|Publication number||US7498766 B2|
|Application number||US 11/442,942|
|Publication date||Mar 3, 2009|
|Filing date||May 30, 2006|
|Priority date||May 30, 2006|
|Also published as||US20070278992, WO2007143299A1|
|Publication number||11442942, 442942, US 7498766 B2, US 7498766B2, US-B2-7498766, US7498766 B2, US7498766B2|
|Inventors||Christopher R. Paul, Joseph Cabana|
|Original Assignee||Symbol Technologies, Inc.|
|Export Citation||BiBTeX, EndNote, RefMan|
|Patent Citations (5), Referenced by (12), Classifications (7), Legal Events (6)|
|External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, Espacenet|
The present invention relates generally to systems and methods for authenticating a battery.
A conventional battery charger recharges a rechargeable battery which is used in a wireless electronic device. The charger may be capable of mating with and charging several types of batteries. However, if a different battery is not capable of receiving the same charging voltage and charging rate from the charger as the batteries intended to be recharged by the charger, the different battery may explode, irreparably damaging the charger and potentially causing harm to bystanders. Thus, there is a need to ensure authenticity of a battery which is coupled to the charger.
The present invention relates to a system and method for authenticating a battery. The system comprises a battery including a first encryption engine storing a first key, and a battery charger including a microcontroller and a second encryption engine storing a second key. When the microcontroller detects a coupling of the battery to the charger, the microcontroller issues a challenge to the first encryption engine and the second encryption engine. The first encryption engine generates a first response as a function of the challenge, the first key and a predefined algorithm, and the second encryption engine generates a second response as a function of the challenge, the second key and the predefined algorithm. The microcontroller compares the first and second responses to authenticate the battery.
The present invention may be further understood with reference to the following description and the appended drawings, wherein like elements are referred to with the same reference numerals. The present invention describes a system and method for authenticating a battery. While the exemplary embodiments of the present invention will be described with reference to a charger authenticating the battery, those of skill in the art will understand that the present invention may be utilized by any device which is coupleable to and draws power from and/or provides power to the battery.
In the exemplary embodiments, the battery 10, as shown in
In the exemplary embodiment, the charger 8 includes a charging circuit 35 for supplying power to the battery 10, a microcontroller 25 and an encryption engine 30 for authenticating the battery 10, and a communication bus (e.g., an I2C bus 20) for communicating with the microcontroller 305 in the battery 10.
In step 210, the microcontroller 25 generates a challenge to obtain a charger response from the encryption engine 30 and to obtain a battery response from the encryption engine 310 in the battery 10. For example, the encryption engine 30 stores a charger key, and, when instructed to do so by the microcontroller 25, generates the charger response based on the challenge, a predefined algorithm (e.g., cyclic redundancy check (CRC), secure hash algorithm (SHA-1), etc.) and the charger key. In the exemplary embodiments, the predefined algorithm is publicly known and the charger key is secret. The charger response may be strongly influenced by the charger key and the challenge, but it would be mathematically impossible to discover the charger key even with knowledge of the charger response, the challenge and the predefined algorithm.
The encryption engine 310 in the battery 10 generates the battery response based on the challenge, the predefined algorithm and a battery key. The predefined algorithm may be the same publicly known algorithm used by the encryption engine 30 to generate the charger response. As described above with reference to the charger response, the battery response may be strongly influenced by the battery key and the challenge, but it would be mathematically impossible to discover the battery key even with knowledge of the battery response, the challenge and the predefined algorithm.
In step 215, the microcontroller 25 receives the charger response from the encryption engine 30 and the battery response from the battery 10. As described above, the microcontroller 25 in the charger 8 communicates with the microcontroller 305 in the battery 10 on the I2C bus 20, allowing exchange of the challenge and the battery response. The microcontroller 305 transfers the challenge to the encryption engine 310 to obtain the battery response.
In step 220, the microcontroller 25 determines whether the battery response is identical to the charger response. When the responses are not identical, the microcontroller 25 may execute a predetermined action on a link between the charger 8 and the battery 10, as shown in step 225. For example, the microcontroller 25 may disable or selectively impair the charging circuit 35. If the charging circuit 25 is disabled, the battery 10 will not receive power from the charger 8. If the charging circuit 35 is selectively impaired, the charging circuit 35 may supply power to the battery 10 at a predetermined charge rate which is selected so that the battery 10 never becomes fully charged, rendering it useless as a power source. Alternatively, the predetermined charge rate may be selected to ensure that the battery 10 does not explode, i.e., a very slow charge rate.
In optional step 230, an authentication failure message (e.g., LED color change/blink sequence, audible signal, etc.) may be output by the charger 8 to indicate that the battery 10 was not authenticated. The authentication failure message may prompt a user to replace the battery 10. When the charger 8 detects removal and replacement of a battery, the method 200 will repeat itself.
When the responses are identical, the microcontroller 25 may assume (without ever expressly knowing) that the battery key is identical to the charger key and authenticate the battery 10, as shown in step 240.
It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various modifications may be made in the present invention, without departing from the spirit or scope of the invention. Thus, it is intended that the present invention cover the modifications and variations of this invention provided they come within the scope of the appended claims and their equivalents.
|Cited Patent||Filing date||Publication date||Applicant||Title|
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|Citing Patent||Filing date||Publication date||Applicant||Title|
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|US20070260892 *||May 8, 2006||Nov 8, 2007||Paul Christopher R||System and method for authenticating a power source|
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|US20110093840 *||Oct 21, 2010||Apr 21, 2011||Micro Power Electronics, Inc.||Patches for battery-interfacing devices and associated systems and methods|
|US20110117396 *||Jul 28, 2010||May 19, 2011||Samsung Sdi Co., Ltd.||Battery Pack and Method of Preventing Cap Disassembly or Cell Replacement in the Battery Pack|
|US20120030480 *||Sep 8, 2011||Feb 2, 2012||Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications Japan, Inc.||Battery pack and electronic apparatus|
|US20120166801 *||Dec 22, 2011||Jun 28, 2012||Electronics And Telecommunications Research Institute||Mutual authentication system and method for mobile terminals|
|U.S. Classification||320/106, 320/137|
|Cooperative Classification||H02J7/0004, H01M2/34|
|European Classification||H02J7/00B1, H01M2/34|
|May 30, 2006||AS||Assignment|
Owner name: SYMBOL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., NEW YORK
Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:PAUL, CHRISTOPHER R.;CABANA, JOSEPH;REEL/FRAME:017941/0934
Effective date: 20060530
|Aug 28, 2012||FPAY||Fee payment|
Year of fee payment: 4
|Oct 31, 2014||AS||Assignment|
Owner name: MORGAN STANLEY SENIOR FUNDING, INC. AS THE COLLATE
Free format text: SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNORS:ZIH CORP.;LASER BAND, LLC;ZEBRA ENTERPRISE SOLUTIONS CORP.;AND OTHERS;REEL/FRAME:034114/0270
Effective date: 20141027
|Jul 8, 2015||AS||Assignment|
Owner name: SYMBOL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, NEW YORK
Free format text: CHANGE OF NAME;ASSIGNOR:SYMBOL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.;REEL/FRAME:036083/0640
Effective date: 20150410
|Aug 17, 2015||AS||Assignment|
Owner name: SYMBOL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., NEW YORK
Free format text: RELEASE BY SECURED PARTY;ASSIGNOR:MORGAN STANLEY SENIOR FUNDING, INC.;REEL/FRAME:036371/0738
Effective date: 20150721
|Aug 29, 2016||FPAY||Fee payment|
Year of fee payment: 8