WO1994015422A1 - System and method for key distribution using quantum cryptography - Google Patents
System and method for key distribution using quantum cryptography Download PDFInfo
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- WO1994015422A1 WO1994015422A1 PCT/GB1993/002637 GB9302637W WO9415422A1 WO 1994015422 A1 WO1994015422 A1 WO 1994015422A1 GB 9302637 W GB9302637 W GB 9302637W WO 9415422 A1 WO9415422 A1 WO 9415422A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
- H04L9/0858—Details about key distillation or coding, e.g. reconciliation, error correction, privacy amplification, polarisation coding or phase coding
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a system for 5 communicating encrypted data.
- it relates to the technique known as quantum cryptography.
- data is encoded at the transmitter and decoded at the receiver using some specified algorithm which is assumed to be freely available 0 to all users of the system, whether authorised or otherwise.
- the security of the system depends upon the key to the algorithm being available only to the authorised users.
- the key is distributed over a secure quantum channel.
- the transmitter and receiver then 5 communicate over a separate channel, known as the public channel, to compare the transmitted and received data.
- the presence of any eavesdropper intercepting the transmitted key results in a change in the statistics of the received data, which can be detected. Accordingly, in the absence 0 of any such change in the statistics of the data, the key is known to be secure.
- a communication system using quantum cryptography includes the steps of:
- step (b) randomly selecting one of the different quantum mechanical operators and using that operator in detecting 0 the signal transmitted in step (a) ;
- step (f) in the event that in step (e) no eavesdropper is detected, using at least some of the data transmitted in steps (a) and (b) as a key for encryption/decryption of subsequent transmissions.
- a method of communication using quantum cryptography is characterised in that a quantum channel and public channel are transmitted over a common transmission medium, and in that a calibration signal is transmitted over the public channel to calibrate the system for the transmission of a key on the quantum channel.
- the present invention by contrast achieves significant advantages by both using a common transmission medium and using transmissions over the public channel to calibrate the system prior to subsequent transmissions over the quantum channel.
- the calibration step can be used, for example, to counter the effect of any shifts in polarization, phase or timing across the transmission medium from the transmitter to the receiver. This makes it possible to maintain the quantum channel effectively over far greater distances than would otherwise be possible.
- the step of calibrating the system includes comparing the phase and/or polarization of a signal communicated over the public channel and received at the transmitter with predetermined values of phase and/or polarization, and controlling phase or polarization compensation means connected in line with the transmission medium so as to produce a predetermined relationship between the phase or polarization of the transmitter and receiver.
- the calibration step preferably includes transmitting a clock from the transmitter to the receiver on the public channel to provide timing information for the subsequent decoding of a key transmitted on the quantum channel.
- the transmission system comprises an optical fibre link, and the public channel is encoded on a multiple-photon optical signal, and the quantum channel is encoded on a single-photon optical signal.
- Preferably separate source outputs are used for the multiple photons and for the single photons and the transmitter switches between the different outputs.
- the single-photon and multiple photon outputs are derived from a common source.
- a method of communication using quantum cryptography characterised in that a quantum channel and a public channel are transmitted over a common transmission medium, and in that a clock signal is transmitted over the public channel from a transmitter to a receiver to provide timing information for the subsequent decoding of a key transmitted on the quantum channel.
- the present invention also encompasses communications systems adapted for use by methods according to the first or second aspects of the present invention. DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
- Figure 1 is a diagram showing schematically a single- photon Mach-Zehnder interferometer for use in an embodiment of the present example, with the photon transmission probability, T, of the two output arms shown as a function of the relative phase-shift set by the phase modulators in the transmitter and receiver;
- Figure 2 shows the interferometer of Figure 1 modified for time-division;
- Figures 3a and 3b are timing diagrams for the interferometer of Figure 2;
- Figure 4 is a diagram showing a fibre-based public/quantum channel communication system; and.
- Figure 5 shows a single-photon source;
- Figure 6 shows a multi-access network embodying the present invention;
- Figure 7 shows a ring network embodying the present invention.
- a communication system comprises a transmitter 1, a receiver 2, and a transmission medium 3 linking the transmitter to the receiver.
- the transmission medium 3 is an optical transmission fibre.
- the transmitter 1 includes a pulsed semiconductor laser which may be, e.g., a DFB laser.
- a pulsed semiconductor laser which may be, e.g., a DFB laser.
- an appropriate device is an Hitachi series HL1361 DFB laser diode operating at 5mW optical power at 1290-1330nm.
- the optical signal from the laser is modulated with encrypted data.
- the signal is then output onto the transmission fibre 3 and subsequently detected at the receiver 2.
- the data is encrypted using the Bennett-Brassard protocol. This scheme is described in detail in C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, S. Breidbart and S. Wiesner, in "Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Crypto , 82", (Plenum, New York, 1983); C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin, 28 3153 '1985) .
- this example uses Bennett's interferometric version of the protocol, as described in C. H. Bennett, Phys. Review Lett
- the quantum channel is based upon a single photon Mach-Zehnder interferometer, the generic form of which is shown in Figure 1.
- individual photons pass through a phase modulator which is randomly switched between the different encoding alphabets corresponding to different integer phase shifts (e.g. 0 and ⁇ radians) or to different half-integer phase shifts (e.g. ⁇ r/2 and 3 ⁇ r/2 radians) , for example.
- a complementary structure is used in the receiver, with the photons again passing through a phase modulator which is randomly switched to decode either integer (i.e. phase set to 0 radians) or half integer phase shifts (i.e. phase set to ⁇ /2 radians) .
- the legitimate users of the channel can be sure that the remainder of the data is secure, and can safely be used as the key for ensuing encrypted communications.
- the error rate in the raw key will be non-zero even in the absence of an eavesdropper. This may be due to system imperfections such as decoder noise or frequency-dependent modulator response for example.
- the transmitter and receiver communicate using the public channel in order to perform the additional steps of error correction and privacy amplification as described in C. H. Bennett et al., J. Cryptology 5, 3(1992).
- the transmission link carries a stream of pulse pairs separated by a time delay ⁇ t.
- these pulse pairs are again split into two, and one half undergoes an identical delay to that in the transmitter.
- the inputs to the final beamsplitter are as shown in Figure 3b and the interference between the temporally coincident pulses can be used as the basis for the quantum key encryption.
- the quantum nature of the channel, and hence the security is obtained by ensuring that the pulses in the transmission fibre contain at most one photon. If the pulses contain more than one photon an eavesdropper could perform an imdetectable "beamsplitting" attack in which one or more photons are split off from each pulse leaving at least one undisturbed photon to be detected by the receiver.
- this scheme is implemented in an optical fibre-based form ( Figure 4) , in which both the quantum channel and the public channel are transmitted on a transmission fibre 3 linking the transmitter 1 to the receiver.
- a pulsed semiconductor laser 48 provides the optical source.
- the laser 48 and a modulator driver 49 for a phase modulator 41 are controlled by a microprocessor 50.
- the receiver 2 has its own local control microprocessor 54 which controls a respective phase modulator 42 via a modulator driver 52.
- the receiver control processor also controls a detector bias supply 53 for two detectors 43,44.
- couplers are available commercially from SIFAM as model P2S 13AA50.
- Appropriate modulators 41,42 for the data encoding and decoding are lithium niobate or semiconductor phase modulators operating at e.g. 100 MHz.
- Appropriate single photon detectors would be for example semiconductor avalanche photodiodes such as those described in B. F. Levine, C. G. Bethea and J. C. Campbell, Electronics Letters, 20 596 (1984) . These are biased beyond reverse breakdown and operate in the Geiger mode with passive or active quenching, as discussed in RGW Brown, KD Ridley and JG Rarity; Appl. Opt. 25 4122 (1986) and Appl. Opt. 26, 2383 (1987) .
- the key distribution protocol requires each received photon to be associated with a given clock period and also identified as a 0 or 1 depending upon which APD it is detected at. These functions are performed by a time interval analyser 45 (e.g. Hewlett-Packard 53310A) .
- the start signals for this device are provided by the APD outputs after processing by a circuit 46 comprising amplifiers and discriminators connected in series with each output and an exclusive-OR gate connected to the discriminators (e.g. Lecroy 612A, 821 and 622) .
- the stop signals are provided by the clock regenerator which is described below.
- the detection procedure is described in P.D. Townsend, J.G. Rarity and P.R.
- Silicon APDs such as the SPCM-100-PQ (GE Canada Electro Optics) can be used in the 400-1060nm wavelength range, while germanium or InGaAs devices such as the NDL5102P or NDL5500P (NEC) can be used in the 1000-1550nm range.
- the quantum channel uses pulses containing at most one photon.
- This situation is approximated by connecting an attenuator 55 in line with the laser source in order to reduce the intensity to a level such that the average number of photons per pulse, ⁇ , is about 0.1.
- ⁇ the average number of photons per pulse
- Attenuation thus reduces the possibility of an undetected beamsplitting attack, however, the received bit rate is reduced by a factor of 10 compared to the case of truly singe photon pulses.
- FIG. 5 shows an appropriate arrangement for the single photon source.
- a laser 4 which may be, e.g., a Ti:sapphire at 750 n , is used to pump a non-linear crystal 5 such as KDP.
- the parametric down conversion effected by the crystal produces correlated twin beams of photons at 1.5 ⁇ m.
- the photons in one beam are detected by a photodetector 6 and this triggers a gate 7 which opens a shutter to let through a single photon.
- an alternative mechanically switched path 8 is provided for the output from the laser, which bypasses the attenuator or single-photon source.
- the switch may be, e.g., JDS-Fitel SW12. This provides the public channel at the same wavelength as the quantum channel but using bright multi-photon pulses. The large intensity of these pulses would lead to saturation and current heating effects in the single-photon detectors. In order to avoid this happening, the reverse bias on the APDs is reduced well below breakdown so that the devices operate with greatly reduced sensitivity in the standard analogue mode.
- the APDs may be isolated by means of electro-mechanical optical switches, similar to that used in the transmitter, or using electro-optic switches, which route the multi-photon pulses to an additional standard detector such as a p-i-n photodiode.
- This channel Since this channel operates with many photons per pulse, it is classical in nature and is therefore open to attack by any eavesdropper.
- This channel provides the public channel for the encoding protocol.
- the transmitter and receiver communicate on this public channel to exchange information on which encoding/decoding alphabets were used for given signal pulses.
- the statistics of the signal received at the receiver can be analysed to determine whether the key has been received securely, or whether an eavesdropper has intercepted any part of the key.
- the public channel is also used to calibrate the transmission system.
- a long optical fibre link which may be as long as say 50 km, unavoidable environmental effects on the fibre, such as temperature fluctuations, cause both the polarization and phase of the transmitted pulses to vary slowly and randomly with time.
- the calibration step makes it possible to correct for these variations, as described below.
- any communication between the transmitter and receiver is initialized by using the public channel to measure the output polarization from the transmission fibre 3.
- a polarization compensator 10 e.g. JDS-Fitel PR2000
- the transmitter and receiver then use the public channel to calibrate the relative phase shift in their interferometers. In order to do this, the microprocessor controllers turn off the time-varying signals from their modulator drivers.
- the controller in the receiver sets the phase in the interferometer to the start position either by changing the DC offset voltage from the modulator driver or, if the modulator is AC- coupled, by means of an additional phase-shifting component connected in-line with the modulator such as a PZT-based fibre-stretcher.
- the phase shift is monitored by means of the APD signal level and this may be, e.g., maximised or minimised. This then completes the calibration of the system.
- the optical switch in the transmitter is then set to establish the quantum channel by connecting the low intensity source, and the bias supply 53 in the receiver (e.g. Keithley 230) reverse biases the APDs beyond breakdown to achieve single-photon sensitivity.
- the transmitter and receiver can then use relative phase modulation of the signal as the basis for secure communication. After some characteristic time, the system needs to be re-calibrated and so the calibration steps outlined above are repeated.
- the public channel is then used to complete the key distribution protocol. This step requires the use of an additional source at the receiver and an additional detector at the transmitter (not shown in Figure 4) to enable two way communication.
- the data sent over the public channel during this discussion stage of the protocol can also be modulated by means of phase shift keying as in the case of the quantum data, using the phase modulators in the system. In practise, it may be desirable to continue the periodic calibration of the system during this stage of the protocol.
- the quantum key distribution system used in the present example has a common pulsed laser source from which both the quantum and public channels sources are derived and the protocol requires that the transmitter and receiver must correlate the sent and received data for each pulse time-slot. Consequently, a system clock is required to avoid timing errors.
- This function can be performed by the public channel during the calibration process outlined above.
- the amplified output from the public channel detector is input to the clock regenerator module.
- the local oscillator is re-timed so as to avoid the accumulation of any timing errors.
- the frequency with which re-calibration needs to be carried out is determined by the shorter of the two time constants associated with the stability of the local oscillator and the transmission channel.
- the public and quantum channels use a single common wavelength
- different wavelengths might be used.
- the different channels can then be separated by means of wavelength-dependent fibre couplers and optical filters.
- the clock and calibration information can be transmitted continuously during the quantum transmission. This removes the need for a local oscillator in the receiver and thereby removes any instability problems that might be associated with such an oscillator.
- the system in its widest scope is not limited to transmission over optical fibres, but can be applied to key distribution systems operating in any region of the electro-magnetic spectrum using any appropriate transmission medium.
- the optical fibre network used for both the quantum transmissions and the public channel is a multiple-access network. As described and claimed in our co-pending European application no.
- the basic quantum- cryptographic protocol can be extended for use with such a network.
- steps (a) to (c) of the transmission protocol each encoded bit transmitted is either lost from the system or received at one only of the plurality of receivers.
- the transmitter outputs a sufficient number of bits, each bit being carried by one single-photon signal, for each receiver to establish an r-bit key, where r is a predetermined integer.
- the number of transmitted bits required is determined by the coupling ratios at each branch and the attenuation in the network.
- Each receiver receives a different sequence of bits, randomly determined by the paths taken by the individual single-photon pulses.
- each receiver has a different r-bit key known to the transmitter. This key can subsequently be used for secure communication between the transmitter and the different receivers using multi-photon signals broadcast on the network in both directions, i.e. from the receiver to the transmitter as well as from the transmitter to the receiver.
- the network functions as a conventional classical multiple-access network, with the multi-photon signals being split at the different branches. Accordingly, a multi-photon calibration signal output by the transmitter can be used to calibrate simultaneously all the different receivers on the network.
- FIG. 6 shows a specific example of a broadcast network containing two receivers and a transmitter.
- the transmitter consists of a gain-switched semiconductor laser 9, of the type described above, an attenuator or intensity modulator 67, and a polarisation modulator 68 and control electronics 70.
- the single-photon detectors in the receivers may be the same devices as described in the first embodiment discussed above.
- Each receiver includes a microprocessor control u ⁇ .t 62, which receives the output of the APD via a discriminator/amplifier circuit 63.
- the control unit 62 also controls an electronic filter 64 and local oscillator 65, as well as the APD bias supply 66.
- the electronic filter 64 isolates the first harmonic of the frequency spectrum of the signal output by the APD in response to synchronising pulses received via the network. This generates a sinusoidal signal at the pulse frequency which locks the local oscillator 65.
- the output of the local oscillator 65 is received at the control unit 62 to provide a timing reference during quantum transmissions.
- the key distribution process is initiated by the transmitter sending a stream of multi-photon timing pulses into the network.
- the attenuator in the transmitter is not engaged at this point.
- the pulses are received by both terminals. Prior to this the receivers have set the reverse bias on their detectors to be well-below breakdown so that the internal gain is low. In this mode, the APDs can detect the multi-photon timing pulses without suffering from saturation.
- Each APD output signal contains a frequency component at the fundamental repetition rate of the pulsed source, and this is used to clock the local oscillator in the receiver as described above.
- the attenuator in the transmitter is engaged so that the output pulses contain around 0.1 photons on average.
- the APDs in the receivers are biased beyond breakdown so that internal gain is high enough to achieve detection sensitivity at the single-photon level. Transmissions are then carried out on the quantum channel as described above.
- timing and calibration information may be sent concurrently with the quantum key information. This may be done, for example, by controlling the attenuator to increase the intensity of every p th pulse. This pulse would then contain sufficient photons to guarantee that it is detected by all the receivers on the network.
- the receivers analyse their received data sets to identify the regularly spaced reference events. These events, possibly after multiplication by a factor of p to convert the event frequency to the pulse frequency, can then be used to identify the time-slots of the quantum channel detection events which, in contrast, occur irregularly and at much lower frequency, between the reference events.
- the single-photon detector may be blanked during each timing pulse slot. This may be done either by reducing the sensitivity of the detector, e.g. by reducing the reverse bias to the APD, or by means of a second switchable attenuator connected in line with the single-photon detector. Consequently, there will be a lower limit on p since ideally the single-photon detector should receive may single-photon pulses for each timing pulse.
- the upper limit for p is determined by the stability of the local oscillators in each receiver.
- the signals may be encoded on a separate wavelength from that used for the quantum channel and wavelength-sensitive components such as WDM couplers and filters used to isolate the quantum and calibration channels.
- the calibration schemes of the present invention may also be used in networks having a loop configuration. Using such a configuration it is possible to achieve significant reductions in cost and complexity for multiple- access key distribution. Instead of using a destructive single-photon detector in each receiver or node, a modulator is provided in each receiver or node which modulates an incoming single-photon signal and passes it on to travel back to a single-photon detector in the transmitter/exchange. As will be apparent, such a configuration then only needs one single-photon detector at the transmitter/exchange, rather than multiple single- photon detectors distributed among the different nodes.
- Figure 7 shows an example of a communications system comprising a transmitter/exchange T connected to three receivers R1-R3 via a passive optical network N having a ring topology.
- the transmitter T includes both a quantum channel source 71 for use in establishing a key by quantum cryptography, and also a conventional intensity-modulated source for outputting multi-photon signals for the calibration phase and also for carrying conventional traffic.
- the quantum channel source 71 and standard source 74 operate at different wavelengths ⁇ q and ⁇ 8 respectively.
- the output from the quantum source 1 passes through a switchable attenuator 79 and a polariser and band-pass filter 78 tuned to the quantum channel wavelength ⁇ .
- Each receiver or node comprises a first multi-photon detector 75 for the signal on channel ⁇ 8 , a detector 80 for multi-photon timing signals at the quantum channel wavelength ⁇ , and a modulator 72, which in the present example is a polarisation modulator.
- the clock detector 80 is connected to the network N by a fibre coupler 81 which provides a weak tap at ⁇ q . These taps have low coupling fractions (e.g. of the order 1%) in order not to introduce excessive attenuation in the quantum channels.
- WDM couplers which have a finite coupling fraction at ⁇ c and ideally a zero-coupling fraction at ⁇ can be employed.
- the detector 75 for the signal wavelength is connected to the network by a WDM (wavelength division multiplexer) coupler 77.
- the WDM is a fibre coupler with a wavelength-dependent coupling characteristic.
- the WDM provides a straight-through route for the quantum channel, i.e. the coupling fraction out of the loop is small at ⁇ q , whilst at the signal wavelength ⁇ s the coupling fraction has a much larger value F s .
- the public channel should be used both for the calibration of the system and for the transmission of timing signals, alternatively, these two functions may be carried out independently.
- the public channel may still advantageously be used for the transmission of a clocking signal in the manner described above.
Abstract
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Priority Applications (41)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE69309496T DE69309496T2 (en) | 1992-12-24 | 1993-12-23 | KEY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AND METHOD USING QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY |
US08/464,710 US5675648A (en) | 1992-12-24 | 1993-12-23 | System and method for key distribution using quantum cryptography |
EP94902943A EP0676110B1 (en) | 1992-12-24 | 1993-12-23 | System and method for key distribution using quantum cryptography |
JP6514960A JPH08505019A (en) | 1992-12-24 | 1993-12-23 | System and method for key distribution using quantum cryptography |
AU57099/94A AU674198B2 (en) | 1992-12-24 | 1993-12-23 | System and method for key distribution using quantum cryptography |
JP7508543A JP2951408B2 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | Quantum encryption system and method |
DE69414864T DE69414864T2 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | KEY DISTRIBUTION IN A MULTIPLE-ACCESS NETWORK USING QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY |
AU75439/94A AU693109B2 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | System and method for key distribution using quantum cryptography |
CA002168851A CA2168851C (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | System and method for quantum cryptography |
PCT/GB1994/001955 WO1995007585A1 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | Method for key distribution using quantum cryptography |
ES94925578T ES2128579T3 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | SYSTEM AND PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF KEYS USING QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY. |
EP94925577A EP0717895B1 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | Key distribution in a multiple access network using quantum cryptography |
DE69415815T DE69415815T2 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | KEY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AND METHOD USING QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY |
DE69432482T DE69432482T2 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | KEY DISTRIBUTION METHOD USING QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY |
ES94925577T ES2126143T3 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | KEY DISTRIBUTION IN A MULTIPLE ACCESS NETWORK THROUGH QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY. |
EP94925578A EP0717896B1 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | System and method for key distribution using quantum cryptography |
JP50854495A JP3734830B2 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | Key distribution method using quantum cryptography |
AU75441/94A AU691197B2 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | Method for key distribution using quantum cryptography |
DE69408152T DE69408152T2 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY |
PCT/GB1994/001954 WO1995007584A1 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | System and method for quantum cryptography |
EP94925579A EP0717897B1 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | System and method for quantum cryptography |
CA002169552A CA2169552C (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | Key distribution in a multiple access network using quantum cryptography |
JP50854195A JP3645261B2 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | Key distribution in multiple access networks using quantum cryptography |
AU75440/94A AU678049B2 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | System and method for quantum cryptography |
CA002169553A CA2169553C (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | System and method for key distribution using quantum cryptography |
ES94925579T ES2111950T3 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY. |
JP50854295A JP3756948B2 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | Key distribution system and method using quantum cryptography |
AU75438/94A AU678848B2 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | Key distribution in a multiple access network using quantum cryptography |
KR1019960701242A KR960705432A (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | METHOD FOR KEY DISTRIBUTION USING QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY |
US08/612,880 US5850441A (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | System and method for key distribution using quantum cryptography |
CA002169746A CA2169746C (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | Method for key distribution using quantum cryptography |
KR1019960701243A KR960705433A (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR KEY DISTRIBUTION USING QUANTUM CRYPTO GRAPHY |
US08/612,881 US5764765A (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | Method for key distribution using quantum cryptography |
EP94925580A EP0739559B1 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | Method for key distribution using quantum cryptography |
PCT/GB1994/001952 WO1995007582A1 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | Key distribution in a multiple access network using quantum cryptography |
PCT/GB1994/001953 WO1995007583A1 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | System and method for key distribution using quantum cryptography |
US08/617,848 US5757912A (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | System and method for quantum cryptography |
KR1019960701188A KR960705431A (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1994-09-08 | SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY |
KR1019960701187A KR960705430A (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1996-03-08 | Communication method and communication system using quantum encryption technique (KEY DISTRIBUTION IN A MULTIPLE ACCESS NETWORK USING QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY) |
HK113097A HK113097A (en) | 1992-12-24 | 1997-06-26 | System and method for key distribution using quantum cryptography |
HK98109334A HK1008766A1 (en) | 1993-09-09 | 1998-07-21 | System and method for quantum cryptography |
Applications Claiming Priority (6)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
GB9226995.0 | 1992-12-24 | ||
GB929226995A GB9226995D0 (en) | 1992-12-24 | 1992-12-24 | Communications system |
EP93307121 | 1993-09-09 | ||
EP93307120.1 | 1993-09-09 | ||
EP93307121.9 | 1993-09-09 | ||
EP93307120 | 1993-09-09 |
Publications (1)
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WO1994015422A1 true WO1994015422A1 (en) | 1994-07-07 |
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PCT/GB1993/002637 WO1994015422A1 (en) | 1992-12-24 | 1993-12-23 | System and method for key distribution using quantum cryptography |
Country Status (9)
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US (1) | US5675648A (en) |
EP (1) | EP0676110B1 (en) |
JP (1) | JPH08505019A (en) |
AU (1) | AU674198B2 (en) |
CA (1) | CA2152628C (en) |
DE (1) | DE69309496T2 (en) |
ES (1) | ES2101495T3 (en) |
HK (1) | HK113097A (en) |
WO (1) | WO1994015422A1 (en) |
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WO1996007951A1 (en) * | 1994-09-08 | 1996-03-14 | British Telecommunications Plc | Polarisation modulation |
EP0885495A1 (en) * | 1996-03-19 | 1998-12-23 | Richard A. Steenblik | Controlling correlated quantum state probability distributions |
EP0920149A2 (en) * | 1997-10-02 | 1999-06-02 | Motoyoshi Akio | Method and apparatus for quantum communication |
FR2801400A1 (en) * | 1999-03-17 | 2001-05-25 | British Telecomm | Optical signal intruder detection system, having intense pulse source/target broadcast diffuser multiple photon rays providing and different position detectors detecting signal change |
GB2405294A (en) * | 2003-08-18 | 2005-02-23 | Toshiba Res Europ Ltd | Receiver for a quantum cryptography communication system |
US7088824B1 (en) | 1999-04-12 | 2006-08-08 | Mitsubishi Denki Kabushiki Kaisha | Single-photon-emission apparatus |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
AU674198B2 (en) | 1996-12-12 |
DE69309496D1 (en) | 1997-05-07 |
EP0676110B1 (en) | 1997-04-02 |
HK113097A (en) | 1997-08-29 |
US5675648A (en) | 1997-10-07 |
AU5709994A (en) | 1994-07-19 |
CA2152628C (en) | 1999-02-02 |
JPH08505019A (en) | 1996-05-28 |
DE69309496T2 (en) | 1997-08-07 |
CA2152628A1 (en) | 1994-07-07 |
ES2101495T3 (en) | 1997-07-01 |
EP0676110A1 (en) | 1995-10-11 |
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