|Publication number||USRE40530 E1|
|Application number||US 09/694,416|
|Publication date||Oct 7, 2008|
|Filing date||Oct 20, 2000|
|Priority date||Dec 9, 1996|
|Also published as||EP0950302A1, EP0950302A4, EP0950302B1, US5848159, US7231040, WO1998026536A1|
|Publication number||09694416, 694416, US RE40530 E1, US RE40530E1, US-E1-RE40530, USRE40530 E1, USRE40530E1|
|Inventors||Thomas Collins, Dale Hopkins, Susan Langford, Michael Sabin|
|Original Assignee||Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.|
|Export Citation||BiBTeX, EndNote, RefMan|
|Patent Citations (15), Non-Patent Citations (26), Classifications (12), Legal Events (2)|
|External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, Espacenet|
This application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/033,271 for PUBLIC KEY CRYTOGRAPHIC APPARATUS AND METHOD, filed Dec. 9, 1996, naming as inventors, Thomas Colins Collins, Dale Hopkins, Susan Langford and Michale Michael Sabin, the discolsure disclosure of which is incorporated by reference.
This invention relates generally to communicating data in a secure fashion, and more particularly to a cryptographic system and methods using public key cryptography.
Computer systems are found today in virtually every walk of life for storing, maintaining, and transferring various types of data. The integrity of large portions of this data, especially that portion relating to financial transactions, is vital to the health and survival of numerous commercial enterprises. Indeed, as open and unsecured data communications channels for sales transactions gain popularity, such as credit card transactions over the Internet, individual consumers have an increasing stake in data security.
Thus, for obvious reasons, it is important that financial transaction communications pass from a sender to an intended receiver without intermediate parties being able to interpret the transferred message.
Cryptography, especially public key cryptography, has proven to be an effective and convenient technique of enhancing data privacy and authentication. Data to be secured, called plaintext, is transformed into encrypted data, or ciphertext, by a predetermined encryption process of one type or another. The reverse process, transforming ciphertext into plaintext, is termed decryption. Of particular importance to this invention is that the processes of encryption and decryption are controlled by a pair of related cryptographic keys. A “public” key is used for the encryption process, and a “private” key is used to decrypt ciphertext. The public key transforms plaintext to ciphertext, but cannot be used to decrypt the ciphertext to retrieve the plaintext therefrom.
As an example, suppose a Sender A wishes to send message M to a recipient B. The idea is to use public key E and related private key D for encryption and decryption of M. The public key E is public information while D is kept secret by the intended receiver. Further, and importantly, although E is determined by D, it is extremely difficult to compute D from E. Thus the receiver, by publishing the public key E, but keeping the private key D secret, can assure senders of data encrypted using E that anyone who intercepts the data will not be able to decipher it. Examples of the public key/private key concept can be found in U.S. Pat. Nos. 4,200,770, 4,218,582, and 4,424,414.
The prior art includes a number of public key schemes, in addition to those described in the above-identified patents. Over the past decade, however, one system of public key cryptography has gained popularity. Known generally as the “RSA” scheme, it is now thought by many to be a worldwide defacto standard for public key cryptography. The RSA scheme is described in U.S. Pat. No. 4,405,829 which is fully incorporated herein by this reference.
The RSA scheme capitalizes on the relative ease of creating a composite number from the product of two prime numbers whereas the attempt to factor the composite number into its constituent primes is difficult. The RSA scheme uses a public key E comprising a pair of positive integers n and e, where n is a composite number of the form
where p and q are different prime numbers, and e is a number relatively prime to (p−1) and (q−1); that is, e is relatively prime to (p−1) or (q−1) if e has no factors in common with either of them. Importantly, the sender has access to n and e, but not to p and q. The message M is a number representative of a message to be transmitted wherein
The sender enciphers M to create ciphertext C by computing the exponential
C=Me(mod n) C≡Me(mod n). (3)
The recipient of the ciphertext C retrieves the message M using a (private) decoding key D, comprising a pair of positive integers d and n, employing the relation
M=Cd(mod n) M≡Cd(mod n) (4)
As used in (4), above, d is a multiplicative inverse of
e(mod(lcm((p−1), (q−1)))) (5)
e·d=1(mod(lcm((p−1), (q−1)))) e·d≡1(mod(lcm((p−1 ), (q−1 )))) (6)
where lcm((p−1), (q−1)) is the least common multiple of numbers p−1 and q−1. Most commercial implementations of RSA employ a different, although equivalent, relationship for obtaining d:
d=e−1mod(p−1) (q−1) d≡e−1 mod((p−1 )·(q−1 )). (7)
This alternate relationship simplifies computer processing.
Note: Mathematically (6) defines a set of numbers and (7) defines a subset of that set. For implementation, (7) or (6) usually is interpreted to mean d is the smallest positive element in the set.)
The net effect is that the plaintext message M is encoded knowing only the public key E (i.e., e and n). The resultant ciphertext C can only decoded using decoding key D. The composite number n, which is part of the public key E, is computationally difficult to factor into its components, prime numbers p and q, a knowledge of which is required to decrypt C.
From the time a security scheme, such as RSA, becomes publicly known and used, it is subjected to unrelenting attempts to break it. One defense is to increase the length (i.e., size) of both p and q. Not long ago it was commonly recommended that p and q should be large prime numbers 75 digits long (i.e., on the order of 1075). Today, it is not uncommon to find RSA schemes being proposed wherein the prime numbers p and q are on the order of 150 digits long. This makes the product of p and q a 300 digit number. (There are even a handful of schemes that employ prime numbers (p and q) that are larger, for example 300 digits long to form a 600 digit product.) Numbers of this size, however, tend to require enormous computer resources to perform the encryption and decryption operations. Consider that while computer instruction cycles are typically measured in nanoseconds (billionths of seconds), computer computations of RSA steps are typically measured in milliseconds (thousandths of seconds). Thus millions of computer cycles are required to compute individual RSA steps resulting in noticeable delays to users.
This problem is exacerbated if the volume of ciphertext messages requiring decryption is large—such as can be expected by commercial transactions employing a mass communication medium such as the Internet. A financial institution may maintain as Internet site that could conceivably receive thousands of enciphered messages every hour that must be decrypted, and perhaps even responded to. Using larger numbers to form the keys used for an RSA scheme can impose severe limitations and restraints upon the institution's ability to timely respond.
Many prior art techniques, while enabling the RSA scheme to utilize computers more efficiently, nonetheless have failed to keep pace with the increasing length of n, p, and q.
Accordingly, it is an object of this invention to provide a system and method for rapid encryption and decryption of data without compromising data security.
It is another object of this invention to provide a system and method that increases the computational speed of RSA encryption and decryption techniques.
It is still another object of this invention to provide a system and method for implementing an RSA scheme in which the components factors of n do not increase in length as n increases in length.
It is still another object to provide a system and method for utilizing multiple (more than two), distinct prime number components factors to create n.
It is a further object to provide a system and method for providing a technique for reducing the computational effort for calculating exponentiations in an RSA scheme for a given length of n.
The present invention discloses a method and apparatus for increasing the computational speed of RSA and related public key schemes by focusing on a neglected area of computation inefficiency. Instead of n=p·q, as is universal in the prior art, the present invention discloses a method and apparatus wherein n is developed from three or more distinct random prime numbers; i.e., n=p1·p2·. . . ·pk, where k is an integer greater than 2 and p1, p2, . . . pk are sufficiently large distinct random primes. Preferably, “sufficiently large primes” are prime numbers that are numbers approximately 150 digits long or larger. The advantages of the invention over the prior art should be immediately apparent to those skilled in this art. If, as in the prior art, p and q are each on the order of, say, 150 digits long, then n will be on the order of 300 digits long. However, three primes p2, p1, and p3 employed in accordance with the present invention can each be on the order of 100 digits long and still result in n being 300 digits long. Finding and verifying 3 distinct primes, each 100 digits long, requires significantly fewer computational cycles than finding and verifying 2 primes each 150 digits long.
The commercial need for longer and longer primes shows no evidence of slowing; already there are projected requirements for n of about 600 digits long to forestall incremental improvements in factoring techniques and the ever faster computers available to break ciphertext. The invention, allowing 4 primes each about 150 digits long to obtain a 600 digit n, instead of two primes about 350 300 digits long, results in a marked improvement in computer performance. For, not only are primes that are 150 digits in size easier to find and verify than ones on the order of 350 300 digits, but by applying techniques the inventors derive from the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), public key cryptography calculations for encryption and decryption are completed much faster—even if performed serially on a single processor system. However, the inventors' techniques are particularly adapted to be advantageously apply enable RSA public key cryptographic operations to parallel computer processing.
The present invention is capable of using extending the RSA scheme to perform encryption and decryption operation using a large (many digit) n much faster than heretofore possible. Other advantages of the invention include its employment for decryption without the need to revise the RSA public key encryption transformation scheme currently in use on thousands of large and small computers.
A key assumption of the present invention is that n, composed of 3 or more sufficiently large distinct prime numbers, is no easier (or not very much easier) to factor than the prior art, two prime number n. The assumption is based on the observation that there is no indication in the prior art literature that it is “easy” to factor a product consisting of more than two sufficiently large, distinct prime numbers. This assumption may be justified given the continued effort (and failure) among experts to find a way “easily” to break large component composite numbers into their large prime factors. This assumption is similar, in the inventors' view, to the assumption underlying the entire field of public key cryptography that factoring composite numbers made up of two distinct primes is not “easy.” That is, the entire field of public key cryptography is based not on mathematical proof, but on the assumption that the empirical evidence of failed sustained efforts to find a way systematically to solve NP problems in polynomial time indicates that these problems truly are “difficult.”
The invention is preferably implemented in a system that employs parallel operations to perform the encryption, decryption operations required by the RSA scheme. Thus, there is also disclosed a cryptosystem that includes a central processor unit (CPU) coupled to a number of exponentiator elements. The exponentiator elements are special purpose arithmetic units designed and structured to be provided message data M, an encryption key e, and a number n (where n=p1*p2* . . . pk n=p1 ·p 2 · . . . ·p k, k being greater than 2) and return ciphertext C according to the relationship,
C=Me(mod(n)) C≡Me(mod n).
Alternatively, the exponentiator elements may be provided the ciphertext C, a decryption (private) key d and n to return M according to the relationship,
M=Cd(mod(n)) M≡Cd(mod n).
According to this decryption aspect of the invention, the CPU receives a task, such as the requirement to decrypt cyphertext ciphertext data C. The CPU will also be provided, or have available, a public private key e d and n, and the factors of n (p1, p2, . . . pk). The CPU breaks the encryption decryption task down into a number of sub-tasks, and delivers the sub-tasks to the exponentiator elements. When the The results of the sub-tasks are returned by the exponentiator elements to the CPU which will , using a form of the CRT, combines the results to obtain the message data M. An encryption task may be performed essentially in the same manner by the CPU and its use of the exponentiator elements. However, usually the factors of n are not available to the sender (encryptor), only the public key, e and n, so that no sub-tasks are created.
In a preferred embodiment of this latter aspect of the invention, the bus structure used to couple the CPU and exponentiator elements to one another is made secure by encrypting all important information communicated thereon. Thus, data sent to the exponentiator elements is passed through a data encryption unit that employs, preferably, the ANSI Data Encryption Standard (DES). The exponentiator elements decrypt the DES-encrypted sub-task information they receive, perform the desired task, and encrypt the result, again using DES, for return to the CPU.
As indicated above, the present invention is employed in the context of the RSA public key encryption/decryption scheme. As also indicated, the RSA scheme obtains its security from the difficulty of factoring large numbers, and the fact that the public and private keys are functions of a pair of large (100-200 digits or even larger) prime numbers. Recovering the plaintext from the public key and the ciphertext is conjectured to be equivalent to factoring the product of two primes.
According to the present invention, the public key portion e is picked. Then, three or more random large, distinct prime numbers, p1, p2, . . . , pk are developed and checked to ensure that each (p i −1 ) is relatively prime to e. Preferably, the prime numbers are of equal length. Then, the product n=p1, p2, . . . , pk n=p1 ·p 2 · . . . p k, is computed.
Finally, the decryption key exponent, d, is established by the relationship:
d=e−1mod ((p1−1) (p2−1)) . . . (pk−1)) d≡e−1 mod((p 1 −1 )·(p 2 −1 )· . . . ·(p k −1 )), or equivalently
d≡e −1 mod(lcm((p 1 −1 ), (p 2 −1 ), . . . (p k −1 )))
The message data, M is encrypted to ciphertext C using the relationship of (3), above, i.e.,
C=Memod n C≡Me(mod n).
To decrypt the ciphertext, C, the relationship of (3) ( 4 ), above, is used:
M=Cdmod n M≡Cd(mod n)
where n and d are those values identified above.
Alternatively, a message data M can be encoded with the private key to a signed message data Ms using a relationship of the form
M s ≡M d(mod n).
The message data M can be reproduce from the signed message data M s by decoding the signed data with the public key, using a relationship of the form
M≡Ms e(mod n).
Using the present invention involving three primes to develop the product n, RSA encryption and decryption time can be substantially less than an RSA scheme using two primes by dividing the encryption or decryption task into sub-tasks, one sub-task for each distinct prime. (However, breaking the encryption or decryption into subtasks requires knowledge of the factors of n. This knowledge is not usually available to anyone except the owner of the key, so the encryption process can be accelerated only in special cases, such as encryption for local storage. A system encrypting data for another user performs the encryption process according to (3), independent of the number of factors of n. Decryption, on the other hand, is performed by the owner of a key, so the factors of n are generally known and can be used to accelerate the process.) For example, assume that three distinct primes, p1, p2, and p3, are used to develop the product n. Thus, decryption of the ciphertext, C, using the relationship
M=Cd(mod n) M≡Cd(mod n)
is used to develop the decryption sub-tasks:
C1=Cmod p1; C1 ≡C(mod p 1);
C2=Cmod p2; C2 ≡C(mod p 2);
C3=Cmod p3; C3 ≡C(mod p 3);
d1=dmod (p1−1) d1 ≡d(mod(p 1 −1 ));
d2=dmod (p2−1) d2 ≡d(mod(p 2 −1 )); and
d3=dmod (p3−1) d3 ≡d(mod(p 3 −1 )).
The results of each sub-task, M1, M2, and M3 can be combined to produce the plaintext, M, by a number of techniques. However, it is found that they can most expeditiously be combined by a form of the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) using, preferably, a recursive scheme. Generally, the plaintext M is obtained from the combination of the individual sub-tasks by the following relationship:
Yi=Yi−1+[(Mi−Yi−1) (wi −1mod pi)mod pi]·wimod n Yi ≡Y i−1+((M 1 −Y i−1)(w i −1(mod p i)))mod p i))·w i(mod n)
where k is the number of prime factors of n, and
Encryption is performed in much the same manner as that used to obtain the plaintext M, provided (as noted above) the factors of n are available. Thus, the relationship
C=Me(mod n) C≡Me(mod n),
can be broken down into the three sub-tasks,
C1=M1 e1mod p1 C1 ≡M 1 e
C2=M2 e2mod p2 C2 ≡M 2 e
C3=M3 e3mod p3 C3 ≡M 3 e
M1=M(mod p1) M1 ≡M (mod p 1),
M2=M(mod p2) M2 ≡M (mod p 2),
M3=M(mod p3) M3 ≡M (mod p 3),
e1=emod (p1−1) e1 ≡e (mod(p 1 −1 )),
e2=emod (p2−1) e2 ≡e(mod(p 2 −1 ), and
e3=emod (p3−1) e3 ≡e(mod(p 3 −1 )).
In generalized form, the decrypted ciphertext C (i.e., encrypted message M) can be obtained by the same summation a recursive scheme as identified above to obtain the ciphertext C from its contiguous constituent sub-tasks Ci.
Preferably, the recursive CRT method described above is used to obtain either the ciphertext, C, or the deciphered plaintext (message) M due to its speed. However, there may be occasions implementations when it is beneficial to use a non-recursive technique in which case the following relationships are used:
k is the number (3 or more) of distinct primes chosen to develop the product n.
Thus, for example above (k=3), M is constructed from the returned sub-task values M1, M2, M3 by the relationship
M=M1(w1 −1mod p1) w1mod/n+M2(w2 −1mod p2) w2mod n+M3(w3 −1mod p3) w3mod n
M=M1 −1(w 1 −1(mod p 1))·w 1(mod n)+M 2(w 2 −1(mod p 2))·w 2(mod n)+M 3(w 3 −1(mod p 3))·w 3(mod n)
w1=p2p3, w2=p1p3, and w3=p1p2.
Employing the multiple distinct prime number technique of the present invention in the RSA scheme can realize accelerated processing over that using only two primes for the same size n. The invention can be implemented on a single processor unit or even the architecture disclosed in the above-referenced U.S. Pat. No. 4,405,829. The capability of developing sub-tasks for each prime number is particularly adapted to employing a parallel architecture such as that illustrated in FIG. 1.
The I/O bus 30 communicatively connects the CPU to a number of exponentiator elements 32 a, 32 b, and 32 c 32a, 32b and 32c. Shown here are three exponentiator elements, although as illustrated by the “other” exponentiators 32 n 32n, additional exponentiator elements can be added. Each exponentiator element is a state machine controlled arithmetic circuit structured specifically to implement the relationship described above. Thus, for example, the exponentiator 32a would be provided the values M1, e1, and p1 n to develop C1. Similarly, the exponentiator circuits 32b and 32c develop C2 and C3 from corresponding subtask values M2, e2, P2 p2, M3, e3, and P3 p3.
Preferably, the CPU 14 is formed on a single integrated circuit for security reasons. However, should there be a need for more storage space than can be provided by the “on-board” memory 22, the bus 30 may also connect the CPU 14 to an external memory unit 34.
In order to ensure a secure environment, it is preferable that the cryptosystem 10 meet the Federal Information Protection System Processing Standard (FIPS) 140- 1 level 3. Accordingly, the elements that make up the CPU 14 would be implemented in a design that will be secure from external probing of the circuit. However, information communicated on the I/O bus 30 between the CPU 14 and the exponentiator circuits 32 (and external memory 34—if present) is exposed. Consequently, to maintain the security of that information, it is first encrypted by the DES unit 24 before it is placed on the I/O bus 30 by the CPU 14. The exponentiator circuits 32, as well as the external memory 34, will also include similar DES units to decrypt information received from the CPU, and later to encrypt information returned to the CPU 14.
It may be that not all information communicated on the I/O bus 30 need be secure by DES encryption. For that reason, the DES unit 24 of the CPU 14 is structured to encrypt outgoing information, and decrypt incoming information, on the basis of where in the address space used by the cryptosystem the information belongs; that is, since information communicated on the I/O bus 30 is either a write operation by the CPU 14 to the memory 34, or a read operation of those elements, the addresses assigned to the secure addresses and non-secure addresses. Read or write operations conducted by the CPU 14 using secure addresses will pass through the DES unit 24 and that of the memory 34. Read or write operations involving non-secure addresses will by-pass these DES units.
The DES unit 24 is structured to recognize addresses in the memory spaces 44, 46, and to automatically encrypt the information before it is applied to the I/O bus 30. The DES unit 24 is bypassed when the processor 20 accesses addresses in the address range 48. Thus, when the processor 20 initiates write operations to addresses within the memory space within the address range 46 (to the external memory 34), the DES unit 24 will automatically encrypt the information (not the addresses) and place the encrypted information on the I/O bus 30. Conversely, when the processor 20 reads information from the external memory 34 at addresses within the address range 46 of the external memory 34, the DES unit will decrypt information received from the I/O bus 30 and place the decrypted information on the data/address bus 26 for the processor 20.
In similar fashion, information conveyed to or retrieved from the exponentiators 32 by the processor 20 by write or read operations at addresses within the address range 44. Consequently, writes to the exponentiators 32 will use the DES unit 24 to encrypt the information. When that (encrypted) information is received by the exponentiators 32, it is decrypted by on-board DES units (of each exponentiator 32). The results of the task performed by the exponentiator 32 is then encrypted by the exponentiator's on-board DES unit, retrieved by the processor 20 in encrypted form and then decrypted by the DES unit 24.
Information that need not be maintained in secure fashion to be stored in the external memory 34, however, need only be written to addresses in the address range 48. The DES unit 24 recognizes writes to the address range 48, and bypasses the encryption circuitry, passing the information, in unencrypted form, onto the I/O bus 30 for storing in the external memory 34. Similarly, reads of the external memory 34 using addresses within the address range 48 are passed directly from the I/O bus 30 to the data/address bus 26 by the DES unit 24.
In operation, the CPU 14 will receive from the host it serves (not shown), via the bus 12, an encryption request. The encryption request will include the message data M to be encrypted and, perhaps, the encryption keys e and n (in the form of the primes p1, p2, . . . pk). Alternatively, the keys may be kept by the CPU 14 in the memory 22. In any event, the processor 20 will construct the encryption sub-tasks C1, C2, . . . , Ck for execution by the exponentiators 32.
Assume, for the purpose of the remainder of this discussion, that the encryption/decryption tasks performed by the cryptosystem 10, using the present invention, employs only three distinct primes, p1, p2, p3. The processor 20 will develop the sub tasks identified above, using M, e, p1 p2, p3 Thus, for example, if the exponentiator 32a were assigned the sub-task of developing C1, the processor would develop the values M1, and e1, and (p1−1) and deliver units (write) these values, with n, p1 to the exponentiator 32a. Similar values will be developed by the processor 20 for the sub-tasks that will be delivered to the exponentiators 32b and 32c.
In turn, the exponentiators 32 develop the values C1, C2, and C3 which are returned to (retrieved by) the CPU 14. The processor 20 will then combine the values C1, C2, and C3 to form C, the ciphertext encryption of M, which is then returned to the host via the bus 12.
The encryption, decryption techniques described hereinabove, and the use of cryptosystem 10 (
As an example, the host system, as indicated, may receive encrypted communication from the stations 64, via the communication medium 60. Typically, the data of the communication will be encrypted using DES, and the DES key will be encrypted using a public key by the RSA scheme, preferably one that employs three or more distinct prime numbers for developing the public and private keys.
Continuing, the DES encrypted communication, including the DES key encrypted with the RSA scheme, would be received by the host system. Before decrypting the DES communication, it must obtain the DES key and, accordingly, the host system 50 will issue, to one of the cryptosystems 10 a decryption request instruction, containing the encrypted DES key as the cyphertext C. If the (private) decryption keys, d, n (and its component primes, p1, p2, . . . pk) are not held by the cryptosystem 10, they also will be delivered with the encryption request instruction.
In turn, the cryptosystem 10 would decrypt the received cyphertext in the manner described above (developing the sub-tasks, issuing the sub-tasks to the exponentiator 32 of the cryptosystem 10, and reassembling the results of the sub-task to develop the message data: the DES key), and return to the host system the desired, decrypted information.
Alternatively, the post host-system 50 may desire to deliver, via the communication medium 60, an encrypted communication to one of the stations 64. If the communication is to be encrypted by the DES scheme, with the DES key encrypted by the RSA scheme, the host system would encrypt the communication, forward the DES key to one of the cryptosystems 10 for encryption via the RSA scheme. When the encrypted DES key is received back from the cryptosystem 10, the host system can then deliver to one or more of the stations 64 the encrypted message.
Of course, the host system 50 and the stations 64 will be using the RSA scheme of public key encryption/decryption. Encrypted communications from the stations 64 to the host system 50 require that the stations 64 have access to the public key E (E, N) E=(e, n) while the host system maintains the private key D (D, N, D=(d, n) and the constituent primes, p1, p2, . . . , pk). Conversely, for secure communication from the host system 50 to one or more of the stations 64, the host system would retain a public key E′ for each station 64, while the stations retain the corresponding private keys E′ D′.
Other techniques for encrypting the communication could used. For example, the communication could be entirely encrypted by the RSA scheme. If, however, the message to be communication ed is represented by a numerical value greater than n−1, it will need to be broken up into blocks size M where
Each block M would be separately encrypted/decrypted, using the public key/private key RSA scheme according to that described above.
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|U.S. Classification||380/30, 380/29|
|International Classification||G09C1/00, H04L9/30, H04L9/00|
|Cooperative Classification||H04L9/302, G06Q20/382, H04L2209/08, H04L2209/125, H04L2209/56|
|European Classification||G06Q20/382, H04L9/30F|
|Jan 19, 2006||AS||Assignment|
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Effective date: 20021001
|Jun 8, 2010||FPAY||Fee payment|
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