|Publication number||US7690027 B2|
|Application number||US 10/496,919|
|Publication date||Mar 30, 2010|
|Filing date||Nov 26, 2002|
|Priority date||Nov 28, 2001|
|Also published as||CA2468622A1, CN1618199A, CN100477579C, EP1457000A1, US20050086496, WO2003047161A1|
|Publication number||10496919, 496919, PCT/2002/446, PCT/NO/2/000446, PCT/NO/2/00446, PCT/NO/2002/000446, PCT/NO/2002/00446, PCT/NO2/000446, PCT/NO2/00446, PCT/NO2000446, PCT/NO2002/000446, PCT/NO2002/00446, PCT/NO2002000446, PCT/NO200200446, PCT/NO200446, US 7690027 B2, US 7690027B2, US-B2-7690027, US7690027 B2, US7690027B2|
|Original Assignee||Telenor Asa|
|Export Citation||BiBTeX, EndNote, RefMan|
|Patent Citations (13), Non-Patent Citations (1), Referenced by (6), Classifications (11), Legal Events (4)|
|External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, Espacenet|
The present invention is related to PKI (Public Key Infrastructure), structure), particularly to registering and activation of PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) functionalities in SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) cards.
To realize the full potential of communication networks, there has to exist a standardized system so that the users can engage in electronic transactions with the same degree of trust as associated with paper-based transactions.
For this reason, PKI has been developed as the primary platform for global commerce and communications. PKI insures that sensitive electronic communications are private and protected from tampering. PKI is used for digital signatures, authentication and encryption.
PKI is based on the use of cryptography, which means scrambling of information by a mathematical formula and a virtual key, so that only an authorized party using a related key can decode it. A PKI uses pairs of cryptographic keys provided by a trusted third party known as a Certification Authority (CA). Central to the workings of a PKI, a CA issues digital certificates that identify the holder's identity. A CA maintains accessible directories of valid certificates, and a list of certificates it has revoked.
Traditionally, PKI functionalities have been used by data terminals with the certificate and keys stored in an external Smart Card. However, as cellular phones merge to data terminals, there will be a need for PKI functions also in the phones. The certificate and keys will then normally be stored in the subscriber card, e.g. in the SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card as for GSM phones.
For the PKI system to be trusted, there has to exist a secure routine when registering new users by issuing digital certificates. One has to be 100% sure that the one requesting digital certificates is who he or she claims to be. This is normally done in that the user in person shows up at an office, e.g. at a post office, fills in a form and identifies himself by a trusted identification like a passport. When the counter clerk at the post office has verified the identification information, the data form is transmitted electronically to a CA. The CA controls and whitewashes the data and issues a PKI card, either in the form of a SIM card or a Smart Card, together with an activation code. The PKI card and the activation code are now sent by registered mail to the user. Again, the user personally has to appear in the post office and identify himself by, e.g., his passport, for being allowed to receive the mail.
This two-time appearance at an office has turned out to be a problem for the spreading of PKI, simply because people seem to have a resistance against making use of new technology with high entrance thresholds meaning that great initial efforts have to be made. Also, the process is naturally time consuming, and at least one week will lapse from the certificate is ordered to the user has got access to PKI functions.
From the issuer of digital certificates point of view, the costs of the issuing process are relatively high, especially because of the execution and sending of the registered mail.
Thus, there is a need for simplifying the issuing process for the benefit for both the issuer and the user.
It is an object of the present invention to provide a method that eliminates the drawbacks described above. The features defined in the claims enclosed characterize this method.
More specifically, the present invention provides a method of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for registering a user of the PKI and enabling a PKI part of a Smart Card of the user by preprinting a number of sealed envelopes each containing an activation code hidden when unopened and a reference number or code visibly printed on the envelope. The reference number or code and the associated activation code of each envelope are stored in a table in a security server being integrated in or connected to the PKI. The user is provided one of the sealed envelopes together with an application form. The user is requested to fill in the reference code or number on the application form together with personal data, and this is transferred to the PKI and the security server.
When the registration is approved by the PKI, approval information is transmitted to the user, requesting him to enter the activation code in his terminal. Simultaneously, the activation code associated with the reference code or number in the table and a Smart Card identity corresponding to the Smart Card of the user, are provided to an Activation Module in the PKI. Upon entering of the activation code in the terminal, the activation code together with the Smart Card identity is transmitted from the terminal to the Activation Module. Upon receipt of the activation code and the Smart Card identity, the Activation Module determines if the received activation code and Smart Card identity match those previously provided by the security server, and if so, the Activation Module executes the necessary procedure for enabling the PKI part of the Smart Card.
More specifically, the present invention provides a method for reliable and secure enabling of a Public Key Infrastructure —PKI—part of a Smart Card of a first mobile terminal, said mobile terminal connected to a mobile communication network providing access to a PKI server, connected to the same network is a control authority—CA. And the method is further defined by the following steps:—A first request for a PKI part of a Smart Card for a user is received electronically at the PKI server. Said PKI server is processing said request. The PKI server is generating a text message, where the textual content of the text message is a response to the processing of the first request, the text message is sent to the first mobile terminal. The first mobile terminal is responding to the received text message by sending a second activation code and a SIM card identity associated with the first mobile terminal as a text message to the PKI server. The PKI server compares said second activation code with a previously received first reference activation code, if the two activation codes matches the PKI server will transmit a message to the first mobile terminal indicating the match of the password, said message is a PKI key enabling command.
The present invention is described by an example where a user is about to order a SIM card with PKI functionality for a GSM phone. The present application is related to U.S. Patent No. 7,024,226 B2, owned by the assignee of the present invention.
As before, the user has to show up in person in authorized offices, like a post office, a bank or at the telephone operator, to which the user is subscribed.
At the authorized office, the user will receive a preprinted sealed envelope together with an application form he is asked to fill in. A reference number printed on a noticeable place thereon identifies the envelope. The form and the sealed envelope that the user receive at the office is uniquely associated with each other in that the mentioned reference number also is printed on the form, or is one of the data the user is asked to fill in.
After filling the form, an officer will check if the given personal information, herein referred to as personalia matches those on an identity card the user has to produce and that the reference number corresponds to the one printed on the envelope. If the personalia and the number correspond to the identity card, the form is forwarded to further execution, and the user will be asked to keep the envelope sealed until he has received his new SIM card.
The sealed envelope contains an activation code that is invisible when the envelope is unopened. Data concerning all the preprinted envelopes are stored, e.g., in a table within a security server connected to or integrated in the PKI. For each envelope, at least the corresponding reference number, activation code and a status are stored so that once the security server knows the reference number or code of an application form, it also knows the activation code that is given to the user in the envelope together with the application form, and in which stage of execution the application presently is. The status may be one of the following: unused, under consideration, approved, but not activated, activated, not approved. Initially, the status is set to “unused”.
Turning to the user example, the form data is read, preferably electronically, and transferred to the security server. Simultaneously, the status of the envelope stored in the table is changed from “unused” to “under consideration”. The form data, which in this example should be considered as an application for a PKI SIM card, is executed by a PKI server under control of a CA in a way according to the state of the art, which should be known to a person skilled in the art. Additionally, the status of the envelope will be changed in the security server according to the result of the execution. If the application is refused, the corresponding status is changed to “not approved”. In contrast, if the application is approved, the corresponding status is naturally changed to “approved”.
The result of the execution of the application will then be sent to the user in a message via a communication network, preferably carried by SMS or similar, and alternatively by e-mail or mail. A new SIM card may be sent to the user, but it is not necessary to use registered mail because the user will be able to prove his identity by using the activation code hidden in the envelope. Alternatively, if the user already has a SIM card with PKI functionality installed, but till now not accessible, no new SIM card will be necessary to issue. Simultaneously, the security server will provide an Activation Module with the activation code associated with the reference number or code together with necessary identity information regarding the corresponding SIM card.
A message representing a positive result will, e.g., read as follows: “Your application has been approved, please open the sealed envelope and use the activation code inside on your SIM card”.
However, before the user may enter the activation code, a “SIM PKI menu” must be enabled. When the “SIM PKI menu” is enabled, the user enters the activation code in his handset to enroll to the service. The activation code is sent by SMS to the PKI together with the SIM card identity. The user may have 3 attempts to enter this code correctly.
The Activation Module fetches the activation code and the SIM card identity and verifies if it matches the activation code and the SIM card identity that already have been provided from the security server. The Activation Module then transmits a “Generate PKI keys enabling command” back to the SIM, and the key generation application in the SIM will generate a key pair comprising one private key and one verification public key.
The verification public key (VPuK) is transmitted by SMS to the Activation Module, and the SMS is preferably encrypted according to GSM 03.48 for protection of sensitive information.
The user is then requested to choose a PIN_SIGNKEY, which is a personal self-chosen signing PIN used for, e.g., transaction signing and authentication.
In the case of successful verification, the Activation Module connects to the CA to issue a valid certificate with the public key associated with the user. This certificate is at the same time sent to a certification directory.
A confirmation of successful certification is sent back to the user and the PKI menu will then be disabled in the SIM. Consequently, the PKI functions in the SIM card are enabled.
The present invention provides a method for registering and activation of PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) functionalities making it unnecessary for a user to show up in person at an authorized office more than once. Sending of items and data associated with the PKI functionalities after the first identity confirmation will not be necessary, as the user will be in possession of the activation code before his identity is assigned to the activation code, inter alia, in the RA. This guarantees that the right person is in possession of the right activation code already at the time of the first personal appearance.
From a user's point of view, the present invention allows for less effort in providing PKI functionalities. From an issuer's point of view, the present invention will most likely increase the number of PKI users. In addition, the costs per registration will decrease as the execution time will decrease and the need of registered mail will be eliminated.
|Cited Patent||Filing date||Publication date||Applicant||Title|
|US6061791||Apr 22, 1999||May 9, 2000||Connotech Experts-Conseils Inc.||Initial secret key establishment including facilities for verification of identity|
|US6370380 *||Feb 17, 1999||Apr 9, 2002||Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ)||Method for secure handover|
|US6711262 *||Dec 30, 1999||Mar 23, 2004||Sonera Oyj||Procedure for the control of applications stored in a subscriber identity module|
|US6957199 *||Jun 5, 2001||Oct 18, 2005||Douglas Fisher||Method, system and service for conducting authenticated business transactions|
|US6961858 *||Dec 16, 2002||Nov 1, 2005||Entriq, Inc.||Method and system to secure content for distribution via a network|
|US6988199 *||Jun 21, 2001||Jan 17, 2006||Message Secure||Secure and reliable document delivery|
|US7020778 *||Jan 21, 2000||Mar 28, 2006||Sonera Smarttrust Oy||Method for issuing an electronic identity|
|US7315823 *||Feb 21, 2001||Jan 1, 2008||Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson||Wireless reservation, check-in, access control, check-out and payment|
|US20040043758 *||Aug 29, 2002||Mar 4, 2004||Nokia Corporation||System and method for providing context sensitive recommendations to digital services|
|US20060020783 *||Aug 5, 2005||Jan 26, 2006||Douglas Fisher||Method, system and service for conducting authenticated business transactions|
|EP1162781A2||May 31, 2001||Dec 12, 2001||TRW Inc.||System and method for generation of a signature certificate in a public key infrastructure|
|EP1185027A2||Aug 29, 2001||Mar 6, 2002||Hitachi, Ltd.||Certificate validity authentication method and apparatus|
|WO2002060210A1||Jan 23, 2002||Aug 1, 2002||Telenor Asa||Method for enabling pki functions in a smart card|
|1||Digitale Signaturer, Sertifikater, Tillit OG TTP-TJenester (PKI Consulting Services, Oslo, Apr. 2001).|
|Citing Patent||Filing date||Publication date||Applicant||Title|
|US7945959 *||Jun 18, 2007||May 17, 2011||International Business Machines Corporation||Secure physical distribution of a security token through a mobile telephony provider's infrastructure|
|US8607050||Apr 30, 2012||Dec 10, 2013||Oracle International Corporation||Method and system for activation|
|US8744078||Jun 5, 2012||Jun 3, 2014||Secure Channels Sa||System and method for securing multiple data segments having different lengths using pattern keys having multiple different strengths|
|US8819432 *||Jan 27, 2009||Aug 26, 2014||Paycool International Ltd.||Method for authentication and signature of a user in an application service, using a mobile telephone as a second factor in addition to and independently of a first factor|
|US20080313457 *||Jun 18, 2007||Dec 18, 2008||International Business Machines Corporation||Secure physical distribution of a security token through a mobile telephony provider's infrastructure|
|US20110016320 *||Jan 27, 2009||Jan 20, 2011||Paycool International Ltd.||Method for authentication and signature of a user in an application service, using a mobile telephone as a second factor in addition to and independently of a first factor|
|U.S. Classification||726/9, 726/4, 726/3|
|International Classification||G09C1/00, G06F7/04, H04L9/32|
|Cooperative Classification||H04L9/006, H04L2209/56, H04L9/3234, H04L9/3263|
|Oct 18, 2004||AS||Assignment|
Owner name: TELENOR ASA, NORWAY
Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:SANDBERG, LEIF;REEL/FRAME:015899/0656
Effective date: 20040921
Owner name: TELENOR ASA,NORWAY
Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:SANDBERG, LEIF;REEL/FRAME:015899/0656
Effective date: 20040921
|Nov 8, 2013||REMI||Maintenance fee reminder mailed|
|Mar 30, 2014||LAPS||Lapse for failure to pay maintenance fees|
|May 20, 2014||FP||Expired due to failure to pay maintenance fee|
Effective date: 20140330