|Publication number||US8122518 B2|
|Application number||US 11/749,865|
|Publication date||Feb 21, 2012|
|Filing date||May 17, 2007|
|Priority date||May 17, 2006|
|Also published as||CN100464295C, CN101075188A, US20080005320|
|Publication number||11749865, 749865, US 8122518 B2, US 8122518B2, US-B2-8122518, US8122518 B2, US8122518B2|
|Original Assignee||Lenovo (Beijing) Limited|
|Export Citation||BiBTeX, EndNote, RefMan|
|Patent Citations (19), Classifications (8), Legal Events (3)|
|External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, Espacenet|
1. Field of Invention
The present invention relates to a virtual machine technology, in particular, to a secure input method based on a virtual machine.
2. Description of Prior Art
In a computer system, when a user inputs data by the keyboard, the device driving program for the keyboard converts the key-pressing event to a corresponding key value and saves it in a buffer memory for inner kernel, then the key value waits until a keyboard hook acquires and stores it into an application reception buffer area. Meanwhile, the computer system generally allows a keyboard filtering driver to intercept the keyboard input event after the keyboard driving, performs special conversion or processing on the keyboard input event and then saves the converted key value in the buffer memory for inner kernel. The computer system allows only one application to obtain the keyboard input focus each time.
During the above flow of a user program receiving a keyboard input, that is, keyboard input->keyboard driver->keyboard filtering driver->buffer memory for inner kernel->keyboard hook->application reception buffer area, since there lacks protective measure for output of the keyboard driver and content in the buffer memory for inner kernel, the data inputted from the keyboard is likely to be acquired by keyboard filtering drivers and keyboard hook of any other computer invasion program. Various Trojan horse programs and eavesdropping programs utilize different filtering driver and keyboard hooks to obtain a user input so as to acquire sensitive data, for example, password, inputted by the user.
On a virtual machine, a keyboard input is first obtained by a virtual machine monitor (VMM), then a keyboard hardware event is sent to a client-end OS through a simulated keyboard device. Like a standard OS, the client-end OS provides the keyboard input to an application through the same flow of keyboard driver->keyboard filtering driver->buffer memory for inner kernel->keyboard hook->application reception buffer area, during which various Trojan horse programs and eavesdropping programs can also utilize filtering driver and different hooks to obtain the user input.
As can be seen from the above introduction, there exists serious security bugs in the keyboard input mechanism for the existing virtual machine, and user input lacks sufficient protection.
The object of the present invention is to provide an input method based on a virtual machine which can overcome the drawback in the existing input method that another application utilizes different filtering driver and keyboard hooks to acquire the user input and offer a secure input method for the user.
The present invention provides a secure input method based on a virtual machine, which comprises steps of
an application invokes a secure input interface of a virtual machine monitor and transfers a logic address and length of input buffer area of the application;
the virtual machine monitor accepts the secure input invoking, turns on an secure input switch and converts the logic address of the input buffer area into a physical address;
the virtual machine monitor receives an output from a keyboard driver, converts it into a key value and saves the converted key value in the input buffer area;
the virtual machine monitor judges that the secure input is completed, returns an input result to the application and turns off the secure input switch.
Further, the virtual machine monitor can be caused to reject input focus switching while the secure input switch is turned on.
From the above method, it can be understood that the input method based on a virtual machine of the present invention settles the output of a keyboard driver directly into an input buffer area provided by an application. This prevents another application from using different filtering drivers and keyboard hooks to acquire the user input and thus enhances the security for a user input.
As shown in
The specific flow for realizing the secure input of the present invention is as shown in
Step A1: an application invokes a secure input interface of a virtual machine monitor.
When requiring a secure input, the application invokes initiatively the secure input interface of the virtual machine monitor and transfers the handle of the application as well as the address and length of a buffer area of the application for receiving the input to the secure input interface as parameters. At this moment, the address of the input buffer area is a logic address within the application.
Step A2: the virtual machine monitor accepts the secure input invoking and converts the logic address of the input buffer area into corresponding physical address.
After accepting the invoking on the secure input interface from the application, the virtual machine monitor turns on a secure input switch, stops simulating the keyboard input for a client-end operating system, converts the logic address of the input buffer area, which is transferred as a parameter, into a physical address, and then waits for a user input.
Step A3: the virtual machine monitor waits for and receives the output of the keyboard driver, and then converts the output of the keyboard driver into a key value and saves it in the input buffer area for the application.
If the virtual machine monitor is in a secure input state, after receiving the output of the keyboard driver, it converts it into a key value and then saves the key value in the input buffer area for the application according to the physical address of the input buffer area. In addition, the virtual machine monitor needs to maintain the current input position of the input buffer area so that the input can be properly settled in the input buffer area.
Step A4: the virtual machine monitor returns an input result to the application and turns off the secure input switch when the secure input is completed.
The completion of input operation can be determined by judging whether the length of the inputted content has been equal to the length of the input buffer area, or by detecting whether a certain key, such as an “Enter” key, has been pressed. If it is determined that the length of the inputted content has been equal to the length of the input buffer area, or that certain key has been pressed, the secure input is completed, the virtual machine monitor returns the input result to the application and turns off the secure input switch. If information related to this secure input is also maintained, corresponding resource will be released.
When the virtual machine is in a secure input state, it is possible that another application requires for the input focus. In view of this issue, the present invention proposes various solutions, and the detailed explanation is as follows.
The first method: when the virtual machine is in a secure input state, requirement for the input focus from another application is denied until the secure input for the original application is completed and the secure input switch is turned off. In this case, if the secure input switch has been turned on, any other application will fail to invoke the secure input interface, and further any general requirement for input focus will be denied.
The second method: when the virtual machine is in a secure input state, the request for the input focus from other application is allowed. Upon the input focus being switched to the other application, the virtual machine monitor saves the secure input status for the application which loses the input focus. The secure input status includes the handle, address and length of input buffer area and the current input position for the application, and turns off the secure input switch. When the input focus is switched to the application which loses the input focus again, the virtual machine monitor first checks whether the secure input status corresponding to the handle of the application has been saved, and if saved, turns on the secure input switch again and stores the input at the current position of the input buffer area. Corresponding resource is released upon the completion of the secure input.
The third method: while invoking the secure input interface, the application introduces a parameter as to whether permits the input focus to be switched. Depending on the value of the parameter, the virtual machine monitor responds to the requirement for switching the input focus by employing either the first method or the second method.
From the above steps, it can be understood that the input method of the present invention converts the output of the key driver to a key vale and stores it into an input buffer area provided by the application. This can prevent another application from using different filtering drivers and keyboard hooks to acquire the user input and thus provide a secure input method for the user.
The above description is only the preferred embodiment of the present invention, and the scope of the invention is not limited thereto. In the technology range disclosed in the present invention, any variation or substitution readily conceivable by those skilled in the art should be covered by the scope of the invention, which should be defined by the appended claims.
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|U.S. Classification||726/30, 726/27, 726/26|
|Cooperative Classification||G06F21/606, G06F21/52|
|European Classification||G06F21/60C, G06F21/52|
|May 17, 2007||AS||Assignment|
Owner name: LENOVO (BEIJING) LIMITED, CHINA
Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:CHEN, JUN;REEL/FRAME:019308/0192
Effective date: 20070509
|Sep 16, 2015||FPAY||Fee payment|
Year of fee payment: 4
|Sep 16, 2015||SULP||Surcharge for late payment|