WO2000045241A2 - Self-generation of certificates using a secure microprocessor in a device for transferring digital information - Google Patents

Self-generation of certificates using a secure microprocessor in a device for transferring digital information Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2000045241A2
WO2000045241A2 PCT/US2000/002317 US0002317W WO0045241A2 WO 2000045241 A2 WO2000045241 A2 WO 2000045241A2 US 0002317 W US0002317 W US 0002317W WO 0045241 A2 WO0045241 A2 WO 0045241A2
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
certificates
certificate
self
public key
key
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2000/002317
Other languages
French (fr)
Other versions
WO2000045241A3 (en
Inventor
Sasha Medvinsky
Eric J. Sprunk
Original Assignee
General Instrument Corporation
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by General Instrument Corporation filed Critical General Instrument Corporation
Priority to AU32186/00A priority Critical patent/AU761317B2/en
Priority to JP2000596433A priority patent/JP4651197B2/en
Priority to KR1020017009554A priority patent/KR20010103756A/en
Priority to EP00910024A priority patent/EP1151579B1/en
Priority to DE60043053T priority patent/DE60043053D1/en
Priority to CA002359673A priority patent/CA2359673C/en
Priority to AT00910024T priority patent/ATE444620T1/en
Priority to US09/890,178 priority patent/US6839841B1/en
Publication of WO2000045241A2 publication Critical patent/WO2000045241A2/en
Publication of WO2000045241A3 publication Critical patent/WO2000045241A3/en

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L65/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for supporting real-time applications in data packet communication
    • H04L65/1066—Session management
    • H04L65/1101—Session protocols
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/606—Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/30—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting lawful interception, monitoring or retaining of communications or communication related information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L65/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for supporting real-time applications in data packet communication
    • H04L65/10—Architectures or entities
    • H04L65/102—Gateways
    • H04L65/1043—Gateway controllers, e.g. media gateway control protocol [MGCP] controllers
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F12/00—Accessing, addressing or allocating within memory systems or architectures
    • G06F12/14—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory
    • G06F12/1408—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory by using cryptography
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2207/00—Indexing scheme relating to methods or arrangements for processing data by operating upon the order or content of the data handled
    • G06F2207/72—Indexing scheme relating to groups G06F7/72 - G06F7/729
    • G06F2207/7219—Countermeasures against side channel or fault attacks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2211/00—Indexing scheme relating to details of data-processing equipment not covered by groups G06F3/00 - G06F13/00
    • G06F2211/007—Encryption, En-/decode, En-/decipher, En-/decypher, Scramble, (De-)compress
    • G06F2211/008—Public Key, Asymmetric Key, Asymmetric Encryption
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2129—Authenticate client device independently of the user
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
    • Y02E50/00—Technologies for the production of fuel of non-fossil origin
    • Y02E50/10—Biofuels, e.g. bio-diesel

Definitions

  • This invention relates in general to secure data transfers in digital systems and more specifically to a device in such a digital system that has the ability to self-issue certificates in a secure manner.
  • Public key systems have become a very popular means for providing security in digital systems.
  • Public Key Systems have two different keys, one for encryption, or signing, and one for decryption, or verifying. This separation of keys has great security value in that the sign/decrypt function can be securely isolated from verify/encrypt functions, as is appropriate for the typical use of these keys.
  • Public key systems are also known as asymmetric systems, or cryptosystems, as opposed to non-public key systems that are known as symmetric, or secret key, systems.
  • a sender obtains the receiver's public key.
  • the sender uses the public key to encrypt a message.
  • the encrypted message is then sent to the receiver. Since only the receiver has the corresponding private key of the public/private key pair, only the intended receiver can decrypt and view the encrypted message.
  • a certificate is typically the information that is included along with a signed message, where the certificate includes the public key required to verify the signature on the message.
  • the certificate is signed with the certifying authority's private key and can be verified by a recipient of the certificate by using the certifying authority's public key.
  • the same problem of obtaining the known certifying authority's correct public key in the first place still exists.
  • a sequence of certified public keys can be obtained from sources of progressively higher trust, where each preceding certificate's public key comes from a successively more trustworthy source. At some point, the user of a certificate's public key must be able to trust, or be assured that, the original public key for the chain of certificates does, indeed, come from the proper source and is valid.
  • the act of user authentication usually includes the verification of the user's certificate.
  • the certificate includes the identity of the sender, the identity of the certificate issuer, the sender's public key, the time period for which the certificate is valid, etc.
  • PKI Public Key Infrastructure
  • IP Internet Protocol
  • Shorter keys are often useful because their security functions (i.e., encoding/encrypting or decoding/decrypting) require less time than longer keys. However, the level of security provided is less than with longer keys so the shorter keys and certificates need to be replaced more often. If the initial keys and certificates are installed by the unit (e.g. cable telephony adapter) manufacturer while the replacement keys and certificates are transferred from the network service provider, a "dual trust" hierarchy is created that is not as robust as a single trust approach.
  • the unit e.g. cable telephony adapter
  • the present invention allows consumer communications device such as an IP telephony adapter to self-generate public key pairs and certificates. This eliminates the need for such keys and certificates to be sent to the devices from an outside source so a single-trust approach can be maintained.
  • public key pairs may be generated by a server and delivered to the consumer device in an encrypted and signed message. The certificate for the delivered public key would still be generated inside the consumer device.
  • a manufacturer-signed consumer device certificate for a large public key is installed into a device at the time of manufacture.
  • the device only issues itself certificates (for a newly generated shorter key pair) based on a signed request from an external outside server.
  • the device's self-issued certificates incorporate information obtained from the server in a profile. This allows control by the server over a device's self-issued certificates.
  • the certificate issuing process occurs within a secure microprocessor.
  • the invention discloses a method for providing self-issuing certificates in a device in a telecommunications system.
  • the method includes receiving, from an external source, a request to generate a new certificate, wherein the request includes a certificate parameter; using a secure microprocessor to generate a new certificate that uses the certificate parameter; and using the new certificate in data transfers.
  • the preferred embodiment includes receiving, from an external source, a request to generate a new certificate, wherein the request includes a signed profile of what parameters should appear in the new certificate.
  • the device generates a new public/private key pair and then signs a new certificate - all done as a single combined operation inside a secure microprocessor.
  • the request itself includes a public key and an encrypted private key.
  • the device in that case decrypts the private key and signs the new certificate - again, all done inside a secure microprocessor as a single combined operation.
  • the decryption key used is a (longer) private key that was installed in the device at the time of manufacture.
  • the device can sign the new certificate with a (longer) certificate signing key that was installed at the time of manufacture.
  • the new key pair and certificate, along with the pre-installed certificate for the device's certificate-signing key, can be used to secure call signaling and other communications.
  • Fig. 1 is a flowchart that describes the basic steps of the present invention
  • Fig. 2 A shows a portion of a telephony network 100 including a Cable Telephony Adapter
  • Fig. 2B shows an exemplary embodiment of the CTA.
  • DESCRIPTION OF THE SPECIFIC EMBODIMENTS The present invention is preferably included in a cable telephony system that is described in detail in the priority documents referenced at the beginning of this specification. Although specific reference is made to a cable telephony system, the invention is adaptable for use in virtually any telecommunications system that uses secured transactions.
  • FIG. 2 A shows a portion of an IP telephony network 100 constructed in accordance with the present invention.
  • the network 100 includes a first user 102 coupled to a source CTA 104.
  • the source CTA 104 is further coupled to a source gateway controller 106 and an IP telephony network backbone 110.
  • the network 100 also includes a second user 112 coupled to a destination
  • the network 100 also includes a customer service representative (CSR) center 120, a provisioning server 122 and a billing host 124.
  • CSR customer service representative
  • Each user of the network 100 goes through an initialization process to activate network service. For example, when the user 102 and associated CTA 104 are coupled to the network, a series of messages are exchanged between the CTA 104, the gateway controller 106 and the CSR 120. The messages provide for activation of telephony service for the user 102, establishment of account information and creation of encryption keys to be used by the CTA to encrypt and decrypt messages exchanged over the network.
  • the billing host 124 is used to setup account information for each user and to bill for network usage.
  • the provisioning server 122 is used to initialize and register CTA devices within a specific IP telephony network.
  • Fig. 2B shows an exemplary embodiment of the CTA 104 constructed in accordance with the present invention.
  • the CTA 104 includes a cable input interface (I/F) 202, a cable output I/F 204, a user output I/F 206, a user input I/F 208, a host processor 210, a memory 212 and an additional secure processor 220 along with secure memory 222, used to protect public/private key pairs 224. Certificates 214 are stored in regular memory because they are signed and don't require additional protection.
  • the cable input I/F 202 is coupled to a cable telephony input 216.
  • the cable output I/F 204 is coupled to a cable telephony output 218.
  • the cable telephony input and output I/F couple the CTA 200 to a cable telephony network, such as by connecting to a cable modem (not shown) that is coupled to the cable telephony network.
  • a cable modem (not shown) that is coupled to the cable telephony network.
  • the cable modem is included in the CTA so that the cable telephony network may be connected directly to the CTA.
  • the processor 210 couples to the cable input I F 202 and the cable output I/F 204 to provide processing of information received and transmitted, respectively, on the telephony network.
  • the line 216 carries secure encrypted and/or signed information which cannot be processed directly by the host processor, since it does not have access to cryptographic keys. The host processor has to pass on this information to the secure processor, which has access to the necessary keys to perform cryptographic operations.
  • the connections between the cable I/F modules and the user I/f modules carry unencrypted information.
  • the unencrypted information is commonly referred to as clear text, which extends back to the user.
  • clear text user input needs to be encrypted and/or signed, this cannot be done directly by the host processor. It passes on the information to the secure processor that performs the cryptographic operations. This way, encrypted and/or signed data appears on line 218.
  • the certificates in 214 cryptographically bind each public key to an identity.
  • the short, self-signed public key may be bound to either the device or user identity, while the longer public keys installed at the time of manufacture must be bound to the identity of the device (since the user identity is unknown at that time).
  • the certificates are not protected in secure memory because they are already cryptographically protected with a digital signature.
  • Fig. 1 is a flowchart that describes the basic steps of the present invention.
  • flowchart 10 is entered during provisioning when the CTA gets a request from a server to issue itself a certificate for a new public key.
  • the preferred embodiment uses a 768-bit RSA key pair as a "small' key pair with a self-issued certificate.
  • the CTA is provided with a large 2048-bit RSA public/private certificate signing key pair and a corresponding public key certificate upon manufacture of the CTA at a factory.
  • a large key-exchange public/private key pair e.g., 2048-bit RSA key pair
  • a corresponding certificate are also installed into the CTA at the factory.
  • Steps 14, 18 and 20 are performed by the secure microprocessor in the CTA. Thus, all of the steps necessary to issue a certificate for a small public key and certificate are performed inside the secure microprocessor.
  • the request from the server is authenticated by verifying the signature.
  • a "short" (e.g. 768-bit) RSA key pair is generated inside the secure microprocessor.
  • step 18 results in the decryption of the "short" RSA private key sent in the certificate request.
  • the CTA issues itself a new certificate for the corresponding public key that is also included in the server request. This new certificate is signed with the CTA's large certificate-signing key.
  • the parameters in the new certificate (e.g., validity time) are copied from the certificate request sent by the server and are used in the self-issued certificate.
  • Table I shows a list of different parameters in the profile of the server request.
  • Table II lists the parameters that are copied over to the certificate from the profile in the request.
  • Signature Algorithm e.g., RSA over SHA-1
  • Signature Over Certificate Request Network Certificate (2048-bit)
  • Network Equipment Manufacturer Certificate (2048-bit)
  • Public Key (optional - used if the device does not generate a key pair, itself)
  • the CTA can use them to either authenticate itself or for secure key exchanges. Because the new certificate is issued inside a secure microprocessor, a hacker can't tamper with the certificate- issuing process. The certificate is based on the information in the server certificate request. Also, it is difficult for a hacker to imitate a server certificate request as the request must be signed with the server's private key.

Abstract

The present invention allows consumer communications device in the figure such as an IP telephony adapter (110) to self-generate public key pairs (224) and certificates (214). This eliminates the need for such keys and certificates to be sent to the devices from an outside source so a single-trust approach can be maintained. A manufacturer's certificate is installed into a device at the time of manufacture. The device only issues itself certificates based on a signed request from an external outside server. The device's self-issued certificates incorporate information obtained from the server in a profile. This allows control by the server over a device's self-issued certificates. In order to prevent tampering, and breaking, of the self-issued certificates, the certificate issuing process occurs within a secure microprocessor.

Description

SELF-GENERATION OF CERTIFICATES
USING A SECURE MICROPROCESSOR IN A DEVICE FOR
TRANSFERRING DIGITAL INFORMATION
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
This invention relates in general to secure data transfers in digital systems and more specifically to a device in such a digital system that has the ability to self-issue certificates in a secure manner.
Public key systems have become a very popular means for providing security in digital systems. Public Key Systems (PKS) have two different keys, one for encryption, or signing, and one for decryption, or verifying. This separation of keys has great security value in that the sign/decrypt function can be securely isolated from verify/encrypt functions, as is appropriate for the typical use of these keys. Public key systems are also known as asymmetric systems, or cryptosystems, as opposed to non-public key systems that are known as symmetric, or secret key, systems.
To send a message in a public key system, a sender obtains the receiver's public key. The sender uses the public key to encrypt a message. The encrypted message is then sent to the receiver. Since only the receiver has the corresponding private key of the public/private key pair, only the intended receiver can decrypt and view the encrypted message.
However, a problem arises in that the sender may not be sure that they have obtained the receiver's correct public key in the first place. For example, a fraudulent public key may have been provided under the guise of the receiver's public key. In order to prevent this, "certificates" are used to generate confidence in the legitimacy of a public key. A certificate is typically the information that is included along with a signed message, where the certificate includes the public key required to verify the signature on the message. The certificate is signed with the certifying authority's private key and can be verified by a recipient of the certificate by using the certifying authority's public key. Of course, the same problem of obtaining the known certifying authority's correct public key in the first place still exists. A sequence of certified public keys can be obtained from sources of progressively higher trust, where each preceding certificate's public key comes from a successively more trustworthy source. At some point, the user of a certificate's public key must be able to trust, or be assured that, the original public key for the chain of certificates does, indeed, come from the proper source and is valid.
The act of user authentication (verification of user identity) usually includes the verification of the user's certificate. Usually the certificate includes the identity of the sender, the identity of the certificate issuer, the sender's public key, the time period for which the certificate is valid, etc.
Sometimes it is necessary to update key pairs by sending new key pairs from one device to another. This procedure can benefit from being validated by certificates, but where the updating occurs frequently the inclusion of certificate processing can put a high processing burden on the participating systems. Also, certificates need to be generated, signed and transferred in order to minimize the effect that a "broken" or "stolen" private key could have on a system. The maintenance of security based on a public key scheme, certificates, authentication, etc., is referred to as a system's Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). An example of telecommunications systems where the implementation of a traditional PKI is problematic or prohibitive is in a large scale digital network, such as the Internet. Where the data being transferred is high bandwidth using many transactions of small size, the number of discrete exchanges of data, along with their corresponding encryption, decryption, authentication, etc., is extremely large. However, the need for security such as is provided by a PKI is also great, especially in applications such as telephony, or other secure data transfers such as banking, etc. Telecommunications systems that are large and based around flexible protocols such as Internet Protocol (IP) typically use many servers, switches, routers and other devices for transferring data. Each device is usually a discrete box that can use a combination of hardware and software. Many such devices are located in diverse locations many miles apart. It is necessary not only to ensure that communication between the devices remains secure, but also that processing within each device is highly immune from security attacks.
Shorter keys are often useful because their security functions (i.e., encoding/encrypting or decoding/decrypting) require less time than longer keys. However, the level of security provided is less than with longer keys so the shorter keys and certificates need to be replaced more often. If the initial keys and certificates are installed by the unit (e.g. cable telephony adapter) manufacturer while the replacement keys and certificates are transferred from the network service provider, a "dual trust" hierarchy is created that is not as robust as a single trust approach.
Thus, it is desirable to provide a security system for use in telecommunications systems that handles certification efficiently.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The present invention allows consumer communications device such as an IP telephony adapter to self-generate public key pairs and certificates. This eliminates the need for such keys and certificates to be sent to the devices from an outside source so a single-trust approach can be maintained. In another embodiment, public key pairs may be generated by a server and delivered to the consumer device in an encrypted and signed message. The certificate for the delivered public key would still be generated inside the consumer device. A manufacturer-signed consumer device certificate for a large public key is installed into a device at the time of manufacture. The device only issues itself certificates (for a newly generated shorter key pair) based on a signed request from an external outside server. The device's self-issued certificates incorporate information obtained from the server in a profile. This allows control by the server over a device's self-issued certificates. In order to prevent tampering, and breaking, of the self-issued certificates, the certificate issuing process occurs within a secure microprocessor.
The invention discloses a method for providing self-issuing certificates in a device in a telecommunications system. The method includes receiving, from an external source, a request to generate a new certificate, wherein the request includes a certificate parameter; using a secure microprocessor to generate a new certificate that uses the certificate parameter; and using the new certificate in data transfers.
The preferred embodiment includes receiving, from an external source, a request to generate a new certificate, wherein the request includes a signed profile of what parameters should appear in the new certificate. The device generates a new public/private key pair and then signs a new certificate - all done as a single combined operation inside a secure microprocessor. In another embodiment, the request itself includes a public key and an encrypted private key. The device in that case decrypts the private key and signs the new certificate - again, all done inside a secure microprocessor as a single combined operation. The decryption key used is a (longer) private key that was installed in the device at the time of manufacture.
In both embodiments, the device can sign the new certificate with a (longer) certificate signing key that was installed at the time of manufacture. The new key pair and certificate, along with the pre-installed certificate for the device's certificate-signing key, can be used to secure call signaling and other communications.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS Fig. 1 is a flowchart that describes the basic steps of the present invention; Fig. 2 A shows a portion of a telephony network 100 including a Cable Telephony Adapter; and Fig. 2B shows an exemplary embodiment of the CTA. DESCRIPTION OF THE SPECIFIC EMBODIMENTS The present invention is preferably included in a cable telephony system that is described in detail in the priority documents referenced at the beginning of this specification. Although specific reference is made to a cable telephony system, the invention is adaptable for use in virtually any telecommunications system that uses secured transactions.
Cable Telephony Adapter
FIG. 2 A shows a portion of an IP telephony network 100 constructed in accordance with the present invention. The network 100 includes a first user 102 coupled to a source CTA 104. The source CTA 104 is further coupled to a source gateway controller 106 and an IP telephony network backbone 110. The network 100 also includes a second user 112 coupled to a destination
CTA 114. The destination CTA 114 is further coupled to a destination gateway controller 116 and the IP telephony network backbone 110. In addition, the network 100 also includes a customer service representative (CSR) center 120, a provisioning server 122 and a billing host 124. Each user of the network 100 goes through an initialization process to activate network service. For example, when the user 102 and associated CTA 104 are coupled to the network, a series of messages are exchanged between the CTA 104, the gateway controller 106 and the CSR 120. The messages provide for activation of telephony service for the user 102, establishment of account information and creation of encryption keys to be used by the CTA to encrypt and decrypt messages exchanged over the network. The billing host 124 is used to setup account information for each user and to bill for network usage. The provisioning server 122 is used to initialize and register CTA devices within a specific IP telephony network.
Fig. 2B shows an exemplary embodiment of the CTA 104 constructed in accordance with the present invention. The CTA 104 includes a cable input interface (I/F) 202, a cable output I/F 204, a user output I/F 206, a user input I/F 208, a host processor 210, a memory 212 and an additional secure processor 220 along with secure memory 222, used to protect public/private key pairs 224. Certificates 214 are stored in regular memory because they are signed and don't require additional protection. The cable input I/F 202 is coupled to a cable telephony input 216. The cable output I/F 204 is coupled to a cable telephony output 218. The cable telephony input and output I/F couple the CTA 200 to a cable telephony network, such as by connecting to a cable modem (not shown) that is coupled to the cable telephony network. In another embodiment, the cable modem is included in the CTA so that the cable telephony network may be connected directly to the CTA.
The processor 210 couples to the cable input I F 202 and the cable output I/F 204 to provide processing of information received and transmitted, respectively, on the telephony network. The line 216 carries secure encrypted and/or signed information which cannot be processed directly by the host processor, since it does not have access to cryptographic keys. The host processor has to pass on this information to the secure processor, which has access to the necessary keys to perform cryptographic operations. The connections between the cable I/F modules and the user I/f modules carry unencrypted information. The unencrypted information is commonly referred to as clear text, which extends back to the user. Similarly, when clear text user input needs to be encrypted and/or signed, this cannot be done directly by the host processor. It passes on the information to the secure processor that performs the cryptographic operations. This way, encrypted and/or signed data appears on line 218.
The certificates in 214 cryptographically bind each public key to an identity. The short, self-signed public key may be bound to either the device or user identity, while the longer public keys installed at the time of manufacture must be bound to the identity of the device (since the user identity is unknown at that time). The certificates are not protected in secure memory because they are already cryptographically protected with a digital signature.
Self-Issuance of Certificates Fig. 1 is a flowchart that describes the basic steps of the present invention. In Fig. 1 , flowchart 10 is entered during provisioning when the CTA gets a request from a server to issue itself a certificate for a new public key. For example, the preferred embodiment uses a 768-bit RSA key pair as a "small' key pair with a self-issued certificate. The CTA is provided with a large 2048-bit RSA public/private certificate signing key pair and a corresponding public key certificate upon manufacture of the CTA at a factory. A large key-exchange public/private key pair (e.g., 2048-bit RSA key pair) and a corresponding certificate are also installed into the CTA at the factory.
Steps 14, 18 and 20 are performed by the secure microprocessor in the CTA. Thus, all of the steps necessary to issue a certificate for a small public key and certificate are performed inside the secure microprocessor. At step 14, the request from the server is authenticated by verifying the signature. In the preferred embodiment, in step 18 a "short" (e.g. 768-bit) RSA key pair is generated inside the secure microprocessor. In another embodiment, step 18 results in the decryption of the "short" RSA private key sent in the certificate request. At step 20, the CTA issues itself a new certificate for the corresponding public key that is also included in the server request. This new certificate is signed with the CTA's large certificate-signing key. The parameters in the new certificate (e.g., validity time) are copied from the certificate request sent by the server and are used in the self-issued certificate. Table I shows a list of different parameters in the profile of the server request. Table II lists the parameters that are copied over to the certificate from the profile in the request.
768-bit RSA Private Key (optional - used if the device does not generate a key pair, itself)
768-bit Public Key (optional - used if the device does not generate a key pair, itself) Key/Certificate Validity Period (start and stop times) Network ID CTA ID
Signature Algorithm (e.g., RSA over SHA-1) Signature Over Certificate Request Network Certificate (2048-bit) Network Equipment Manufacturer Certificate
TABLE I
Public Key (optional - used if the device does not generate a key pair, itself)
•• Key/Certificate Validity Period (start and stop times) • Network (or Service Provider) ID •• CTA (or user) ID
TABLE II
After creation of the new certificate, and corresponding key pair, the CTA can use them to either authenticate itself or for secure key exchanges. Because the new certificate is issued inside a secure microprocessor, a hacker can't tamper with the certificate- issuing process. The certificate is based on the information in the server certificate request. Also, it is difficult for a hacker to imitate a server certificate request as the request must be signed with the server's private key.
Note that variations from the specific embodiments discussed here are possible. For example, different key sizes and public key technology (e.g., RSA, Elliptic Curve, El Gamal, etc.) may be used. Thus, although the invention has been presented with respect to specific embodiments thereof, these embodiments are merely illustrative, and not restrictive, of the invention, the scope of which is to be determined solely by the appended claims.

Claims

WHAT IS CLAIMED IS:
L A method for providing self-issuing certificates in a device in a telecommunications system, the method comprising receiving, from an external source, a request to generate a new certificate, wherein the request includes an encrypted public key; using a secure microprocessor to generate a new certificate that uses the public key; and using the new certificate in data transfers.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the request includes a validity time, the method further comprising including the validity time in the new certificate.
PCT/US2000/002317 1999-01-29 2000-01-28 Self-generation of certificates using a secure microprocessor in a device for transferring digital information WO2000045241A2 (en)

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AU32186/00A AU761317B2 (en) 1999-01-29 2000-01-28 Self-generation of certificates using a secure microprocessor in a device for transferring digital information
JP2000596433A JP4651197B2 (en) 1999-01-29 2000-01-28 Certificate self-generation using a secure microprocessor in devices that transfer digital information
KR1020017009554A KR20010103756A (en) 1999-01-29 2000-01-28 Self-generation of certificates using a secure microprocessor in a device for transferring digital information
EP00910024A EP1151579B1 (en) 1999-01-29 2000-01-28 Self-generation of certificates using a secure microprocessor in a device for transferring digital information
DE60043053T DE60043053D1 (en) 1999-01-29 2000-01-28 SELF-GENERATION OF CERTIFICATES USING A SAFE MICROPROCESSOR IN A DIGITAL DATA TRANSMISSION DEVICE
CA002359673A CA2359673C (en) 1999-01-29 2000-01-28 Self-generation of certificates using a secure microprocessor in a device for transferring digital information
AT00910024T ATE444620T1 (en) 1999-01-29 2000-01-28 SELF-GENERATION OF CERTIFICATES USING A SECURE MICROPROCESSOR IN A DIGITAL DATA TRANSMISSION DEVICE
US09/890,178 US6839841B1 (en) 1999-01-29 2000-01-28 Self-generation of certificates using secure microprocessor in a device for transferring digital information

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US11778899P 1999-01-29 1999-01-29
US60/117,788 1999-01-29
US12877299P 1999-04-09 1999-04-09
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