|Publication number||US7593896 B1|
|Application number||US 09/691,175|
|Publication date||Sep 22, 2009|
|Filing date||Oct 19, 2000|
|Priority date||Mar 25, 1998|
|Also published as||CA2322356A1, CA2322356C, CA2362033A1, CA2362033C, CN1292131A, DE1029311T1, DE69900169D1, DE69900169T2, DE69900169T3, EP1029311A1, EP1029311B1, EP1029311B2, EP1115095A2, EP1115095A3, EP1729267A2, EP1729267A3, US6636833, US7136835, US7567934, US7571142, US8676707, US8756150, US20030028481, US20090037333, US20090070260, US20090134217, US20130204781, US20140122340, US20140236831, WO1999049424A1|
|Publication number||09691175, 691175, US 7593896 B1, US 7593896B1, US-B1-7593896, US7593896 B1, US7593896B1|
|Inventors||Daniel I. Flitcroft, Graham O'Donnell|
|Original Assignee||Orbis Patents Ltd.|
|Export Citation||BiBTeX, EndNote, RefMan|
|Patent Citations (103), Non-Patent Citations (28), Referenced by (56), Classifications (63), Legal Events (1)|
|External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, Espacenet|
This application is a divisional, of application Ser. No. 09/235,836, filed Jan. 22, 1999 now U.S. Pat. No. 6,636,833.
This application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/099,614 filed Sep. 9, 1998; U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/098,175 filed Aug. 26, 1998; and U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/092,500 filed Jul. 13, 1998, the entire contents of each of which are incorporated by reference herein. This application also claims the benefit of Irish Patent Application No. S98 0458 filed Jun. 15, 1998; Irish Patent Application No. S98 0346 filed May 7, 1998; and Irish Patent Application No. S98 0223 filed Mar. 25, 1998, the entire contents of each of which are incorporated by reference herein.
1. Field of the Invention
This invention relates to a credit card system and method, and more particularly, to a credit card system and method offering reduced potential of credit card number misuse.
2. Related Art
The development of retail electronic commerce has been relatively slow in spite of the perceived demand for such trade. The single greatest deterrent to the expansion of retail electronic commerce is the potential for fraud. This potential for fraud has been a major concern for the credit card companies and financial institutions as well as the customers and the providers of the goods and services.
The former are concerned about fraud because essentially the financial institutions have to bear the initial cost of the fraud. Additionally, the credit card companies have an efficient credit card system which is working well for face to face transactions, i.e., “card present” transactions where the credit card is physically presented to a trader and the trader can obtain the credit card number, compare signatures and in many cases photographs before accepting a particular credit card.
The latter are equally concerned about fraud being well aware that ultimately the user must pay for the fraud. However, there are particular personal concerns for the consumer in that the fraudulent use of the credit card by misuse of the credit card number by a third party may not become apparent for some time. This can happen even if the card is still in his or her possession. Further, when fraud does occur the consumer has the task of persuading the credit card provider that fraud by another did indeed occur.
There is also the additional fear of being overcharged on a credit card. There are thus particular risks for those credit card holders who have relatively high spending limits, in that if fraud should occur, it may be some considerable time before it is detected. One particular form of fraud referred to as “skimming” is particularly difficult to control. What happens is that the card holder proffers his or her card at an establishment to make a transaction, the relevant information is electronically and/or physically copied from the card and the card is subsequently reproduced. This can be a particular problem with travelers particularly during an extensive period of travel as the fraudulent card may turn up in other places and it may be some considerable time before the fraud is detected.
For remote credit card use, the credit card holder has to provide details of name, master credit card number, expiration date and address and often many other pieces of information for verification; the storing and updating of the information is expensive but necessary. This of itself is a considerable security risk as anybody will appreciate that this information could be used to fraudulently charge goods and services to the card holder's credit card account. Such fraudulent use is not limited to those people to whom the credit card information has been given legitimately, but extends to anybody who can illegitimately obtain such details. A major problem in relation to this form of fraud is that the credit card may still be in the possession of the legitimate holder as these fraudulent transactions are taking place. This is often referred to as “compromised numbers” fraud. Indeed all this fraud needs is one dishonest staff member, for example in a shop, hotel or restaurant, to record the credit card number. It is thus not the same as card theft.
The current approaches to the limiting of credit card fraud are dependent on the theft of a card being reported and elaborate verification systems whereby altered patterns of use initiate some enquiry from the credit card company. Many users of credit cards have no doubt received telephone calls, when their use of the card has been exceptional, or otherwise unusual in the eyes of the organization providing the verification services.
Thus, there have been many developments in an effort to overcome this fundamental problem of fraud, both in the general area of fraud for ordinary use of credit cards and for the particular problems associated with such remote use.
One of the developments is the provision of smart cards which are credit card devices containing embedded electronic circuitry that can either store information or perform computations. Generally speaking they contribute to credit card security systems by using some encryption system. A typical example of such a smart card is disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 5,317,636 (Vizcaino).
Another one of the developments is the Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) protocol which represents the collaboration between many leading computer companies and the credit card industry which is particularly related to electronic transmission of credit card details and in particular via the Internet. It provides a detailed protocol for encryption of credit card details and verification of participants in an electronic transaction.
Another method that is particularly directed to the Internet is described in U.S. Pat. No. 5,715,314 (Payne et al.). U.S. Pat. No. 5,715,314 discloses using an access message that comprises a product identifier and an access message authenticator based on a cryptographic key. A buyer computer sends a payment message that identifies a particular product to a payment computer. The payment computer is programmed to receive the payment message, to create the access message, and to send the access message to a merchant computer. Because the access message is tied to a particular product and a particular merchant computer, the access message can not be generated until the user sends the payment message to the payment computer. Because the access message is different from existing credit card formats, the access message is ill-suited for phone/mail orders and other traditional credit card transactions.
There are then specific electronic transaction systems such as “Cyber Cash,” “Check Free” and “First Virtual.” Unfortunately, there are perceived problems with what has been proposed to date. Firstly, any form of reliance on encryption is a challenge to those who will then try to break it. The manner in which access has been gained to extremely sensitive information in Government premises would make anyone wary of any reliance on an encryption system. Secondly, a further problem is that some of the most secure forms of encryption system are not widely available due to government and other security requirements. Limiting the electronic trading systems and security systems for use to the Internet is of relatively little use. While electronic commerce is perceived to be an area of high risk, in practice to date it is not.
Additionally, various approaches have been taken to make “card present” transaction more attractive. For instance, Japanese Patent Publication No. Hei 6-282556 discloses a one time credit card settlement system for use by, e.g., teenage children of credit card holders. This system employs a credit card which can be used only once in which various information such as specific personal information, use conditions, and an approved credit limit identical to those of the original credit card are recorded on a data recording element and displayed on the face of the card. The one-time credit card contains the same member number, expiration date, card company code, and the like as on existing credit card, as well as one-time credit card expiration date not exceeding the expiration date of credit card, available credit limit for the card, and the like. The one-time credit card makes use of some of the same settlement means as the conventional credit card. However, the system also requires use permission information to be recorded on the credit card, the information permitting the credit card to be used only once or making it impossible to use the credit card when the credit limit has been exceeded. A special card terminal device checks the information taken from the card for correctness and imparts use permission information for when the card is not permitted to be used on the transmission to the credit card issuing company. The use permission information takes the form of a punched hole on the card itself. This system has obvious drawbacks, such as the card terminal having to be modified for additional functions (e.g., punching holes, detected punched holes, imparting additional information, etc.). Also, such a system offers little additional security insofar as fraud can still be practiced perhaps by covering the holes or otherwise replacing the permission use information on the credit card. Further, such a system would require a change in nearly all card terminal equipment if it were adopted.
U.S. Pat. Nos. 5,627,355 and 5,478,994 (Rahman et al.) disclose another type of system that uses a plurality of pin numbers which are added to a credit card number on an electronic display. U.S. Pat. No. 5,627,355 discloses a credit card having a memory element containing a series of passwords in a predetermined sequence. These passwords are identical to another sequence stored in a memory of a host control computer. Further, the card contains a first fixed field containing an account number (e.g., “444 222 333”). In operation, the memory element of the credit card device provides a unique password from the sequence with each use of the credit card device. This permits verification by comparing the account number and the password provided with each use of the device with the account number and the next number in sequence as indicated by the host computer. The host computer deactivates the password after the transaction. Among the drawbacks with this type of system is the need for a power supply, a display, a memory device, a sound generator and the need to recycle a limited sequence of pin numbers. Such a system is not readily adapted to current credit card transactions because it lacks the ability of providing a check sum of the card number and cannot be read by a standard card reader. Also, if the card is lost or stolen, there is little to prevent a person from using the card until it is reported to be lost or stolen by the correct holder. See, also, U.S. Pat. No. 5,606,614 (Brady et al.).
Other attempts have been made to Make funds available to an individual, but with limitations. For example, U.S. Pat. Nos. 5,350,906 (Brody et al.) and 5,326,960 (Tannenbaum et. al.) disclose issuing temporary PINs for one time or limited time and limited credit access to an account at an ATM. These patents disclose a currency transfer system and method for an ATM network. In this system, a main account holder (i.e., the sponsor) sets up a subaccount that can be accessed by a non-subscriber by presenting a fixed limit card associated with the subaccount and by entering a password corresponding to the subaccount. Once the fixed limit is reached, the card can no longer be used. The fixed limit card contains information on its magnetic stripe pertaining to the sponsor account.
One of the problems with all these systems is that there are many competing technologies and therefore there is a multiplicity of incompatible formats which will be a deterrent to both traders and consumers. Similarly, many of these systems require modifications of the technology used at the point of sale, which will require considerable investment and further limit the uptake of the systems.
Many solutions have been proposed to the problem of security of credit card transactions. However, none of them allow the use of existing credit cards and existing credit card formats and terminal equipment. Ideally, as realized by the present inventors, the solution would be to obtain the functionality of a credit card, while never in fact revealing the master credit card number. Unfortunately, the only way to ensure that master credit card numbers cannot be used fraudulently is to never transmit the master credit card number by any direct route, i.e. phone, mail, Internet or even to print out the master credit card number during the transaction, such as is commonly the case at present.
According to exemplary embodiments, the present invention is directed towards improving the existing credit card system by providing a more secure way of using existing credit cards and in particular to providing an improved way of using existing credit cards in remote credit card transactions. The present invention is further directed towards providing a more secure way of using existing credit cards generally which will not require any major modifications to existing credit card systems. It is further directed towards providing an improved credit card system that will be more user friendly and will provide customers with a greater confidence in the security of the system.
Further the invention is directed towards providing an improved credit card system, in one embodiment, that will not necessarily require the use of expensive and potentially fallible encryption systems. The present invention is also directed towards providing an improved credit card system which will enable a user to obtain the functionality of a credit card while never revealing the master credit card number.
Further the invention is directed towards overcoming as far as possible the incidence of skimming and compromise numbers frauds.
These and other objects of the present invention are satisfied by a first exemplary embodiment, which pertains to a credit card technique involving: maintaining a pool of credit card numbers which share identical formatting; assigning at least one credit card number from the pool of credit card numbers to be a master credit card number; assigning at least one credit card number from the pool of credit card numbers to be a limited-use credit card number which is deactivated upon a use-triggered condition subsequent; and associating the master credit card number with the limited-use credit card number, while ensuring that the master credit card number cannot be discovered on the basis of the limited-use credit card number.
The technique further comprises: receiving notification that the limited-use credit card number has been used in a credit card transaction; determining whether a limited-use event has occurred based on the notification, and if so, generating a deactivation command; and deactivating the limited-use credit card if a limited-use event has occurred, based on the deactivation command which is generated upon a use-triggered condition subsequent. In one embodiment, the limited-use event is satisfied when the limited-use credit card is used only once. In another embodiment, the limited-use event is satisfied when the limited-use credit card is used to accrue charges which are greater than a prescribed monetary amount, which are greater than a prescribed frequency of use, and/or a combination of use frequency, individual transaction amount and total amount.
In one embodiment of the invention, the additional limited-use credit card numbers are allocated automatically as soon as the credit card holder uses more than a preset amount of limited-use credit card numbers. The advantage of this is that the master credit card holder does not have to request the credit card numbers each time they are required.
In another embodiment, a technique for performing a credit card transaction based on one of a master credit card number and a limited-use credit card number is provided, wherein the limited-use credit card number is randomly chosen with respect to the master credit card number, but the limited-use credit card number includes identical formatting to the master credit card number and is associated with the master credit card number. The technique comprises: entering a transaction on the basis of the master credit card number or the limited-use credit card number to generate a transaction message; and receiving the transaction message and processing the transaction. The step of processing the transaction includes: authorizing or denying the transaction; determining whether to deactivate the limited-use credit card number when the limited-use credit card number was used to perform the transaction, and generating a deactivation command in response thereto, wherein the determining step determines whether to deactivate the limited-use credit card number based on whether a limited-use event pertaining to the use of the limited-use credit card number has occurred, and if so, generates the deactivation command when the limited-use event has occurred; and deactivating the limited-use credit card number based on the deactivation command.
One advantage of the above-described techniques is that the credit card holder obtains the functionality of a credit card without ever in fact revealing the master credit card number in the course of a transaction. More specifically, according to a preferred embodiment, there is no mathematical relationship between the limited-use credit card number and the master credit card number. This is attributed to the fact that the numbers are randomly selected from a queue of available limited-use credit card numbers based upon the requests and/or needs of different customers. It is thus virtually impossible to predict which customers are looking for numbers at any time or how they will be allocated.
Further, the technique can use a limited-use credit card number, and hence the possibility of compromised numbers credit card fraud may be eliminated or at least greatly reduced. Additionally, in one embodiment of the credit card technique, a preset credit limit, etc. is allocated. Irrespective of how the trader behaves (for example, by fraudulently overcharging or providing additional goods) the total risk to the credit card holder is directly related to the preset credit limit, and thereby can be minimized.
The foregoing, and other, objects, features and advantages of the present invention will be more readily understood upon reading the following detailed description in conjunction with the drawings in which:
In this specification the term “credit card” refers to credit cards (MasterCard®, Visa®, Diners Club®, etc.) as well as charge cards (e.g., American Express®, some department store cards), debit cards such as usable at ATMs and many other locations or that are associated with a particular account, and hybrids thereof (e.g., extended payment American Express®, bank debit cards with the Visas logo, etc.). Also, the terms “master credit card number” and “master credit card” refer to the credit card number and the credit card as generally understood, namely, that which is allocated by the credit card provider to the customer for his or her account. It will be appreciated that an account may have many master credit cards in the sense of this specification. For example a corporation may provide many of its employees with credit cards but essentially each of these employees holds a master credit card even if there is only one customer account. Each of these master credit cards will have a unique master credit card number, which set of master credit card numbers will be linked to the account. Similarly, in families, various members of the family may hold a master credit card all of which are paid for out of the one customer account.
The term “limited-use” credit card number is used to encompass at least both the embodiment in which the credit card is designated for a single use, and the embodiment in which the credit card is designated for multiple uses providing that the charges accrued do not exceed a prescribed threshold or thresholds, such a total single charge, total charges over a limited time period, total charge in a single transaction, etc. Also, the limited use credit card can be limited to a single use for a present amount e.g., $20.00. A common feature is that the limitation is based on a use-triggered condition subsequent, and not just the expiration date of the card.
1. Overview of System Features
There are at least two basic different ways of carrying out the present invention. In summary, they are the allocation of additional credit card numbers for remote trade and secondly the provision of what are effectively disposable credit cards for remote and card present trade, both of which have the feature of in the case of single use or in the case of multiple use, protecting against the worst effects of compromised numbers fraud or skimming.
In a refinement of the invention, it is possible to control the manner in which an actual transaction is carried out as a further protection against unscrupulous providers of goods and services.
Essentially, there are certain matters that will be considered in relation to this invention. They are firstly the operational or functional features in so far as they affect customers, and then there are the technical features, namely how the invention is implemented, how the invention is provided to the customers, and finally, how the invention is handled by the providers of goods and services and the processors of the credit cards, i.e., the financial institutions and/or their service providers.
The operational or functional features of this invention will be discussed first in the context of a standard credit card system.
One basic feature of the invention is to provide in a credit card system such that each master credit card holder could be provided with one or more of the following: 1) additional single use credit card numbers for remote transactions; 2) multiple use credit card numbers for remote transactions; 3) single use additional credit cards for remote and card present transactions; and 4) multiple use credit cards for remote and card present transactions.
It is also envisaged that in certain situations credit cards can be provided to people who do not have an account with any credit card company. This latter feature is described in more detail below. Various other features may be provided in the above situations which will further improve the security of credit card transactions.
Dealing firstly with the situation where a master credit card holder has an additional credit card number allocated to him or her for a single use, it will be appreciated that since the number can only be used for one single transaction, the fact that the number is in anybody else's hands is irrelevant as it has been deactivated and the master credit card number is not revealed to the third party. Various other features may be added to such single use credit card numbers, for example, the value of the transaction can be limited, thus the master credit card holder can have a plurality of single use credit card numbers of differing values. For example, when a remote trade is carried out, the master credit card holder will use a credit card number which has a credit card limit only marginally above or equal to that of the value of the transaction. This would reduce the chances of or prevent an unscrupulous trader using the credit card number to supply additional goods or services over those ordered or to increase the agreed charge.
A second embodiment of the invention provides the master credit card holder with an additional credit card number for use in remote trade, which credit card number could have, as in the previous example of the invention, a credit limit for each specific transaction or a credit limit such that when the aggregate amount of a series of transactions exceeded a specific credit limit that the credit card number would be canceled, invalidated or in some other way deactivated. Similarly, the multiple use credit card number could be limited to, for example, five uses with a credit limit not exceeding $100 in each transaction and an aggregate credit limit not exceeding $400. Similarly, a time restriction could be put on such a credit card number in that it would be deactivated if it was used with frequency above (or below) a given threshold, for example, more than once a week. It will be appreciated that the limits that can be placed on the use of a single use credit number or a multiple use credit card number are almost limitless and those having skill in the art will consider other ways in which the use of the credit card number could be limited, whether it be by time, by amount, frequency of use, by geographical region, or by purpose or use (such as limited to Internet trade and so on), or by some combination of these separate criterion.
The third way in which the invention could be carried out is by physically providing additional single use credit cards each of which would have a unique additional credit card number. Such additional single use credit cards could then be used both for remote trade by using the additional credit card numbers for respective transactions, and for “card present” trade where each card would be “swiped” in the normal manner. Such a disposable credit card could be made like any common credit card, or from a relatively inexpensive material, such as cardboard or thin plastic, with the relevant information entered into it in readable (e.g., magnetic) form, as is already the case with many forms of passes for use in public transport and the like. Again, substantially the same features as with the credit card number could be provided. Thus, for example, the disposable credit card could be limited to use geographically, to a use, to an amount, to a frequency of use, to an expiration date, and so on. Again, those skilled in the art will appreciate that there are many variations to this concept.
Another way of carrying out the invention is to provide a master credit card holder with a multiple use additional credit card, where the additional credit card provides any limitations as to use triggered conditions subsequent that may be desired.
Ideally, irrespective of the manner in which the invention is carried out, the master credit card holder would be provided with either a plurality of single use additional credit card numbers or multiple use credit card numbers or a mixture of single and multiple use credits cards.
It will be appreciated that with either single use credit card numbers or single use additional credit cards, it is possible to eliminate or reduce the risk of credit card number fraud. Further, depending on the credit limit imparted to the particular credit card number or additional credit card number or single use additional credit card, it is possible to further limit the possibilities of fraud in any remote transaction and that with the use of a disposable single use credit card it is possible to eliminate or reduce the risk of skimming.
With multiple use additional credit card numbers and multiple use additional credit cards, the above-identified problems may not be totally eliminated due to preferences of the user. This is because, in certain circumstances, credit card users may prefer to have, for example, an additional credit card number for remote trade with a specific credit limit that they use all the time and are willing to take the risk of compromised number fraud, in the sense that they can control the severity of this misuse. This would be particularly the case where some of the various user triggered conditions subsequent limitations suggested above are used with the additional credit card number. Substantially the same criteria would apply to an additional multiple use credit card.
Effectively, the present invention solves the problem by obtaining the functionality of a credit card while never in fact revealing the master credit card number as the master credit card number need never be given in a remote transaction. Further, the master credit card itself need never be given to a trader.
In another embodiment of the invention, it is envisaged that people who do not hold master credit cards could purchase disposable credit cards which would have a credit limit for the total purchases thereon equal to the amount for which the credit card was purchased. These could then be used for both card present and card remote trade, the only proviso being that if the credit limit was not reached it will then be necessary for a refund to be given by the financial institution or credit card provider. An obvious way of obtaining such a refund would be through an automatic teller machine (ATM). In this way, the existing credit card transaction system is employed and the card holder is given the convenience of having a credit card.
As an alternative, the above-iscussed cards could be, in effect, debit cards in the true sense, in which funds are withdrawn against a customer's account. In this case, the “credit card.” issued, whether it be a one time use card or multi-use card, and whether have a credit limit or not, would be used to debit the account immediately. Preferably, the credit card issued in these circumstances would be single use with or without a transaction amount limit which would be used and processed by the customer and merchant for a transaction as if it were a credit card, while in the customer's bank it would be treated like any other debit to the account.
2. Exemplary Implementation
2.1 Implementation Overview
Various aspects of the invention may be embodied in a general purpose digital computer that is running a program or program segments originating from a computer readable or usable medium, such medium including but not limited to magnetic storage media (e.g., ROMs, floppy disks, hard disks, etc.), optically readable media (e.g., CD-ROMs, DVDs, etc.) and carrier waves (e.g., transmissions over the Internet). A functional program, code and code segments, used to implement the present invention can be derived by a skilled computer programmer from the description of the invention contained herein.
The central processing station 102 itself may include a central processing unit 120, which interfaces with the remote units via network I/O unit 118. The central processing unit 120 has access to a database of credit card numbers 124, a subset 126 of which are designated as being available for limited use (referred to as the “available range”). Also, the central processing unit 120 has access to a central database 122, referred to as a “conditions” database. This database is a general purpose database which stores information regarding customers' accounts, such as information regarding various conditions which apply to each customers' account. Further, this database 122 may store the mapping between a customer's fixed master credit card number and any outstanding associated limited-use credit cards, using, for instance, some type of linked-list mechanism. Databases 122 and 124 are shown separately only to illustrate the type of information which may be maintained by the central processing station 102; the information in these databases can be commingled in a common database in a manner well understood by those having skill in the data processing arts. For instance, each limited-use credit card number can be stored with a field which identifies its master account, and various conditions regarding its use.
The central processing unit 120 can internally perform the approval and denial of credit card transaction requests by making reference to credit history information and other information in the conventional manner. Alternatively, this function can be delegated to a separate clearance processing facility (not shown).
Finally, the central processing station includes the capability of transmitting the limited-use credit card numbers to customers. In a first embodiment, a local card dispenser 128 can be employed to generate a plurality of limited-use cards 132 and/or a master credit card 134 for delivery to a customer. In a second embodiment, the limited-use credit card numbers can be printed on a form 136 by printer 130, which is then delivered to the customer via the mail. The printed form 136 may include material which covers the numbers until scratched off, thereby indicating what numbers have been used and are no longer active. This listing of numbers can be included in a monthly or other periodic account statement sent to the customer. In a third embodiment, these limited-use numbers can be electronically downloaded to a user's personal computer 104, where they are stored in local memory 142 of the personal computer 104 for subsequent use. As an alternative to local storage, the numbers can be stored remotely and the next number downloaded from a central computer system for each transaction. In this case, the credit card numbers can be encrypted (described in detail later). Instead of the personal computer 104, the numbers can be downloaded to a user's smart card though an appropriate interface. In a fourth embodiment, the single-use credit card numbers can be downloaded to a radio unit 140 (such as a portable telephone) via wireless communication. In a fifth embodiment, an ATM 108 can be used to dispense the limited-use cards 110. Those skilled in the art will readily appreciate that other means for conveying the numbers/cards can be employed. These embodiments are, of course, usable together.
The logic used to perform the actual allocation and deactivation of limited-use credit card numbers preferably comprises a microprocessor which implements a stored program within the central processing unit 120. Any general or special purpose computer will suffice. In alternative embodiments, the logic used to perform the allocation and deactivation of the limited-use credit card numbers may comprise discrete logic components, or some combination of discrete logic components and computer-implemented control.
The processing then advances to step 204, where it is determined whether a customer requests or an event triggers a request for additional limited-use cards or card numbers. If so, additional limited-use cards or card numbers are allocated to the customer.
Processing then advances to step 206, where the central processing station determines whether a transaction has taken place using a previously issued limited-use card. This step is followed by a determination (in step 208) whether the limited-use number should be deactivated. For instance, if the card is a single-use card, it will be deactivated. If the card is a fixed-limit card, the card is only deactivated if the recent transaction exceeds some stored threshold limit. These threshold limits can be stored on the card itself or in the conditions database 122. The actual step of deactivating is performed by generating a deactivation command, as represented in step 210 shown in
Once a number is deactivated, this number can not be fraudulently reused. Hence, the risk of fraudulent capture of these numbers over the Internet (or via other transmission means) effectively disappears. In an alternative embodiment of the invention, these deactivated numbers can be reactivated providing that a sufficiently long time since their first activation has transpired. Providing that there is a sufficiently large number of limited-use credit card numbers to choose from, it would be possible to wait a long time before it was necessary to repeat any numbers. At this point, it would be very unlikely that someone who had wrongfully intercepted a credit card number years ago would be motivated to fraudulently use it before the rightful owner.
After the limited-use card is deactivated or a number of limited-use cards are deactivated, an additional limited-use card or cards can be activated. As described in detail in the following section, the actual activation of the credit card number can involve various intermediate processing steps. For instance, the credit card numbers from the list 126 can be first allocated to an “allocated” range of numbers, and then to an “issued but not valid” range of numbers, and then finally to an “issued and valid” range of numbers.
Having set forth a summary of how the invention can be implemented, further details are provided in the following.
2.2 Allocation of the Credit Card Numbers
The first thing that the credit card provider should do is to generate a list of additional credit card numbers, whether they be single use or multiple use, and allocate additional credit numbers to a master credit card as a further credit card number for optional use instead of the master credit card number. Such a list can be produced by any suitable software package in the exemplary manner discussed in more detail below. Since the numbers allocated to a particular master credit card holder will not have any link to the master credit card number, the master credit card number should not be able to be derived from the additional credit card numbers.
In effect, randomness in credit card numbers is provided by the fact that there is a queue formed by the customers requiring numbers. Further, it should not be possible, even knowing the additional credit card numbers in a particular master credit card holder's possession which he or she may have used, to predict the next set of numbers that that particular master credit card holder will be allocated, since there will be randomness of access to additional credit card numbers in the truest sense. Even if the credit card provider were to allocate numbers sequentially, there would be no way of predicting the number that that credit card holder would subsequently acquire, since the numbers would be allocated by virtue of a queue, the randomness of this allocation being such as to prevent any prediction.
As such, the credit card numbers generated by the central computer need not be per se random numbers. Preferably, though, these numbers are valid credit card numbers with the constraint that they must conform to industry specifications of the format in terms of their numerical content in such a way that they can be handled with no (or minimal) modifications by merchant/acquiring systems and networks and be routed to the appropriate center for processing. An additional constraint is that they must be different from all other conventional account numbers and all other single use numbers during their lifetime of validity. These constraints are practical requirements to produce a commercially viable system, which would likely not be satisfied by any process that generates random numbers in isolation.
To achieve these allocation requirements, an issuing bank decides within its total available range of credit cards to allocate a certain range or ranges of numbers to the single use system, referred to herein as the “available range.” This may represent spare numbers using existing header sequences (e.g., the sequence of usually 4-6 digits that define the issuing institution and are used to route the card to the appropriate transaction processor) or within newly created header sequences. The numbers not allocated include existing credit card accounts for that issuer and sufficient spare capacity for new account holders and replacement numbers for existing customers. The additional non-embossed components of the card details and any card specific information that is transmitted during a transaction may be varied from card to card to enhance security and privacy of credit card transactions.
Although each limited-use number is unique during the its lifetime of validity, information required to route the card number and transaction details to the appropriate processor is maintained to ensure that limited-use numbers are processed appropriately. However, the limited-use numbers do not need to include either the master card account number or an encoded version of the account number. Indeed privacy and security are enhanced when no unique account holder identifier is included within the limited-use credit card number.
Also, information that is verified prior to the card being processed for authorization and payment, such as expiry date and checksum digit must be valid. This information may vary from limited-use number to limited-use number, but must be valid to ensure that the number passes checks that may be completed within the merchant terminal, i.e., the checksum is appropriately calculated for each limited-use number and the associated expiry date is valid at the time of use.
Within the constraint of using a valid credit card format, the random allocation process used to generate lists of unique limited-use numbers can involve allocation from a range of numbers in which either the entire number or portions of the account number are varied. In addition, the allocation can include combinations of all or part of the account number together with all or part of additional information such as non-embossed additional numbers, expiry date and other information that identifies the card and is passed on by the merchant to the card processor during a transaction.
Sequential random allocation from a list of available valid credit/debit/charge card codes that have been solely allocated for use as limited-use numbers ensures that the criteria specified for limited-use numbers are met, i.e., no two limited-use numbers are the same, no limited-use number is the same as an existing account number, and no newly issued conventional card number is the same as a previously issued limited-use number. To achieve true computational independence between account numbers and limited-use cards and between limited-use numbers for the same account, the random allocation process requires a truly random seed value. Such true randomness can be obtained from a physically random system with well defined properties such as a white noise generator. An analog to digital converter that receives an analog signal from such a truly random physical system can be used to ensure truly random allocation.
Other approaches can result in the same result with lower computational efficiency. For example the allocation process could randomly select valid credit card numbers within the entire range for a given card issuer and then discard the number if it is already in use as a limited-use or conventional card number or if the same number was allocated within a given time frame.
The above process generates a series of available single use numbers. To repeat, the allocation process is achieved by a truly random (or less ideally a pseudo random) mapping process in which a single use number is randomly selected and then assigned to a selected account holder (either an existing credit/debit card holder, a new solely single use account holder or a bank account). Additional single use numbers can be allocated for purchase on an individual basis. Each assigned single use number is then removed from the sequence of available numbers before the next allocation, ensuring a unique allocation of each single use number. An alternative mechanism for performing direct allocation to a specific account holder is for lists of single use numbers to be allocated to unique storage locations. The list from a specific storage location can then be directly allocated to a given account at a later date. This allows for rapid allocation of cards to new customers without any delay arising from the need to perform a new allocation procedure for each new customer.
This allocation, process generates another series of single use numbers, the “allocated range” with an associated identification field to determine how the account will be settled once used, i.e., onto whose account the transaction will be charged. The allocation process can occur a significant time before the single use numbers are required. Once allocated, they are not added into the list of valid accounts until required by the user.
When a customer needs single use cards, the CPU can issue the additional credit card numbers to the customer. Unless these single use numbers are issued directly into the hands of the customer (e.g., by an automated teller machine (ATM)), they are not directly added to the list of valid account numbers held within the central computer system. These numbers are added to an “issued, but not valid” list of numbers. (Step 312). The number of single use numbers issued at one time depends upon the rate at which the customer will use the cards and the capability of the device used to store the single use numbers until used. The CPU can provide the customer with enough single use numbers to fulfill their single use purchase requirements for up to, for example, 2 years. Each single use number can be endowed with specific restrictions in terms of transaction type or value, provided that these properties do not exceed the restrictions placed up on the customer's account (such as the available credit balance).
Once a series of single use numbers are issued, the user has the option of confirming receipt by telephone before any of the issued numbers become validated on the processing system. (Step 314). Once receipt has been confirmed (or assumed), not every issued single use number is added to the “issued and valid” list. (Step 316). To prevent excessive valid single use numbers being held within the processing system, the number of single use numbers declared to be valid at any one time is limited to account for waste of numbers (i.e., numbers that are accessed by a customer but are never used to complete a transaction) and to allow for time delays between different transactions leading to differences in the sequence in which single use numbers are accessed by the customer and the sequence in which they arrive at the processing center. The maximum number of single use numbers valid at any one time can be determined by the card issuer but would be preferably in the range of 5-10. In the case of any attempted use outside the allocated range, the next single use number can used as an additional identifier to validate the transaction. In this case, only a subset of the digits should be given by the user to prevent a fraudulent trader being able to gain access to multiple unused single use numbers. As soon as a single use number is invalidated (step 320) on use (step 318), an additional number from the “issued not valid” list for that customer is allocated to the “issued and valid” list, ensuring a continual supply of single use numbers up to the maximum allowed until the next set of single use numbers are issued. (Step 322).
In relation to the actual supply of the additional credit card numbers, this will not cause any difficulties to the credit card provider. For example, with a standard master credit card number, there are up to fifteen or more digits, the first of which is used to identify the credit card provider, e.g., American Express®, VISA®, Mastercard®, etc. For major banks, three digits are used to identify the issuing bank. The last digit in a typical sixteen digit master credit card number is a checksum used to confirm that the number is a valid number. This leaves a total of up to 11 digits or more for the account identifying number and the expiration date. In some instances, the expiration date may not be sent back for clearance, while with certain credit card providers, additional credit card numbers or even additional information is required for clearance. For example, certain credit card providers print additional numbers on the card, which additional numbers are not embossed on the card and do not form part of the master credit card number. These additional printed and non-embossed credit card numbers can be used to identify that the person proffering the card for a non-card present transaction is actually in possession of the card when the order is made whether it be in writing or by phone. There are many devices, digits, pieces of information, etc. used by a credit card issuer or processor working for a credit card issuer to clear the credit card for the specific transaction. According to another embodiment, when issuing additional credit card numbers in accordance with the present invention, such additional credit card numbers could include a code which would identify that the person using the additional credit card number in a remote transaction is the one to whom the numbers were sent or, in the case of a disposable credit card, is the one to whom the disposable credit card was sent.
A preferred feature of these additional credit card numbers is that they be constrained to be in the correct format for a credit card number with a valid check sum, while at the same time be mathematically unrelated to each other or to the master credit card. In certain situations, for single use numbers, the expiration date is virtually irrelevant. Thus, using the month code of the expiration date with said eleven digits, there are 12×1011, i.e., 1.2×1012, i.e., 1,200 billion possible unique codes available for any given credit card provider. This would allow for 50 transactions a month for 10 years for 200 million account holders, before any codes would have to be recycled or a new header code introduced. When it is understood that there are then another 104 header numbers that a credit card provider can use, it will be appreciated that the structure and arrangement of existing master credit card numbers is sufficient to operate this invention with the advantage that the existing infrastructure of dealing with credit card transactions can be used with minimum modification. All that is required for the credit card provider is to store the generated numbers against the master credit card number.
If, for example, the card is a VISA® card, there are approximately 21,000 issuing banks. The sixteen digit number has a “4” followed by a five digit code to identify the card issuer. The last number is a checksum to verify that it is a valid number. As a result, there are 21,000×109×12 (252 trillion) unique numbers and associated expiry months. This number of codes is sufficient for 36,000 years of transaction processing at the current annual rate of approximately 7 billion transactions per year.
While existing credit card formats allow for a sufficiently large number of available card numbers, numbers will eventually need to be recycled for allocation. As the range of available numbers reduces in size over time, additional or recycled numbers should be added back into this range to ensure that the allocation process is performed from a range sufficiently large to maintain random allocation. The length of time prior to recycling depends on the total number of available unique card codes available to an issuer and the number of transactions that use limited-use numbers. Such recycling can only occur after a number has been invalidated for further use and is no longer valid for refunds. Once recycled, automatic fraud detection mechanisms that would normally be activated on the attempted reuse of a previously inactivated card need to be altered by removing the recycled number from the list of previously issued limited-use numbers.
2.3 Limitations on the Use of the Credit Card Numbers
The use triggered condition subsequent limitations placed on limited-use card numbers, i.e. transaction value limitations, number of transactions limits, etc., are central to their additional flexibility and security compared to conventional credit/debit/charge cards. These limitations can be imposed and controlled in a variety of ways. For example, the limitations can be stored within a database held by the card issuer and used to check that the transaction falls within these limitations during the authorization process.
Alternatively the limitations can be encoded within part of the number format that is transmitted during a transaction. The limitations would then be decoded from the transmitted transaction details by the card processor. This would offer the user more control, but would offer less security since knowledge of the encoding format could be used to fraudulently alter the limitations chosen by altering the appropriate portion of the limited-use number format.
As internet commerce develops, there will be an increased need for a wide range of financial transactions. The limitations placed on limited-use card numbers can be used to implement a wide range of payment options. For example, a credit card number can be limited to a single transaction for a pre-arranged transaction limit. Or alternatively, a credit card number can be used, for example, to implement an installment plan where the credit card number is, for example, only valid for twelve payments for a pre-arranged transaction limit for twelve months to a single merchant. This plan provides security against fraud because it is locked to a single merchant, and it is only good for one year. Or similarly, a credit card number can be used to implement a debit plan where the credit card number is limited to a specific merchant. When the limited-use number is limited to a specific merchant, the merchant can be prearranged by the user or can be determined by first use. Or finally, a credit card number can be used as a gift voucher where the credit card number is limited to a specific transaction value, but it can be used for any merchant.
2.4 Distribution of the Credit Card Numbers
The next matter that is considered is how these additional credit card numbers and/or additional credit cards are distributed to a credit card holder. One way of providing such additional credit card numbers and/or additional credit cards is to in some way provide them physically to the master credit card holder, whether it be by collection, delivery by courier, post or some other way which can generally be covered under the heading of provision by post. Obviously, the financial institutions wish to provide the additional credit card numbers or the additional credit cards to the user as efficiently as possible with the minimum risk of the additional credit card numbers and/or cards falling into a third party's hand. While one can never prevent theft, for example, of a credit card from a user, what is important is to ensure that these disposable credit cards and/or credit card numbers are delivered to the user with the least possibility of a third party obtaining either the numbers or the disposable credit cards from the time they are generated until the time they are physically received by the user.
It is envisaged that there are various methods by which a credit card provider could issue the additional credit card numbers and/or credit cards to the user. One of the simplest ways would be to post them on request. Another way would be for the credit card provider, after receiving a payment of an account or with a statement of an account, to provide a sufficient number of additional credit card numbers and/or additional credit cards to replace the ones used since the previous statement. Particularly, if such statements do not quote the master credit card number or some code number, it would be possible to put in additional checks on the activation of the additional credit card numbers or credit cards. Some form of receipt system could be used. In this way effective theft would be reduced.
In either case, it is important that the user can keep track of which numbers have been used. If the card has only one number, an opaque removable cover can be used to cover one or more portions of the card. (Step 510). For example, the opaque removable cover can cover the number portion of the card, so that the cover has to be removed before the card can be used. The act of removing the cover indicates that the card number has been accessed or used.
Or alternatively, an opaque removable cover can conceal a message such as “used.” The opaque removable cover can be a scratch off layer that is scratched off before or after the card is used. The scratch off layer can resemble the layer that is often used to cover lottery numbers or the like. Or alternatively, the single use cards can be placed in a self-contained container that resembles a razor-blade dispenser. (Step 516). The owner can remove a single use card from a first compartment and then place the used card into a second compartment.
If the card has multiple numbers, the owner can keep track of the numbers by using a device that covers one or more portions of the card. (Step 510). The device can cover the numbers until they are used. As described above, the device can comprise multiple opaque layers that must be removed prior to the use of each number. Or alternatively, each number could be visible when the card is issued and each number is associated with a panel in which an opaque covering conceals a message that indicates that the number has been used. After each use, the corresponding covering is removed or scratched off to indicate that the number has been used.
In both above cases the solutions incorporated on the cards act to remind the user which numbers have been used. The critical check on the validity of the number is performed by the processing software responsible for authorizing card transactions.
The additional credit card numbers and/or cards can be sent with a statement. (Step 518). The additional credit card numbers are not activated until the statement is paid. (Step 520). The card issuer could also require that the payment be accompanied by the master credit card number or another identifier. Or, for example, an additional security step involving either direct contact with the issuing credit card company or an independently issued password to allow activation of an electronic device could be used.
A further way in which the additional credit card numbers and/or additional credit cards could be distributed to the user is by way of an ATM machine. (Step 522). The ATM machine with very little modification could provide the additional credit card numbers. Similarly, with relatively little modification, an ATM machine could provide additional credit cards.
Cards/single use numbers can be issued directly into an electronic device that is capable of storing such numbers. This applies to mobile phones and pager devices to which information can be transmitted using existing systems and computers connected either directly or via a telecommunications system to the Internet or a specific host computer system. In such a situation a mechanism is required to protect these numbers in transit to prevent unauthorized access. For global applications, this mechanism must not be subject to export restrictions. In addition, this protection should not be susceptible to “brute force” decryption techniques. Such a system is described below in relation to the storage of single use cards.
An alternative method to provide additional credit card numbers could be by way of a computer programs. Obviously it would be necessary for the credit card provider to have sufficient security that when the computer program was dispatched, either through the telecommunications network or through the post, that unauthorized access could not be obtained.
2.5 Electronic Use of the Credit Card Numbers
In the situation where the user stores and accesses limited-use numbers via an electronic device such a computer of any form (desktop, television or cable linked Internet access device, laptop, palmtop, personal organizer etc), any device that can deliver the same functions as a computer or dedicated Internet access device, a dedicated microprocessor device with key pad and screen or any form of telephone with associated microprocessor controlled electronics, the associated software can perform some or all of the following functions:
1) Password controlled access to software or other security activation system that can verify that the user has a valid right of access.
2) Secure storage of issued limited-use credit/debit/charge card numbers until required by the user. These numbers can be stored in a variety of encrypted forms. An additional security step is to encrypt the number in the form a valid credit card number as previously described.
3) Secure storage of transaction details and date of use for reconciliation with records held by the credit/debit/charge card company in case of disagreement. This may include digitally signing each transaction record.
4) Facility for user to review past usage of limited-use card numbers and transactions.
5) Notification to user of available number of limited-use cards.
6) Initiate automated request from software to card issuing organization or agreed agent for further cards to be issued by previously agreed route if requested by user or if the number of available limited-use cards is less than a pre-arrange limit.
7) Secure communication between software package and card issuing organization or agreed agent for downloading additional limited-use numbers. This secure communication can exploit any available form of encryption suitable for this purpose.
8) Secure communication between card issuing organization or agreed agent and the software package for the transmission of information regarding credit card transactions, account balances and other information as requested by the user or card issuer. This secure communication can exploit any available form of encryption suitable for this purpose.
9) Automated or manual means for transfer of credit card information to the merchant. The software can integrate with Internet software in the situation where it is run on a device linked to the Internet or similar electronic network and allow automatic transmission of transaction details if the merchant software so allows. To ensure compatibility with any form of merchant software the user also has the option of dragging and dropping a limited-use number displayed by the software onto the appropriate part of a web page, or manually entering the number. In the case a device intended for use over the telephone, the number can either be spoken by the user or appropriate tones can be generated to automatically transmit the number to the merchant.
10) Use of digital signature verification to verify both parties of a credit card transaction (i.e. merchant and cardholder).
11) Use of digital signature verification to verify both parties of a communication involving the transmission of financial information or additional limited-use card numbers (i.e. card issuer and cardholder).
12) Use of stored lists of limited-use numbers held by user and card issuer as dynamic passwords to verify both parties (user and card issuer) of a communication involving transmission of financial information or additional limited card numbers.
For “card not present” transactions, it is proposed that the customer uses an electronic device to store issued single use numbers. This may represent a range of devices from a mobile telephone, pager, dedicated single use storage device or a software package that can run on range of platforms such as a conventional desktop computer, television based Internet access device (e.g., WebTV) or a portable computing device.
The software that is used within these devices for storing and accessing these numbers will have specific features that are common to all platforms/devices.
For security reasons, access to the software will be password protected or protected by another security system that allows identification of the user. Multiple passwords may be employed to provide limited access to certain individuals, for example limiting access for a family member to single use numbers with specific pre-allocated limits on application or maximum transaction value.
The single use numbers are preferably stored in a secure form involving one or more encryption systems. It is proposed that a dual system will be employed using a standard protocol (e.g, DES or RSA encryption) and a specific system designed for credit cards as described below.
“Brute force” decryption involves using multiple fast computers and specific algorithms to test large numbers of possible encryption “keys.” Success can be determined by seeing whether the result appears in the expected format, for example as comprehensible English text in the case of an encrypted document. If the encrypted version is in an identical format to the unencrypted version (though with different information) then brute force decryption cannot succeed. This is not a computationally viable option for text but it is possible for credit cards.
The approach is to break down each component of a credit card number and encrypt these with a private password so as to maintain the numerical composition of each component. The end result should be securely encrypted but should not represent another existing credit card account. This can be achieved by constraining the encryption system to convert the credit card header sequence used to identify the issuing bank (usually 4-6 digits) into a currently unused sequence. Since this information will be constant for all cards from the same issuer, this information should be randomized (rather than encrypted) to prevent recognition of a valid decryption solution. Once the rest of the number is decrypted by the program, the appropriate header sequence can be added. The remaining digits excluding the checksum (the last digit) are then encrypted using any private key encryption system that will maintain the same number of digits and produce a result that represents the numerals 0 to 9. The expiration date and any other identifying digits are also encrypted in such a manner as to respect their existing structure, i.e., the month is encrypted between 1 and 12 and the year is encrypted so as to represent a number within the next three years that ensures that the expiration date is valid. Following these steps, the digits used to calculate the checksum in a normal card number are processed to calculate a valid checksum for the encrypted card. The result is a valid appearing credit card number that has a valid checksum and which can be guaranteed not to belong to any existing credit/debit card account holder.
For example, for a card with a 6 digit header and valid checksum, e.g., “1234 5678 9012 3452 expiration date of December 1999,” 123456 is randomly assigned to a currently unused header sequence, e.g., 090234 (this is an example and does not necessarily represent an unused header sequence). 789012345 is encrypted into another 9 digit number, e.g., 209476391. December 1999 is encrypted to a valid date format that ensures the card is not expired, e.g., March 2000. The checksum is recalculated to produce a valid appearing credit card number, for this example the checksum is 4, i.e., 0902 3420 9476 3914 expiry March 2000.
To decrypt this number for use or after transmission from the bank, the appropriate header sequence for the issuer is exchanged for the digits in the encrypted number. The other digits are decrypted using the private password and the check-sum is recalculated.
Provided that the header number is unused and the private password remains private, then this number is encrypted in such a way that brute force encryption cannot be used to determine the original number, since it will not be possible to determine when the correct solution has been reached. In combination with standard encryption systems, this allows a means to securely store credit cards and transmit them over insecure systems with confidence.
Once the appropriate password is entered into the software, the next available single use number is decrypted and either displayed, allowing the customer to use it in any form of trade that can achieved by quoting credit card information, or directly transmitted via the software to the merchant. Once used, the single use number is removed from the stored list. The date of access, the number accessed and any additional available transaction details are then stored in a secure fashion and digitally signed to allow for verification in the case of a disputed transaction. Each access to a single use number requires the entry of a password to prevent unauthorized access if the customer leaves his software/computer device unattended and active.
Once launched the user puts in one password to gain access to the main screen which contains a key pad to allow a PIN to be inputted either by keyboard or by mouse clicks. (Step 604). The latter protects against any covert attempts to record passwords by trapping key strokes. A consecutive number of errors in inputting the password will permanently disable the program and overwrite remaining encrypted numbers. After the correct PIN is entered, the user can select a new limited-use number with or without additional constraints (e.g. maximal transaction value). (Step 606). A new limited-use number is then displayed on the graphical interface. The software can provide secure access to encrypted credit card numbers that are stored on a computer's hard disk or equivalent storage device. The storage can also be on remote computer via a local network or global network such as the Internet. (Step 608). These numbers can be accessed for use on the Internet or for use over the phone/mail order. (Step 610). The numbers must therefore be able to be inserted directly into a web page (step 612), or printed out/copied from screen for use in other ways. (Step 614). The limited-use number can be copied, printed, pasted via the clipboard (or equivalent) or dragged-and-dropped on to a web page. The length of time a number is displayed and how the program terminates are user configurable. The user can also record a comment to provide further information about how a number was to be applied. For automated transactions, the software should ideally be able to intercept and respond to merchant server initiated signals activating integrated functions within the browser.
Once a number has been accessed, it can be deleted from the encrypted lists. (Step 616). The date, number, current URL in the case of Web use and any user comments are then stored by a separate form of encryption to facilitate audit/review. (Step 618). The user can review, but not edit this information
There should be a facility for downloading additional numbers either from additional floppies or via the Internet using high security protocols. (Step 620). The latter function can be performed by a separate program.
The program should include a maximal degree of transparent security features, i.e., features that do not affect a normal user, but that protect against the program being reinstalled or copied onto a second machine. This means that the encrypted limited-use numbers should either be stored within the executable file or stored in a file that also stores encrypted copies of the machine specific information. (Step 622). This is required to ensure that the numbers can only be accessed on the machine on which the software was first installed. The data files should also be stored as hidden system files.
Some users may wish to have the equivalent of an electronic wallet that can be de-installed from one computer and reinserted on another, for example, when transferring a “wallet” from an office to a home machine. This transfer process ensures that only one version of the program is running at any one tie and that no problems arise in terms of reconciling lists of used numbers. Appropriate security mechanisms can be implemented to identify the valid user. An alternative solution to the problem of wanting to access stored limited use numbers from multiple sites is for the numbers to be stored remotely at a single site. In this situation multiple copies of the access software can exist on different computers but each will access a single remote storage site.
Encryption of limited-use numbers should involve two levels. At the first level, the card numbers are encrypted using an algorithm that acts only to alter the free digits within the credit card. The header sequence (i.e. bin number) is left unaltered or converted into an unused bin number and the checksum recalculated. This prevents any form of brute decryption because there will be no way of telling when the correct algorithm has been selected since each number starts and ends up as a valid looking credit card number. Following this step each number is encrypted with industry standard encryption methods (e.g. RSA or DES). Following decryption within the program the checksum is recalculated for the final number and the appropriate bin number reinserted.
The software can be shipped on a single 1.4 Mb Floppy (or any other computer readable or usable medium) in an encrypted form or downloaded from a website. Limited-use numbers can be issued either with the program or independently. An independently shipped password can be required for installation. The installation process will allow the program to be installed a restricted number of times after which critical data is overwritten. The precise number of allowable installations will be easily alterable within the software design. Once installed on the host computer, the program encrypts internal information regarding the machine's configuration to protect against copying of the program onto other machines. At first installation the user can select his own passwords. These will be used to control both access to the programs and to influence the pattern of one level of encryption that is applied to limited-use numbers.
As numbers are accessed, a graphical indicator of the remaining amount of limited-use numbers provides early warning if additional numbers are required. The software can also provide a log of previously accessed numbers, the date, associated URL if activated from within a browser and comment; a summary of account expenditure; assistance with adding additional numbers from disk or via Internet; the ability to configure additional passwords/users for shared cards; and/or hot link Internet access to the card number issuer's website.
2.6 Processing of Card Transaction
It is envisioned that additional credit card numbers and/or additional credit cards would be processed by merchants in the same manner as existing credit card numbers and/or credit cards with the merchant obtaining validation of the credit card number from the credit card company or authorized third party. In much the same way as at present, the additional credit card number would be matched to the customer account and the account would be debited accordingly. The merchant reimbursement following verification of an additional credit card transaction would be performed in the normal manner. A particular advantage for the merchant is that since they are never in possession of the master credit card number or indeed, in many instances, of the master credit card, they have no responsibility for security to the master credit card holder. It is envisaged that where there are additional credit cards used, it may not be preferable to take an imprint of the credit card manually, as the imprint can be taken electronically. Similarly, those processing the credit cards will process them in the same manner described heretofore.
Processing systems for handling limited-use cards perform a number of functions including some or all of the following:
1) Verify that the limited-use number is valid.
2) Verify that the transaction falls within limitations placed on the specific number.
3) In the case of a limited-use number associated with another account, verify that transaction falls within limits acceptable for the associated account.
4) Provide authorization to the merchant if valid and within the limitations for specified number and associated account.
5) Permit later transactions to be charged to a limited-use number that has been invalidated for further authorizations only if the transaction is generated by the same merchant that obtained pre-authorization for the same transaction.
6) Deny authorization if invalid or exceeding limitations on number or associated account.
7) Activate fraud detection mechanisms if invalid number or on attempt to reuse an invalidated limited-use number.
8) Invalidate limited-use number for further authorizations/payments if limitations on use are met or exceeded by a specific transaction.
9) Maintain list of invalidated numbers for reimbursement in the case of returned or faulty goods for a defined period.
10) Limited-use numbers and transaction details logged and lied to associated account.
11) Transmit records of limited-use and other card transactions to the user by post or e-mail.
12) Instigate payment to merchant for approved transactions.
13) Instigate reimbursement to account holder in case of a refund.
14) Invoice account holder for payment for charges incurred or arrange settlement via another account.
Many of the procedures associated with limited-use cards represent functions already performed by the clearing systems. These existing functions include: adding new credit/debit card numbers to the processing databases; allowing these card numbers to be activated following a confirmatory call to the issuer by the customer; conferring a credit limit on a credit card number; and invalidating a credit card number from further use and marking any further use as fraudulent. This overlap represents part of the commercial value of the single use invention, minimizing the required changes.
Once a limited-use number enters the clearing system it can be handled in a normal fashion, e.g., by ensuring that it has not been reported as being stolen and that it represents a valid account number within the database. If the transaction is within the credit limit of the customer and the transaction limit or restricted use limitations of the limited-use number, it is authorized.
Several specific modifications should be made to the processing software to implement the features of single use cards. For instance, valid limited-use numbers are stored in a database of valid account numbers along with other information specific to single use numbers. This includes sufficient information to identify the customer to whom it was issued and any additional limitations placed upon the card in terms of transaction value or category of merchant for which the card can be used.
Once authorized, the limited-use number is invalidated so as to ensure that further authorization/charges cannot be made on that number. To allow for authorization preceding request for settlement by a substantial delay, for example in the context of a mail order purchase where a credit/debit card number may be authorized at the time of order and charged only when the product ships, delayed settlement to the same merchant must be allowed.
Once the number of transactions permitted for a limited-use card is reached, the central card processing software invalidates the card. Due to the time delay that can occur between authorization and a merchant request for settlement, improved security is achieved by linking the invalidation process to authorization. Linking invalidation to settlement facilitates pre-authorizations at the cost of increased risk of, for example, multiple use of a card number intended for limited-use. Pre-authorizations can be used with authorization dependent invalidation as described above. In the case where a transaction is not authorized before being accepted by a merchant, the invalidation process will occur when the transaction details are transmitted to the processor for settlement. When no authorization is obtained for a limited-use number the system will therefore still operate normally with an increased level of risk for the issuer/merchant as is the case with an unauthorized conventional card transaction.
Whenever the credit limit or validity of a customer's account changes, all currently valid limited-use numbers are identified and their associated credit limit is altered to the lower of either their allocated transaction or the existing credit limit. If the customer account is closed or declared-delinquent, all valid single use numbers are handled in the same manner.
Whenever a limited-use number is used, the next available single use number previously allocated to the same customer and issued to the customer is added to the database of valid account numbers.
When a transaction is charged to a limited-use number, the transaction details and customer account details are stored together for audit purposes and the value of the transaction is added to the customer's account for billing.
The software for storing transaction details and printing statements can be modified to allow for both the customer's conventional account details and the limited-use number transaction details to be reported.
Processing of limited-use numbers can be integrated into existing systems in a variety of ways. The authorization and settlement process can be completed in a single cycle or split into a separate authorization and settlement processes as is commonly done in existing credit card systems.
In the case of an entirely new, stand-alone, limited-use credit/debit/charge card processing system, the above functions can be implemented without restriction in any suitable computer capable of incorporating the required database and communication functions. Such a system should be able to provide an authorization for a transaction within the same time scale as an existing credit/debit/charge card transaction.
In the case where the above functions have to be integrated into existing systems several approaches can be taken to minimize the required changes. It is possible to add steps to the processing chain that is encountered as soon as a credit/debit/charge card number is received from a merchant.
The system can check the limited-use number and the corresponding limitations. (Step 710). If the number is not valid for the designated transaction, the transaction is denied. (Step 712). Otherwise, a database look-up procedure determines the associated master account number and transmits this number (i.e. the master account number) back into the processing system. (Step 714). This allows all existing fraud detection, authorization and demographic software procedures to be completed with no alteration. (Step 716). Once the master account number is substituted for the limited-use number a number of additional steps are required. (Step 718). If the criteria for invalidating the limited-use number have been met during this transaction, then the limited-use number is invalidated for all future transactions except refunds. An additional limited-use number can be automatically issued if a continual supply of single use numbers is required. The transaction details and master account number are then transmitted for inclusion within a database to allow for tracking of transaction details and billing of the user. These functions do not need to be performed before an authorization is issued but can completed afterwards. (Step 720).
With the above system, the software responsible for substituting the master account number for the limited-use number can also process additional features unique to limited-use numbers. These features include transaction value limitations, merchant type restrictions and geographical limitations. If the transaction exceeds the limitations placed on the limited-use card then authorization is denied and the master credit card need not be passed on for further processing. In the case of a transaction falling within the limitations of a limited-use card, then the transaction details are passed on with the master account number for conventional validation. In this way the restrictions in place for the master account (e.g., available balance, expiry date) are checked for each limited-use transaction.
Specific fraud detection mechanisms can also be incorporated into the software. For example, on the first occasion that an invalidated limited-use number is used this transaction can be flagged as potentially fraudulent and appropriate measures taken. Repeated attempts to authorize invalid numbers from a single merchant or group of merchants also potentially points to fraud and can lead to activation of appropriate fraud management measures.
The above system requires the least modification of existing systems but may take up to twice the processing time of a conventional transaction due to the double authorization process, once within the limited-use verification and translation step and once within the standard systems. It may be advantageous to initially process the limited-use card as a master credit card by using a single list of limited-use numbers and master credit card numbers.
For settlement and billing purposes (step 812), the associated account needs to be identified (step 810), but this does not need to be done during the course of an authorization. The existing software should be modified or linked to a new program that performs duties specific for limited-use card numbers as described above. (Steps 814, 816, and 818). These functions do not need to be performed before an authorization is issued. These functions can be completed afterwards.
This system requires more modification of the existing processing software systems, but offers authorization times within the same timescale as existing transactions since only one authorization steps is involved. Other activities such as updating the limitations on the limited-use card when the master account changes can be performed outside the authorization process (i.e. “off-line”).
The invention is not limited to the embodiments hereinbefore described but may be varied in both construction and detail. For instance, the invention has been heretofore described mainly in the context of a system in which a customer receiving a single use card already has a main account with the credit card provider. But this need not be so. For example, it is envisaged that an ATM machine (or similar apparatus) could be used by people who did not have a credit card account to purchase disposable credit cards, which disposable credit cards could then bemused for either card present or remote transactions. When the card had been used, the card would be simply reinserted into the ATM machine, and after a suitable period of time the purchaser's account would be credited with any money not spent. Similarly, if the person who purchases the disposable credit card does not have an account of any sort with the credit card provider, the credit card could still be purchased from the ATM machine and then any refund could take place a sufficient time after the transaction would have been cleared, which refund could be either in the form of a cash refund to the purchaser or to a crediting of that purchaser account with another financial institution. Similarly, it will be appreciated that the use of an ATM machine is not essential, as the disposable credit cards or single use credit cards could be purchased in the normal way in which one purchases any other goods or services, such as either directly in a face-to-face transaction or by post.
Similarly, while in the above it has been suggested that there could be single use credit cards that would be purchased, there is no reason why they could not be multiple transaction credit cards with an aggregate credit limit. Further, these cards could, instead of being credit cards, be simply credit card numbers for single or multiple use. It is, however, envisaged that for operational efficiency, these numbers are much more likely to be issued as disposable credit cards or single use credit cards. Thus, for those who do not wish to handle a credit card or whose credit worthiness is such that they would not be allowed to have a credit card, it will now be possible for them to have the use of a credit card. This would have considerable advantages for the credit card providers.
2.7 Additional Uses of the Credit Card Numbers
In situations where the card-holder and card issuer are in communication and authentication is required of one or both parties, the list of limited-use card numbers held by each party can used as a form of identification. In the manner of a dynamic password all or part of a single limited-use number a sequence of such numbers could be used to identify either party without the need for issuing any additional security systems. Since this identification does not need to be handled by conventional transaction systems, all or part of a limited-use number can be used for this purpose.
As can be readily seen, there are fundamental differences between the system of the present invention and any system that uses a PIN or other number (whether constant or varying from transaction to transaction) to validate a transaction. In the present system the numerical details conveyed in the course of a transaction are identical in format to an existing credit card number but no unique account code is included. This maximizes the security and privacy of a credit/debit/charge-card transaction. Within the processing system the validity of the limited-use number is verified first and then the associated account identified second by examining information stored with the limited-use number. With the transmission of an additional PIN or other number in addition to the account number or other unique identifier, there is a lower level of security and privacy. Within any form of PIN identification (and as described by Rahman) the associated account is identified first and then the PIN verified after this step. For this reason many card holders can share the same PIN, indeed in most cases due to the short length of PIN codes many users do have identical PINs but different account numbers. For our system each limited-use number must be unique at the time of use and so the associated account can be uniquely identified.
While the foregoing description makes reference to particular illustrative embodiments, these examples should not be construed as limitations. Not only can the inventive system be modified for other card numbered systems; it can also be modified for other computer networks or numbering schemes. Thus, the present invention is not limited to the disclosed embodiments, but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the claims below.
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|U.S. Classification||705/39, 705/35, 705/38|
|International Classification||G06Q20/00, G07F, G07F19/00, G07F7/02, G06K19/067, G07F7/12, H04B7/26, G07F7/08, G07F7/10, H04L9/00|
|Cooperative Classification||G06Q20/342, G06Q20/16, G06Q40/025, G07F7/12, G06Q20/00, G06Q40/00, G06Q20/354, G06Q20/04, G07F7/122, G06Q20/357, G07F7/08, G06Q20/382, G07F19/00, G07F7/1008, G06Q40/04, G07F7/025, G06Q20/105, G06Q20/10, G06Q20/3552, G06Q20/28, G07F19/2055, G06Q20/34, G06Q20/40, G06Q20/24, G06Q20/385, G06Q20/4016|
|European Classification||G06Q20/04, G06Q20/28, G06Q20/24, G06Q20/16, G06Q20/342, G06Q20/357, G07F7/12, G07F7/12A, G07F19/2055, G06Q20/382, G06Q20/3552, G06Q20/10, G06Q40/04, G06Q40/025, G06Q20/40, G06Q40/00, G06Q20/385, G06Q20/354, G06Q20/105, G07F7/02E, G06Q20/00, G07F19/00, G07F7/10D, G07F7/08|