WO1996042182A1 - Verfahren und vorrichtung zur übertragung von vertraulichen verbindungsaufbau- und serviceinformationen zwischen teilnehmerseitigen endeinrichtungen und einer oder mehreren digitalen vermittlungsstellen - Google Patents
Verfahren und vorrichtung zur übertragung von vertraulichen verbindungsaufbau- und serviceinformationen zwischen teilnehmerseitigen endeinrichtungen und einer oder mehreren digitalen vermittlungsstellen Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO1996042182A1 WO1996042182A1 PCT/DE1996/001068 DE9601068W WO9642182A1 WO 1996042182 A1 WO1996042182 A1 WO 1996042182A1 DE 9601068 W DE9601068 W DE 9601068W WO 9642182 A1 WO9642182 A1 WO 9642182A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- subscriber
- service information
- security device
- confidential
- connection
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04Q—SELECTING
- H04Q11/00—Selecting arrangements for multiplex systems
- H04Q11/04—Selecting arrangements for multiplex systems for time-division multiplexing
- H04Q11/0428—Integrated services digital network, i.e. systems for transmission of different types of digitised signals, e.g. speech, data, telecentral, television signals
- H04Q11/0435—Details
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04Q—SELECTING
- H04Q2213/00—Indexing scheme relating to selecting arrangements in general and for multiplex systems
- H04Q2213/339—Ciphering/encryption
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method for transmitting confidential and authentic connection establishment and / or service information between subscriber end devices and one or more switching centers of a digital communication network, in particular an ISDN network, as well as a device for transmitting confidential connection establishment and / or Service information according to claims 6 and 8.
- Digital communication networks which have several subscriber lines and digital switching centers. Since a subscriber line unencrypted all dialing and service information, i.e. in plain text, sends to a digital exchange, intruders or so-called eavesdroppers can easily listen to this confidential information on the connecting lines by connecting to the existing connection paths at various points or by connecting to the existing connections. Once an intruder has obtained the dialing and service information in this way, he can, although he is not authorized, use the exchange at the expense of the subscriber.
- the invention is implemented in a digital communication network, in particular the ISDN network.
- a digital communication network is known to comprise a number of switching centers, at least one network termination device installed at the subscriber, to which at least one data terminal device, for example telephone devices, personal computers or facsimile devices, can be connected.
- An unwanted use of a switching center by an intruder is now prevented by arranging at least one first security device for at least one owner of a subscriber line, and that at least one second security device is also arranged in at least one switching center, the first and second security devices assigned to a specific subscriber can encrypt and / or decrypt and / or exchange connection establishment and / or service information of this subscriber.
- These security devices each have a security module, which in turn can accommodate an identity holder.
- Connection-specific modules are installed in each exchange, each of which contains a second safety device.
- this embodiment is expensive and complex, since the exchanges themselves would have to be converted.
- a more cost-effective way which can be achieved with less effort, is to connect an additional device between the network termination devices assigned to the switching center and the switching parts, starting from existing digital switching centers.
- the corresponding second security device is arranged in this additional device for each associated subscriber line.
- the first security device of a specific subscriber is expediently arranged in the network termination device itself assigned to the subscriber line. In this case, a single security device is sufficient, even if the owner of a subscriber line can connect up to eight data terminals to the network termination device via an S 0 bus. It is entirely possible to equip each data terminal that is assigned to a network termination device with its own security device.
- Another alternative can be to connect a security device between each data terminal and the associated network termination device.
- the service information can, for example, call forwarding and
- Conference calling features include. If the digital communication network is an ISDN network, the confidential information is transmitted between the subscriber-side first security device and the security device assigned to the switching center via the D-channel of the ISDN network. Each identity holder can save an individual cryptographic key related to the owner of the subscriber line.
- the identity carrier can be a chip card which can be inserted into the first security module by the owner of a subscriber line and into the second security module by an operator of the network operator.
- a useful alternative relates to a software module as an identity carrier, which can be used interchangeably in the respective security module.
- the first security device on the subscriber side and the second security device assigned to the switching center can authenticate the subscriber to the Execute exchange. Alternatively, separate authentication devices can be installed for this task.
- the protection of the switching center and of the authorized subscriber line holder can be improved in that, for user-to-user communication, the first and second security devices assigned to a specific subscriber use all the data to be transmitted via the control channel of the digital communication network. or decrypt.
- the subscriber-side security device assigned to a particular subscriber and the security device assigned to the exchange have the same subscriber-related identity. They also encrypt and / or decrypt the confidential information using the same subscriber-specific key.
- FIG. 1 shows, in a schematic manner, a section of a digital communication network that supports the
- FIG. 2 shows an embodiment in which the invention
- FIG. 3 is a detailed block diagram of the
- Fig. 4 is a detailed block diagram of a connection-specific assembly of the
- Fig. 1 shows a simplified representation of a part of a digital communication network, which should be an ISDN network for the following exemplary description.
- a telephone set 20 is shown as the data terminal device, which is connected to a network termination device 10 via an S Q bus 25.
- the network termination device 10 also called Network Terminator (NT)
- NT Network Terminator
- a subscriber-side safety device 40, 50 according to the invention is shown in FIG.
- the security device comprises a subscriber-specific identity carrier 50 and a security module 40 which can be permanently installed in the network termination device 10 and into which the identity carrier 50 can be inserted.
- the identity carrier 50 can be a chip card or a software module.
- the security device 40, 50 is designed in such a way that it can encrypt the confidential connection and / or service information of a particular subscriber with a subscriber-specific or connection-specific key. This key can be stored in a memory chip on the chip card of the subscriber.
- the network termination device 10 is connected on the output side in a known manner via a twisted two-wire line to an ISDN switching device 30 assigned to it.
- an ISDN network comprises a number of network termination devices 10 and a number of switching systems 30 which can be connected to one another via twisted two-wire lines.
- the switching device 30 contains a number of modules 80 (in 1 only shows a connection-specific module 80), which are each assigned to a specific subscriber line owner.
- a safety device 60, 70 is arranged in each connection-specific assembly 80.
- the security device 60, 70 in the switching center 30 comprises a module 60 which can be permanently installed in the assembly 80 and an identity carrier 70 which can be used therein. It is assumed that the identity carrier 70 in the switching device 30 likewise has the individual cryptographic key of the subscriber-side security device 40, 50 contains.
- FIG. 2 shows an alternative embodiment in which an additional device 100 is connected between the network termination device 10 and the switching device 30.
- FIG. 2 shows the additional device 100 only with the built-in security device 60, 70.
- the security devices 60, 70 that are assigned to the subscribers or network termination devices, which are all assigned by the switching center, are installed in the additional device 100 30 are operated.
- the connecting lines are indicated in FIGS. 1 and 2.
- the identity carriers 70 can be inserted from the outside by an operator as a chip card, or can already be inserted into the respective security module 60 during implementation as a software module.
- the use of the additional device 100 has the advantage that existing switching centers of the ISDN network can continue to be used without having to make time-consuming, expensive and complicated changes to the switching systems in order to transmit encrypted information, for example of the subscriber to the telephone set 20, in an encrypted manner Switching device 30 to be able to perform.
- 3 shows a simplified block diagram of the known network termination device 10, in which the security module 40 according to the invention is installed together with the identity carrier 50.
- the network termination device 10 On the subscriber side, the network termination device 10 has a connection unit for the S 0 bus 25, to which up to eight data terminal devices 20 can be connected. Since the structure and mode of operation of the network termination device 10 are generally known, only the essential assemblies are briefly explained below. Basically, the network termination device 10 has a transmission path and a reception path.
- the transmission path comprises an encoder 210 which, among other things, feeds the confidential information to be transmitted in the D-channel of the ISDN network to a encryption egg in the and time-division multiplex the D channel into a coherent data stream.
- a corresponding frame format consists of 48 bits per 250 ms, only four D-channel bits per frame being provided. In other words, 16 kbit / s are transmitted via the D channel (see FIG. 5).
- the transmission path then runs in succession via a transmitter 180 to a hook switch 170, which gives the outgoing data stream to a two-wire line which the switching center 30 connects to
- Network termination device 10 connects. Incoming data streams pass through the hybrid circuit 170, a receiver 160 and a device 150, which equalizes, amplifies the received data stream and recovers the clock signal from it. Next, the data stream passes through a demultiplexer 140, which divides the data stream back into the two B channels and the D channel. The demultiplexed data stream passes through a decoder 130 and is then transmitted to the telephone set 20 via the S 0 bus 25 in accordance with a destination address. An echo compensation 190, which is connected in parallel between the transmitter 180 and the receiver 160, serves, among other things, for outgoing messages that are transmitted via the Fork switch 170 and the receiver 160 are fed to the receiving path to compensate.
- connection-specific assembly 80 essentially forms the counterpart to that
- Network termination device 10 Incoming data messages arrive via the two-wire line to a hook switch 230 and then pass through a demultiplexer 240, a decoder 250 and a D-channel dealer 260.
- the D-channel dealer 260 supplies a central control unit of the switching device 30 with the corresponding tax information.
- Outgoing messages run in the opposite direction via an encoder 270, a multiplexer 290, the hook switch 230 and via the two-wire line to the network termination device 10.
- a control unit 280 takes over the management and interaction of the individual components.
- the security module 60 with an externally insertable chip card or an inserted software module 70 is installed in the connection-specific assembly 80.
- Network termination device 10 and a second security device 60, 70 are installed in the module 80 of the switching center 30 assigned to the subscriber of the telephone set 20.
- the safety device 60, 70 can also be installed in the additional device 100.
- the methods described below run essentially in the same way for both embodiments. It is further assumed that the subscriber identity carrier 50 and the exchange identity carrier 70 have the same identifier, ie the identity of the subscriber of the telephone set 20.
- the subscriber-side security device 40, 50 and the exchange-side security device 60, 70 have the same cryptographic key related to the subscriber of the telephone set 20. Both identifiers 50, 70 are chip cards.
- the security device 40, 50 After the security device 40, 50 has authenticated the subscriber of the telephone set 20 to the switching center 30 in connection with the security device 60, 70 installed in the subscriber-specific assembly 80 - the authentication can also be carried out by separate
- Authentication devices are carried out - all connection establishment and service information is encrypted by the subscriber-side security device 40, 50 with the subscriber-related key and transmitted in the D channel via the ISDN network to the security device 60, 70 in the subscriber-specific module.
- the security device 60, 70 in the exchange 30 decrypts the received encrypted connection establishment and / or service information with the common subscriber-related key and sends the decrypted information via the D-channel dealer to a central unit of the exchange 30.
- the decrypted is carried out - all connection establishment and service information is encrypted by the subscriber-side security device 40, 50 with the subscriber-related key and transmitted in the D channel via the ISDN network to the security device 60, 70 in the subscriber-specific module.
- the security device 60, 70 in the exchange 30 decrypts the received encrypted connection establishment and / or service information with the common subscriber-related key and sends the decrypted information via the D-channel dealer to a central unit of the exchange 30.
- Connection establishment information the desired connection to the called subscriber is established and the requested services are made available in response to the decrypted service information. In this way it is ensured that an unauthorized attacker cannot establish a connection to another subscriber at the expense of the subscriber of the telephone set 20.
- a wide variety of known ones can be used for encryption and decryption Encryption methods are used and used. This is, for example, the Riwest-Shamir-Adlerman process or the data encryption standard process.
- the decryption module 70 is installed in the subscriber-specific assembly 80 instead of the chip card.
- the decryption module 70 is the powered from a central or decentralized key center "to the subscriber of the telephone set 20 associated key.
- the key can be transmitted to the security device 60, 70 either by means of a data carrier, for example a floppy disk, or by electronic data transmission. Special security aspects that are important and known in the field of confidential and authentic information transmission must be taken into account, because the subscriber-specific key must not be known to an unauthorized third party.
- the security device 60, 70 of the module 80 has received the subscriber-specific, cryptographic key, the confidential connection establishment and service information is transmitted in accordance with the method described above.
- control channel (D channel) of the digital communication network functions as a transmission line for data of a user-to-user transmission, namely between the data terminal 20 and the exchange 30.
- the subscriber side Security device 40, 50 is capable of encrypting the data coming from a personal computer, for example, and assigning it to the switching center 30
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (9)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP9502513A JPH11507782A (ja) | 1995-06-13 | 1996-06-08 | 秘密の接続確立情報及びサービス情報を加入者のターミナルと1又はそれ以上のデジタル交換機との間で伝送するための方法及び装置 |
AU59966/96A AU712703B2 (en) | 1995-06-13 | 1996-06-08 | Process and device for transmitting confidential connection establishment and service information between subscriber terminals and one or more digital exchanges |
DE59608454T DE59608454D1 (de) | 1995-06-13 | 1996-06-08 | Verfahren und vorrichtung zur übertragung von vertraulichen verbindungsaufbau- und serviceinformationen zwischen teilnehmerseitigen endeinrichtungen und einer oder mehreren digitalen vermittlungsstellen |
AT96917355T ATE210918T1 (de) | 1995-06-13 | 1996-06-08 | Verfahren und vorrichtung zur übertragung von vertraulichen verbindungsaufbau- und serviceinformationen zwischen teilnehmerseitigen endeinrichtungen und einer oder mehreren digitalen vermittlungsstellen |
US08/973,927 US6708275B1 (en) | 1995-06-13 | 1996-06-08 | Process and device for transmitting confidential connection establishment and service information between subscriber terminals and one or more digital exchanges |
EP96917355A EP0834238B1 (de) | 1995-06-13 | 1996-06-08 | Verfahren und vorrichtung zur übertragung von vertraulichen verbindungsaufbau- und serviceinformationen zwischen teilnehmerseitigen endeinrichtungen und einer oder mehreren digitalen vermittlungsstellen |
DK96917355T DK0834238T3 (da) | 1995-06-13 | 1996-06-08 | Fremgangsmåde og anordning til overføring af fortrolige forbindelsesetablerings- og serviceinformationer mellem terminaler på abonnentsiden og en eller flere digitale centraler |
NZ309731A NZ309731A (en) | 1995-06-13 | 1996-06-08 | Process and device for transmitting confidential connection and service information between subscriber terminals and one or more digital |
NO19975866A NO321858B1 (no) | 1995-06-13 | 1997-12-12 | Fremgangsmate og innretning for overforing av fortrolige forbindelsesoppbygnings- og tjenesteinformasjon mellom abonnentterminaler og en eller flere digitale sentraler |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE19521485.4 | 1995-06-13 | ||
DE19521485A DE19521485A1 (de) | 1995-06-13 | 1995-06-13 | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Übertragung von vertraulichen Verbindungsaufbau- und Serviceinformationen zwischen teilnehmerseitigen Endeinrichtungen und einer oder mehreren digitalen Vermittlungsstellen |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO1996042182A1 true WO1996042182A1 (de) | 1996-12-27 |
Family
ID=7764268
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/DE1996/001068 WO1996042182A1 (de) | 1995-06-13 | 1996-06-08 | Verfahren und vorrichtung zur übertragung von vertraulichen verbindungsaufbau- und serviceinformationen zwischen teilnehmerseitigen endeinrichtungen und einer oder mehreren digitalen vermittlungsstellen |
Country Status (14)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US6708275B1 (de) |
EP (1) | EP0834238B1 (de) |
JP (1) | JPH11507782A (de) |
AT (1) | ATE210918T1 (de) |
AU (1) | AU712703B2 (de) |
CA (1) | CA2224316A1 (de) |
DE (2) | DE19521485A1 (de) |
DK (1) | DK0834238T3 (de) |
ES (1) | ES2170236T3 (de) |
NO (1) | NO321858B1 (de) |
NZ (1) | NZ309731A (de) |
PT (1) | PT834238E (de) |
TR (1) | TR199701606T1 (de) |
WO (1) | WO1996042182A1 (de) |
Cited By (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE19916490A1 (de) * | 1999-04-13 | 2000-10-26 | Alcatel Sa | Überwachung der Übertragungsqualität in einem digital Nachrichtenübertragungsnetz |
AT411509B (de) * | 1999-09-17 | 2004-01-26 | Telekom Austria Ag | Anordnung und verfahren zur verschlüsselten kommunikation |
US6708275B1 (en) | 1995-06-13 | 2004-03-16 | Deutsche Telekom | Process and device for transmitting confidential connection establishment and service information between subscriber terminals and one or more digital exchanges |
US20190333122A1 (en) * | 2010-06-11 | 2019-10-31 | Cardinalcommerce Corporation | Method and System for Secure Order Management System Data Encryption, Decryption, and Segmentation |
Families Citing this family (7)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US6819655B1 (en) | 1998-11-09 | 2004-11-16 | Applied Digital Access, Inc. | System and method of analyzing network protocols |
US6930788B1 (en) * | 1999-07-20 | 2005-08-16 | Canon Kabushiki Kaisha | Secure printing over cable network to home printer |
DE10117930B4 (de) * | 2001-04-10 | 2015-03-05 | Deutsche Telekom Ag | Verfahren zur Verschlüsselung von zu übertragenden Daten und Schaltungsanordnung zur Durchführung des Verfahrens |
DE10129424A1 (de) * | 2001-06-19 | 2003-01-09 | Tenovis Gmbh & Co Kg | Verfahren zum Aufbau einer Verbindung |
JP4727860B2 (ja) * | 2001-08-03 | 2011-07-20 | 富士通株式会社 | 無線操作装置、およびプログラム |
FR2869745A1 (fr) * | 2004-04-28 | 2005-11-04 | France Telecom | Systeme et procede d'acces securise de terminaux visiteurs a un reseau de type ip |
US8680455B2 (en) * | 2011-02-04 | 2014-03-25 | Aptina Imaging Corporation | Plasmonic light collectors |
Family Cites Families (12)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE3905667A1 (de) * | 1989-02-24 | 1990-08-30 | Ant Nachrichtentech | Verfahren zum ver- und entschluesseln eines nachrichtenstromes |
NO168860C (no) * | 1989-11-13 | 1992-04-08 | Alcatel Stk As | Kommunikasjonsnettverk |
DE4120398A1 (de) * | 1991-06-20 | 1993-01-07 | Standard Elektrik Lorenz Ag | Datenverarbeitungsanlage |
US5172414A (en) * | 1991-09-13 | 1992-12-15 | At&T Bell Laboratories | Speech and control message encrypton in cellular radio |
US5608800A (en) * | 1992-04-09 | 1997-03-04 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Process for detecting unauthorized introduction of any data transmitted by a transmitter to a receiver |
TW225623B (en) * | 1993-03-31 | 1994-06-21 | American Telephone & Telegraph | Real-time fraud monitoring system |
US5506904A (en) * | 1993-08-04 | 1996-04-09 | Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. | System and method for transmitting and receiving variable length authorization control for digital services |
DE4406590C2 (de) * | 1994-03-01 | 2001-05-31 | Deutsche Telekom Ag | System zur Authentifizierung von Anrufern |
DE4406602C2 (de) * | 1994-03-01 | 2000-06-29 | Deutsche Telekom Ag | Sicherheitssystem zum Identifizieren und Authentisieren von Kommunikationspartnern |
US5546463A (en) * | 1994-07-12 | 1996-08-13 | Information Resource Engineering, Inc. | Pocket encrypting and authenticating communications device |
DE9417399U1 (de) * | 1994-10-29 | 1995-03-09 | Rutenbeck Wilhelm Gmbh & Co | Schaltungsanordnung zur Leitungsüberwachung für analoge Fernsprechanschlüsse |
DE19521485A1 (de) | 1995-06-13 | 1996-12-19 | Deutsche Telekom Ag | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Übertragung von vertraulichen Verbindungsaufbau- und Serviceinformationen zwischen teilnehmerseitigen Endeinrichtungen und einer oder mehreren digitalen Vermittlungsstellen |
-
1995
- 1995-06-13 DE DE19521485A patent/DE19521485A1/de not_active Withdrawn
-
1996
- 1996-06-08 JP JP9502513A patent/JPH11507782A/ja active Pending
- 1996-06-08 TR TR97/01606T patent/TR199701606T1/xx unknown
- 1996-06-08 WO PCT/DE1996/001068 patent/WO1996042182A1/de active IP Right Grant
- 1996-06-08 CA CA002224316A patent/CA2224316A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 1996-06-08 NZ NZ309731A patent/NZ309731A/en unknown
- 1996-06-08 AT AT96917355T patent/ATE210918T1/de active
- 1996-06-08 ES ES96917355T patent/ES2170236T3/es not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1996-06-08 US US08/973,927 patent/US6708275B1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1996-06-08 DK DK96917355T patent/DK0834238T3/da active
- 1996-06-08 EP EP96917355A patent/EP0834238B1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1996-06-08 DE DE59608454T patent/DE59608454D1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1996-06-08 AU AU59966/96A patent/AU712703B2/en not_active Expired
- 1996-06-08 PT PT96917355T patent/PT834238E/pt unknown
-
1997
- 1997-12-12 NO NO19975866A patent/NO321858B1/no not_active IP Right Cessation
Non-Patent Citations (5)
Title |
---|
DIFFIE W ET AL: "SECURE CCM", TELESIS, vol. 16, no. 2, 1 January 1989 (1989-01-01), pages 42 - 50, XP000072004 * |
FORD W ET AL: "PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY AND OPEN SYSTEMS INTERCONNECTION", IEEE COMMUNICATIONS MAGAZINE, vol. 30, no. 7, 1 July 1992 (1992-07-01), pages 30 - 35, XP000307910 * |
GASSER ET AL.: "THE DIGITAL DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM SECURITY ARCHITECTURE", PROC. 12TH NAT. COMPUTER SECURITY CONF., October 1989 (1989-10-01), pages 305 - 319, XP002017714 * |
O'HIGGINS ET AL.: "ENCRYPTION AND ISDN - A NATURAL FIT", INTERNATIONAL SWITCHING SYMPOSIUM 1987, 15 March 1987 (1987-03-15) - 20 March 1987 (1987-03-20), PHOENIX, ARIZONA USA, pages 863 - 869, XP002017713 * |
PRESTTUN K: "INTEGRATING CRYPTOGRAPHY IN ISDN", ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY, SANTA BARBARA, AUG. 16 - 20, 1987, no. CONF. 7, 1 January 1987 (1987-01-01), POMERANCE C, pages 9 - 18, XP000130200 * |
Cited By (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US6708275B1 (en) | 1995-06-13 | 2004-03-16 | Deutsche Telekom | Process and device for transmitting confidential connection establishment and service information between subscriber terminals and one or more digital exchanges |
DE19916490A1 (de) * | 1999-04-13 | 2000-10-26 | Alcatel Sa | Überwachung der Übertragungsqualität in einem digital Nachrichtenübertragungsnetz |
AT411509B (de) * | 1999-09-17 | 2004-01-26 | Telekom Austria Ag | Anordnung und verfahren zur verschlüsselten kommunikation |
US20190333122A1 (en) * | 2010-06-11 | 2019-10-31 | Cardinalcommerce Corporation | Method and System for Secure Order Management System Data Encryption, Decryption, and Segmentation |
US11748791B2 (en) * | 2010-06-11 | 2023-09-05 | Cardinalcommerce Corporation | Method and system for secure order management system data encryption, decryption, and segmentation |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
JPH11507782A (ja) | 1999-07-06 |
PT834238E (pt) | 2002-06-28 |
DE59608454D1 (de) | 2002-01-24 |
DK0834238T3 (da) | 2002-04-08 |
NO975866L (no) | 1998-02-05 |
CA2224316A1 (en) | 1996-12-27 |
US6708275B1 (en) | 2004-03-16 |
ES2170236T3 (es) | 2002-08-01 |
TR199701606T1 (xx) | 1998-06-22 |
EP0834238A1 (de) | 1998-04-08 |
NO975866D0 (no) | 1997-12-12 |
ATE210918T1 (de) | 2001-12-15 |
NZ309731A (en) | 1998-11-25 |
AU712703B2 (en) | 1999-11-11 |
DE19521485A1 (de) | 1996-12-19 |
NO321858B1 (no) | 2006-07-17 |
EP0834238B1 (de) | 2001-12-12 |
AU5996696A (en) | 1997-01-09 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
EP0832542B1 (de) | Verfahren und vorrichtung zur authentisierung von teilnehmern gegenüber digitalen vermittlungsstellen | |
DE3919734C1 (de) | ||
DE4406602C2 (de) | Sicherheitssystem zum Identifizieren und Authentisieren von Kommunikationspartnern | |
EP0834238B1 (de) | Verfahren und vorrichtung zur übertragung von vertraulichen verbindungsaufbau- und serviceinformationen zwischen teilnehmerseitigen endeinrichtungen und einer oder mehreren digitalen vermittlungsstellen | |
EP0048903A1 (de) | Sicherheitssystem zur Verhinderung unerlaubter Manipulationen bei der elektronischen Textübertragung in Nachrichtennetzen | |
DE3425720A1 (de) | Verfahren zur herstellung von internverbindungen zwischen zwei in busstruktur installierten endgeraeten desselben teilnehmers eines dienstintegrierten digitalen nachrichtennetzes | |
DE19720719C2 (de) | Verbindungsaufbau-Überwachungsvorrichtung | |
DE3922642C2 (de) | ||
DE19515681A1 (de) | Verfahren, System und Teilnehmereinrichtung zum manipulationssicheren Trennen von Nachrichtenströmen | |
DE69834167T2 (de) | Vorrichtung zur Sicherung einer Telefonverbindung zwischen zwei Teilnehmerendgeräte | |
DE3309403A1 (de) | Integriertes nachrichtensystem und verfahren zum aufbauen von bildfernsprechverbindungen in einem solchen nachrichtensystem | |
DE19542226B4 (de) | Verfahren und Anlage zur Verwirklichung einer teilnehmerbezogenen Vermischung und Entmischung in einem Teilnehmernetz | |
DE3420874A1 (de) | Verfahren und anordnung zur kontrolle des netzzugangs in fernmeldenetzen | |
DE4416595C2 (de) | Verfahren zur Sicherung von verschlüsselten vertraulichen Informationsübertragungen | |
DE3033871A1 (de) | Nachrichtenuebertragungssystem | |
DE3420814A1 (de) | Lokales kommunikationssystem mit einem sternnetz | |
DE10117930B4 (de) | Verfahren zur Verschlüsselung von zu übertragenden Daten und Schaltungsanordnung zur Durchführung des Verfahrens | |
DE19718583C2 (de) | Ende-zu-Ende Verschlüsselung | |
DE3028407A1 (de) | Datennetz mit erweiterter durchschaltekapazitaet fuer die durchschaltung von kanaelen mit groesserer bandbreite | |
EP1089532B1 (de) | Verfahren zum Anmelden einer Applikation an einer Kommunikationsanlage | |
DE10203331B4 (de) | Rufweiterleitung von PBX zu externen Zielen mit Zuweisung von Serviceberechtigungen | |
EP1314296B1 (de) | Verfahren zur sicherung eines internet supplementary service | |
EP1432276B1 (de) | Mobiles Scramblermodul | |
WO2004107701A1 (de) | Verfahren und system zur übertragung von sprachinformationen zwischen mindestens zwei teilnehmern | |
CH647369A5 (en) | Method for secured amendment of customer and program data in telecommunications systems, in particular telephone systems, from a central management station |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
AK | Designated states |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): AU CA IS JP NO NZ TR US |
|
AL | Designated countries for regional patents |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): AT BE CH DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE |
|
DFPE | Request for preliminary examination filed prior to expiration of 19th month from priority date (pct application filed before 20040101) | ||
121 | Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application | ||
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 309731 Country of ref document: NZ |
|
ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 2224316 Country of ref document: CA Ref document number: 2224316 Country of ref document: CA Kind code of ref document: A |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 97/01606 Country of ref document: TR |
|
ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 1997 502513 Country of ref document: JP Kind code of ref document: A |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 1996917355 Country of ref document: EP |
|
WWP | Wipo information: published in national office |
Ref document number: 1996917355 Country of ref document: EP |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 08973927 Country of ref document: US |
|
WWG | Wipo information: grant in national office |
Ref document number: 1996917355 Country of ref document: EP |