About 134,000 results
Peter Madsen, Richard Plunz - 2005 - 400 pages
|Peter Madsen I CITY, DESIRE, KNOWLEDGE In his “satire” Rameau's Nephew, |
Diderot starts out presenting himself sitting ... will, and desire are the modes of
the human soul, and the just human being is he who lets reason govern desire
|Chesterfield, Lord The madman is not the man who has lost his reason. He is the |
man who has lost everything except his reason. - Chesterton, Gilbert K. Reason
should direct and appetite obey. - Cicero, Marcus T. Let reason govern desire.
|Cicero, Marcus T. Let the punishment be proportionate to the offense. - Cicero, |
Marcus T. Reason should direct and appetite obey. - Cicero, Marcus T. Let
reason govern desire. - Cicero, Marcus T. To disregard what the world thinks of
us is not ...
|claim ancient honour He strikes before the flame shines . . Possessing antiquity |
To live without a principle concealed It appears . Let reason govern desire Day
dawns The eagle is no fly catcher Christ is the tree of life, the fruit whereof we
|Order of the Golden Fleece Antiquum obtinens Possessing antiquity Bagot Ajierto |
vivere voto To live without a principle concealed Finch Apparet It appears Edgar
Appetitus ration i pareat Let reason govern desire Fitzwilliain Appropinquat ...
|You will say, that I should govern my Desires ; for being mine, my right and |
property, I may justly exercise that dominion nature hath giyen me over them.
Well, let me ask you again, is it sit Reason should govern Desire, or Desire
|Appetitus rationi pareat Let reason govern desire Ashworth, Custance, |
FitzwilHam. Appropinquat dies Day dawns Johnston, Apto cum lare With a fit
abode Elliot. Aqua cadit resurge Water falls to rise again Waterfall. Aquibe vitem
pocula Let ...
|Motto, in English, Let reason govern desire. Town Residence— 4, Grosvenor-|
square. Onmtry Seatt— Milton, near Peterborough. Northamptonshire ; and
Wentworth-House, near Hothcrham, Yorkshire. FITZWILLIAM, VISCOUNT, (John
Sergio Tenenbaum - 2010 - 251 pages
|... is overcome by something can commit an act that is neither forced nor belief-|
governed, as long as it is desire-governed. ... let us call a desire brute if it does
not allow the agent to forgo whatever action it prompts her to commit, and let us
|It would not follow that these hypothetical desires are the ground of the normative |
reasons in question. ... Let us start with the status of normative reasons, which is
probably the most important preoccupation of the theory of practical reason. ...
judgment can still agree that there are external reasons for action, and that
accordingly reason should govern desire, whether, causally speaking, it does or