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2009 - No preview
|This essay argues that that American foreign policy during the Reagan Administration contributed to the Soviet Union's fear of American attack; that the United States intelligence community either failed to detect, or ignored, signs of this ...|
|One of Gordievsky's most important contributions was averting a potential nuclear |
confrontation with the Soviet Union when NATO exercise Able Archer 83 was
misinterpreted by the Soviets as a potential first strike. Indeed, the information ...
|The events of November 1983, and in particular the NATO command-post |
exercise, Able Archer-83, have been identifiedasa particular focus ofanxiety.In
hismemoir, Robert Gates,then DeputyDirector oftheCentral IntelligenceAgency ...
|The exercise, Able Archer '83, was designed to practice the procedures for a full-|
scale simulated release of nuclear weapons in a European conflict. The Soviets
hail long feared that training exercises could be used as a disguise for a real ...
|... matters and strategy. EXERCISE ABLE ARCHER-83, NATO. See |
EUROMISSILE CRISIS; REAGAN, RONALD W. EXERCISE ALLIED ACTION,
NATO.Annual exercise by NATO in mid-May to EXERCISE ABLE ARCHER-83,
NATO • 255.
|The KGB suspected that a NATO exercise, Able Archer 83, could be a full-scale |
nuclear assault.'31 As NATO officials became aware of the unexpected effect of
Able Archer, significant changes were made to such exercises and the whole ...
|In 1983 Soviet leaders appar— ently misconstrued a NATO nuclear exercise—“|
Able Archer 83”—as a possible ini— tiation of nuclear war. The KGB began to
prepare for imminent conflict. See Benjamin B. Fischer, “A Cold War Conundrum,
|Paranoia in the Centre reached its peak during the NATO command-post |
exercise Able Archer 83, held from 2 to 11 November, to practise nuclear release
procedures. Soviet contingency plans for a surprise attack on the West envisaged
|Exercise Able Archer 83 ended by mid- November 1983, and the crisis soon |
passed. Nevertheless, the deep underlying suspicion on both sides about one
another's intent still existed.1 Much of the work for creating a strong anti-Soviet
bias in ...
|He was advised by CIA Director William Casey that a NATO exercise, Able |
Archer 83, which was conducted in November 1983 and had simulated
procedures for the release of nuclear weapons by NATO, had alarmed the Soviet
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