operable simultaneously. This arrangement is particularly suited to a fully duplex system.
  • Preferably the switch means in a station in the communications network defined above is arranged to supply power to the transmission means (and/or as appropriate, the reception means) only when the encryption means (and/or as appropriate, the decryption means) is not in operation.
  • The signal storage means located intermediate the encryption means and the transmission means ensures that the output signal of the encryption means can be held for a while before being input to the transmission means, thereby enabling the operation of the encryption means to be separated temporally (with no overlap) from operation of the transmission means. The storage means may have a data-input rate differing from the data-output rate, this being particularly appropriate if error-coding is provided adjacent the encryption/decryption step.
  • The present invention is particularly suited to communications networks incorporating burst mode transmissions; it is also applicable to those incorporating continuous processing of data, if the data source provides the data in block form and the encrypted data is input to the transmission means at high speed.
  • The type of protocol used in a network embodying the present invention is dependent on the characteristics of the network. One protocol, which is particularly suited to a half-duplex system to prevent both stations transmitting at the same time, ensures that both stations are in a "standby receive" mode when their encryption means are not operational. One station commences transmission for a predetermined time, and thereafter the other responds with an acknowledgement; failure to receive the correct reply leads the first station to repeat the transmission, the repetition interval being larger than the time required for the storage means to off-load into the decryption means (this being the interval during which the reception means is inoperative). In another suitable protocol, one station transmits during even time divisions, and the other at odd time divisions according to the same routine.
  • In a fully duplex network, preferably different carrier frequencies are used for the two oppositely-directed paths, so that simultaneous transmission by the two stations can occur. A suitable protocol provides for the receivers always to be in a "receive" mode and the transmitters to be in a "standby" mode, except when the storage means are interacting with the encryption means or decryption means as appropriate; in this exempted instance, if one station intended transmitting data, it would use a "handshake" mode whereby it transmits a query signal and awaits an acknowledgement before passing on the data signal.
  • A network embodying the present invention can utilise any one of a number of protocols for establishing the completion of a burst transmission. In one protocol, all bursts are of an equal duration, and the receiving station is aware of the number of bits contained in the message (i.e. all those bits following the sync pattern). In another protocol, the messages are of varying lengths and the end of the message is identified by a distinctive pattern. In either case, the carrier signal ceases at the end of burst, so that the lack of a carrier is an indication that the burst has been completed.
  • The present invention also embodies a station for use in a communications network as defined herein.
  • In order that the invention may more readily be understood, a description is now given, by way of example only, reference being made to the accompanying drawings, in which:-
    • Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of part of a communications network embodying the present invention; and
    • Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of part of another communications network embodying the present invention.
  • The simplex communications network partly shown in Figure 1 has a number of transmitter stations (only one, referenced 1, is illustrated) and a number of receiver stations (only one, referenced 2, is illustrated).
    Transmitter station 1 has a data source (for example a digital processor or computer), a crypto unit 4 for converting input signals into encrypted format, a buffer store 5 for holding encrypted signals and a transmitter 6 with an aerial 7 to send out to the network signals from store 5, all these components sharing a common power supply 8. The station also has a switching control unit 9 which is arranged so that it has two separate switch positions, in one of which it connects data source 3 and crypto unit 4 to the power supply 8 but isolates transmitter 6 therefrom; in the other switch position, transmitter 6 is connected to the power supply 8 while data source 3 and crypto unit 4 are isolated therefrom. In this way, if any signals output from data source 3 pass directly (i.e. not via crypto unit 4) to the input of transmitter 6, they will not be sent on into the network because transmitter 6 is "off" (i.e. de-energised) at that time. Also, when the transmitter 6 is energised (and thereby itself capable of sending out to the network any unencrypted signals which might appear at its input) data source 3 is de-energised and therefore cannot produce any unencrypted signals which might pass directly to the input of transmitter 6. Store 5 is connected directly to the power supply 8 at all times, and remains unaffected by operation of the switching control unit 9.
  • The station 1 operates in the following manner when a data signal is to be sent out on the network. Switching control unit 9 takes up the position illustrated in Figure 1 whereby data source 3 and crypto unit 4 are simultaneously energised, so that the appropriate data signal is output from source 3, is encrypted by unit 4 and then passes to store 5. Once the entire signal in encrypted form is held in store 5, switching control unit 9 reverts to its other position thereby de-activating source 3 and unit 4 while activating transmitter 6 which then receives the encrypted signal from store 5. Once the signal has been fully transmitted, the cycle can be repeated if appropriate.
  • In a modification to the above method of operation, the unit 9 is in each of its positions for predetermined intervals of time (whether equal or not), irrespective of the duration of the message signal to be conveyed.
  • In another modification , all the components are continually energised, and unit 9 is modified such as to selectively instruct operation of the components for example by issuing enabling/disabling signals.
  • Receiver station 2 has a number of components which operate together in an analagous way to those of transmitter station 1; these components include an aerial 10, a receiver 11, a buffer store 12, a crypto unit 13 to decrypt signals output from store 12, a digital processor 14, a power supply 15 common to station 2 and a switching control unit 16. Accordingly when receiving a data signal, initially the receiver 11 and store 12 are energised so that the signal passes to store 12. Once all the signal is in the store 12, the unit 16 acts to de-energise receiver 11 while energising crypto unit 13 and digital processor 14, so that the signal in store 12 can be duly decrypted and passed to processor 14 for appropriate action.
  • Figure 2 shows a station for use in a fully-duplex communications network of the present invention. The station has a digital processor 20 which acts as a source of data signals for those to be sent out onto the network from the station, and as a destination for signals sent into the station. The "transmitting channel" of the station has a transmit crypto unit 21, a buffer store 22 and a transmitter 23; the "receiving channel" has a receiver 24, a bit synchroniser 25, a receive buffer store 26 and a receive crypto unit 27. These two channels share a number of facilities including aerial 28, power supply 29, the internal clocks 30 and 31, the switch control unit 32 and switches 33 to 38.
  • This station essentially operates in the same manner as the network of figure 1, with the additional requirement that, although simultaneous transmission and reception is possible, there is neither transmission nor reception while any crypto unit in the station is in use. Thus the receiver buffer store 26 cannot read into receive crypto unit 27 while the transmit buffer store 22 is read out, so as to avoid receiver-channel plain text leakage into the transmitter channel. The protocol ensures that, while transmit buffer store 22 reads out into transmitter 23, the receiver 24 reads into the receive buffer store 26; thereafter, both channels are switched over into the "crypto" mode and the data is decoded.
  • When all switches 33 to 38 are in position 1, the station is in the mode allowing reception and/or transmission of signals. In this condition the bit synchroniser provides the received signal clock for the buffer store, and internal clock 31 provides the transmit clock for reading the buffer store 22 out into transmitter 23. When all switches 33 to 38 are in position 2, the station is in the mode allowing encryption and/or decryption of the data signals. In this condition internal clock 30 provides the timing for the receive buffer store 26 and receive crypto unit 27, and the transmit buffer store 22 and transmit crypto unit 21.
  • In a modification, the station has error correction to overcome the effect of chance errors on the crypto units, and appropriate devices can be provided on either side of one or both stores.
  • In another modification to either of the above-illustrated arrangements, one or more optical isolators may be used to provide or enhance the selective operation of the crypto unit(s) and the transmitter(s)/receiver(s). Thus for example such optical isolators may be located between the digital processor and the crypto unit(s), or between the crypto unit(s) and the buffer store(s), or between the store(s) and the receiver/transmitter. In any of these cases, the isolators are switched into operation (either by powering on/off or by enabling/disabling) such as to accord with the operation of the crypto unit(s) and the transmitter(s)/receiver(s) mentioned in relation to the illustrated examples.

Claims (7)

  1. A communications network having a plurality of stations, at least one station having: a source of signals (20), means (21) to encrypt a signal from the signal source, means (22) to store an encrypted signal, means (23) to transmit an encrypted signal into the network, and characterised by switch means (33) to render the transmission means incapable of transmitting while the encryption means (21) is in use whereby to prevent leakage of an encrypted signal to the network.
  2. A communications network having a plurality of stations, at least one station having: means (24) to receive an encrypted signal from the network, means (26) to store an encrypted signal, means (27) to decrypt a received signal, and characterised by switch means (33) to render the reception means incapable of receiving while the decryption means (27) is in use whereby to prevent leakage of an unencrypted signal to the network.
  3. A network according to Claim 1, wherein the at least one station has means (24) to receive an encrypted signal from the network, means (26) to store an encrypted signal, means (27) to decrypt a received signal, and switch means (33) to render the transmission means (23) incapable of transmitting and the reception means (24) incapable of receiving while the decryption means (27) is in use.
  4. A network according to Claim 3, characterised in that the transmission means (23) and reception means (24) are operable simultaneously.
  5. A network according to any one of Claims 1 to 3, characterised in that the switch means (33) is arranged to supply power to the transmission means (23) or reception means (24) only when the encryption means (21) or decryption means (27) is not in operation.
  6. A station for a communications network, the station being characterised by a source of signals (20), means (21) to encrypt a signal from the signal source, means (22) to store an encrypted signal, means (23) to transmit an encrypted signal into a communications network, and characterised by switch means (33) to render the transmission means incapable of transmitting while the encryption means (21) is in use whereby to prevent leakage of an unencrypted signal.
  7. A station for a communications network, the station having means (24) to receive an encrypted signal from a communications network, means (26) to store an encrypted signal, means (27) to decrypt a received signal, and characterised by switch means (33) to render the reception means (24) incapable of receiving while the decryption means (27) is in use whereby to prevent leakage of an unencrypted signal.
EP86309490A 1985-12-18 1986-12-05 Communications network Expired - Lifetime EP0228830B1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

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GB8531209 1985-12-18
GB8531209 1985-12-18

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EP0228830A2 EP0228830A2 (en) 1987-07-15
EP0228830A3 EP0228830A3 (en) 1989-02-15
EP0228830B1 true EP0228830B1 (en) 1992-10-28

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO1990014735A1 (en) * 1989-05-24 1990-11-29 Motorola, Inc. Apparatus and method for enhancing the reliability of digital messages
US5228083A (en) * 1991-06-28 1993-07-13 Digital Equipment Corporation Cryptographic processing in a communication network, using a single cryptographic engine
AU4373493A (en) * 1992-05-15 1993-12-13 Tecsec, Incorporated Voice and data encryption device
JPH0635112U (en) * 1992-10-13 1994-05-10 株式会社ポールスタア Cardboard box
WO2000025476A1 (en) 1998-10-28 2000-05-04 L-3 Communications Corporation Apparatus and methods for cryptographic synchronization in packet based communications

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DE2507803C1 (en) * 1975-02-24 1980-04-03 Siemens Ag Circuit arrangement for controlling the key operation in procedure-controlled half-duplex data transmission systems
US4185166A (en) * 1975-04-14 1980-01-22 Datotek, Inc. Multi-mode digital enciphering system
NL183862C (en) * 1980-02-04 1989-02-01 Philips Nv TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM WITH CODED MESSAGE TRANSMISSION.
US4429180A (en) * 1980-05-19 1984-01-31 The United States Of America As Represented By The Director Of The National Security Agency Apparatus for simultaneous generation of key at two locations
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DE3127843A1 (en) * 1981-07-15 1983-05-26 AEG-Telefunken Nachrichtentechnik GmbH, 7150 Backnang METHOD FOR PREVENTING "COMPROMISING RADIATION" IN PROCESSING AND TRANSMITTING SECRET DATA INFORMATION

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US4249180A (en) * 1978-09-20 1981-02-03 Northern Telecom Limited Past dependent microcomputer cipher apparatus

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DE3687040T2 (en) 1993-04-22
DE3687040D1 (en) 1992-12-03
JPS62155644A (en) 1987-07-10
EP0228830A3 (en) 1989-02-15
US4811392A (en) 1989-03-07
EP0228830A2 (en) 1987-07-15

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