UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI
FAKULTETA ZA DRUŽBENE VEDE

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Race in American Politics:

Symbolic Racism and the Tea Party Movement

Vprašanje rase v ameriški politiki:

Simbolni rasizem in gibanje čajank

Magistrsko delo

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The aim of this master's thesis is to establish whether it is possible to connect the emergence of a new social movement called the Tea Party with the election of Barack Obama as the first African-American president in the history of the US. Its formation coincides with the inauguration of the first black president as well as the adoption of Obama's first legislative bills in February 2009. While many celebrated the election of Obama as a victory over racial inequality that plagued the US since its very beginning, others warned against the reasons for the swift rise of the popularity of the Tea Party movement. The controversy about the existence of racist elements within the Tea Party movement has exacerbated even further after the release of the report by the NAACP and IREHR, accusing several individuals within the Tea Party movement of racist behavior, alongside strong Tea Party opposition to Obama's announcement of the health care reform. Since the 1970s, experts have been studying racial discrimination in American society and realized that despite the legally ensured racial equality we can still find traces of ingrained racial prejudice among whites which is expressed in a more symbolic fashion. The theory of symbolic racism is based on the whites' opposition to black political candidates and contemporary racial policies (like welfare) because of their negative beliefs about blacks as violators of traditional (Protestant) values, such as individualism, work ethic, obedience, discipline, etc. The purpose of our research therefore lies in determining whether the Tea Party's opposition to President Obama and his welfare policies is based on principles of this new form of racism – symbolic racism.

Keywords: Tea Party movement, symbolic racism, Barack Obama, welfare policies.

Vprašanje rase v ameriški politiki: Simbolni rasizem in gibanje čajank

V magistrskem delu smo se spraševali, ali je bliskovit pojav novega družbenega gibanja čajank možno pripisati izvolitvi prvega afroameriškega predsednika v zgodovini ZDA, Baracka Obame. Nastanek gibanja namreč sovpada z inavguracijo prvega črnskega predsednika, pa tudi s sprejetjem prvih zakonodajnih aktov Obamine administracije februarja 2009. Medtem ko so številni v izvolitvi prvega črnskega predsednika videli zmago nad rasno neenakostjo, ki ZDA pesti od samih začetkov, so nekateri v presenetljivem porastu priljubljenosti gibanja čajank videli ravno nasprotno. Polemika o obstoju rasističnih elementov znotraj gibanja čajank se je dodatno zaostrila po izidu poročila NAACP in IREHR, ki navaja rasistično delovanje številnih posameznikov znotraj gibanja čajank, ter ob ostrem nasprotovanju pripadnikov gibanja ob Obamini napovedi reforme zdravstvenega sistema. Strokovnjaki že od sedemdesetih let 20. stoletja ugotavljajo, da v ameriški družbi rasna diskriminacija ni stvar preteklosti, kljub pravno zagotovljeni rasni enakosti. Med belci je še vedno zaznati sledi zakoreninjenih rasnih predsodkov, ki pa več niso odkrito izraženi, temveč se pojavljajo v svoji simbolni obliki, govorimo o t. i. simbolnem rasizmu. Teorija simbolnega rasizma temelji na nasprotovanju belcev črnskim političnim kandidatom in rasno občutljivim politikam, na primer politikam blaginje, ki je posledica belskih negativnih prepričanj o črncih kot kršiteljih tradicionalnih (protestantskih) vrednot, med katere spadajo individualizem, delovna etika, poslušnost, disciplina in podobno. Namen našega raziskovanja je ugotoviti, ali je novo obliko simbolnega rasizma možno zaslediti pri podpornikih gibanja čajank ter ali je ta razlog za nasprotovanje predsedniku Obami in njegovim politikam blaginje.

Ključne besede: gibanje čajank, simbolni rasizem, Barack Obama, politike blaginje.

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INTRODUCTION

The question of race has been one of the central issues in the American politics for centuries. One might argue "race has been an important or critical factor in almost every moment that scholars of political development have identified as significant in U.S. history" (Novkov 2008, 650). From the early racial tensions between the white European settlers and the Native Americans, to the period of slavery and Civil War, through the period of Jim Crow Laws and finally the Civil Rights movement, race mattered. As depicted, racial conflicts have plagued the United States of America throughout its existence, with racial prejudice against African-Americans being the core of it (Henry and Sears 2002, 253). Since race, and consequently racial policies, has played such a crucial role in the making of American history, so did the presidential elections in 2008 – "a historic event that marked the moment of an implicitly white America's transcendence of its racial history" (Novkov 2008, 649).

The presidential election of 2008 has been historical for several reasons. It was one of the longest and most expensive presidential elections in history, preceded only by the 2012 presidential elections; the election cycle occurred during the worst economic crisis in the United States (US) since the Great Depression in the 1930s, and it resulted in the election of Barack Obama (Pike and Maltese 2010, 461). On November 4, 2008 America witnessed the victory of its first African-American president, the first non-southern Democrat president since John F. Kennedy and one of the most progressive Democratic presidents since the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt – Barack Obama (Abramowitz 2012, 196), marking the occasion as one of the stepping stones to achieving racial equality even at the most important political office in the country. Democrats celebrated the election of the new president, on top of the unified control over the US Congress. These new circumstances made the realization of Obama's pre-election platform much easier. He began lobbying for his new economic stimulus package even before his election (Pike and Maltese 2010, 474), extended Bush's Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), and was preparing for his reform of the health care system – the problem that has not been dealt with since Clinton's first two years in office (Clark and Schaffner 2012, 3–4).

A month after Obama's inauguration as the forty-fourth president of the US, and a couple of days after the passage of the economic stimulus package, a new social phenomenon appeared in the political arena – a social movement called the Tea Party. The name itself has a

symbolic value. Not only is the word TEA an acronym that stands for "Taxed Enough Already" (Parker and Barreto 2013, 2), the name itself reminds the Americans of the events taking place in Boston, Massachusetts, on December 6, 1773, when British colonists rebelled against a new tax on imported tea by dumping tea from East India Company vessels into the Boston Harbor. The protest had little to do with the tea prices, for it was an act of rebellion against the British Parliament to levy taxes on unrepresented people living in America, which then led to the American Revolution and the Independence (Jolly 2011). The movement began as a series of small rallies to protest against the stimulus package, which later on spread to an even more controversial issue, the health care reform (Clark and Schaffner 2012, 4). The protestors called for a smaller government, fiscal responsibility, a free market, and the commitment to states' rights (Parker and Barreto 2013, 2–3). Moreover, they intend to "Take the country back!" as various rally signs suggest. But the question is – take back where or take back from whom? There are many different answers to this question. Some say the country needs to go back in time when the federal government spent less, when it was smaller and more limited. Perhaps it is time to revisit the days when the economic market was free from the governmental intrusions. Or maybe we need to go back to the time when a black man would not dare to run for president (Zernike 2010, 51).

While the supporters of the movement gathered at rallies and protests throughout the country, giving passionate speeches about the pitfalls of vast government spending and ever-growing intrusion into people's lives, the first shadow of doubt over the Tea Party's motives and reasons for emerging had already been cast. The critics have seen another problem with the insurrection. If the expansion of the activities of the executive branch and their interference with the free market pose such a threat to Tea Partiers, how come the movement did not rise at the time when George W. Bush expanded government surveillance over communication with the Patriot Act or decided to bailout banks and other institutions in October 2008? (Katel 2010, 244–249). Even during Bush's first term, the federal deficit expanded more than ever before in US history. Bush also increased discretionary spending by almost 50 percent, and left his replacement a 1.3 trillion USD deficit (when he took over from Clinton, he inherited a 700 billion USD surplus). In the words of Edwards (Parker and Barreto 2013, 251), President Bush was the biggest spender since Lyndon B. Johnson.

The Tea Party emerged by mobilizing sentiments that had taken root during the 2008 presidential campaign and manifested them in opposition to Obama and his policy agenda

immediately after his first acts as the President (Jacobson 2011, 6–7). While Abramowitz (2012, 196) is convinced that any Democratic president with a policy agenda as progressive as Obama's would generate negative reaction on the part of many economic and social conservatives in the US, such reactions may have been intensified by racial fears and resentments among the white population. The new American president is black – his father was Kenyan. And not only was his election historical, it was a coalition of liberals, young people, and racial minorities who got him elected.

The first shadow of suspicion of racism was therefore cast on the basis of materialization immediately after the election of Barack Obama, and deepened following remarks on Obama's possible foreign birth and his ties to Islamic religion (Katel 2010, 249). "For Obama's racial opponents, he represents a notion of blackness linked to irresponsible welfare spending, foreignness linked to nativist anxieties, and Islam, depicted as a violent, anti-American religion" (Lowndes 2012, 164). Furthermore, the linkage between the Tea Partiers and racism was backed up by a 2010 report entitled "Tea Party Nationalism" in which the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in cooperation with the Institute for Research and Education on Human Rights (IREHR) accuses several Tea Party leaders and Tea Party associated groups of using racist language and symbols (as depicted in slogans such as: "A Village in Kenya is Missing its Idiot: Deport Obama!", "Congress = Slave Owner; Tax Payer = Niggar" or "Imam Obama Wants to Ban Pork: Don't Let Him Steal Your Meat" (Quarishi in Maxwell and Parent 2012, 3)), as well as presents their connections to white supremacist organizations (Burghart and Zeskind 2010). It was again reinforced in the midst of the health care debate. During the Tea Party protest against the passage of the health care reform in May 2010 in Washington, D.C., Representative John Lewis, a hero of the civil rights movement, reported being called a "nigger" by the protestors, whereas another black congressman from Missouri, Emanuel Cleaver said that he had been spat on by protestors while he walked behind Lewis. Also, Representative Barney Frank was called a "faggot", the word being accompanied by deliberate lisp sounds. On that occasion, South Carolina's congressman James Clyburn noted that he had not seen such treatment since he was leading civil rights protests in South Carolina in the 1960s (Zernike 2010, Stein 2010).

What was even more surprising was the response of the Tea Party organizations to these accusations. The last described occurrence has been pegged as untrue by most of the Tea Party organizations. One of them, the Tea Party Patriots, issued a zero tolerance policy,

however, there was no apology in sight (Zernike 2010, 139). The reaction to the NAACP's resolution was even more drastic. NAACP reported receiving death threats and verbal abuse following the issue of the report. These were then preceded by statements rejecting the notion of racism in their midst, saying that "a few offensive posters or obnoxious remarks of one person DO NOT represent the feelings or behavior of the Tea Party movement" (Martin in Burghart and Zeskind 2010, 65). While one of the most notorious leaders among the Tea Party's national faction, Mark Williams, was removed from the Tea Party Express leadership, and this group expelled from the membership of the Tea Party Federation, the same organization denied the NAACP's accusations of racism in its ranks. To help them disprove the report, they turned to black conservatives with long-standing ties to either the Republican Party or the movement itself (Burghart and Zeskind 2010, 64–66).

With approximately 44 percent of the networks' reporting on the Tea Party as a fringe movement with a dangerous quality (Rasmussen and Schoen 2011, 10), and a relatively big support among the American voters, the public opinion was split and the question who is right was left to social science researchers, who produced ample studies with contradicting results.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1 RELEVANCE AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS THESIS

As shown, the Tea Party has been accused of various accounts of racism, ranging from the suspicions of its creation soon after the election of Obama as the first black president, all the way to open expressions of racial massages and actions during Tea Party protests. We've already hinted at the objectives of this thesis and shall now continue to elaborate on it even further. By stating the numerous complaints and assumptions over racism in the Tea Party movement and its rejection by the Tea Partiers, we need to ask ourselves the following question: are Tea Partiers opposing President Obama and his policies based on the opposition to big government spending or is their opposition motivated by racial prejudice against blacks?

We are aware that the Tea Party movement could simply be classed as another conservative insurgence as it adheres to the same values historically associated with conservatism and conservative movements – preference for a small government, the rule of law, and fiscal responsibility. However, as depicted by Parker and Barreto (2013) the movement shares demographic structure of previous far right-wing movements of the 1920s and 1960s, and

represents their extension to the present. “If the history of right-wing movements is in any way indicative of the dynamics of the Tea Party, it suggests that its supporters are motivated by both politics and racism” (Parker and Barreto 2013, 10). As in the case of the previous (racist) right-wing movements, the Tea Party movement consists of mostly older people, 50 years of age or even older, which are in Lowndes’s opinion more likely to be uncomfortable with cultural and racial differences (Katel 2010, 249)

In order to find an answer to the posed question, we have decided to employ the theory of symbolic racism as envisioned by Sears and Kinder back in 1971, and perfected over the last four decades. The theory proposes the transformation of old-fashioned racism resting on biological inferiority of blacks to a new, covertly expressed form of racism – symbolic racism. This new, symbolic racism is an expression of racial prejudice obtained through early socialization experiences and expressed in the opposition to black politicians and racial policies, such as busing, affirmative action, crime and welfare (Sears and Henry 2005). We will be focusing on the latter – welfare, quoting Edsall and Edsall’s (1991) conclusion: “when the official subject is presidential politics, taxes, welfare, crime, rights, or values… the real subject is race”. Gilens’ (1995, 995) research shows similar results. He concludes that racial attitudes shape support and opposition to the American welfare state. Those (whites) who see blacks as lacking in work ethic are more likely to oppose programs aimed at the poor (work ethic and responsibility of outcomes is one of the four main themes of the theory of symbolic racism). Welfare is widely viewed as a “coded” political issue that plays upon whites’ negative views of blacks without explicitly mentioning race (Gilens 1996, 593). Portrayal of blacks being lazy is reinforced by media coverage, strengthening the whites’ opinion on aid to the (undeserving) poor in terms of race (Gilens and Chong in Goren 2002, 202).

The Tea Party movement burst into the public eye opposing Obama’s stimulus package and his health care reform. We realize the movement opposed several other actions of Obama’s administration (auto industry bailout, energy initiatives, etc.), nevertheless, the literature most frequently states the opposition to the two mentioned policies. Due to accounts of big government spending, taxation and federal government’s breach of its constitutional limitations, both have been contested by the Tea Party movement. Both also feature important welfare components. According to Fox News, which had been searching out popular opposition to the stimulus bill and found on in the Tea Party movement (Zernike 2010, 21), Obama’s stimulus package intends to spend roughly a quarter of all means intended for this

measure (224 billion USD) on various forms of welfare support, whereas this number may rise to 650 billion USD over ten years (Wilson 2009). This article was published a day after Obama signed the stimulus bill into law and a day before the "official" starting point of the Tea Party movement. Following this line of thought, the health care reform may then be considered as even more far reaching than the stimulus package. In Skocpol's (2011) opinion, the new Obama health care reform is "one of the biggest steps in the expansion of the welfare state since Social Security and the creation of Medicare and Medicaid. It's been called one of the most redistributive pieces of legislation to pass in the US in the recent decades".

The objective of our proposed master's thesis is therefore the application of the theory of symbolic racism to the Tea Party movement and their opposition to Barack Obama and his policy agenda. The theory is suitable for the selected case study, since we have the Tea Party's opposition to legislation concerning welfare on one side, and their opposition to President Barack Obama, the first black president in the history of the US on the other.

We will examine whether their opposition springs from a rooted political belief system which includes racial prejudice or is it merely the opposition to the concept of big government as the Tea Partier's claim. In order to complete our task, we will be using measures of symbolic racism as designed by Henry and Sears (2002) in their Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale. We shall carry out our research by analyzing public opinion polls, focusing primarily on the American National Election Studies (ANES), entitled ANES 2010–2012 Evaluations of Government and Society Study. We will only use data from the first cycle of surveys – EGSS 1, which was finished in 2010, because of the unavailability of data for the next two cycles. This precise survey has been chosen on the account of containing specific questions relating to our field of research.

2 HYPOTHESES

The aim of our research is to apply the theory of symbolic racism to the study of the Tea Party's motives to oppose president Obama and his policy initiatives. We have already posed our research question in the previous chapter, however, we will pose it again for the sake of clarifying the idea for our hypotheses: are Tea Partiers opposing President Obama and his policies based on opposition to big government spending or is their opposition motivated by racial prejudice against African-Americans?

In order to answer our research question and focus our research work, we have set two hypotheses that will guide us throughout this master's thesis. They will be:

Hypothesis 1: *The supporters of the Tea Party movement oppose the first African-American president of the United States of America – Barack Obama as a result of their latent racist beliefs, manifested as symbolic racism.*

Firstly, we will need to establish that there is a widespread opposition to President Obama and his policies among Tea Party supporters. We will do so by gathering data from previously written literature as well as analyzing data from the opinion polls. By accomplishing this we will have empirical proof of dissatisfaction with his presidency.

Hypothesis 2*: The supporters of the Tea Party movement oppose Obama's welfare initiatives due to their unique belief system, rooted in racial prejudice and expressed as symbolic racism.*

The theoretical background for setting such bold hypotheses originates out of the theory of symbolic racism which explains whites' opposition to racial policies and black political candidates, "in some cases exerting a larger effect than party identification, political ideology, adherence to the value of individualism, and direct racial threat" (Gomez 2006, 612). Since the opposition is not only directed towards a black political candidate, but contemporary racial policies alike, we will be examining the racist claim on the Tea Party's opposition to two of Obama's most contested welfare initiatives, the American Recovery and Reinvestment act of 2009 and Patient Protect and Affordable Care Act. We will elaborate on the selection of these two initiatives later in the thesis.

3 METHODOLOGY

One of the main requirements for conducting research is the knowledge of a range of methods and techniques available to perform the task at hand (Kustec Lipicer 2007, 113). To compose an ideal policy research study, we need to combine qualitative and quantitative research methods to yield certain advantages of both approaches: we increase the perceived validity of the conducted research and provide additional insight that one method alone could not (Majchrzak 1984, 66). In order to carry out the proposed work, we shall make use of the methods described below:

• the analysis of secondary data/sources will be used to gather and interpret the existing sources. The primary purpose of this method is to establish the state of current knowledge

about our research topic (Pierce 2008, 101) – we will identify existing sources of information and means to extract relevant information from them (Hogwood in Gunn 1984, 83). The analysis of secondary data will help with framing the theoretical basis for our future empirical research.

• a single case study is the essential block of empirical research. It will provide us with the basic minimum of information to answer our research question and to test our hypotheses (Pierce 2008, 53). Case studies exhibit a profound respect for the complexity of the researched social phenomena, with the aim of developing a deeper understanding of the selected case (Mabry 2008, 217–224). For this thesis, we chose to analyze the Tea Party movement in order to study the motives for their emergence in 2009.

• the comparative method usually goes hand in hand with conducting case studies (Bučar et al. 2000, 29). It will be helpful when determining the similarities and differences between the answers given by supporters of the Tea Party movement and the rest of the (white) respondents to the questions, relating to the measurement of symbolic racism.

• the regression analysis will be employed to test our two hypotheses. This statistical tool is used when investigating the relationships between variables, especially when trying to examine the casual effect of one variable upon another (Sykes 1992). In our case, we shall be testing the effect of symbolic racism on the support for the Tea Party movement, the impression of President Barack Obama, as well as its effect on attitudes toward the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

Our master's thesis is divided into several parts: the current part serves as an introduction to the topic we chose to research. We believe in the importance of understanding the phenomenon that is the Tea Party movement, for it played a major role in the US political system from its conception onwards, and its actions may have deep and profound consequences on future relations among the two parties, the Republicans and the Democrats. For the purpose of presenting our work, we devised a conceptual framework and the methodology that will help us to test our hypotheses.

We will follow with a detailed examination of the Tea Party movement, starting with the birth of the movement and the controversies surrounding it, the movement's success in the integration into the two-party system, its structure on the national level and the demographics

of the supporters – Tea Partiers. We took a closer look to the main ideas, before moving on to the next integral part, concerning racism and racial attitudes, one of the most poignant issues in America's political history. We explained the historic background of racism in the US, incorporate the theory of symbolic racism in the theory of new racism, and specified it in detail, using conclusions and remarks from top scholars and researchers in the field. We emphasized the conceptualization and measurement of symbolic racism and address the critiques of the approach, selected for this thesis.

The two respective subjects, the Tea Party movement and symbolic racism, are confronted in the fourth section of this work. We present the Tea Partiers' sentiments toward Barack Obama, and two of his most heavily contested legislation pieces as presented in the introduction, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), also known as the stimulus package, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Obama's health care reform called Obamacare by its opponents. We also looked for elements of racial prejudice among the Tea Party supporters as predicted in the introduction.

We shall conclude our thesis with final remarks in the conclusion, summarizing the work we carried out and present our findings. Since we decided to write the thesis in the English language, we are obligated to add a short translation of the thesis in Slovenian language, which will be followed by the list of references and appendices.

TEA PARTY MOVEMENT

We shall begin with the fact that there is some confusion over determining the "date of birth" of the Tea Party movement. It has been said that, what we now know as the Tea Party movement, came into existence just days after the Department of the Treasury's unveiling of the Financial Stability Plan (FSP) (Kiel 2009), and a couple of days after Obama signed the ARRA, and Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan (HASP) into law (Trost and Rosenthal 2012, 10) – on Thursday, February 19, 2009. The mentioned documents represent Obama's solution to the economic crisis, often described as a stool with several legs. According to Lee (2009), ARRA represents the first leg, FSP the second, and finally HASP the third leg. The crisis started as a mortgage crisis, and turned into a credit crisis as well as a job crisis, therefore all three problematic areas had to be tackled at once.

Even though this is the prevailing opinion on the exact date of the creation of the Tea Party, there are some who stress the importance of earlier events on the formation and the organization of the movement and shall be addressed in the following chapter. We shall also deal with the one of the biggest controversies surrounding the formation of the movement – whether it really is a grassroots movement, shaped by concerned citizens (bottom-up) or was the former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi right when she called the Tea Party events Astroturf (top-down), "the Washington euphemism for a corporate public relations campaign disguised to look like a grass root citizen movement" (Murphy 2009).

Still, we believe the success of the Tea Party would not have been this great if it were not for the major national organizations, giving advice to the political novices in the Tea Party, and coordinating their activities. Some of the most visible ones already existed by the time the Tea Party frenzy hit the Americans while others were created within weeks of the first "official" Tea Party event (Burghart and Zeskind 2010, 17). Nonetheless, it is the American people who believe in the ideas of the movement that brought it this far. The history of social movements suggests that right-wing movements that emerge during periods of social change are mainly supported by white, Christian, middle-class men over forty (Parker and Barreto 2013, 30–34), and apparently the history repeated itself in the case of the Tea Party movement.

Since there is always a motive behind a story, we will examine the main ideas of the Tea Party, pointing out the pieces of legislation they opposed the most, which will serve as an introduction to our analytical work in the fifth chapter of this thesis.

5 THE BIRTH OF THE TEA PARTY MOVEMENT AND ITS TRANSFORMATION INTO A POLITICAL PHENOMENON

As mentioned above, the story of the Tea Party begins on Thursday, February 19, 2009, when, Rick Santelli, a CNBC financial news commentator, gave a heated speech on the floor of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in which he expresses his deep opposition to the new HASP. In Santelli's opinion, new legislation "promotes bad behavior" because now everyone will have to pay for their "neighbor's mortgage that has an extra bathroom" that they cannot afford. He suggests the administration puts up a webpage and let people decide whether or not they wish to subsidize such mortgages. He finishes with a call for a Chicago Tea Party in July, when like-minded Americans will have a chance to gather on Lake Michigan to dump in "some derivative securities" (Santelli in Zernike 2010, 13–21). Santelli's rant became a YouTube

sensation overnight (Rasmusen and Schoen 2011, 120), prompting FreedomWorks (one of the major Tea Party organizations) to begin organizing the Tea Party and launching a twenty-five-city Tea Party Tour. In the following weeks, protesters opposing taxes and government spending gathered in Cincinnati, Green Bay, Harrisburg, and other towns and cities across the US (Trost and Rosenthal 2012, 10).

"What Rick Santelli did was give the discontent a name, and a bit of imagery" (Zernike 2010, 20). However, certain tea-party-like events occurred before the actual rant. The earliest reported "tea party" inspired protest took place on January 24, 2009 in Binghamton, New York, when a small group of protesters, led by Trevor Leach, the chairman of the Young Liberty voiced their discontent with Governor Paterson's proposed obesity tax on soft drinks by pouring soda into the Susquehanna River (Cannon and Bevan 2011). On February 1, 2009, the FedUpUSA called Americans to send tea bags to their representatives in Congress in order to protest against Wall Street bailouts. But the first true Tea Party protest (although it did not bear that name at the time) happened on President's day on February 16, 2009, when Kelly Carender was joined by 120 equal-minded residents of Seattle, Washington, to stage a protest against Obama's stimulus package (ARRA) (Trost and Rosenthal 2012, 10). The protest with the name of "Anti-Prokulus Protest" inspired Michelle Malkin (Zernike 2010, 18), who promoted a similar event, organized by Americans for Prosperity and the Independence Institute, in Denver a day after Carender's (Burghart and Zeskind 2010, 16), while in Fort Myers Mary Rakovich rallied a few protesters to witness the Republican Governor Charlie Crist promoting the stimulus bill with President Obama by his side (Zernike 2010, 19–20).

Rassmussen and Schoen (2011, 36–116) are convinced that, contrary to popular belief, the Tea Party movement did not begin with the electoral success of Barack Obama. The movement itself is rooted in the ideas of Berry Goldwater, or even Father Coughlin during the Great Depression on Senator McCarty in the 1950s. Populism in America is not a new phenomenon. This particular one, the Tea Party movement, is merely a resurgence of the 1992 populist movement surrounding Ross Perot. It resurfaced on December 16, 2007, on the 234th anniversary of the Boston Tea Party. On that day, the presidential candidate Ron Paul held a fundraising for his campaign in the 2008 Republican primaries (Burghart and Zeskind 2010, 15). For that occasion he "re-enacted the dumping of tea in Boston Harbor, by tossing banners that read "tyranny" and "no taxation without representation" into boxes that were placed in front of an image of the harbor" (Smith in Rasmussen and Schoen 2011, 116). But most

importantly, he protested against the ever growing federal expenditure and the federal deficit (Rasmussen and Schoen 2011, 116). Some believe the hits of the movement appeared during the actual presidential campaign of 2008, especially with Sarah Palin (Trost and Rosenthal 2012, 1), who later became one of the symbolic leaders of the Tea Party (Rassmussen and Schoen 2011, 153).

Either way, groups identifying themselves as Tea Parties sprung up all over the US, organizing meetings and protests against Obama's way of handling the crisis. While every Tea Party had their own activities, they managed to coordinate and execute events on a grander scale. The first "real" Tea Party events across the country on February 27 were only the beginning, since the Tax Day Tea Party protest on the last day for filing income tax returns, April 15, 2009, combined 750 Tea Party events (Robbins 2009) in 346 cities. These events reportedly attracted an estimated 311 460 protesters (Silver 2009). While the Tax Day Tea Party occurred in multiple US cities, the Taxpayer March on Washington brought the Tea Partiers from every corner of the country to Capitol Hill. On September 12, 2009, the right-wing populism reached a "fever pitch" when the 912 Project – initially proposed by Fox News star Glenn Beck in March 2009 (Rassmussen and Schoen 2011, 125) – attracted tens of thousands of people, all protesting the expansion of government spending, including the health care reform (Williamson et al. 2011, 26). The stage was set for the breakthrough of the Tea Party's ideas into the political arena.

5.1 Electoral success of the Tea Party movement

By the beginning of 2010, the Tea Party became a household name, despite of the movement being ignored by certain media outlets (e.g. ABC, CBS, and NBC) in 2009 (Rasmussen and Schoen 2010, 3). The reason for its newfound popularity can also be found in Scott Brown's unexpected electoral victory in January 2010. A special election of the Massachusetts Senate seat held by late Ted Kennedy gave the Tea Party one of the first opportunities to show their strength in a historically blue state. Moreover, they were given a chance to redeem themselves after their first failed attempt to achieve electoral victory in a special election in New York's 23rd Congressional district in November 2009. And they seized it – on January 19, 2010, Scott Brown, the Tea Party candidate, celebrated his victory over Martha Coakley (Zernike 82–91).

Zernike (2010, 82) called it a symbolic win in two ways – the Tea Party managed to fill the seat that was considered to be a safe Democratic haven, while giving the Tea Partiers the

drive to influence the 2010 midterm election in a grander scale than previously anticipated. However, for the Tea Party to exert their influence on public policy, they had to inject themselves into the existing two-party system, which translated into the necessary cooperation with the Republican Party (Cohen 2012, 212). At the time, many Tea Partiers were dissatisfied with the Republican Party almost as much as they were angry with the Democrats. They felt betrayed by several Republicans officeholders and candidates who they call RINOs – Republicans in Name Only. In order for the Tea Party to work together with the Republicans, the Republican Party would have to change (Zernike 2010, 103–104). On the other hand, the Republican Party was willing to convert the Tea Party's popularity into votes at the midterm elections in November 2010, and therefore embraced the core values of the movement (Rasmussen and Schoen 2011, 178). Looking at the election results, we could say that the union between the movement and the Republican Party was productive, although it did not run entirely according to plan – especially for the Republican establishment. Moreover, the movement is also responsible for "ultimately influencing the direction of the party, pushing it further to the right" (Parker and Barreto 2013, 258).

By March 2010, Katel (2010, 244) counted at least 58 candidates in 25 states who align their beliefs with those of the Tea Party Movement, however, two weeks before the elections, The New York Times counted 129 Tea Party affiliated candidates for the House of Representatives, and 9 for the Senate (Zernike et al. 2010). Burghart (2012a) counted even more Tea Party endorsed candidates, 135 for the House of Representatives and 16 for the Senate – all running on the Republican ticket. It was the senatorial race that proved to cause friction between the Tea Party movement and the Republican Party, which was most visible during the primary season of 2010. Tea Party-backed candidates fought the more moderate candidates endorsed by the National Republican Senatorial Committee, for instance the committee endorsed Arlen Specter over Pat Toomey, and Charlie Crist over Marco Rubio (Zernike 2010, 86). Republican establishment was also shocked by Rand Paul's easy victory over Trey Grayson, as well as Joe Miller's over an incumbent senator, Lisa Murkowski (Cohen 2012, 236).

Nevertheless, the strategic cooperation between the two proved positive, and brought the Republican Party control over the House of Representatives. Republicans gained 63 seats in the House and five in the Senate. Moreover, the Republicans also gained six governor positions. From the initial 129 Tea Party candidates for the House of Representatives, 42

(32.6 percent) have been elected for office, while five of the 9 candidates (55.6 percent) became Senators in the 112th US Congress (The New York Times 2010). According to Burghart (2012a), the figures are somewhat higher – out of 135 candidates for the House of Representatives, 85 (or 63 percent) won the election, as did 10 out of the 16 candidates (62.5 percent) for the US Senate. Although candidates supported by the Tea Party movement did no better than other Republicans in the midterm elections in 2010, their endorsement played a crucial part in the Republican primaries, as did the signing of the Contract from America by the Tea Party candidates (Karpowitz et al 2011, Jacobson 2011). In the summer of 2010, several of these elected officials joined the newly established Tea Party caucus in the House of Representatives under the leadership of Michele Bachmann (Gervais and Morris 2012, 245), while the Tea Party caucus in the Senate formed in the winter of 2011 (Shaw 2011).

However, their biggest challenge was yet to come – the presidential elections in 2012. Even with the strong opposition to Obama's reelection from the Tea Party movement in 2012, the incumbent president won his second term, beating the Republican Mitt Romney. The movement maintained a considerable influence in the first months of the Republican primaries, especially having a number of candidates in line with their ideas – Michele Bachmann, Rick Santorum, Herman Cain, and Rick Perry, nonetheless their initial excitement dwindled after the nomination of a more traditional Republican candidate. In order to attract the Tea Party voters, Romney did embrace Tea Party's views on an anti-immigration policy and Obama's big-government spending plans, and most notably, named a Tea Party favorite, Paul Ryan as his running mate. His turn to the right eventually proved successful, since it made him win 87 percent of the Tea Party vote, however, it was not enough to make him the forty-fifth president of the US (Parker and Barreto 2013, 258–259).

The Tea Party's efforts were more fruitful in congressional elections. The national Tea Party groups and their political action committees endorsed 83 candidates for the House of Representatives and 13 candidates for the Senate. Only two candidates for the Senate achieved success, bringing the Tea Party winning percentage to 15 percent, whereas 67 candidates (80.7 percent) won their House races – 44 out of the elected 67 were incumbents (Burghart 2012a). The balance of power remained the same inside the Congress, while the Republican Party has the majority in the House of Representatives, the Democrats still hold the Senate.

5.2 Grassroots vs Astroturf

In less than two years, the movement has gone from being virtually non-existent, to being considered a fringe protest, to becoming a powerful political force behind the Republican re-taking of the Congress. With all the Tea Party candidates running for Congress on the Republican ticket and the Republican agenda leaning further to the right (Rasmussen and Schoen 2011, 173), the question whether we witnessed a political breakthrough of a true bottom-up, grassroots movement, or was it simply an Astroturf campaign, organized by a wealthy few or even by the Republican Party, regained momentum. It was the House Speaker Nancy Pelosi who initiated such talks after the Tax Day protests in 2009. In her opinion, the Tea Party was designed by the wealthiest people in the country "to keep the focus on tax cuts for the rich instead of for the great middle class" (Pelosi in Powers 2009). As suggested by Robbins (2009), the movement was largely created by Fox News with the financial and political support from Republican leaders, especially the former House Majority Leader Dick Armey, a chairman of FreedomWorks until his resignation in 2012 (Gardner 2012), and David and Charles Koch, founders of Citizens for a Sound Economy (Zuesse 2013).

As the skeptics were focused on the connections between the well-known conservative individuals and the Tea Party, others dismissed such accusations calling the movement a nonpartisan protest effort (Rassmussen and Schoen 2011, 133). According to Lo (2012, 98), the Tea Party movement cannot be described as merely a grassroots movement, neither can it be marked as simply an Astroturf campaign. The same can be said for Skocpol (2011) who concurs that the Tea Party cannot be described as purely bottom up, nor can it be classed as top-down movement – it is a combination of both. Neither can it be dismissed as simply a product of the Republican Party.

In Lo's (2012, 99) opinion we can talk about two separate, yet connected, waves of Tea Party mobilization. While the first protest wave (February and March 2009) had been a product of daily efforts of several conservative groups in favor of reducing social spending and lowering taxes – top-down, the second wave (from April 15, 2009, onwards) can be classed as facilitated mobilization, where the local groups used the preexisting networks to build a grassroots movement – bottom-up.

The first wave started straight after Santelli's call for a Chicago Tea Party on February 19, 2009, when a coalition by the name of The Nationwide Tea Party Coalition decided to "test

market" this idea of the Tea Party. The Nationwide Tea Party Coalition consisted of Top Conservatives on Twitter (a following led by Michael Patrick Leahy, and commonly known as #tcot), thedontgo movement (now the American Liberty Alliance, founded by Eric Odom), and Smart Girl Politics (founded by Stacy Mott), with American Solutions (founded by Newt Gingrich) joining a month after it was established. The coalition was closely linked to Matt Kibbe, CEO of FreedomWorks (Lo 2012, 100).

The coalition embraced Santelli's concept of protesting Obama's proposals and tested it in a variety of localities. They were preparing for the events taking place on February 27, 2009, providing local activists with ready-to-use tea party websites (using domains purchased many months before February 19) and advice on how to reach larger audiences. The first wave peaked on the day of the protests, February 27, 2009, when around thirty thousand people gathered in eighteen US cities. Even though the concept of Santelli's Tea Party tested positive, it focused more or less exclusively on Obama's attempt to help the struggling homeowners. In the next few months, the idea surpassed its original frames, attracting followers who opposed the administration's plan to solve the economic crisis, and not just the HASP. The initial idea behind the Tea Party transformed and entered the so-called second wave of mobilization, when over three hundred thousand people gathered to protest against Obama's agenda. The conservative groups of the coalition could no longer directly control the Tea Party; they could only provide the means to facilitate the mobilization. They have succeeded in creating a self-sustaining movement that did not have to depend on its "founding fathers and mothers" (Lo 2012, 100–103).

6 THE STRUCTURE OF THE TEA PARTY MOVEMENT

We have already mentioned some of the prominent names in Tea Party organizing, as well as mentioned some of the groups responsible for its beginnings. However, we have still to explain the structure of the movement. Skocpol (2011) concludes that the Tea Party movement includes three structural elements: right wing media impresarios or cheerleaders – mainly Fox media empire, the very important grassroots component and the roving billionaire-backed advocacy organizations. The Tea Party movement is described as a confluence of media cheerleading, local organizing and ultra-right wing free-market organizations that have renamed themselves after the emergence of the movement or linked themselves to the Tea Party organizations. We shall introduce them in the following chapter,

along with other newly established organizations, under the banner of major national Tea Party groups, responsible for coordinating the Tea Party activity nationwide, along with providing the local and state Tea Party affiliated organizations with information and advice, and above all, policy ideas (Skocpol 2011). We will follow with the demographic structure of the Tea Party grassroots support, which forms the basis of the Tea Party movement.

6.1 Major national organizations

"Supporting the Tea Party movement is a multimillion dollar complex that includes for-profit corporations, nonparty nonprofit organizations, and political action committees" (Burghart 2012b, 67). Rasmussen and Schoen (2011, 146–150) recognize five such groups: FreedomWorks, Our Country Deserves Better Political Action Committee/Tea Party Express, Tea Party Patriots, Tea Party Nation, and Americans for Prosperity. Burghart and Zeskind (2010) agree that FreedomWorks, Tea Party Express, Tea Party Partiots and, Tea Party Nation should be classed as major national organizations, however, they do not include Americans For Prosperity. Instead, they add two new organizations, ResistNet/Patriot Action Network, and 1776 Tea Party. With the lack of mutual agreement on the most important national backers of the state and local Tea Party chapters, we feel it is necessary to provide a short introduction of all the mentioned national Tea Party factions.

6.1.1 FreedomWorks

FreedomWorks (FW) has been cited as one of the members of the coalition which created the Tea Party movement. Coincidently, it is the national organization with the highest number of online users – on November 19, 2013, that number reached 263 357 online members (FreedomWorks). Such a large online membership can in most part be contributed to their high involvement with the Tea Party movement and the success of the Tea Party candidates in the 2010 elections, for the group had less than 20 000 members in the summer of 2010 (Burghart 2012b, 70), even though FW preceded the modern Tea Party movement.

According to the FW's website, it was founded in 1984 (FreedomWorks), although it did not bear that name back in the eighties. It was known under a different name, Citizens for a Sound Economy (CSE), a conservative think-tank, funded largely by the previously mentioned Koch brothers (Zuesse 2013). Due to a disagreement within the think-tank in 2003, two new groups emerged out of the former CSE – Americans for Prosperity and FW. The current organization

was therefore created in 2004, when a division of CSE merged with a group called Empower America (Burghart and Zeskind 2010, 19). The newly formed FW advocated for Social Security privatization, deregulation, free trade, tax cuts for the wealthiest citizens, caps on lawsuit damages, as well as the opposition's efforts to address global climate change (Burghart 2012b, 69).

FW's mission is to recruit, educate, train and mobilize volunteers which share their core beliefs. It promotes ideas, which are consistent with the ones advocated in its previous stages, and focuses on several key issues: budget and spending, civil liberties, healthcare reform, energy and environment, tax reform, Medicare, Social Security and entitlement reform, red tape and hidden taxes, sound money, and workplace freedom. In their opinion, the federal government is bankrupting the nation by spending the taxpayers' dollars on wasteful and redundant programs and plans, such as bailouts, corporate handouts, stimulus plan, welfare programs, out-of-control entitlements like Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and the new health care reform, which are in desperate need of reform. On one hand, the government is damaging America's economy with excessive regulation imposed by the Internal Revenue Service, the Environmental Protection Agency and other bureaucratic offices, but on the other hand, it is not doing enough to restrain the unions from overreaching in both, the public and private sector. Free market principles should also apply to parents choosing schools for their children based on their performance, and not be assigned one based on their zip code. In short, FW is "leading the fight for lower taxes, less government, and more freedom" (FreedomWorks).

6.1.2 Our Country Deserves Better Political Action Committee/Tea Party Express

Our Country Deserves Better (OCDB) is a California-based Political Action Committee (Rasmussen and Schoen 2011, 147), formed during the 2008 presidential election in order to support John McCain after he selected Sarah Palin as his candidate for vice president (Tea Party Express). OCDB dedicated its efforts to promote "the Reaganesque conservatism of lower taxes, smaller government, strong national defense, and respect for the strength of the family as the core of a strong America" and to stand up to president Obama and his Democrats in Congress (Our Country Deserves Better).

Santelli's rant in February 2009, has inspired the OCDB to introduce the Tea Party Express (TPE), which would mobilize like-minded individuals and collect donations in order to

financially support conservative Tea Party candidates who would further their cause. Their main principles include the call for no more bailouts and tax rises, a call to repeal Obama's health care reform and reduce the size and intrusiveness of the government, as well as a demand to bring prosperity back to the American people (Tea Party Express).

To achieve their goals, they launched a campaign to attack "politically vulnerable" electoral candidates, and thus became the Tea Party faction most deserving for the electoral successes of the Tea Party candidates. Nevertheless, it is also the most controversial of all major Tea Party organizations for it had clashed with several other Tea party groups and been accused of endorsing racism and violence. Since both organizations, OCDB and TPE, lack an online social network presence similar to other factions, and have donors instead of members, it is hard to evaluate the size of its followers' base (Burghart and Zeskind 2010, 49–51). We might shed some light on the size of their base by providing levels of support for their Facebook page. On November 19, 2013, the official TPE's Facebook page, Our Country Deserves Better PAC, had 137 269 likes (Facebook 2013b). In comparison, the two biggest national Tea Party organizations, FW and TPP, have 4 336 014 and 1 237 314 likes on Facebook, respectively (Facebook 2013a, Facebook 2013c).

6.1.3 Tea Party Patriots

Tea Party Patriots (TPP) appeared on the scene on March 10, 2009, when their website domain was officially registered. Since then, they have evolved into the most grassroots organization among the main national Tea Party factions (Burghart and Zeskind 2010, 17–41), with 2965 affiliated local Tea Party chapters and 202 273 individual online members. They are a non-profit organization that was spontaneously formed as a reaction to "fiscally irresponsible actions of the federal government, misguided "stimulus" spending, bailouts and takeovers of private industry. Their mission is to restore the founding American principles of fiscal responsibility, constitutionally limited government and free markets (Tea Party Patriots). These principles which are in line with the priorities advocated by FreedomWorks and promoters of libertarian philosophy became the motto for all the groups that wanted to focus on fiscal concerns and not be troubled with divisive social issues (Zernike 2010, 143).

With almost 3000 local chapters under TPP's umbrella, and only loosely identified key principles, the organization came under attack when some of the affiliated local Tea Parties were suspected of racial and anti-Semitic slurs, as well as exhortations to political violence.

Nonetheless, the TPP refused to deal with these occurrences, even though they claim to have a zero-tolerance policy against discrimination (Burghart 2012b, 81–82).

The TPP's website also played host to the collaborative effort that produced the so called "Contract from America" (Rasmussen and Schoen 2011, 149), a document with a ten point plan which outlined the Tea Party's agenda. The document was inspired by Newt Gingrich's Contract with America, and was drawn up with the help of over 450 000 voters (Becker 2010). The project was a brainchild of Ryan Hecker, who launched a "ContractFromAmerica.com" website and encouraged activists to submit their vision of the main priorities which need to be acknowledged by the Congress. From the 1 000 submitted ideas, Hecker chose 50 of the most popular ones, narrowed them down to the list of 21 and presented them to voters who would decide on the final ten point agenda. The preamble to the contract also states the three main principles of the document, similar to TPP's motto – individual liberty, limited government, and economic freedom (Davis 2010).

6.1.4 Tea Party Nation

Tea Party Nation (TPN) is a national Tea Party organization founded by Judson and Sherry Phillips on April 6, 2009. While so far all of the presented Tea Party factions put forward ideas of fiscal conservatism, the TPN insists on merging the fiscal principals with social conservative issue (Burghart 2012b, 77). On their website we can learn that TPN is a "user-driven group of like-minded people who desire our God-given individual freedoms written out by the Founding Fathers. We believe in Limited Government, Free Speech, the 2nd Amendment, our Military, Secure Borders and our Country". On November 19, 2013, this group was supported by 52 867 online members (Tea Party Nation).

There are several controversies surrounding the TPN. The first one involved the very nature of its status. Whereas most Tea Party factions work as non-profit organizations, the founders of TPN registered their group as a for-profit corporation, a notion which became even more obvious when they organized a first ever Tea Party Convention in February 2010, and charged the Tea Partiers 549 USD for a two-day pass to the event. Judson was also accused of helping the Republicans hijack the Tea Party movement (Burghart and Zeskind 2010, 33–35). Furthermore, he convinced 180 Tea Party groups, leaders, and activists to sign a letter addressed to the GOP demanding they include culture war staples, like opposition to gay marriage, anti-immigration policies, and opposition to abortion, into their legislative agenda.

Not only did the TPN push for such ideas inside the Tea Party movement, it opened its doors to birthers (term is used to describe individuals or groups that are convinced Obama is not a real natural born American, and is therefore ineligible to run for the highest office In the country) and white nationalist groups, while Judson openly supported the restriction of the voting rights of non-property owners and the idea of gutting the Fourteenth Amendment. TPN is therefore one of the groups pushing the Tea Party toward the far-right agenda (Burghart 2012b, 76-79).

6.1.5 Americans for Prosperity

Americans for Prosperity (AFP) is a group originating from the same organization as FW – CSE. It was founded by David Koch in 2004, however, the group has soon joined the Tea Partiers in their efforts to voice their distress and fight for their beliefs (Rasmussen and Schoen 2011, 150). AFP consists of 34 state chapters, and claims to have more than 2.3 million activists nationwide. According to the AFP's website, these activists advocate principles of entrepreneurship, in addition to fiscal and regulatory restraints, by supporting the ideas of cutting taxes and government spending, as well as reducing red tape and restoring fairness to the US judicial system. In their opinion, the federal government has a spending problem, which is noticeable in various public policies. Not only is it preventing the energy market to work properly by supporting wind subsidies, it introduces new costly legislation and taxes through health care reform, it is attacking the property rights of its citizens, allows unions to exert too much power, and interferes in the banking and financial system. AFP therefore calls for the repeal of the health care reform and Dodd – Frank Wall Street Reform, while at the same time promotes the REINS Act[1] (Americans for Prosperity).

6.1.6 ResistNet/Patriot Action Network

Patriot Action Network (PAN), the former ResistNet.com is a for-profit project of an Internet activism service organization Grassroots Action, founded by Steve Elliott. Elliot registered his new domain on December 15, 2008, after the election of Obama and the Democratic Congress.

[3] The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act represents the most extensive expansion of financial regulation since the Great Depression, and it is aimed to end "too big to fail," rule under which certain financial institutions are considered too important for the nation's financial state to be permitted to collapse (De La Bruere 2011). The REINS Act "proposes that any regulation expected to have an economic impact of at least 100 million USD or more be approved by Congress before implementation" (Galoozis 2013).

Before the registration, an email form Grassfire Nation, a division of Grassroots Action, circled the web warning its readers about the socialist threat that Obama poses as the president of the US America, while the Congress in is in the hands of Pelosi and Reid. ResistNet has thus been created to serve as the "Home of the Patriotic Resistance", ResistNet groups joined the Tea Party agenda and started to organize the events immediately after the idea hit the internet (Burghart and Zeskind 2010, 29). However, by the end of 2010 they decided to change their name, their logo, website and the "About Us" page. The change came as a result of accusations about ResistNet's online social network turning into a meeting point for nativists, militia types, birthers, white nationalist, and Islamophobes (Burghart 2012b, 75). The group is now known as PAN and has currently 93 552 online members (Patriot Action Network).

According to the new "About Us" page, PAN is "one of the nation's largest conservative social action networks, serving hundreds of thousands of citizens every month." Their members believe in the greatness of their nation, the Constitution, God given-liberty and limited government, and they wish to re-establish the "Constitution-based liberty and limited government through dialogue, debate, legislation and elections." (Patriot Action Network 2013). Before the makeover the site described ResistNet as "a place where citizens can resist – in a peaceful, patriotic way – the efforts to move our nation away from our heritage of individual liberties toward a 'brave new world' of collectivism" (Burghart 2012b, 75).

6.1.7 1776 Tea Party

We will finish our presentation of the national Tea Party factions with the 1776 Tea Party, or TeaParty.org, a national Party organization most commonly associated with the anti-immigrant movement. While the TeaParty.org was created back in 2004 (1776 Tea Party 2013), the certificate for the creation of a nonprofit organization was filled in February 2009 (Burghart 2012b, 73). The group sees itself as a Christian political organization, and states fifteen non-negotiable core beliefs:

> 1) Illegal aliens are here illegally., 2) Pro-domestic employment is indispensable., 3) A strong military is essential., 4) Special interests must be eliminated., 5) Gun ownership is sacred., 6) Government must be downsized., 7) The national budget must be balanced., 8) Deficit spending must end., 9) Bailout and stimulus plans are illegal., 10) Reducing personal income taxes is a must., 11) Reducing business income taxes is mandatory., 12) Political offices must be available to average citizens., 13) Intrusive

government must be stopped., 14) English as our core language is required., and 15) Traditional family values are encouraged (1776 Tea Party).

Apart from being the faction most connected to anti-immigration issues, it has also attracted much negative attention due to racist and anti-Semitic attitudes of the group's founder, Dale Robertson. He is assisted by two corporate directors, Stephen Eichler and Tim Bueler, prominent members of the Minutemen Project, an activist group monitoring the illegal immigration flow across the US – Mexico border. With their non-negotiable belief, the group has been in a series of clashes with the rest of the national Tea Party factions, mainly FW and TPP, although they still carried out activities alongside ResistNet and TPE (Burghart and Zeskind 2011, 25–26). On November 19, 2013, the 1776 Tea Party accounted for the lowest online membership of all the major national Tea Party organizations, having 37 932 online members, and advertising 399 different local Tea Party chapters (1776 Tea Party).

6.2 Demographic structure of the Tea Party supporters

In order to determine the structure and the characteristics of the Tea Partiers we will use available data from various public opinion polls and conducted studies. We will start by determining the levels of support for the Tea Party movement, and continue with the people forming the base of support for the Tea Party movement.

Burghart and Zeskind (2010, 8) explain the existence of the Tea Party phenomenon at three different levels of engagement with the movement. The opinion polls are predicting the support of the Tea Party running at approximately 16 to 18 percent of the adult US population, which would mean that the number of sympathizers would reach tens of millions of people. Sympathizers are considered to be the outermost ring of support. The next level of engagement with the movement belongs to the larger defined group of a couple of million activists who attend the Tea Party events and meetings, as well as buy and read the Tea Party literature. At the core of the Tea Party support we find members from all over the country who have signed up on the websites of the national organizational networks, In 2010, when the two authors were writing the report on the movement, the core consisted of 250 000 "true believer", all members of the six national organizations they believe to be essential to the Tea Party. Since their membership count, the number of all the members of the national Tea Party factions combined has risen from 250 000 to almost 650 000, however, it would be hard to

determine the exact number of "true believers" since an individual can be a member of more than one national group at the same time.

Nonetheless, we can observe the shift in favorability of the Tea Party movement from 2010 to 2013. The support of the Tea Party, along with its agreeability with the public was more or less on the rise throughout the year 2010, peaking in October and November 2010 in time of the national elections. Since then, the Tea Party has seen its popularity drop among the people, while the polls measuring support of the Tea Party do not record a major difference in opinions (Bowman and Rugg 2013). Nevertheless, the number of those opposing the movement has been on the rise. According to the latest CNN poll (Steinhauser 2013), the Tea Party's favorability reached an all-time low in October 2013 during the government shutdown. Such results are in unison with those of the Pew Research Center (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2013a) – half of the public has an unfavorable opinion about the Tea Party, while 30 percent still have a favorable opinion. One the other hand, the percentage of people having a very favorable opinion of the Tea Party has scarcely changed since February 2010, from 10 percent to 9 percent in October 2013.

We have so far established the approximate number of the Tea Party supporters, however, we still have not revealed who they are. What are the characteristics of the Tea Partiers? To answer this question, we examined a number of conducted surveys: CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll, New York Times/CBS News poll, Pew Research Center survey, and USA Today/Gallup poll. For the purpose of determining the supporter's base of the Tea Party movement, we have compared the answers given by the Tea Party supporters with the answers given by all respondents combined. By doing so, we can conclude that Tea Party supporters are more likely to be male than female, they are predominantly white and conservative, as well as of protestant beliefs. Apart from the USA Today/Gallup poll, the polls show Tea Partiers as better educated than the general American population, they are also older (most of them are over 45/50 years old – depending on which poll we are observing) with a higher family income than the overall population sample. The majority of them declare themselves as Republicans, nevertheless, a considerable percentage sees themselves as Independents (see Appendix A).

7 MAIN IDEAS OF THE TEA PARTY MOVEMENT

We have already emphasized that the Tea Party movement opposes the idea of a big, overspending federal government and are against several pieces of legislation put forward by Obama's administration, primarily the stimulus bill and the healthcare reform. We also introduced the core values and area of interest of every major national Tea Party group. While they agree on the principles of limited government and free market economy, they all have their own individual agendas. The same goes for their supporters. The movement acts as an umbrella for a vast "spectrum of voices on the right: economic conservatives, small government libertarians, social conservatives, and the religious right." (Rasmussen and Schoen 2011, 115). The movement that was firstly focused on Obama's budget and spending initiatives soon began to protest the president's health care reform, whereas some supporters turned to issues like abortion, offshore drilling, taxation etc. (Rasmussen and Schoen 2011, 122–127). There were also some regional differences in the issues supported by Tea Party activist. Zernike (2010, 65) reports that groups in the Northeast are more likely to mobilize against higher taxes, while those in the Southwest are expressing their concerns about illegal immigration. Such differences make it hard to determine the Tea Party's agenda. To make matters even more complicated, national Tea Party groups and its members cannot agree whether to limit their attention solely on economic issues alone, or further expand their agenda on social issues.

It is important to note we will be avoiding the discussion on social issues. There are several reasons behind our decision to do so. First of all, not all Tea Party groups agree to the inclusion of social issues to the movement's agenda. And second of all, the right to regulate certain divisive social issues, common to the conservative movements (abortion, gay marriage, etc.), is by the Constitution given to the States. We are aware that the goal of our work lies in addressing one of the most controversial and prominent social issues in American politics, the question of race, however, it is crucial to understand that we are following the theory of covertly expressed racism, and are examining the Tea Partiers as a group, and are therefore examining the issues all the previously mentioned major national fractions have in common.

In order to define the main ideas of the movement, we shall be citing the provision of the Contract from America as a grassroots document associated with the Tea Party movement, not merely due to its connection to TPP, but also because of its commitment to individual

liberty, small government and the freedom of the market – all principles of the Tea Party movement, and its unveiling at the Tax Day rally in 2010 (Davis 2010).

7.1 Contract from America

Given that the Tea Party's agenda is hard to define, we turn our focus to a document with a high support from Tea Party activists – the ten point agenda of the Contract from America was determined by almost half a million votes, while the document itself played a significant role in the Republican primaries (a study by Karpowitz et al. (2011, 306) shows higher levels of success, a twenty point increase of their vote shares, for candidates who adopted the Tea Party principles by signing the contract). The Contract is based on three principles, individual liberty, limited government and economic freedom, and includes the subsequent ten point agenda for the congressional representatives to follow:

> 1) Protect the Constitution (82.03 percent), 2) Reject Cap & Trade (72.2 percent), 3) Demand a Balanced Budget (69.69 percent), 4) Enact Fundamental Tax Reform (64.90 percent), 5) Restore Fiscal Responsibility & Constitutionally Limited Government in Washington (63.37 percent), 6) End Runaway Government Spending (56.57 percent), 7) Defund, Repeal & Replace Government-run Health Care (56.39 percent), 8) Pass an 'All-of-the-Above' Energy Policy (55.51 percent), 9) Stop the Pork (55.47 percent), 10) Stop the Tax Hikes (53.38 percent). (Davis 2010).

As we can see, the Contract includes all the main (economic) points, advocated by the national Tea Party groups, and has received support from numerous local Tea Party organizations, as well as organizational help from the TPP and FW (Davis 2010, Rasmussen and Schoen 2011). Every single item has been determined by the number of votes, in order of their popularity. The most popular on the list is the need to protect the US Constitution (Davis 2010). The supporters' belief that a strict interpretation of the Constitution would solve the problem of excessive governmental spending has also been reported by Zernike (2010, 65), who argues this point to be a part of the shared Tea Party ideology. In the words of Rosenthal (2013, 2), "rare is the American political movement that identifies itself as profoundly with the American Constitution as the Tea Party". The Tea Partiers see themselves as they see the Founding Fathers, as "liberty-loving people rebelling against a distant and increasingly overbearing government. By getting back to what the founders intended, they believed they could right what was wrong with the country" (Zernike 2010, 66).

The Tea Party supporters consider the passed legislation as an abuse of the Constitution. They emphasize the importance of the limitation of Congressional power as it is stipulated in Article I, Section 8[2]. They also believe there was a violation of the Tenth Amendment, which states that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved for the States respectively, or to the people" (Constitution of the United States of America). Continuing this line of argumentation, the Congress had no legal right to establish the Federal Reserve, Social Security, federal policy on education, energy, housing, labor, or the right to regulate health care. Such violations of the Constitution started during the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and are again present now, during the presidency of Barack Obama (Zernike 2010, 69).

The second point voiced in the Contract, and later on included in the passing of the appropriate energy policy, is the concern over the dangers of a cap and trade program. Voters are convinced that Obama's intention to introduce such legislation would result in the rise of unemployment and consumer prices, while weakening the global competitiveness of the US (Davis 2010). Not only would the government be interfering with the free market, it would be consequently responsible for tremendous economic damage (Broder 2010). Cap and trade would work as an economy-wide tax that would be paid by the consumers and not the companies, while there have been reports that Obama intends to spend the revenues, obtained through this program, on new social spending (The Wall Street Journal 2009). While President Obama stresses the importance of cap and trade to combat climate change, such legislation has still not been approved by the Congress. While ARRA does include provisions to promote development of renewable energy sources and increase energy efficiency in all sectors of the economy (approximately 38 billion USD in government spending and additional 20 billion USD in tax incentives for the period of ten years) (LeMonica 2009), Obama's plan on cap and trade was not adopted by the legislator.

Several Tea Party organizations are calling the cap and trade program the largest excise tax in the history (Border 2010), and their dissatisfaction with the American tax policy does not end there. The supporters see a great need in a tax reform and the introduction of a single rate tax system, written in a unified document, no longer than the original Constitution. They also oppose tax hikes and call for a two-thirds majority vote in Congress on any tax hike (Davis 2010). The idea of opposing new taxation (and repealing those that began in 2011, including

[2] See Appendix B.

the income tax, capital gains tax and death tax (Davis 2010)) goes hand in hand with the limitation of governmental spending in order to achieve one of Tea Party's goals, a balanced budget. Not long after the Contract form America was unveiled, a new Tea Party coalition by the name BBA Now – Balanced Budget Now, envisioned an amendment to the Constitution which would end the annual deficit by requiring a balanced budget, limit federal spending to 20 percent of the national GDP and would require a two-thirds vote in Congress to raise taxes, as was stated in the Contract from America (Pappas 2010). A balanced budget amendment has in fact been proposed by Jackie Walorski in 2013, a Representative from Indiana who was a Tea Party endorsed candidate for Congress (The Wall Street Journal 2012). Nevertheless, the proposal has an estimated 12-percent chance of being passed by Congress (GovTrack).

In 2012, the members of the Senate Tea Party Caucus presented their version of the plan to achieve a balance budget called "A Platform to Revitalize America", a plan which would overhaul Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security, while Medicaid, State Children's Health Insurance Program, food stamps and child nutrition programs would be funded through block grants. It would also save the national defense spending from the cuts mandate by the Budget Control Act, freeze foreign aid spending at 5 billion USD a year, as well as eliminate several governmental departments, among them the Department of Energy, and privatize the Transportation Security Administration Furthermore, their plan would also repeal the PPACA and the Dodd – Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Bolton 2012).

To repeal the government-run health care is also considered as one of the key points on the agenda and became one of the focal points of the Tea Party movement in the summer of 2009 (Rassmusen and Schoen 2011, 122). According to the Contract from America, Obama's health care reform should be replaced by a system that will actually provide customers with affordable health care and insurance, for the existence of which it is of the upmost importance to ensure a competitive free-market health care and insurance system that is not restricted by state boundaries (Davis 2010). The Tea Party's need to repeal "Obamacare" has been shown on various occasions and on various levels – it has been attempted to be repealed by the House and the Senate over thirty times, while the Supreme Court examined its constitutionality (Obamacare Facts). Moreover, the importance and perseverance in repealing the health care reform was best displayed during the governmental shutdown in October 2013, following the months long repetition of Tea Party threats of such action unless the health care reform if defunded, delayed or repealed (Rosenthal 2013, 1).

We have so far presented the key features of the Tea Party movement, however, we have yet to elaborate on the elements that lead us to question the motives behind their opposition to the presidency of Barack Obama and several of his policy initiatives. As we claim in the introduction to the thesis, such opposition might be rooted in deep-seated racial tensions, which have plagued American politics for centuries. In order to do so we must first explore the historical development of racial relations and explore the most prominent explanations of the current state of racism in the American society.

RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Oxford Dictionary of English (2010) defines racism as "the belief that all members of each race possess characteristics, abilities, or qualities specific to that race, especially so as to distinguish it as inferior or superior to another race or races" as well as "prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed against someone of a different race based on such a belief". The history of the United States (and thirteen British colonies) is full of animosity, directed toward different racial and ethnic groups. However, for the purpose of this thesis, we shall limit ourselves solely on the black population, bearing in mind the gruesome effects of racial discrimination against other groups. Nevertheless, we wish to point out that Africans were the only group brought to the Americas against their will (Sowell 1981, 183) and enslaved for the purpose of crating and sustaining the colonists' plantation system. Even though slavery and violation of basic human and civil rights of the black population are now the thing of the past, one can still argue that previous discriminatory actions have an impact on racial equality in today's society. It is of vital importance to understand the historic timeline of social exclusion/inclusion of the black population in the United States in order to determine their present position and the state of racial relations between the white and the black population in modern America.

8 THE HISTORY OF RACIAL TENSIONS BETWEEN WHITE AND BLACK POPULATION IN THE US

8.1 The time of slavery

Slavery in America can be traced back to the time of Columbus when the numbers of native population started to decline due to sickness, war and exploitation by the conquerors. The

need for fresh workers on the fields and in the gold mines drove the Spanish and the Portuguese to import Africans as slave laborers, setting the precedent for the English colonies and its successor, the United States of America, for more than two centuries (Jones et al. 2003, 116–117).

The first Africans brought to colonial Virginia came with the Dutch ship in August 1619. In need of provisions, the master of the ship traded in his only cargo, 20 black Africans, who were incorporated into colonial society as indentured servants. Indentured servants were contract laborers who were obligated to serve a master for a specific number of years. Once the contract expired, the servant became a free citizen (Healey 2006, 148). In the next few decades the system of indenture produced a small number of freed black citizens, however, "by the 1650s /…/ many African Americans (and their offspring) were being treated as property of others, or, in other words, as slaves" (Morgan in Healey 2003, 149).

By the middle of the seventeenth century, 10 000 slaves were being transported across the Atlantic per year (Sowell 1981, 14) and even though the majority of them were headed toward the Caribbean, there was a pressing need to legally determine their status in the colonies. It was in the 1660s that the first laws defining slavery were enacted (Healey 2006, 149). A series of laws were passed in Virginia and Maryland which separated the servants working for a fixed period of time and slaves consigned to labor for life. Moreover, in 1662 the Virginia's General Assembly proclaimed all children of enslaved mothers as slaves, whereas in Maryland (and later on in Virginia) a newly baptized slave could not gain freedom by simply converting into Christianity as was sometimes the case in Spanish colonies. The legislatures also stigmatized interracial ties and undermined the position of free blacks (former indentured servants). In addition, Virginia's Negro Act of 1705 consolidated the position of slaves in the colonial society by introducing torture and dismemberment as punishment for escaping. It also stated that any master or overseer who kills a slave while administering punishment goes free and is not charged with a felony, while the owners of slaves who were killed by law get reimbursed for the loss of their property (Jones et al. 2003, 121–125).

By the beginning of the eighteenth century slavery was accepted throughout the colonies. With Great Britain becoming the number one slave transporter between 1700 and 1800, the number of slaves in the future United States grew, primarily in the southern colonies. Even though all the colonies could be described as societies with slaves, it was the southern

colonies which were full-fledged slave societies, in the economic and cultural sense – the consequence of such reliance on slavery proved to be a powerful motivator in the attitudes toward the blacks in years to come (Jones et al. 2003, 131–167).

It was the American Revolution that brought the moral issues of slavery forward. Famous founding fathers, such as Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, James Madison, and Patrick Henry all publicly advocated the abolition of slavery, yet the notion of all men being created equal did not apply to the black population of the United States (Sowell 1981, 193). It was clear that a constitution seeking to end slavery would not be ratified by the states; however, it was also obvious that the idea of slavery directly opposes the principles of freedom, designed by the framers of the constitution. As a result, the constitution does not mention the word slavery, although the document itself is ripe with racial consideration, especially Article I and Article IV[3]. (Gilliam 2002, 3).Article I included the so called 3/5 Compromise between the north and south states over whether the slaves should be counted for taxation or representation purposes. According to the three-fifths formula, written in the Constitution, five enslaved people were equivalent to three free people in apportionment matters (Jones et al. 2003, 281). Article I also contains the provision, that Congress could not prohibit the slave trade until 1808 (when the agreement between England and the US to ban international slave trade came into force), however, it still had the option of levying a tax on imported slaves. Moreover, Article IV held the so called fugitive clause, which stated that there is no discharge from service for those slaves who escaped to states without slavery (Gilliam 2002, 3).

The Constitution did not abolish slavery, however, all the northern states did just that between 1790 and 1804. While slaves became free in the North and the southern states loosened their strict regulations of slavery, the pattern of slavery spread west to the new states (Jones et al. 2003, 302–310). Nevertheless, with growing of cotton being the source of labor for around 60 percent of all slaves in the US, their biggest concentration remained in the states of the Deep South – Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and Louisiana. These states have historically been the most extreme on any racial issue (Sowell 1981, 191).

As the number of slaves grew (million black slaves in the US by 1860 (Sowell 1981, 195)), so did their resistance to slavery, and what followed was a greater number of restrictions and tightening of the slave laws, or Slave Code, in the South (Franklin and Moss in Gilliam 2002,

[3] See Appendix B.

11). The American society was torn – the American abolitionist movement brought slavery under attack, which resulted in the strengthening of the anti-black racism (Wilson in Healey 2006, 163), not only among the southern slave owner but also some northern whites with allies in Congress. In the last years of 1840s, the slave owners controlled the presidency and Supreme Court, and outnumbered the North in the House of Representatives, the North held control of the Senate. With new territories joining the Union, the question of slavery gained new momentum, especially on the account of California's application for statehood (California would unbalance the federal system consisting of 16 free states and 15 slave states), and Utah's and New Mexico's intentions to ban slavery once they join the Union. The US Congress once again resorted to a compromise (before the Compromise of 1850, the Congress settled for the so called Missouri Compromise (1820), under which Missouri was admitted as a slave state, and Maine as a free state. Slavery was banned above 36°30' parallel). Under the compromise of 1850, California would enter the US as a free state, Utah and New Mexico would submit the question of slavery to its voters, the federal government would abolish the slave trade in Washington, D.C., and a new Fugitive Slave Law would be introduced. The new law destroyed the notion of northern states as free territory as it granted local and federal enforcement agents the authority to retrieve runaway slaves from every state in the US. Blacks were also denied the trail or the right to testify on their own behalf (Jones et al. 2002, 362–447).

With new states joining the Union in 1854, i.e. Kansas and Nebraska, the discussion over the expansion of slavery became even more heated, since Congress allowed the voters of these two states to decide whether or not they wished to declare themselves a free or a slave territory (therefore disregarding the Missouri Compromise). This decision has turned Kansas into a bloody battlefield between the abolitionists and the supporters of slavery. Supporters of slavery even drew up a document called the Lecompton Constitution, in which they nullified the principle of popular sovereignty by stating that even if the voters decide for Kansas to become a free state, any slave already in the state remains a slave in accordance with the law (Jones et al. 2003, 448–454).

The divide between supporters of contradicting sides was additionally affected by the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857). The ruling has been classed as "perhaps the most important governmental act concerning race in the 19th century" (Gilliam 2002, 11). The court ruled that even residence on free soil could not release slaves of

their bondage. According to the ruling, black people had "no right which the white man was bound to respect" (Jones et al. 2003, 454). The decision ruined the balance between slave states and free states, declared the Missouri Compromise as unconstitutional and spread slavery further to the North (Jones and others 2003, 454).

Poor economic outlook in the East and fear of slaves taking over work in the northern states convinced more and more citizens of the North that the question of slavery must be resolved immediately, preferably in favor of abolitionists. Even the Congress started to lean in the direction of anti-slavery, with the admission of two new free states – Minnesota (1858) and Oregon (1859) (Jones et al. 2003, 454–456).

The circumstances gave rise to the creation of new political options, challenging the existing two-party system. The Republicans came into existence in 1854, attracting many Democrats and Whigs, alongside supporters of abolition. Even though the Republicans were not unified on major issues, they were in unison when it came to the abolition of slavery. Their platform proved to be a success since Abraham Lincoln, a Republican candidate, was elected president in 1860. He won the Electoral College, although he received merely 40 percent of the votes. Such outcome was a result of the actions undertaken by ten southern (slave) states, which refused to put Lincoln's name on the ballot. Nevertheless, Lincoln became the 16th president of the US, and the first Republican to take the highest office in the country, on the count of anti-slavery sentiments of the North and the Upper Midwest (Jones et al. 2003, 448–458).

The White House was now in the hands of the northern abolitionist, while the South intended to protect their slave-based system with all means. "By the end of 1860 South Carolina had seceded from the Union, and the nation headed toward war" (Jones et al. 2003, 458).

8.2 From the Civil War to Jim Crow racism

South Carolina set an example for other southern states – in the following months the additional 10 states seceded from the Union (Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina), forming the pro-slavery Confederate States of America (The History Place 1996). Other slave states, i.e. Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri remained in the Union, with Unionists and the Confederate sympathizers divided over the question of slavery (Jones and others 2003, 466).

The stage was therefore set for the beginning of the Civil War which officially started in April 1861 and ended in May 1865 (The History Place 1996).

According to Hodgson (2009, 69), the Civil War was an exceptional event, for it was fought over "two distinct, though related principles: over whether the Union could endure "half-slave and half-free", and over the issue of human bondage itself". The principles in question started to unfold in 1863, with Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation that all slaves in the Confederate states become free on January 1, 1863. The proclamation itself defined the conflict between the South and the North a war for abolition, inspiring many blacks in the North to take up arms for the Union, while in the South, black people would flee the plantations as the Union army moved forward down south (Jones et al. 2003, 482–485).

Even with Lincoln's proclamation, slavery survived the Civil War, until it was officially abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment to the US Constitution[4] on December 6, 1865. The Senate passed the amendment in April 1864, followed by the House of Representatives in January 1865. Congress therefore passed the amendment before the southern states rejoined the Union (Our documents), however, it still required ratification by ¾ of the states, including at least eight former Confederate states. These efforts were met with resistance in the South. While promising to provide social and economic stability, southern states began to pass laws, commonly known as Black Codes. Such legislation was the states' attempt to institute a system similar to slavery (Gilliam 2002, 22). The purpose of the code was to penalize the newly freed slaves who did not work in the fields owned by whites, as well as to deprive them of the right to vote, serve on juries, or, in some states, even own land (Jones et al. 2003, 506). These vagrancy laws also introduced compulsory apprentice laws for black children and various other regulations limiting freedom of choice of the black populous (Sowell 1981, 198).

As a response, Congress adopted the Civil Rights Bill in 1866, a document which gave the federal government the authority to protect individual rights against the carelessness of the states (as demonstrated by the Black Codes) (Jones et al. 2003, 506). The bill was succeeded by the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment[5] in 1868, which "extended the liberties and rights by the Bill of Rights to former slaves" (Our documents). Finally, in 1870 Congress passed the last of the so-called "Civil War Amendments". The Fifteenth Amendment[6] gave

[4] See Appendix B.
[5] See Appendix B.
[6] See Appendix B.

the newly freed black citizens the right to vote (Gilliam 2002, 23). The new legislation gave way to the election of approximately 2000 black men to the positions of local officials, sheriffs, justices, tax collectors, and civil councilors. During the Reconstruction (1865–1880s) 16 black Southerners were elected to Congress. Moreover, the Southern legislators introduced a new public school system, fairer taxation methods, racially integrated public transportation and accommodation, bargaining rights of the plantation laborers, as well as public works projects (Jones et al. 2003, 514–515). As Healey (2006, 183) sees it "the period of Reconstruction /…/ was a brief respite in the long history of oppression and exploitation of African Americans".

The time of relative prosperity and peace was soon to be over. Even though the blacks were given their freedom, many still refused to accept their equality. The Reconstruction era witnessed the rise of scientific racism or social Darwinian Theory, becoming the prevailing ideology, especially in the South. The idea of white people being intellectually and socially superior to non-whites was not new and had been voiced earlier by the likes of David Hume and Immanuel Kant. What made it different from the Enlightened Era was the pseudo-scientific rationale, associated with the new science of anthropology. Many anthropologists believed the darker a person's skin, the more removed the person was from civilized society. Individuals were considered biologically superior or inferior, and were granted legal rights befitting their level of barbarity. Supporting this notion was the theory of polygenism, believing humans originated from different lineages (Darian-Smith 2010, 133–134).

Violence between different groups escalated even on the account of the lack of jobs in time of the economic depression in 1879, when now free blacks entered the labor force. The period therefore witnessed a shift in racial rhetoric, along with other physical expressions of hatred (Darian-Smith 2010, 165–166). Soon after the war, the white supremacy clubs and organizations emerged. The Ku Klux Klan of 1866 was soon followed by Young Men's Democratic Clubs, White Brotherhood, and Knight of the White Camellia, all determined to reinstate their supremacy over the blacks (Jones et al. 2003, 507–512).

The era of Reconstruction ended in 1877 with all federal troops withdrawing from the South. This came as part of a compromise between the Republicans, who remained in the White House, in return for the withdrawal and a promise that their work to secure the equality for blacks was finished. The power in southern states was returned to those who upheld the

traditional southern hierarchy. “White Southerners were free to uphold the principles of states’ rights that had been traditionally invoked to deny blacks their rights in the region” (Jones et al. 2003, 532). As a result, a new system of race relations emerged – the Jim Crow system.

The Jim Crow system is the system of de jure racial segregation. The basis for it can be found in the virtually intact class structure and agrarian economy of the South after the war. The plantation elite still needed the hands to work on their fields, however, these workers were now a part of a large free black electorate with the chance to threaten the political dominance of the said white elite. Once the federal troops returned back North, they had sufficient power to construct a repressive system that would “put the blacks back in their place” by the means of segregation in every aspect of life (Healey 2002, 187–188). The segregation was fully institutionalized by the US Supreme Court with its ruling in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 which gave impetus to the “separate but equal” doctrine (Darian-Smith 2010, 233). Homer Plessy, a “one-eight” black man, purchased a first class train ticket and refused to relinquish his seat in the whites only coach, thus violating Louisiana’s law. Plessy argued that the law violated his constitutional civil rights, however, the Court disagreed by ruling that the mentioned law did not reestablish a state of involuntary servitude, and thus not violating the Thirteenth Amendment, nor did it violate the Fourteenth Amendment which enforced the absolute equality of the races before the law and was not abolishing the distinctions based on color (Gilliam 2002, 35).

As a result, the segregation spread to other states and regulated more and more activities. New states and local laws mandated separate water fountains for blacks and whites, gave way to separation of black and white pupils (by supporting two separate school systems – white and well-funded, and black and low-funded), as well as banned them to enter certain white-owned premises (theaters, restaurants, hotels etc.) (Jones et al. 2003, 580). By the 1920s, segregation was present in housing, education, health services, religion, employment and penitentiaries (Darian-Smith 2010, 234). Moreover, restrictions were imposed even on voting rights of black men – literacy requirements, poll taxes and “grandfather clauses” made voting almost impossible for black men in the South. A poll tax was a fee that a person had to pay in order to vote, while the so-called grandfather clause meant that only men whose grandfathers had been eligible to vote before the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment could cast their ballots) (Jones et al. 2003, 611).

The system went hand in hand with the increased level of prejudice and racism. Along with the political and legal repression of the blacks in the South, the number of lynchings of blacks rose, with more than a 100 lynchings every year (Sowell 1981, 202). Furthermore, the Ku Klux Klan became the most powerful white supremacy group, promoting itself as a patriotic organization dedicated to preserving American values (Jones et al. 2003, 710). The US society as a whole became very racist and intolerant (Healey 2002, 190), with segregation practices noticeable even in the US military (Jones et al. 2003, 581). The 20th century therefore witnessed a great migration of the black population from the South to the North of the country. The move was prompted not only by the worsening racial relations in the South, but also by the economic distress following a bug infestation of cotton fields, and new job opportunities caused by the World War I mobilization. The vast numbers of ill-educated, uncultured, rural southern blacks who arrived to the northern cities were met with the resentments from whites and the middle class blacks alike. The whites' reaction to the migration was to raise racial barriers against blacks as a group (Sowel 1981, 209–210), introducing discrimination in housing, schools and the job market (Healey 2002, 190). While the South had de jure segregation, the North faced de facto segregation. Nevertheless, the exodus of the blacks from the South continued during the 1940s and the 1950s, with a minor pause in the time of the Great Depression. Between the 1940s and 1970s that number reached 4 million (Sowel 1981, 211).

8.3 The Civil Rights Movement and the end of the Jim Crow system

The term civil rights movement defines a multifaceted campaign to end segregation and ameliorate the inequalities encountered by the blacks in the US. The campaign lasted for decades and included lawsuits, sit-ins, protests marches, demonstrations, prayer meetings, voting registration drives, as well as the so-called Freedom Rides (Healey 2002, 225–226).

One of the major voices of the civil rights belongs to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Preceded by the Niagara Movement of 1905, the NAACP called for an end to segregation, as well as economic equality and educational opportunities as early as 1908 (Jones et al. 2003, 662). From the beginning, the strategy rested on filing lawsuits that challenged the legal foundations of the Jim Crow segregation (Healey 2002, 194), and managed to outlaw segregation in voting primaries (Smith v. Allwright, 1944), interstate transportation (Morgan v. Virginia, 1946), contracts for house sales (Shelley v.

Kraemer, 1948), and graduate schools (Sweatt v. Painter and McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 1950). Their biggest victory, however, came in 1954 with the ruling in the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka case (Jones et al. 2003, 807).

The action was comprised of four separate cases in Delaware, Virginia, South Carolina, and Kansas, all dealing with the constitutionality of the segregated school system. The significance of the Brown v. Board of Education lies in the Supreme Court's departure from the "separate but equal" doctrine set in Plessy v. Ferguson case (Gilliam 2002, 48–49). The NAACP argued that separate facilities deny black students their equal rights as citizens, basing their argument on the psychological effect of the stigma of segregation on black children (Jones et al. 2003, 845). The Supreme Court unanimously deemed racial segregation in public schools unconstitutional and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Darian-Smith 2010, 242). Unfortunately, it soon became clear that the federal government will not enforce the ruling, the southern state legislators vowed to protect segregation. The authority over schools has been transferred to local school boards that assigned students to schools according to concern for the general welfare, thus protecting segregation without mentioning race as a criterion (Jones et al. 2003, 846). The resistance also included "shutting down white schools rather than accepting black students, and politicians personally blocking black students' access to classrooms" (Darian-Smith 2010, 242).

The fight to end the Jim Crow system continued with the boycotts and sit-ins. On December 1, 1955 Rosa Parks refused to give up her bus seat to a white passenger, therefore violating the Montgomery's ordinance, and resulting in Parks' arrest (Gilliam 2002, 65). Overnight, the black community of Montgomery, Alabama started their bus boycott which ended more than a year later when the Supreme Court ruled that the Montgomery's buses must integrate. The boycott renewed the civil rights movement's determination, gave way to a new form of protests – the sit-ins, and introduced a new public figure of the movement, Martin Luther King, Jr. (Jones et al. 2003, 847).

The non-violent direct action of the blacks continued with the sit-ins. Even though the sit-ins were conducted in at least 16 cities between 1957 and 1960, the one in Greensboro is considered as the opener of the sit-in movement (Gilliam 2002, 70). On February 1, 1960 four black students at North Carolina Agricultural and Technical College in Greensboro sat down at Woolworth's segregated lunch counter and refused to leave when being told to do so. This

particular sit-in prompted thousands of students to join in as well and organize similar activities (Jones et al. 2003, 848). The movement used various tactics to express their opposition to the Jim Crow system, however, it also triggered a new wave of repression and violence from the police and white supremacist groups (Healey 2002, 226) (the Ku Klux Klan re-emerged after its disbandment in 1944, counting approximately 17,000 members in the 1960s). Such ferocity was displayed in Birmingham, Alabama in 1963, when a peaceful march, led by Martin Luther King, Jr., turned violent. The police blasted the demonstrators with fire hoses and attacked them with dogs. Violence spread and culminated in the bombing of a church, killing four black children (Jones et al. 2003, 710–863).

The executive and legislative branch had to adapt to social change. Their first attempt came in 1957 with the creation of a Civil Rights Commission, a Civil Rights Division within the Justice Department, and the empowerment of the Attorney General to seek an injunction when citizens were deprived of their right to vote. The legal foundation for these new measures was still full of restrictions and included only light penalties for the violation of the Fifteenth Amendment (Bowles 1998, 55). The Kennedy administration made the first step toward affirmative action in 1961 (The Week, 2013), moreover, Kennedy declared himself on the side of the civil rights protestors after the Alabama incident. His work was continued by his successor Lyndon Johnson who became a vigorous promoter of racial equality (Jones and others 2003, 863–870). Under his presidency, the Congress adopted the most important civil rights act of the 20th century (The Civil Rights Act of 1964) that ushered in the desegregation of all public facilities and provided relief against discrimination in such places. It was followed by the Voting Rights Act in 1965 which "suspended the use of state illiteracy tests, prohibited state residency requirements beyond 30 days as a bar on voting in Presidential elections, and establish uniformed national rules for absentee registration and voting in presidential election" (Bowles 1998, 57). The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was the final nail in the coffin for the former Jim Crow system in the South. In 1967 the Supreme Court declared marriage one of the basic civil rights of men and therefore uplifted the ban on interracial marriage in the remaining 16 states (Jones et al. 2003, 873).

De jure segregation was dismantled, what remained were the consequences of de facto segregation. In the summer of 1965 the frustration of the urban black communities exploded into riots which spread throughout the country in the space of 4 years. While race riots normally involved attacks of the whites against blacks, the unrest of the 1960s involved

blacks attacking the symbols of their oppression: blacks fought with the police and destroyed white-owned businesses in black neighborhoods (Healey 2002, 229). By the 1966, the civil rights movement slowly faded away, for it accomplished its main task of ending legal segregation and discrimination (Jones et al. 2003, 883). Nonetheless, a new movement was ready to take its place – Black Power Movement. It was a loose coalition of organizations, promoting a number of different ideas such as racial pride, African heritage, and black nationalism. While the Civil Rights Movement strived to achieve assimilationist goals, the Black Power movement tried to increase the influence of black Americans over public services operating in black neighborhoods. They argued that the US still faces structural and institutional problems concerning racial relations and blamed Anglo-American values for creating and maintaining the system of racial repression (Healey 2002, 229–231).

8.4 The state of racial relations today

The lives of minority groups in the US have improved considerably in the last few decades of the previous century, they, however, continue to experience severe disadvantages in many different areas. Healey (2002, 254) notes that many black Americans still face poverty, unemployment, residential segregation, a failing educational system, discrimination, and prejudice on a daily basis. Following Healey's conclusions, we shall be examining the position of the black population in the modern US society with the help of statistical data concerning population, urbanization, education, employment, income, poverty, criminal justice, and health insurance as one of the key policy areas causing friction between Obama's administration and the Tea Party movement.

We will start with the basic population figures from the last conducted US census in 2010. According to the report, the total population of the US is 308 745 538. Out of those 308 million 12.6 percent or 38 929 319 were black or African American alone (13.6 percent or 42 020 743 if we include racially mixed individuals) while 63.7 percent of the population were white (white alone, not Hispanic or Latino), and 16.3 percent Hispanic or Latino. The majority of blacks (56.5 percent) still live in the South, whereas 17.9 percent live in the Midwest, 16.8 percent in the Northeast and 8.8 percent in the West (United States Census 2010). When it comes to the rural – urban divide, most of them live in suburban or urban areas (86.1 percent) and only 13.9 percent of all blacks live in rural areas (The Housing Assistance Council 2012), however, in the last decade there has been a decrease in the number

of blacks living in the inner cities of the 20 largest metro areas – in other words, the black population is moving out to the suburban and exurban areas (United States Census 2010).

Almost 60 percent of all blacks live in 10 states: New York, Florida, Texas, Georgia, California, North Carolina, Illinois, Maryland, Virginia, and Louisiana. The concentration of the black population can also be seen in the counties. In 2010, 62 percent (1941) of all US counties had 5 or less percent black population while in 106 of them (all the counties are located South, apart from St. Louis, MO) black population counts for more than 50 percent of the total population. Moreover, the black population was between 25 and 49.9 percent of the total population in 317 counties. The same goes for urban areas as well, since there are a number of cities with the population that is predominantly black: Detroit, MI (82.7 percent), Jackson, MS (79.4 percent), Miami Gardens, FL (76.3), and Birmingham, AL (73.4 percent) to name a few (United States Census 2010).

The concentration of the black people is again visible in the classrooms as well. After the ruling in the case of Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell the schools began to re-segregate and according to the recent figures 74 percent of black students attend class in schools where minorities represent 50 to 100 percent of all students. Almost 40 percent of them go to intensely segregated schools where 90 to 100 percent of students are members of minority groups (numbers are even higher in the case of Latino students). Furthermore, black and Latino segregation is very likely to be segregation by both, race and poverty. A typical black student is now going to schools in which two thirds of pupils come from low income families. Such schools are likely to have less experienced teachers, more remedial and special classes and consequently less honor or AP classes, lower graduation rates, weaker connections to college, etc. (Orfield et al. 2012, 19–26).

Along with Healey's (2002, 247) observations, the gap between the whites and blacks is narrowing when it comes to educational attainment. In 2012, 30 percent of whites older than 18 years had a high school diploma compared to 34 percent of blacks with the same degree. The gap is wider if we look at postsecondary education – 38.1 percent of whites have at least an associate's degree, while the same can be said about 27.3 percent of blacks (United States Census Bureau 2012). However, between 1974 and 2006 the enrollment in postsecondary education among black Americans rose from initial 34 percent in 1974 to 53 percent in 2006 (Ingels et al. 2012, 11).

It has been said that people with higher levels of education are generally more likely to be employed, as well as having a higher paying job. Bearing in mind that whites are better educated, it comes as no surprise their employment rates and pays are higher in comparison with black Americans. In 2012, Blacks had the second lowest labor force participation rate after Alaska Natives (61.5 percent), while whites had a 64 percent participation rate. Blacks made up roughly 12 percent of the labor force: 30 percent of them were employed in management, professional or related occupations, 26 percent in services, 25 percent in sales and offices, 6 percent in natural resources, construction, and maintenance, and 15 percent in production, transportation, and material moving (in comparison, 39 percent of the white work force worked in management, professional or related occupations, 17 percent in services, 23 percent in sales and offices, 10 percent in natural resources, construction, and maintenance, and 12 percent in production, transportation, and material moving). Even though blacks constitute 12 percent of all employees, they accounted for about 25 or more percent of all employed workers in several occupations like nursing, psychiatric, and home health aides (35 percent), security guards and gaming surveillance officers (27 percent), and bus drivers (25 percent) (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013, 2–4).

On the other hand, black families are also least likely to have an employed member, while unemployed blacks experienced the longest periods of unemployment which amounted to 24.7 weeks on average (17.6 for unemployed whites). Whereas the US unemployment rate for 2012 stopped at 8.1 percent, the black population had the highest unemployment rate at 13.8 percent, while whites' unemployment rate was 7.2 percent. Blacks also earned less money since the median usual weekly earnings of full-time wage and salary workers amounted to 621 USD for blacks and 792 USD for whites (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013, 5–7).

In 2012, the black real median household income was the lowest of them all at 33 321 USD, while the overall average real median household income was 51 017 USD and 57 009 USD for non-Hispanic whites. It should be noted, that the family household with no spouse present had the lowest real income (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2013, 5–7), and according to the 2010 census such family households are the most common among black Americans (30.1 percent of such families are black) (United States Census Bureau 2010). The black community is also facing the highest poverty rate with 27.2 percent of black living below poverty, while the poverty rate of non-Hispanic whites stands at 9.7 percent and the national average at 15

percent. 30.9 percent of all families with a female household also live below the poverty line (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2013, 13–17).

What about the criminal justice system? According to Healey (2002, 233) "no area of race is more volatile and controversial than the relationship between the black community and the criminal justice system". Around 6 9777 700 offenders were supervised by the adult correctional authorities in the year 2011 (or about 2.9 percent of all adults in the US) – about 4 814 200 offenders were either on probation or parole, while about 2 239 800 offenders were incarcerated in state and federal prisons or local jails (Glaze and Parks 2012, 1–2). In 2011, blacks constituted 31 percent of all offenders on probation (white s 54 percent) and 39 percent of all offenders on parole (whites 41 percent) (Maruschak and Park 2012, 17–20). Moreover, of all the offenders in jails 36.9 percent were black (45.8 percent white) (Minton 2013, 6), however, the ratio between blacks and whites changes when we look at the numbers of prisoners in state and federal prisons. As stated in the report for 2011, out of 1 537 415 prisoners in state and federal prisons 37.8 percent was black and 33.5 percent white, with most of the incarcerated blacks serving time for drugs or robbery. While black Americans represent only 13.6 percent of the American population they represent 37.8 percent of all prisoners in the US. Their imprisonment rate is the highest of all races with 3 023 prisoners per 100 000 US resident, whereas with white prisoners it is 478 per 100 000 US residents (Carson and Sabol 2012, 8–26). Many would argue that such statistics gave the basis for racial profiling, as it is more likely to be involved in street crime and in illegal drug trade if you are black (Taylor and Whitney in Healey 2006, 234).

And last but not least, we will look at the statistics concerning health care coverage. In 2012, there was 15.4 percent of American without any health coverage. Most uninsured individuals come from families whose real household income is less than 25 000 USD (24.9 percent) or is between 25 000 and 49 999 USD (21.4 percent). Since uninsured rates for people vary by poverty, age, and race, as well as Hispanic origin, most uninsured people are of Hispanic origin (29.1 percent), while blacks take the second lowest position with 19 percent uninsured individuals. On the other side, there are only 11.1 uninsured white Americans (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2013, 22–28).

In summary, in five decades after Jim Crow there is still a concentration of black people in certain parts of the US, a high percentage of black students still attend racially (more or less)

segregated schools, even though a higher number of them decide to continue their studies at a postsecondary level, although they are on average less successful in the job market as their white peers. They are also more likely to live in poverty and to be imprisoned, as well as to not have health care insurance. Healey (2002, 254) is therefore saying that even though the biological racism may have almost vanished, the indifference to racial issues have remained. "Traditional racism has declined, only to be replaced by modern racism" (Healey 2002, 254).

9 THE EMERGENCE OF "NEW RACISM"

Since the elimination of de jure segregation, the whites' views toward racial issues have become more liberal. Researchers report of "a gradual shift in the racial attitudes of the white public to the current near-unanimous support for general principles of equal treatment and nondiscrimination" (Schuman et al. in Tarman and Sears 2005, 731). Nevertheless, the black community is still suffering from significant disadvantages. Numerous government policies were designed to tackle the problems, faced by the blacks, but they have been met with opposition from the whites (Tarman and Sears 2005, 731). Ward (1985, 1) calls it a paradox of recent American political history, for we have seen "a great deal of change in the expression of racial prejudice, while at the same time there may have been substantially less change in the amount of prejudice". Researchers were therefore eager to find an explanation as to why do whites show almost universal support for principles of racial equality but not express the same level of support to ensure that equality (Krysan 2000, 144).

The explanations of white public's opposition can be divided into four different categories: 1) a new form of racism replaced the political role of the old fashioned, "redneck" or "Jim Crow racism"; 2) contemporary racial politics is considered a normal political process, in which elites control the agenda and coalition formation as well as appeal to the mass public's nonracial political ideologies and values; 3) group conflicts are the result of structural inequalities; 4) "implicit" racism is largely automatic and unconscious (Sears and Henry 2005, 98).

According to the first explanation, racism did not disappear as a political force with the demise of the Jim Crow system (Sears and Henry 2005, 98). Many scholars argue that negative racial stereotypes have not disappeared (Sears et al. 1997, 17). In other words, we are not seeing the "end of racism" (D'Souza in Bonilla-Silva et. al 2004, 560), but its transformation. Racial prejudice has simply gone underground and it is now expressed in a

different manner (Bonilla-Silva et. al 2004, 560). The old, overt racism based on biological superiority of the white race is all but disappeared, but a more convert racism – a "new racism" took its place (Rattansi 2007, 95). Each of the theories of new racism includes "the assumption that a new form of prejudice became politically potent after the civil rights revolution of the 1960s and that they embody both negative feelings toward Blacks as a group and some conservative nonracial values" (Sears and Henry 2005, 97). The new racism theory therefore presumes that the expression of racial prejudice lies in the language of American individualism (Kinder and Sanders 1996, 106).

The theory of symbolic racism was the first of new racism theories. It was developed by Sears and Kinder in 1971 in order to "describe whites' animus toward blacks in its contemporary guise" (Gomez and Wilson 2006, 612). A decade later, McConahay developed an overlapping, yet somewhat different model, which we named "modern racism", followed by "subtle prejudice" by Pettigrew and Meertens, and the theory of "racial resentment" by Kinder and Sanders in 1996. Even though each of these concepts varies slightly from the other, they are all operationalized in a similar way (Henry and Sears 2002; Sears and Henry 2005). Other distinct, but related concepts of new racism include Katz's "racial ambivalence", Gaertner and Dovidio's theory of "aversive racism", and last but not least, Bobo and Smith's "laissez-faire racism" (Sears and Henry 2005, 98).

9.1 Symbolic racism

The idea for creation of the theory of symbolic racism comes from analyses of campaigns for the mayor's office in Los Angeles in 1969, when a conservative white incumbent, Sam Yorty faced a liberal black city councilman, Tom Bradley. The analyses clearly show that the white suburban vote was influenced by a special kind of racial animosity, an abstract, moralistic racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders 1996, 291). The researchers demonstrated the biggest support for Sam Yorty among whites who endorsed three principles: that blacks have a poor work ethic and are not really in need of welfare, that their demands are unwanted and illegitimate, and that they receive an undeserved attention from the government (Sears and Henry 2005, 99). According to the proponents of the theory, his type of resentment was symbolic, an expression of a moral code, because it was associated with complaints about the organization of the society as a whole and with endorsement of traditional American values, as well as it was unconnected to personal dissatisfaction of whites with their own lives. It

predicted the white vote powerfully – symbolic racism was more powerful than partisanship, conservatism, or personal threats that blacks may pose to private lives of whites. As a result, Sam Yorty resumed his duties as mayor of Los Angeles. The theory was put to the test in 1973, when Tom Bradley challenged Sam Yorty in yet another mayoral campaign. The second campaign gave Sears and Kinder the opportunity to define and measure symbolic racism more precisely, since symbolic racism dominated the white vote in 1973 as well (Kinder and Sanders 1996, 291).

Symbolic racism which has been described as "one of the major social-scientific challenges to post-civil rights optimism about the winding-down of racism in America" (Krysan and Schuman et al. in Sears and Henry 2002, 4) ever since. Theorists of social structures agree that measures of symbolic racism are the most powerful predicators of white opposition to racial policies, hence the reason why policy scientists treat this theory as central to the study of race in American politics. The theory claims that the politics of race are distorted by the underlying racial prejudice – the race-neutral conservative rhetoric disguises underlying racial animosity. Moreover, those who are convinced that racial prejudice lost its potency in American politics have reserved most of their criticism precisely for the theory of symbolic racism (Sears and Henry 2005, 98–101).

9.1.1 Conceptualization of symbolic racism

The theory of symbolic racism combines two idea: the term racism is used to describe the underlying prejudice toward blacks, while the term symbolic reflects the hypotheses that symbolic racism targets blacks as an abstract collectivity, a group (and not a specific black individual), and is rooted in abstract moral values (rather than personal experience or self-interest of the whites) (Sears and Henry 2003, 260). The original theory was designed on the basis of three essential propositions:

> First, a new form of racism, "symbolic racism", had replaced the Jim Crow or "old-fashioned" racism, which had embodied social distance between the races, beliefs in the biological inferiority of Blacks, and support for formal discrimination and segregation in pre-Civil Rights days. Symbolic racism had replaced Jim Crow racism in two senses: the latter was no longer very popular /…/, and because only a tiny minority still accepted it, old-fashioned racism no longer could be very influential in ordinary politics. Second, opposition to Black politicians and racially targeted policies were more influenced by symbolic racism than by realistic self-interest; that is, more than by real or perceived racial threats to

> Whites' own personal lives. Finally, the origins of symbolic racism lay in a blend of early-socialized negative feelings about Blacks with traditional conservative values (Sears and Henry 2005, 98).

Symbolic racism can therefore be described "as a blend of anti-black affect and the kind of traditional American moral values embodied in the Protestant Ethic" (Kinder and Sears 1981, 416). The so called anti-black affect represents negative feelings toward blacks, which can be expressed as fear, avoidance, and a desire for distance, contempt, discomfort, unease, disgust, or simple dislike (Sears, Dovidio and Gaertner in Sears and Henry 2003, 260). In other words, symbolic racism expresses the whites' "symbolic behavior of the feeling that blacks are violating cherished values and making illegitimate demands for changes in the racial status quo" (McConahay and Hough 1976, 23). The theory speculates that blacks are violating such traditional values as individualism and self-reliance, as well as the work ethic, obedience, and discipline (Kinder and Sears 1981, 416). The list of violated American values became longer in 1988, when Sears (Sears and Henry 2003, 261) added values such as thrift, punctuality, sexual repression, and delay of gratification. Nonetheless, these traditional values on their own have no intrinsic link to race (Sears and Henry 2005, 106).

The origins of prejudice against blacks can be found in the process of individual's early socialization. The past several centuries have been marked by negative attitudes toward blacks which have become a strong component of American socializing culture, unlikely to be overturned by the end of the Jim Crow system (Sears et al. 1997, 18). Hence, symbolic racism is rooted in "deep-seated feelings of social morality and propriety and in early-learned racial fears and stereotypes" (Kinder and Sears 1981, 416). In time, such attitudes evolve into a blend of primitive anti-black affects with traditional values, which are fused in a single construct – black individualism (Sears and Henry 2003, 259). These common elements are evoked when blacks are presented with racially targeted policies or black candidates (Sears et al. 1997, 18).

According to the theory, symbolic racism is the reason behind the white opposition to racial policies and black candidates, or in other words, "the effects of Black individualism on racial policy preferences are /…/ mediated by symbolic racism" (Sears and Henry 2003, 259). Racial attitudes have been shown to have considerable effects on whites' opposition to affirmative action, busing, or welfare, and support for law and order and tax reduction policies. Researchers, among them Kinder and Sears, also linked racial attitudes to whites' opposition

to black candidates (Sears et al. 1997, 17). The theory of symbolic racism can be visually demonstrated in the following model by Sears and Henry (2005).

Figure 9.1: The symbolic racism model



Source: Sears and Henry (2005, 104).

The effects of symbolic racism partially overlap with the effects of conservatism; they are, however, not reduced to general conservatism, as they "occur above and beyond the effects of general ideology" (Sears and Henry 2005, 99). In fact, the explanatory power of symbolic racism outweighs not only ideology, but also party identification, attitudes toward the size of the federal government, or older racial attitudes, like the belief in blacks' genetic inferiority, support for racial segregation, negative stereotypes, or anti-black affect (Sears and Henry 2005). Nevertheless, prejudice represented by symbolic racism is difficult to identify, as they are disguised and embedded in consensual political values. They may well be entirely unconscious, thus even harder to identify (Ward 1985, 3).

9.1.2 Measurement of symbolic racism

The theory of symbolic racism is defined as "a coherent belief system reflecting an undimensional underlying prejudice toward Blacks" (Sears and Henry 2005, 100). Figure 1

presents its combination of four specific themes: that blacks failed to progress because of their unwillingness to work hard enough (work ethic and responsibility for outcomes), that blacks are demanding too much (excessive demands), the belief that blacks no longer face much prejudice in society today (denial of continuing discrimination), and the sense that blacks have gotten more than they deserve (undeserved advantages) (Henry and Sears 2002, 256).

In order to measure symbolic racism through its four themes researchers used numerous symbolic racism items. However, there has not been a single consensus measure of symbolic racism (Henry and Sears 2002, 256). The specific items used, as well as the balance between the four themes, varied from study to study, usually as a consequence of the availability of certain questions in a particular survey or study. Such inconsistencies in measuring symbolic racism generated some criticism which shall be further addressed in the next chapter (Sears and Henry 2005, 108).

With the objective to create an up-to-date, cleaner measurement of symbolic racism in modern American society, Henry and Sears (2000, 258–278) composed a new measurement scale, the so-called Symbolic Racism 2000 (SR2K) scale which shall be used in this particular thesis. The scale should always remain short, limited to no more than eight items. Nonetheless, it can be shortened or lengthen as needed, usually depending on the availability of suitable items/questions in a selected survey. The ideal scale, the complete SR2K scale would consist of these 8 survey items:

> 1. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as white. /…/
> 2. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same. /…/
> 3. Some say that black leaders have been trying to push too fast. Others feel that they haven't pushed fast enough. What do you think? /…/
> 4. How much of the racial tension that exists in the United States today do you think blacks are responsible for creating? /…/
> 5. How much discrimination against blacks do you feel there is in the United States today, limiting their chances to get ahead? /…/
> 6. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. /…/
> 7. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. /…/
> 8. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve. /…/ (Henry and Sears 2000, 279).

For the purpose of explaining attitudes about racial policies, it is of vital importance that the items of symbolic racism do not mention any government policy, program or action. The proposed scale proves to be reliable and internally coherent, while having discriminant validity that is different from older forms of racial attitudes as well as political conservatism. It has predictive validity of explaining the whites' racial policy preferences that exceed any other traditional racial attitudes or political predispositions (Henry and Sears 2000, 253–278).

9.1.3 Criticism of the theory of symbolic racism

As mentioned earlier, the theory of symbolic racism received the most criticism of all new racism theories. Most critics focused on the interpretation of the results, rather than on disputing the findings, thus offering alternative interpretations without collecting new data (Sears and Henry 2005, 101–104).

Sears and Henry (2002, 7) have identified six main critiques of their theory of symbolic racism and addressed them, respectively. The first critique refers to the inconsistencies in conceptualizing and measuring of symbolic racism through time. Because research began quite inductively, as an effort to describe changes in attitudes in the post Jim Crow era, such inconsistencies did in fact occur. They are also a result of the (un)availability of items in early surveys (Sears and Henry 2005, 106). Symbolic racism has been therefore treated as a single construct, as well as composed of two to five sub dimensions (Tarman and Sears 2005, 733). Today it is consistently described as having four themes – work ethic and responsibility of outcomes, excessive demands, denial of continuing discrimination, and undeserved advantages (Sears and Henry 2005, 106). When addressing the criticism of inconsistent measurement of symbolic racism, Tarman and Sears (2005, 733) believe such claims are overstated, since both the earliest and more recent studies measured all four themes. Sniderman and Tetlock's (1986a, 133) remarks that no measure of symbolic racism is the same as any other and therefore some measure can be described as better and some worse, is replied by the appearance of described four themes in research over time, while the difference in measurements of symbolic racism still exist as a result of the availability of items in a particular survey (Sears and Henry 2005, 108).

The second critique refers to the definition of symbolic racism as a single psychological construct rather than the combination of multiple elements. The definition has been questioned, as an artificial conjunction of four different attitudes into a single construct

(Sniderman and Tetlock 1986b, 175), while other skeptics have stated that a number of other subjective fault lines run through them (Kluegel, Smith, Stoker, Bobo and Apostle et. al in Tarman and Sears 2005, 734). However, Tarman and Sears' (2005, 756) tests of its internal consistency revealed that it is in fact a single logically and psychologically consistent belief system. Presumably, the reason for this consistency is that is "a substantively meaningful package of beliefs to most White Americans" (Sears and Henry 2005, 109). As Tarman and Sears (Sears and Henry 2005, 128) concluded, symbolic racism is a key component to explaining whites' contemporary racial attitudes as they apply especially to racial politics.

The third critique deals with the question, whether symbolic racism really does differ from old-fashioned racism. According to the opponents of the theory, symbolic racism is merely "old wine in new bottles", however, empirical research deems such accusations untrue. Even though the two concepts are correlated, they are distinctive in several ways (Henry and Sears 2005, 123). Tarman and Sears (2005, 756) tested the claims of the critics and revealed that symbolic racism is "a psychologically important construct in its own right", for it represents a distinctive belief system, and does not purely borrow elements from conservative ideology, individualism, anti egalitarianism, or old-fashioned racism. Similar results have also been produced by Sears and his colleagues (Sears et al. 1997, 46).

Furthermore, the critics are also convinced that the content of some symbolic racism items are too similar to the racial policy preferences it is supposed to predict (Sniderman et al. in Sears and Henry 2005, 113), and are therefore rendering its main findings as mere tautologies (Sears and Henry 2002, 7). This fourth critique has taken two forms. The first one belongs to Sniderman and Tetlock (1986b, 174–175) who criticized the use of opposition to affirmative action and busing as an item of measurement of symbolic racism. A number of conducted studies used the opposition to busing and affirmative action as either an independent variable predicting other political attitudes, or as a dependent variable predicted by symbolic racism. Researchers of symbolic racism acknowledged the criticism and removed all such items from their measures. The second form of this criticism applies to measures of symbolic racism that refer to any type of government action. The critics have stated that some items seem too close to in content to the policy attitudes that serve as the dependent variables they are predicting (Sears and Henry 2005, 114). In order to test this hypothesis a study, limiting the measurement of symbolic racism to the two wholly nongovernmental themes, denial of continuing discrimination and work ethic and responsibility of outcomes, has been conducted

by Tarman and Sears (2005, 749), and compared to the study including items relating to all four themes of symbolic racism. Their research showed almost equally strong levels of correlations between symbolic racism and racial policy preferences, even though the measure of symbolic racism was purged of items relevant to the government. Nevertheless, all items referring to government involvement have been eliminated from the SR2K scale (Henry and Sears 2002, 278).

The fifth hesitation to the theory of symbolic racism is that it confuses prejudice with political conservatism. In accordance with this critique, "the effects of symbolic racism on racial policy preferences could then be caused either by racial prejudice or by unprejudiced conservatives' aversion to big government, which would have very different implications" (Sears and Henry 2005, 124). However, it has been proven that symbolic racism and its impact on racial policy preferences cannot be reduced to a nonracial ideological conservatism, even though ideological conservatism does correlate with symbolic racism and racial policy preferences. Sears and colleagues (Sears et al. 1997, 47–48) addressed that claim and discovered that ideology is not a strong determinant of symbolic racism, that substantial controls on ideology (as well as party identification and social welfare attitudes, which are linked to the magnitude of government action without explicit references to blacks) do not weaken the effects of symbolic racism on policy preferences, and that symbolic racism has unique explanatory values even after ideology and other nonracial attitudes have been considered. Moreover, Tarman and Sears (2005, 754–756) proved the critics wrong by conducting an explanatory factor analysis and discovering that items used to measure symbolic racism load onto a different factor than ideology and party identification, while analyses from three different surveys specify that symbolic racism taps an attitudinal dimension which is different from conservative ideology. The purging of the symbolic racism scale, described earlier, also speaks against the fifth critique, since removing of items with any reference to policy or to government does not reduce its political effects, and therefore such purges do not enhance the explanatory power of ideology (Sears and Henry 2005, 126).

And last but not least, the sixth critique states that the theory of symbolic racism does not demonstrate that its origins lie in the bland of anti-black affect and traditional conservative values, especially individualism (Sears and Henry 2002, 7). Sniderman and Tetlock (1986b, 180–182) are not content with Kinder's explanation of symbolic racism being a conjunction of anti-black affect and traditional values. Their doubts were put to the test by Henry and

Sears (2003) who concluded that symbolic racism presents the glue that links political conservatism to racial prejudice among whites in today's society. They proved that symbolic racism is significantly explained by both the anti-black affect and individualistic values. Furthermore, they created a new index, the so called black individualism, which directly measures the fusion of anti-black affect and individualistic values – the sense that blacks violate individualistic values (Henry and Sears 2003, 259–267). Black individualism proved to have a strong effect on symbolic racism and exceeded the effects of anti-black affect and general individualism measured separately and later combined (Sears and Henry 2005, 119).

We have addressed all six main critiques of the theory of symbolic racism, however, we should also point to two further implications of the approach (Sears and Henry 2002, 14). The first implication concerns the consistency of the symbolic racism effects across diverse racial policies. Sniderman and his colleagues (Sears and Henry 2005, 116) argue that white opinion varies significantly across different racial policies. However, Tarman and Sears (2005) as well as Sears and his colleagues (Sears et al. 1997) claim otherwise. They were able to confirm that the effects of symbolic racism on such preferences are very similar across different policy domains (Sears and Henry 2005, 116). Sears and his colleagues (Sears et al. 1997, 44) also disproved Snidermand and Piazza's (Sears and Henry 2005, 116) suggestions that poorly educated whites' policy preferences are more influenced by racial prejudice, the same as those who are more educated in political ideology. Their research showed that symbolic racism had more influence over whites' preferences among the college educated than among those with no college, nevertheless, the difference in influence was rather minimal.

TEA PARTY MOVEMENT AND SYMBOLIC RACISM

We have provided an extensive overview of the Tea Party movement, the history of racism in the US, and presented the theoretical approach we will use to test our hypotheses: H1 – The Tea Party movement opposes the presidency of Barack Obama, H2 – The supporters of the Tea Party movement oppose the first African-American president of the United States of America and his initiatives as a result of their unique belief system, rooted in racial prejudice. We will do so by employing the results of the 2010 ANES survey EGSS1, using specific questions relating to Tea Party support, support for Barack Obama and his two legislation pieces, ARRA and PPCPA, along with the set of questions designed to measure symbolic racism.

10 SENTIMENTS OVER THE PRESIDENCY OF BARACK OBAMA

On November 4, 2008, Barack Hussein Obama II became the first black president in US history. He was elected with 69 498 516 or 52.93 percent of the popular vote[7] with 58.23 percent of voting age population casting their vote, which translated into 365 electoral votes, 95 more electoral votes than needed for the election (Federal Election Commission 2009, 5–6). According to a study conducted by Edison Media Research/Mitofsky International (2008), he fared better than McCain with the female voters, younger groups, as well as all racial and sexual minorities in the US. He was also considerately more popular with voters whose income did not exceed 29 999 USD. His overall approval ratings in the first months in office were relatively high; his job was approved by more than 60 percent of the respondents, while his disapproval ratings were in the lower twenties, if that. The percentage of people approving his job dropped below 60 percent in the summer of 2009, along with the rise in the number of people who disapproved of the Obama's performance – according to Gallup, the disapproval ratings reached 30 percent for the first time in May 2009 and rose to 40 percent in August 2009. The numbers are pretty similar in the case of Pew's survey in which the percentage of people disapproving of Obama's work reached 30 percent in June and reached 40 in December of 2009. In the time of the first Tea Party protests between February and April 2009, the average approval rating of Barack Obama was approximately 62 percent (Gallup 2013, Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2013b). Nonetheless, Obama never enjoyed a high approval rating from the Tea Partiers. The data suggests that Tea Partiers are more likely to have negative attitudes toward Obama, exceeding the simply Republican opposition to a Democratic president (Parker and Barreto 2013, 203). Obama's approval ratings are shown in the next table.

Table 10.1: Approval of Obama's performance (in percent)

Survey	Tea Party's approval	Tea Party's disapproval	Overall approval	Overall disapproval
The Winston Group	17	81	49	44
New York Times/CBS News	7	88	50	40

Source: Winston (2010), New York Times/CBS News (2010), American National Election Studies (2010-2012).

[7] The Republican candidate John McCain received 59 948 323 or 45.65 percent of the popular vote (Federal Election Commission 2009, 5).

The initial phase of the Tea Party movement is therefore coinciding with Obama's highest approval ratings to date. The explanation may be found in the fact that the movement materialized after the passage of several pieces of legislation in February 2009, among them the disputed ARRA. Maxwell and Parent (2012, 1) point out that both, disapproval of Obama and economic policy preferences, form significant predictors of Tea Party membership. The disapproval of Obama by the members alone does not necessary translate into racial animosity, argue the Tea Partiers, and add that their opposition to the president springs out of differences in economic philosophies and principles.

On the other hand, the critics of the Tea Party were quick to point out that the movement's sudden presence is the result of racial prejudice, prompted by the inauguration of the first black president. Parker and Barreto (2013, 35) went even further. According to their findings, "Obama, by virtue of his position as president, and the fact that he's the first nonwhite person to hold the office of president, represents to some an assault upon a specific ethnocultural conception of American identity and everything for which it stands". Tea Party's reaction to Obama is due to his presence as the face of their country, as the commander in chief of their armed forces undermines their sense of social prestige.

Let us return to the primary focus of this thesis, the existence of symbolic racism in the Tea Party movement. The movement has been said to harbor ideas which emerged during the presidential campaign of 2008. It was during the campaign when Tesler and Sears (2013, 3) observed that political evaluations strongly related to Obama (for instance, assessments of his opponent John McCain, tax policy preferences) became racialized, the intensity of which increased as the 2008 campaign continued. The term racialization stands for the process in which racial attitudes come to influence political evaluations (Tesler 2012, 2–3). They discovered a strong connection between racial attitudes and voting in 2008 general elections. Researching public's opinion in the election year, they concluded that" racial attitudes /…/ had a much larger effect on general election votes in 2008 than in any other recent presidential election". Moreover, the vote was heavily influenced by feelings about Muslims, therefore Obama is not only evaluated as a black person but also as someone who is an example of "otherness"" (Tesler and Sears 2010, 2).

In the first years of Obama's presidency, the symbolism of his position as the first nonwhite American president, appeared to make racial attitudes one of the most important determinants

of how the public responded to him (Tesler and Sears 2010, 20). As the policy proposals of any US president are heavily influenced by the public's feelings about him, the impact of racial attitudes on assessment of Obama should spill over into issues strongly connected to his administration. Tesler's (2012, 2–19) research indicates that Obama's strong association with his policies, in his case the health care reform, racialized white American's opinion about the issue. He notes that Obama is not your typical president. When past presidents' policy positions polarized the electorate by party identification, Obama's proposals divide the opinions of whites by their racial predispositions. His findings on Obama's health care reform made him come to a realization that racial attitudes became more important in whites beliefs about the issue, along with deactivating the effects of party identification. That race is a factor in opposition to Obama's policies is also the prevailing opinion of the American public, for this opinion is shared by 54 percent of the respondents to Pew Research Center's survey (2010a) – 23 percent of all respondents are of an opinion that Obama's race plays a major role in the opposition to his policies, while 31 percent of them thinks race still plays a role, even though this role is considered minor. It should be mentioned that percentages are higher in the case of black respondents. 73 percent of them are of opinion Obama's race is an important issue when it comes to his policies, 52 percent are giving it a major role and 21 a minor role in the opposition to his policies.

11 SENTIMENTS OVER BARACK OBAMA'S POLICY AGENDA

Tea Partiers have based their opposition to Obama on the grounds of his government being overreaching and overspending. They would like to see their government spend less, tax less, stop the further growth of the national debt and stick to the constitutionally limited obligations. As indicated in TPP's mission statement: "The impetus for the Tea Party movement is excessive government spending and taxation" (Lowndes 2012, 155). The question therefore is which programs to cut? What does the administration have to give up in order to reduce spending and balance the budget?

Jacoby (1994, 347–348) suggests that people have particular ideas in mind when discussing government spending. His research suggests that the idea of government spending is strongly connected to a specific set of government programs, mainly those intended to help disadvantaged groups in the US. Other forms of public spending – national defense, research and development, law enforcement and similar are viewed as separate and distinct. In other

words, the stimulus "government spending" activates individuals to think about welfare spending, "even if the particular programs are not explicitly called to public. /…/ Most citizens seem to translate the phrase "government spending" into "government spending on programs that could benefit the poor, blacks and other disadvantage groups"" (Jacoby 1994, 354). If we turn to the New York Times/CBS News poll (2010), we can discover that 25 percent of the Tea Partiers are convinced that Obama's policies favor blacks over whites (their opinion is shared by 11 percent of all respondents), while 56 percent of them think that his policies favor poor Americans (27 percent of all respondents). The Tea party supporters also believe that providing government benefits to poor people encourages them to remain poor – this answer has been given by almost three quarters of all Tea Partiers, 73 percent.

As indicated in the introduction, the movement produced the loudest opposition to two of Obama's pieces of legislation – ARRA and PPACA, which can also be viewed as two important legislative pieces concerning spending, welfare spending. It should also be noted, that the Tea Party movement has pushed the Republicans in Congress to reduce spending on programs for the poor as well as on middle-class entitlements such as Medicare and Social Security (Lowndes 2012, 155). Nevertheless, the New York Times/CBS News poll (2010) shows that Tea Partiers still think of Social Security and Medicare as programs worth their costs, as oppose to one of the national Tea Part factions, FW. "They regard Social Security and Medicare /…/ as benefits to which they are entitled because they have paid for them. Other governmental expenditures, specifically health care reform and the financial stimulus, strike them as irresponsible and unfair because /…/ they believe they will both increase the scope of the United States government and inflate the deficit" (Disch 2012, 137).

11.1 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009

One of the most criticized legislation of Obama's administration is most definitely the ARRA, commonly known as the "stimulus package" or simply "stimulus". ARRA was the administration's response to the economic crisis and the significant weakening of the American economy with the biggest job loss since the end of the World War II (The White House 2009). The bill was introduced to the Congress on January 26, was passed in the House of Representatives on January 28, with no Republican "yes" votes, while the Senate passed their version on February 10, 2009, with the support of three Republican Senators. The two versions of the bill were, however, somewhat different – the bill passed by the House of

Representatives favored spending over tax cuts and was estimated at 819 billion USD, whereas the Senate version focused more on tax cuts and was estimated at 838 billion USD (Montopoli 2009). After the joint negotiations, the bill was finally approved by the House of Representatives (246 to 183) and the Senate (60/38) on February 13, 2009, and signed into law by the president on February 17, 2009 (Sahadi 2009).

ARRA's total expenditure estimate was initially valued at 787 billion USD, however, the Congressional Budget Office (2013, 1) later announced that the stimulus package would increase budget deficits by 830 billion USD between 2009 and 2019. According to the White House (2009), the package was supposed to create or save 3.5 million jobs in the first two years, provide direct relief to working and middle class families, double renewable energy generating capacity over the first three years, provide new investments in the renewable energy sector, make a 150 billion USD investment in infrastructure, protect health care coverage for millions of Americans, as well as enact the most significant expansion in tax cuts for low- and moderate-income households ever. As reported by Fox News (2009), the 2009 estimate was a combination of 281 billion USD in tax cuts with 308 billion USD in outlays funded by the appropriations committees and 198 billion USD in spending for benefit programs such as unemployment assistance, Social Security, and Medicaid.

On the other side, the Republicans were strongly opposed to this 1071-page measure. Not only did they vote against it in the Congress, the House Republican leader threw the bill on the floor as a gesture of contempt. He was quoted saying: "The bill that was about jobs, jobs, jobs has turned into a bill that's about spending, spending, spending." (Fox News 2009). A day after Obama signed the bill into law, Fox News (Wilson 2009) published an article stating Obama plans to spend approximately 224 billion USD on various forms of welfare support, such as Medicare, unemployment benefits, food stamps, and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The article also quotes Robert Rector, a senior research fellow on welfare and family issues at the Heritage Foundation, who claimed ARRA will undo Clinton's welfare reform, which rested on benefits encouraging work, by rewarding states for having more welfare dependents (Rassmusen and Schoen 2011, 268). When the House of Representatives passed the bill, the same expert released a memo in which he criticizes it for spreading the wealth without reviving the American economy. He has also pointed out that the spending for the means-tested welfare, even without ARRA, reached a historic high and is rapidly growing. Even if the bill was not enacted, federal, state, and local means-tested

spending will reach the total of 8.97 trillion USD over the next decade (Rector and Bradley 2009). All in all, the stimulus package will amount to the new rise in the total welfare spending, for those 224 billion USD may yet turn into 650 billion USD until the year 2019 (Wilson 2009).

11.2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act

The second, even more controversial documents, is PPACA, which was introduced to Congress on September 17, 2009 (GovTrack). PPACA soon became another central point of the Tea Party's opposition to Obama's policy agenda, shifting the focus from Obama's budget and spending initiatives to the reorganization of the American health care in the summer of 2009. It has been said by Rassmusen and Schoen (2011, 122–123) that the health care debate represented the total sum of the Tea Party's frustration over the administration policies and initiatives, and it was therefore given a new name – Obamacare. The ideograph can be classed as the previously explained spillover of racialization of attitudes toward Obama into his policy proposals. The term Obamacare personalizes the issue by linking it to the president's name, which suggested that the reform is "part of the president's personal agenda and his pet project, not one that has broader support and consensus". Along with the Obamacare, Fox News used several other phrases to describe the health care overhaul – ideographs such as "government takeover", "socialized medicine", "health care rationing", "death panel" and "government imposed euthanasia" (Ha 2012). What followed was a summer of town hall meetings, where Tea Partiers expressed their opposition to the new health care reform by targeting Democratic representatives and senators in Congress. The rise of Tea Party's opposition to health care reached its peak with the march on Washington in September of 2009 (Zernike 2010, 83–85).

Obama set a deadline for the Congress to adopt the initial health care document by August 2009, however, the turn of events prevented the Congress to do so. The divide in the public's opinion over the health care reform was starting to show in Congress as well, primarily among Republicans. After the introduction in September 2009, the House of Representatives finally passed its version of the bill on November 7, 2009, with the final vote of 220 Representatives for and 215 against (39 Democrats voted against it, one Republican voted for). The Senate passed its version of the bill along party-lines (60–39) on December 24, 2009, nevertheless, the Democratic efforts to speed up the adoption of the reform were prolonged by

the election of Scott Brown to the US Senate in January 2010. The bill was finally adopted on March 21, 2010 and signed into law by Obama two days later (Dunham 2010, GovTrack).

PPACA was described as the most expansive social legislation enacted in decades (Stolberg and Pear 2010), and one of the biggest expansions of the welfare state since the creation of Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid (Skocpol 2011). It reforms the health insurance industry and the American health care system as a whole, gives Americans more rights and protections and expands access to affordable health care to millions of previously uninsured citizens (Obamacare Facts). Under Obama's new health care reform, 33 million previously uninsured Americans would gain health care coverage, which would, according to Congressional Budget Office, contribute to the reduction of the budget deficits by 143 billion USD between 2010 and 2019 (Amadeo 2012). The changes proposed to the initial document, most notably the ruling of the Supreme Court which upheld PPACA which gives states the option of opting-out of expanding access to Medicaid, as envisioned in the legislation, would reduce the deficit by additional 84 billion USD between 2012 and 2022, however, the changes would also result in fewer insured Americans (Congressional Budget Office predicts that around 3 million fewer people will have insurance) (Amadeo 2012).

The focus on the expansion of Medicaid in one of the Tea Parties concerns as well. Fox News has been associating Obamacare with Medicaid, with headlines like "ObamaCare forcing people into Medicaid" (McKelway 2013), "Medicaid To Explode Under ObamaCare But Will Doctors See The Patients?" (The New York Times in Fox Nation 2013), "Rush on Medicaid could spell trouble for ObamaCare's health" (Berger 2013), etc. It has also been associated with cuts in employment, as Fox News hosted owners of national chain franchises discussing cuts in their employees' hours due to their inability to afford to provide their full-time workers with health insurance under Obamacare (Obamacare Facts). FW joined in by stressing that PPACA will "kill jobs, bankrupt the government, drive up everyone's health insurance costs, put bureaucrats in charge of our health care, and ruin the world's best health care system (FreedomWorks). Their opinion over the reform has not changed even with the Congressional Budget Office announcing the deficit reductions as a result of the implementation of PPACA.

Not only has PPACA been viewed as too expensive and too expansive, it was also seen as a measure which would take benefits from the older, deserving individuals in order to reduce the number of uninsured young Americans. As stated by Michele Bachmann, the leader of the

Tea Party caucus in the House of Representatives, “health care threatens to take money from Medicare for seniors to pay for younger people” (Postel 2012, 38). The Tea Party therefore hit a nerve among older, whiter population who are currently recipients of the Medicare program, or are likely to become one soon, by framing the reform in the lines of redistributing funds belonging to senior Americans to new stakeholders in line for federal support. Tea Partiers were therefore expressing their dissatisfaction to the health care reform with slogans like “Keep the Government Out of My Medicare!”, which we previously presented as one of the social welfare programs Tea Partiers still support (Postel 2012, 38–39).

11.3 Opposition to welfare policies

The federal US welfare system developed in the 1930s during the period of the Great Depression, when the government needed to respond to the vast number of needy families and individuals. Under the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Social Security Act of 1935 passed through Congress, establishing the first national welfare system in the history of the US (Constitutional Rights Foundation 1998). The Act crated a two-tier system composed of benefits deemed universal for they provided security to workers in old age, and of need-based benefits that provided relief for non-elderly poor. However, the universal tier did not include agricultural workers and domestic servants, thus narrowing coverage to little over half of the labor force and excluding most blacks and childless women – this distinction was removed two decades after its enactment (Disch 2012, 138–140). Since the time of the Great Depression, the national welfare system expanded in coverage and federal regulation. It was also met with criticism, mainly over whether the system did enough to get people to work and whether it should exist on the federal level. These concerns were put to rest in time of Clinton’s first term in office when a Republican Congress passed a law which returned most control over welfare back to the states (Constitutional Rights Foundation 1998).

Today, welfare is a broad term used to describe a number of different programs, ranging from school lunch programs to Social Security. It could be described by using three basic components to it: 1) Social Security and Medicare for the elderly, 2) unemployment insurance and worker's compensation, and 3) anti-poverty or means-tested welfare programs. The later consists of 79 federal programs, which provide cash, food, housing medical care, social services, training, and targeted education to poor and low-income citizens (Rector 2012).There are six programs, all belonging to the so-called means tested welfare, that create

a “social safety net”: TANF (cash assistance to single-parent or unemployed two-parent families for a limited term), Food Stamps (benefits to low-income households to buy nutritional, low cost food), Supplemental Security Income (cash benefits to individuals whose abilities to work is restricted by blindness or disability), Medicaid (medical care for the low-income individuals), housing assistance (to improve housing quality and to reduce housing costs for lower-income households), and the Earned Income Tax Credit (refundable tax credit for working individuals with low earnings) (MaCurdy and Jones).

It therefore comes as no surprise that Americans hold different opinions on various components of the welfare system. Almost unanimous support is given to programs that require previous contributions, are aimed at the elderly and the infirm, or are perceived as enhancing self-sufficiency On the other hand, programs that are limited to the poor and provide direct cash or in-kind transfers are met with ambivalence or opposition (Gilens 1995, 995–996), like Temporary Assistance to the Needy Families, General Assistance, Food Stamps. These means-tested programs, which are often referred to as simply “welfare”, signify only a small fraction of social welfare spending but public thinking and policy debates are disproportionately focused on these exact programs (Gilens 1996, 593–594). Surveys show that opposition to welfare is more common among whites’ than blacks (Gilens 1995, 997), it is also more common among higher earning Americans than among lower income ones (Gilens 1996, 1996).

According to Gilens (1996, 601), when it comes to the whites’ opposition to these welfare programs, racial attitudes are considered a powerful influence. The analysis indicates that beliefs about nonblack poor, individualism, party identification, ideology, age, income, and education all affect whites’ perceptions of welfare, nevertheless, the evidence suggests that racial considerations are the single most important factor affecting whites’ views on welfare. He also notes that blacks in America have always been disproportionately poor, and their economic problems too often perceived as a result of blacks being lazy (Gilens 1995, 1010). The notion of black Americans being lazy is reinforced by media coverage, turning them into the undeserving poor, blamed for their own poverty and seen as favoring government handouts to working their way up, as oppose to the deserving poor who have a valid claim for government assistance because they are viewed as committed to working their way up of poverty (unless prevented to do so by a reason beyond their control) (Goren 2002, 204).

We have previously explained how symbolic racism affects the individual's views on welfare policies and black politicians. We have also made the connection between the perception of values relating to work ethic and responsibilities for outcomes to the same outcomes. What we now need to do is to test whether our theoretical frame applies to the Tea Party supporters, as stated by the critics, or agree with the Tea Party movement in their pursuit of fiscal responsibility, constitutionally limited government and free market economics, and trace their motives for emerging to strictly economic concerns and ideological belief in a smaller government.

12 ELEMENTS OF SYMBOLIC RACISM AMONG TEA PARTY SUPPORTERS

12.1 Data and Methods

We have started this thesis with the goal to examine the connection between support for the Tea Party movement and the expression of covert racist elements, combined in a single construct of symbolic racism. Our research so far has lead us to the assumption that Tea Party supporters hold unfavorable opinions of President Obama and his policy initiatives on matters of welfare as a result of their racial prejudice against blacks. In order to test this assumption, we shall be using the opinion poll data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) survey, entitled ANES 2010–2012 Evaluations of Government and Society Study. ANES is conducted by both – Stanford University and the University of Michigan, and funded by the National Science Foundation. We will be analyzing data from the first survey cycle conducted in October 2010 (EGGS1) for its purpose is to "support research on the public's evaluations of the President and American government and society" (American National Election Studies) by including a range of questions on policy issues, the state of the national economy, attitudes toward President Obama and support for several legislation pieces, among them ARRA and PPACA. The survey was conducted during October 8–19, 2010 and includes responses from 1240 American citizens, age 18 or older, of which the total of 1189 have completed the entire survey (DeBell et all 2011, 4). Selected survey also contains items on the support for the Tea Party movement, as well as four out of the eight items proposed in Henry and Sears' (2000) SR2K scale, which we will explain further on. Moreover, the EGSS1 survey has been carried out in October 2010 which coincides with the highest support for the Tea Party movement preceding the congressional elections in 2010, and the publication of the special report on Tea Party nationalism by IREHR, and should have captured a similar sentiment about the Tea

Party movement as the other opinion polls from the year 2010, used throughout this thesis (for details on when surveys were conducted, see Appendix A).

We shall continue with the presentation of the variables and items measuring them, as well as with the description of values for each variable in order to calculate the basic descriptive statistics and prepare them for the multivariate analysis. We will calculate the mean – μ[8] as "the most common measure of central tendency in behavioral research" (Heiman 2006, 69) for every variable, along with the mode – M_o as "the value that occurs most frequently" (Agresti and Finlay 2009, 45), namely in the case of dichotomous variables. Nevertheless, the measure of central tendency would be meaningless without a measure of variability. While the measure of central tendency describes the typical value (Agresti and Finlay 2009, 46), it provides an incomplete description of a distribution, and therefore a measure of variability is needed in order to describe how scores in the distribution differ from each other (Heiman 2006, 89). We will be using three measures of variability: the range – R[9]as "the descriptive statistics that indicates the distance between the two most extreme scores in the distribution" (Heiman 2006, 91), in addition to standard deviation – σ [10] which "indicates how much the scores are spread out around the mean" (Heiman 2006, 92). It gives us the indication of how far the value is from the mean (Brvar, 2007, 109). If the variability is small, similar behaviors or attitudes are occurring among respondents, while a larger variability would indicate that scores are more spread out. Moreover, a measure of variability shows us how accurately the measure of tendency is in describing the distribution (Heiman 2006, 89–90). These descriptive statistics will give us an insight into the chosen variables and provide us with a better understanding of the key findings.

12.1.1 Independent variables

In accordance with the aim of this thesis, the two independent variables are the support for the Tea Party movement and the expression of symbolic racism. As described in the previous section, we are using the items included in the EGSS1 questionnaire. The ones measuring the

[8] $\mu = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} x_i}{N}$ (Ferligoj 1995, 36).

[9] $R = x_{max} - x_{min}$ (Ferligoj 1995, 45).

[10] $\sigma^2 = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{n}(x_i - \mu_j)^2$, $\sigma = \sqrt{\sigma^2}$ (Ferligoj 1995, 49).

Tea party support are new to ANES, while the four symbolic racism items have previously been used in ANES panel studies (DeBell et all 2011, 6–8).

To determine the attitude toward the Tea Party movement, we used the item entitled Tea Party – "Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Tea Party movement?" The respondents have been given the option of expressing their support, opposition or to consider themselves neutral. 22.8 percent of the respondents expressed support for the movement, 22.7 percent oppose it, while the majority or 54.5 percent neither support nor oppose the Tea Party movement. Among the supporters of the movement, more than half of them, 52 percent support the Tea Party a great deal and 37.82 percent support them a moderate amount. Only 10.18 percent of all those respondents who expressed support of the Tea Party in this survey item described their level of support as little (American National Election Studies). To analyze data, the answers have been assigned the following values: 1 – oppose, 2 – neutral, 3 – support. The average score for Tea party support is 2.0008, with the minimum and maximum value of 1 and 3, making the range equal 2. In the case of Tea Party support, the standard deviation amounts to 0.675 (valid N=1212; missing N=28).

The other independent variable, Symbolic Racism is measured using four items from the EGSS1 survey. All four items can be found in the SR2K scale. We are aware that Henry and Sears' symbolic racism scale proposes the inclusion of eight items, however, the scale has been shortened as a result of the unavailability of the remaining four items in the chosen survey, which is one of the main reasons the authors give for amending their ideal scale. Based on the availability of items, we have devised a four-item symbolic racism scale, identical to the one Maxwell and Parent (2012) employed for measuring symbolic racism in their research. The scale has been designed to include the next four items: "Irish, Italians, Jewish and other minorities overcame prejudice. Blacks should do the same. Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly?"; "Slavery/discrimination made it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly?"; "Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly?"; and "If blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly?". The respondents were asked to give their answers

on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "agree strongly" to "disagree strongly". The values needed to be recoded so that answers "disagree strongly" are valued at 1, and "agree strongly" at 5. We then added up raw scores for each of the four items and every individual respondent has a score that ranges from 4 to 20 (R = 16). A low score therefore indicates low levels of symbolic racism, while a high score indicates the high levels of symbolic racism. The average over all score comes to 13.92, with a standard deviation of 3.86 (valid N=1174; missing N=66). The most frequent score was 12 and it was given by 14 percent of all respondents. Interestingly, the second most frequent scores were 16 and 20 points, both scored by 9.1 percent of the sample.

12.1.2 Dependent variables

We will continue with the dependent variables: Impression of President Obama, support for ARRA and support for PPACA. The impression of Obama has been measured using this item "Please rate your feelings towards Barack Obama, is your overall impression of him favorable, somewhat favorable, neither favorable nor unfavorable, somewhat unfavorable or unfavorable?". The respondents have been very polarized in their opinions of Obama. 23.5 percent find the president favorable and 23.4 percent unfavorable. The answers have been coded so that 1 is used for unfavorable opinion, 2 for somewhat unfavorable, 3 for neither favorable nor unfavorable, 4 for somewhat favorable, and 5 for favorable. The average score is 3.0542, with the range of 4, and standard deviation of 1.522 (valid N=1181; missing N=59).

The next two dependent variables are the support for ARRA, and the support for PPACA – the variables are simply named ARRA and PPACA. In the previous section we have explained the connection between race and welfare policies, as well as the elements which place ARRA and PPACA into this specific policy group. The item measuring support for both legislative pieces is the same: "Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle: American Recovery and Reinvestment Act – Authorizes $787 billion in federal spending to stimulate economic growth in the US/Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act – Requires all Americans to have health insurance. Allows people to keep current provider. Sets up health insurance exchanges for those without coverage. Increases taxes on investment income for families making more than $250,000.". The minimum value 0 is used for the opposition, while the maximum value of 1 for support of the legislation. In the case of ARRA,

mode is 0 with the range of 1. The standard deviation comes down to 0.5 (valid N=1177, missing N=63). The opinions over ARRA are more or less equally distributed among the supporting and the opposing sides, however, more respondents oppose ARRA than support it – 48.2 percent to 46.7 percent. If we look at the support for PPACA, the story is opposite to that of ARRA. With the 54 percent we can say that the slight majority supports the legislation, while 41.5 percent oppose it. With the mode of 1, the standard deviation amounts to 0.496 (valid N=1183; missing N=57).

12.1.3 Control variables

We have previously shown that Tea Party supporters are more likely to be male, white, conservative, better educated with higher earnings, as well as Republican. Considering statistical data for white and black Americans, blacks are more likely to live in poverty than the whites, they are less successful in the job market, they have the second lowest rate in health insurance (only Hispanics have a lower rate of health insurance) and are, on average, less educated than their fellow white citizens. We also assume that the support for welfare policies will, because of the aforementioned reasons, be higher among blacks than whites. Moreover, the concept of symbolic racism has been criticized for borrowing elements from the nonracial conservative ideology and turning them into a racialized issue. Given these reasons, we shall be running our analysis using these control variables: party identification, ideology, minority status, household income status, education level, employment status, gender and age. Additionally, our PPACA model will also include a variable depicting the ability to pay for health care, for we presume that those not worried about their ability to pay for health cost will be less inclined to support the PPACA when compared to those, who fear they will not be able to do so.

Party identification, or Party ID as the variable will be names henceforth, is being measured with the following item – "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" Respondents were asked to choose between four answers: Republican, Democrat, Independent, or something else. We have eliminated the fourth option, something else, and therefore reduced the number of valid cases by 37 (valid N=603; missing N=637), while emphasizing the dominance of the two established political parties in the US party system and the number of voters in the sample not aligned with any of the parties. The Republicans have been assigned the value of 1, the

Independents are assigned value 2 and the Democrats 3. Almost 40 percent of the respondents consider themselves as Independents (M_o = 2), while 33.5 percent class themselves as Republicans and 27 percent as Democrats.

As a variable for ideology we are using this survey item – "In general, do you think of yourself as extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, moderate, middle of the road, slightly conservative, conservative or extremely conservative. Each answer has been coded, so extremely conservative holds the value of 1 and extremely liberal value 7. The rest have been assigned the value according to their position in the line. On average people tend to be slightly more conservative (μ = 3,697), even though the majority or 34.6 percent consider themselves moderate (the most frequent answer is 4). The standard deviation for this item amounts to 1.446 (valid N=1773; missing N=67). This variable will be called Ideology in the following tables.

The measurement of minority status is derived using the survey item – "Race/Ethnicity". The respondents have been asked to define themselves as white/non-Hispanic, black/non-Hispanic, other/non-Hispanic, Hispanic or 2+races/non-Hispanic. The variable will simply be named Minority Status. For the purpose of the analysis, we will only distinguish among the whites and non-whites. Consequently, we have coded the category of white/non-Hispanic as value 0, and grouped the rest into a new category, non-white with the assigned value of 1. The mode for this variable is 0, since 77.4 percent of the respondents are white, and 22.6 percent belong to any or several other races (valid N=1240).

The next control variable is the household income status, measured by the survey item – "Household Income". The respondents had an option to place themselves in one of the nineteen categories, ranging from less than 5 000 to 175 000 USD or more. In order to simplify the operationalization of this variable, we have grouped the categories into three new ones and coded the values as follows: 1 – upper class (above 100 000 USD), 2 – middle class (40 000 – 99 999 USD), 3 – lower class (below 40 000 USD), and named the variable Income. The most highly represented group with 44.1 percent of all respondents is the middle class category (M_o = 2), however the average mean somewhat surpasses the mode and is 2.2669. With the range equaling 2, standard deviation is 0.698 (valid N=1240).

When it comes to education, we have used the survey item – "Education (highest degree received)" and named the variable Education. The answers in fourteen categories have been

grouped into four categories with the next values: 1 – less than high school, 2 – high school, 3 – some college, associate degrees, 4 – bachelor's degree, 5 – master's degree, 6 – professional or doctorate degree. The highest number of respondents falls into the second group (M_o = 2) with the high school diploma, which is the highest received degree for 30.4 percent of them. Nonetheless, the average score is 2.964, with the range of 5, and standard deviation of 1.24 (valid N=1240).

Employment status has been measured using the survey item – "Current Employment Status", while the variable is called Employment. A respondent chose one of the seven given answers. Since we are only interested whether the individual is employed or not, we have devised two groups. Value 0 represents the unemployed who are currently not working and looking for work, were either temporary laid-off from their jobs or are not working for any other reason. On the other hand, value 1 is used for those who are working as a paid employed, are self-employed, retired or not working because of a disability. The later have been included in the group of employed individuals because they are more likely to receive medical benefits from the federal and state government and would be less worried about the implementation of the health care reform or the economic downturn which sparked the creation of ARRA. Those who are included in the group unemployed have been coded with the value of 0 and the employed ones with the value of 1. The majority of 84.5 of all respondents are employed (M_o = 1), with 10.3 percent of them having some a disability and are consequently not employed. On the other hand, the unemployed only constitute 15.5 percent of the sample (valid N = 1240).

Age and gender are the last two general control variables. Our respondents are on average 49.13 years old, with the minimum of 18 years and the maximum of 100 (R = 82), and standard deviation of 16.7 (Valid N=1240). In the case of the variable for gender, males have been assigned the coded value of 0 and the females value 1. The majority or 52.2 percent of all respondents were women (M_o= 1), while men represent 47.8 percent of the entire sample (valid N=1240).

And last but not the least, the special control variable checking respondents' ability to pay for health care was measures with the following survey time – "How worried are you about not being able to pay for health care during the next 12 months?". Respondents were asked to answer with either extremely worried, very worried, moderately worried, a little worries or

not at all worried. They have been coded in the following way: 0 – not at all worried, 1 – a little worried, 2 – moderately worried, 3 – very worried, 4 – extremely worried. 32.5 percent of all respondent are not worried at all (M_o= 0), however, the average score amounts to 1.4585, making respondents on average not particularly worried about paying for their heath care costs. Nevertheless, we can see that 19 percent of the respondents are still moderately worried about the costs and as much as 12.7 percent extremely worried. The range of this variable is 4, with the standard deviation of 1.385 (valid N=1193; missing N=47). We shall refer to this variable as "Ability to pay".

12.2 Data Analysis

Having identified all our variables, we move onward to find an answer to our research question and, consequently, test our hypotheses: "The supporters of the Tea Party movement oppose the first African-American president of the United States of America – Barack Obama as a result of their latent racist beliefs, manifested as symbolic racism.", and " The supporters of the Tea Party movement oppose Obama's welfare initiatives due to their unique belief system, rooted in racial prejudice and expressed as symbolic racism." The second hypothesis will be tested on both pieces of legislation, ARRA and PPACA, respectively, in order to determine the effect of Tea Party support and symbolic racism on the views toward the two most contested welfare initiatives of Obama's administration.

We began our analysis with a simple pairwise correlation between the respondents' feelings toward the Tea Party movement and their symbolic racism score.

Table 12.1: Correlation between the attitude toward the Tea Party and Symbolic Racism

	Tea Party	Symbolic Racism
Tea Party	1.0000	
Symbolic Racism	0.4235	1.0000
	0.0000	

As shown in Table 12.1, there is an indication of a strong and statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) relationship between a respondent's symbolic racism score and their view of the Tea Party. Note that the Tea party variable is coded 1 for opposition, 2 for neutral, and 3 for support, while a higher symbolic racism score proposes a higher degree of symbolic racism.

As symbolic racism scores increase the respondent has relatively more measured symbolic racism. The positive relationship depicted in Table 12.1 suggests that those who support the Tea Party movement are more likely to have higher symbolic racism scores.

As mentioned, the respondents in the EGSS1 survey had three options to describe their level of support for the Tea Party movement: oppose (1) the movement, neither oppose it nor support it (2) or support (3). In order for us to understand the effect of respondent's symbolic racism score to the approval or disapproval of the Tea Party movement, we have compared the results of the opponents and the supporters of the movement with those, whose opinion can be classed as neutral. We ran a multinomial logistic regression, with the neutral group as the comparison group (Table 12.2).

We can see that among the respondents registering opposition to the Tea Party, the symbolic racism score is negatively related to their attitudes toward the movement. On the contrary, the symbolic racism scores among those, indicating support for the movement, relate positively to their attitude toward the movement. Moreover, the effect of symbolic racism is notably higher with the supporters of the Tea Party movement.

Looking at the Relative Risk Ratio (RRR) score for the Tea Party opponents, the score of 0.881 would suggest that, holding other independent variables constant, a one point change in their symbolic racism score would move the likelihood of them being less supportive of the Tea Party movement by 88.1 percent, relative to the respondents who have a neutral opinion about the Tea Party. Among the Tea Party supporters, their RRR implies that, again holding all other variables constant, a one point move in their symbolic racism score moves their likelihood of being in a more favorable Tea Party attitude response category by nearly 121 percent, relative to those neutral to the Tea Party.

The connection between the attitude toward the Tea Party movement and symbolic racism proves to be statistically significant for both, the opponents and the supporters of the Tea Party (alpha level set to 0.001). The presented results are even more persuasive given the numerous control variables that might be expected to have an effect on Tea Party support, especially the controls for party identification and ideology. Even though both of these variables exert the expected effect on the attitudes toward the Tea Party, symbolic racism continues to exert an independent, substantial, and significant effect on the respondents'

views on the movement. The RRR for supporters of the movement as well as opponents' symbolic racism scores is one of the stronger effects in both Tea Party attitude models.

Table 12.2: Multinomial logistic regression for the Tea Party opposition/support

Multinomial logistic regression Log likelihood = - 417.79002			Number of obs = 575 LR chi2 (18) = 332.98 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Pseudo R2 = 0.2849	
Tea Party	**Relative Risk Ratio**	**Standard Error**	**z**	**P > | z |**
Tea Party opposition				
Symbolic Racism	.8811999	.0324163	- 3.44	0.001
Employment	1.201154	.4591016	0.48	0.632
Education	1.387642	.1622066	2.80	0.005
Age	1.02546	.0082025	3.14	0.002
Gender	.9451923	.239883	- 0.22	0.824
Minority Status	.8087892	.2529205	- 0.68	0.497
Income	.826544	.1603459	- 0.98	0.326
Party ID	.6086365	.1187047	- 2.55	0.011
Ideology	1.721848	.1902858	4.92	0.000
Tea Party support				
Symbolic Racism	1.206918	.0495848	4.58	0.000
Employment	.4591621	.1688742	- 2.12	0.034
Education	1.113186	.1293632	0.92	0.356
Age	1.018886	.0079148	2.41	0.016
Gender	.4794138	.1198787	- 2.94	0.003
Minority Status	1.15242	.4003982	0.41	0.683
Income	.7992018	.1528152	- 1.17	0.241
Party ID	1.532676	.284536	2.30	0.021
Ideology	.5129124	.0597141	- 5.73	0.000

(Outcome Tea Party 2 = 2 is the comparison group)

To test our first hypothesis, we need to examine the effects of the Tea Party attitudes on the impression the respondents have of Obama. Our hypothesis suggests that supporters of the Tea Party movement oppose the president due to their covert racist attitudes; therefore we tested the effect of the attitude toward the Tea Party and the effects of both, the attitude toward the movement and symbolic racism, on the impression of Obama, respectively. Since the variable measuring the impression of Obama takes five distinct values – 1 being low or unfavorable, and 5 being high or favorable, we chose to run the simpler ordinary least regression, which provides a straightforward test of the hypothesis that animus toward President Obama is motivated, at least to some degree, by symbolic racism. Results from the more extensive multinomial logistic regression are in accord with the conclusions reported here and below in Table 12.4. These results are available upon request.

Table 12.3: The effect of the attitudes toward the Tea Party movement on impression of President Barack Obama

Regression with robust standard errors			Number of obs = 581 F (9, 571) = 124.39 Prob > F = 0.0000 R – squared = 0.5413 Root MSE = 1.0519	
Obama Impression	**Coefficient**	**Robust Standard Error**	**t**	**P > | t |**
Education	.1016201	.041511	2.45	0.015
Age	.0035266	.0028369	- 1.24	0.214
Gender	.2568837	.0928841	2.77	0.006
Minority Status	.6098907	.1168975	5.22	0.000
Income	.0975192	.0671718	1.45	0.147
Employment	.0733321	.1289271	0.57	0.570
Party ID	-.6013578	.0744342	- 8.08	0.000
Ideology	.1817743	.0432041	4.21	0.000
Tea Party	-.7524349	.0835235	- 9.01	0.000
_cons	4.376944	.4671837	9.37	0.000

Table 12.3 presents the effect of attitudes toward the Tea Party on respondents' impression of Obama. The coefficient (-.752) for this variable is negative and highly significant (t = - 9.01), which indicates that support for the Tea Party movement has a strong and negative effect on a

respondent's impression of Obama. The value of the coefficient suggests, that the group of respondents who oppose the Tea Party hold the highest appraisal of Obama among the three groups (Tea Party opponents, neutral group, and Tea Party supporters). If we move from those who oppose the movement to those who have a neutral opinion of the Tea Party, the favorability of Obama declines by 0.75 points. The impression of Obama is the lowest in the group of Tea Party supporters. According to the value of the coefficient, a move from the group of Tea Party opponents to Tea Party supporters would result in a 1.5 point drop in the favorability of the president.

Table 12.4: The effects of the attitude toward the Tea Party movement and Symbolic Racism on impression of President Barack Obama

Regression with robust standard errors			Number of obs = 573 F (10, 562) = 129.13 Prob > F = 0.0000 R – squared = 0.5684 Root MSE = 1.0199	
Obama Impression	**Coefficient**	**Robust Standard Error**	**T**	**P > | t |**
Education	.0558824	.0413352	1.35	0.177
Age	-.0041106	.0027856	- 1.48	0.141
Gender	.2371366	.0910761	2.60	0.009
Minority Status	.402493	.1157564	3.48	0.001
Income	.0950006	.0656271	1.45	0.148
Employment	.1005952	.1279952	0.79	0.432
Party ID	-.5575471	.0730096	- 7.64	0.000
Ideology	.1433233	.0443592	3.23	0.001
Tea Party	-.630926	.0840596	- 7.51	0.000
Symbolic Racism	-.0793357	.0136508	- 5.81	0.000
_cons	5.492898	.5109809	10.75	0.000

Table 12.4 includes respondents' symbolic racism scores. The inclusion of a new variable, i.e. symbolic racism, has reduced the effect of the Tea Party coefficient both in magnitude (from -0.752 to -0.631) and in statistical significance (t-score declines from -9.01 to a lower, yet still substantial -7.51). The change has two separate implications. First, a respondent's attitude toward the Tea Party continues to influence his or her impression of Obama independent of

their symbolic racism score. Secondly, the reduced impact of the Tea Party coefficient in the full model (Table 12.4) indicates that some portion of the effect of Tea Party attitude on impression of Obama is contingent on a respondent's symbolic racism score. To rephrase that, when adding the variable of symbolic racism to the model the negative influence of Tea Party support on impression of Obama declines, indicating the apparent effect of the attitudes toward the Tea Party on one's impression of Obama, symbolic racism notwithstanding.

Having moved on to our second hypothesis, we tested the effects of the attitude toward the Tea Party and symbolic racism on each of the welfare initiatives, ARRA and PPACA. We needed to run a logistic regression due to the dependent variable being dichotomous (one either opposes the legislation – 0, or supports it – 1). We ran two models for each initiative, the reduced model with the controlling variables and the attitude toward the Tea Party, and the full model where we added the variable of symbolic racism.

Table 12.5: The effect of the attitude toward the Tea Party movement on the support for American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009

Logistic regression			Number of obs = 574 Wald chi2 (9) = 128.79 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000	
Log pseudolikelihood = - 322.41172			Pseudo R2 = 0.1884	
ARRA	**Odds Ratio**	**Robust Standard Error**	**z**	**P > | z |**
Employment	1.005058	.2880212	0.02	0.986
Education	1.079428	.0947778	0.87	0.384
Age	.9932094	.0061985	- 1.09	0.275
Gender	1.267792	.251227	1.20	0.231
Minority Status	1.712589	.4227585	2.18	0.029
Income	1.205918	.181103	1.25	0.212
Party ID	.6822331	.1029042	- 2.54	0.011
Ideology	1.430947	.1342734	3.82	0.000
Tea Party	.4758368	.0866434	- 4.08	0.000

The reduced model (Table 12.5) shows that a respondent's Tea Party attitude has a negative effect (z = - 4.08) on the support for the ARRA. The coefficient for this variable implies that moving from the opponent of the Tea Party to being neutral to the movement would result in a

0.476 point decline in the likelihood of being supportive of ARRA. Moving from opposing the Tea Party movement to supporting it results in a 0.952 point increase in the likelihood of opposing ARRA. In other words, the supporter of the Tea Party movement is 95 percent more likely to oppose ARRA than the respondent who has a disapproving opinion of the movement. If we compare the supporters of the movement to those with a neutral opinion about the Tea Party, we can see that the supporters are more likely to oppose ARRA by roughly 48 percent.

Table 12.6: The effects of the attitude toward the Tea Party movement and Symbolic Racism on the support for the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009

Logistic regression			Number of obs = 569 Wald chi2 (10) = 132.42 Prob > chi² = 0.0000	
Log pseudolikelihood = - 315.55125			Pseudo R2 = 0.1991	
ARRA	**Odds Ratio**	**Robust Standard Error**	**z**	**P > | z |**
Employment	1.0551	.3145893	0.18	0.857
Education	1.056149	.0951822	0.61	0.544
Age	.991915	.0062275	- 1.29	0.196
Gender	1.237102	.2481429	1.06	0.289
Minority Status	1.454992	.3806806	1.43	0.152
Income	1.221395	.1869938	1.31	0.191
Party ID	.7049183	.107823	- 2.29	0.022
Ideology	1.423005	.1387803	3.62	0.000
Tea Party	.5433368	.102607	- 3.23	0.001
Symbolic Racism	.9330167	.0280154	- 2.31	0.021

When symbolic racism is included in the model (Table 12.6), we can see that the Tea Party variable remains statistically significant, with a slight increase in the magnitude of the odds ratio (from 0.476 to 0.543). It is also clear that symbolic racism scores play a role in the level of support for ARRA. Nevertheless, the attitude toward the Tea Party has an independent effect, which seems to be unrelated to symbolic racism as shown by the increase in the magnitude of the odds ratio.

In the case of PPACA, the reduce model (Table 12.7) shows a strong effect for attitude toward the Tea Party movement on respondent's support for PPACA. The connection

between the two variables is negative and significant ($p < 0.001$). We can clearly see that a respondent who supports the Tea Party has a greater likelihood of opposing PPACA than the one whose opinion of the movement is neutral or disapproving. The odds ratio suggests that a supporter of the movement is 84 percent more likely to oppose PPACA than an opponent of the Tea Party, whereas a supporter is 42 percent more likely to oppose PPACA compared to a respondent who neither supports nor opposes the Tea Party movement.

Table 12.7: The effect of the attitude toward the Tea Party movement on the support for the Patient Protection and Affordability Act

Logistic regression			Number of obs = 575 Wald chi2 (10) = 142.89 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000	
Log pseudolikelihood = - 268.22851			Pseudo R2 = 0.3203	
PPACA	**Odds Ratio**	**Robust Standard Error**	**z**	**P > | z |**
Ability to pay	1.063156	.0947283	0.69	0.492
Employment	1.120558	.4094881	0.31	0.755
Education	1.039727	.093038	0.44	0.663
Age	.9972117	.0067379	- 0.41	0.679
Gender	1.315121	.2956405	1.22	0.223
Minority Status	1.824977	.5236918	2.10	0.036
Income	1.09778	.1881098	0.54	0.586
Party ID	.4444187	.0741757	- 4.86	0.000
Ideology	1.757143	.1856485	5.34	0.000
Tea Party	.4199247	.0852025	- 4.28	0.000

When we look at the full model (Table 12.8), the one including the respondent's symbolic racism score, the Tea Party attitude continues to exert an independent and significant effect on support for PPACA. We detect a slight increase in the odds ratio for the attitude toward the Tea Party movement, in comparison to the reduced PPACA model – from 0.42 to 0.481. Such an increase indicates that while symbolic racism does play a role in respondent's attitude toward PPACA, it seems to be independent of the Tea Party attitude. Similar to the previous model on the ARRA, symbolic racism appears to be even more decisive in a respondent's views toward PPACA – the odds ratio is close to double that of the effect of the Tea Party

attitude. To put it differently – a one point change in the symbolic racism score would result in a 0.92 point decline in the likelihood of supporting PPACA.

Table 12.8: The effect of the attitude toward the Tea Party movement and Symbolic Racism on the support for the Patient Protection and Affordability Act

Logistic regression			Number of obs = 570 Wald chi2 (11) = 152.41 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000	
Log pseudolikelihood = - 263.65166			Pseudo R2 = 0.3269	
PPACA	**Odds Ratio**	**Robust Standard Error**	**z**	**P > | z |**
Ability to pay	1.07508	.0971785	0.80	0.423
Employment	1.105106	.4088563	0.27	0.787
Education	1.00249	.0961474	0.03	0.979
Age	.9968312	.0068497	- 0.46	0.644
Gender	1.278738	.2901036	1.08	0.278
Minority Status	1.471353	.4516506	1.26	0.208
Income	1.103775	.1921579	0.57	0.571
Party ID	.4632733	.0774911	- 4.60	0.000
Ideology	1.708729	.1847346	4.96	0.000
Tea Party	.4805347	.1029801	- 3.42	0.001
Symbolic Racism	.9207691	.0310712	- 2.45	0.014

CONCLUSION

On November 4, 2008, America turned over a new leaf by electing its first black president in the history of the nation. Obama secured his victory over McCain by gaining the votes of women and the youth, as well as all racial and sexual minorities. In the words of Obama's professor Wilkins (Harvard Law Today 2008) "electing the first black president is an enormous accomplishment, one for which all Americans can justly be proud". Obama was seen as the one who is capable of transcending not only the question of race in American politics but also the standard liberal-conservative divide which has been one of the key characteristics in American politics for the past thirty years (Harvard Law Today 2008).

The initial optimism and the belief in change soon encountered opposition from a newly formed social movement, the Tea Party movement. The Tea Party saw the light of day just weeks after Obama's inauguration and a few days after his administration started to enact the president's campaign promises. While the supporters of the movement gathered to demand less government spending, less taxes, a free market and a commitment to states' rights, the skeptics perceived them as defenders of the "real" America – a heterosexual, Christian, middle-class, patriarchal white country (Parker & Barreto 2013, 3). The optimists may have seen Obama's victory as the transcendence of America's racial issues, however, the emergence and swift rise in the popularity of the Tea Party movement has once again brought the question of race in American society (and politics) to the forefront of the nation's attention. Along with the rise in the Tea Party's popularity, a suspicion of racist elements within the movement gained its own supporters who found their validation in Burghart and Zeskind's (2010) report on the Tea Party factions.

In this master's thesis, we have set out to contribute to the discussion about racism in the Tea Party membership. We have conducted our research using data from the 2010 EGSS1 survey in order to determine whether the Tea Party movement opposes President Obama and his welfare initiatives as a result of their latent expression of racism or rather does their opposition rest on their belief in a small, fiscally responsible government. In order for us to carry out our proposed work, we have based our research on the theory of symbolic racism as the predominant theory replacing old-fashioned racism after the demise of Jim Crow laws. According to the theory of symbolic racism, racial discrimination did not simply disappear when all citizens became equal; it was merely transformed into a new, symbolic expression of racism. The theory of symbolic racism suggests that a new form of racism is still very much alive and is manifested in whites' opposition to black political candidates as well as contemporary racial policies. Whites who oppose such candidates and policies act on the combination of their early socialization experiences, the so called black affect and neutral traditional values, alongside symbolic racism which is shown in perceiving blacks as lacking in work ethic and being irresponsible for the outcomes, blacks making excessive demands and gaining undeserved advantages, and in denial of the continuing discrimination in today's American society. We have thus decided to examine whether the Tea Party's opposition to the first black president in US history and his welfare policies rests on the principles of the theory of symbolic racism as the most influential among the theories of new racism.

We have first explored the connection between the opposition to Barack Obama as president of the US and the support for the Tea Party movement. We have set out to test the following hypothesis: "The supporters of the Tea Party movement oppose the first African-American president of the United States of America – Barack Obama as a result of their latent racist beliefs, manifested as symbolic racism." We have shown that there is a strong and significant correlation between symbolic racism and the level of support for the Tea Party movement. We have also revealed a respondent's symbolic racism score is significantly greater among those who support the Tea Party movement than those who oppose it. In other words, the higher the symbolic racism scores, the bigger the likelihood of an individual expressing a favorable opinion about the Tea Party. Having established this connection, we observed that opponents of the Tea Party movement have a more favorable opinion of Obama than Tea Party supporters who have the least favorable impression of the president. The attitude toward the movement has a clear impact on the impression of Obama; our results, however, suggest that the impression of Obama is effected by symbolic racism only to a certain extent. According to our research work, we can therefore neither reject nor can we approve our first hypothesis. We have proven that the attitude toward the movement exerts an effect on the impression of Obama, and the same can be said for symbolic racism. Nevertheless, only part of the Tea Party supporters' opinion toward Obama is colored by symbolic racism, since the attitudes toward the Tea Party has an independent effect on favorability of Barack Obama. One's impression of Obama appears to be influenced by a combination of factors, with symbolic racism contributing a substantial amount.

Our second hypothesis was designed to test whether symbolic racism has an effect on the Tea Party's opposition to ARRA and PPACA. In the case of ARRA, our findings suggest that the supporters of the Tea Party are 95 percent more likely to oppose Obama's law than the opponents of the movement. Moreover, symbolic racism is also an important factor in the respondents' decision whether to support or oppose ARRA. However, the results imply that the supporters of the Tea Party movement derive their opposition to ARRA from something else than the hypothesized effect of symbolic racism. Even though symbolic racism plays a role in support (or rather opposition) to ARRA, the attitude toward the Tea Party movement has an independent effect on one's opinion about the program, and it seems to be unrelated to symbolic racism. The supporters of the movement claim to be primarily concerned with the fiscal state of the country, the issue many believe was threatened by this program, therefore

our initial hypothesis of Tea Party movement opposing Obama's welfare initiatives due to the unique belief system, rooted in racial prejudice and expressed as symbolic racism, is rejected in the case of ARRA. We came to similar conclusions in the case of support for PPACA. Even though the supporters of the Tea Party are 84 percent more likely to oppose Obamacare when compared to the opponents of the movement, they do not oppose it due to their racial prejudice, expressed as symbolic racism. Like in our previous case, symbolic racism does have an effect on respondent's attitude toward PPACA, still, this effect seems to be independent of the attitude toward the Tea Party movement. This finding is congruent to that revealed in the ARRA analysis, thus we can reject our second hypothesis in the case of both programs, ARRA and PPACA.

We have previously shown that symbolic racism has an impact on the attitude toward the Tea Party movement. We have also shown that ideology and party identification exert a strong effect on the support for the movement as well – one can therefore be a Tea Party supporter, and not express (symbolic) racist elements, and still dislike Obama. Both variables have a statistically significant effect on respondent's opinion toward Obama. The same goes for the support/opposition to ARRA and PPACA, since both, party identification and ideology, clearly play a significant role. We must not forget that conservatism influences the whites' candidate preferences as it does their opinion on contemporary racial policies even in Henry and Sears' (2005) symbolic racism model and can be the predominant factor in their decision making process. Nevertheless, we wish to point out that when looking at the results of the impression of Obama, race still has an effect on supporters of the Tea Party movement, at least to a certain extent – even if the same does not apply for his policies. Maybe in the case of the Tea Party supporters, the spillover of racialization from Obama to his policies was not as strong as certain studies suggest. The connection between Obama as a president and the question of race is also more (visually) visible than it is when speaking of his welfare initiative; especially, if those are thought of as financially irresponsible pieces of legislation or as limitations to the free market.

In the introduction to this master's thesis we have asked ourselves whether the Tea Party's opposition stems from their latent racial prejudice or simply out of their disagreement with the concept of big government. Our research has led us to believe there is a link between symbolic racism and general support for president Obama. We have also shown there is a connection between symbolic racism and the approval of the Tea Party movement.

Nonetheless, the connection between the Tea Party movement and symbolic racism was less visible once we turn from the president himself and focused on specific policies, ARRA and PPACA. The supporters of the Tea Party movement clearly oppose the two (welfare) policies, but it seems that their opposition could be the result of them favoring the notion of a smaller, limited federal government rather than the effect of symbolic racism. These findings are consistent with the effect which ideology exerts on the support for either of the two policies. The ideas of a small government, limited regulation and the free market have always been at the core of American fiscal conservatism, and have reappeared in the form of the Tea Party movement. Even though racial issues have not simply vanished with the election of Barack Obama, they are not the main reason behind the Tea Party's opposition to policies which have an impact on the American welfare system. We believe the Tea Party can definitely be classed as a social movement advocating ideas of limited government and individual freedoms, nonetheless, without a centralized leadership and mutually agreed objectives it will always attract people of different attitudes and approaches toward political and social issues – even those holding racial prejudice against black Americans.

In the meantime, five years have passed since the birth of the Tea Party as a new social movement in the US. Its popularity and rapid expansion may have triggered many assumptions and predictions of the impact the movement will have on the American political system. Nevertheless, the novelty seems to be wearing off, the public's affection toward the movement has dwindled, and the representatives of the Tea Party movement in Congress have yet to prove their worth to their (Tea Party) voters. Despite the Tea Party's fierce opposition to the president and his agenda, Barack Obama managed to secure his victory in the presidential elections in 2012 and is now serving his second term as the president of the US. When it comes to Obama's most contested policies, both ARRA and PPACA are still in the process of implementation. Time has clearly not been on the side of the Tea Party movement. Even so, the movement will always find its place among those who continue to wage America's long-lasting fight against an overreaching government in pursuit of their individual freedom and happiness. It is, after all, the principle which led the rebels during the Boston Tea Party in 1773 and is still held in high esteem by the supporters of the modern day Tea Party movement.

VPRAŠANJE RASE V AMERIŠKI POLITIKI: SIMBOLNI RASIZEM IN GIBANJE ČAJANK – SUMMARY IN SLOVENIAN LANGUAGE

Vprašanje rase je v Združenih državah Amerike (v nadaljevanju ZDA) stoletja ena izmed ključnih dilem v družbi kot celoti in posledično v ameriški politiki. Lahko bi rekli, da je rasa imela nadvse pomembno vlogo v praktično vseh ključnih trenutkih v politični zgodovini države (Novkov 2008, 650). Sužnjelastniški sistem se je na severnoameriškem kontinentu vzpostavil že v kolonialnem času, saj so evropski priseljenci od sredine 17. stoletja naprej z domorodnim črnskim prebivalstvom ravnali kot s sužnji (Morgan in Healey 2003, 149). Sistem se je obdržal tudi v novonastalih ZDA, kjer se je pravnoformalno ohranil vse do sredine šestdesetih let 20. stoletja, ko si je gibanje za državljanske pravice utrlo pot do pravne ukinitve rasne diskriminacije z Zakonom o državljanskih pravicah leta 1964 in Zakonom o volilnih pravicah leta 1965 (Bowles 1998, 57). Rasna diskriminacija je torej ZDA pestila že od začetka, njeno jedro pa je rasna diskriminacija zoper črnsko prebivalstvo (Henry in Sears 2002, 253). Ker je vprašanje rase in rasnih politik pustilo tako močan pečat v ameriški zgodovini, ne preseneča, da je bila zmaga prvega črnskega kandidata na ameriških predsedniških volitvah leta 2008 obravnavana kot zgodovinski trenutek, s katerim je pretežno belska Amerika presegla svojo rasistično obarvano preteklost (Novkov 2008, 649).

Predsedniške volitve 2008 so se v politično zgodovino zapisale iz dveh razlogov. Prvič, z izvolitvijo Baracka Obame se je zaključila ena najdaljših in najdražjih volilnih kampanj v ameriški zgodovini, ki je poleg tega potekala v obdobju najhujše ekonomske krize od časov velike ekonomske depresije v tridesetih letih 20. stoletja (Pike in Maltese 2010, 461). Drugič, ZDA so 4. novembra 2008 zabeležile zmago prvega afroameriškega predsednika, ki je hkrati tudi prvi demokratski predsednik po Johnu F. Kennedyju, ki ni prihajal z ameriškega juga, hkrati pa eden najbolj progresivnih demokratskih kandidatov v obdobju po Franklinu D. Rooseveltu (Abramowitz 2011, 2). Demokratska stranka ni slavila le izvolitve novega predsednika iz lastnih vrst, ampak se je veselila še večine tako v predstavniškem domu, kot tudi v ameriškem senatu, kar je znatno olajšalo realizacijo Obaminih predvolilnih obljub. Leta je podporo za svoj gospodarski stimulacijski načrt začel zbirati še pred izvolitvijo (Pike in Maltese 2010, 474), Bushev program TARP je podaljšal takoj po izvolitvi, poleg tega pa se je pripravljal na začetek reforme zdravstvenega sistema oziroma na reševanje problema, ki se ga

je zadnji lotil Bill Clinton v svojem prvem predsedniškem mandatu (Clark in Schaffner 2012, 3–4).

Le mesec dni po inavguraciji Obame kot 44. predsednika ZDA in samo nekaj dni po sprejetju gospodarskega stimulacijskega načrta se je na ameriškem političnem parketu pojavilo novo družbeno gibanje, t. i. gibanje čajank. Gibanje se je oblikovalo po čustvenem govoru Ricka Santellija, finančnega poročevalca medijske družbe CNBC. Ta je v komentarju s čikaške blagovne borze 19. februarja 2009, ob sprejetju Obaminih prvih legislativnih aktov, pozval vse zaskrbljene Američane, naj se mu v znak protesta pridružijo na čikaški čajanki, na kateri bodo skupaj izrazili nestrinjanje z zvezno politiko. Čeprav Rick Santelli ni prvi, ki je predlagal protestne shode proti politikam predsednika Obame, saj so se le-ti začeli že pred omenjenim govorom, pa je Santelli nezadovoljstvu dal tako ime, kot tudi simbolno vrednost (Zernike 2010, 13–20). Ideja o novodobni čajanki je namreč Američane spomnila na prelomni dogodek v Bostonu leta 1773, ko so se britanski kolonialisti zoperstavili novi obdavčitvi čaja, ki je bila uvedena brez sodelovanja zastopnikov kolonij. Svoje nestrinjanje z zakonodajalci v Veliki Britaniji so izkazali z metanjem čaja v bostonsko pristanišče, kar je bil povod za kasnejšo ameriško revolucijo in osamosvojitev ZDA (Jolly 2011).

Gibanje je svojo pot začelo s serijo manjših protestov proti gospodarskemu stimulacijskemu načrtu, kasneje pa se je razširilo na številna druga politična področja, predvsem na načrtovano reformo zdravstvenega sistema (Clark and Schaffner 2012, 4). Čajankarji so se zavzemali za manjšo vlado, fiskalno odgovornost, prosti trg in pristojnosti zveznih držav (Parker in Barreto 2013, 2–3), obenem pa pozivali k ponovnem zavzetju lastne države: »Take the country back!«. Ob tem se poraja več vprašanj, predvsem pa: komu je potrebno vzeti državo ter kam oziroma komu jo je potrebno vrniti. Odgovorov, kakor tudi interpretacij samega vprašanja, je seveda več. Nekateri pravijo, da se mora država vrniti v čas, ko je zvezna vlada porabila manj, ko je bil njen obseg manjši in njene pristojnosti bolj omejene. Drugi razumejo, da se je treba vrniti v čas, ko je bil prosti trg dejansko svoboden pred vladnim vmešavanjem. Nekateri gredo v razumevanju odgovora še dlje – da se je potrebno vrniti v čas, ko si črnec sploh ne bi upal kandidirati za predsednika države in bi ta funkcija vedno pripadala belemu Američanu (Zernike 2010, 51).

Medtem ko so se podporniki gibanja zbirali na shodih in protestih po državi ter poslušali govore o pasteh preširokih vladnih pooblastil in vedno večji zapravljivosti le-te, se je pri

nasprotnikih vedno bolj krepil dvom o izključno ekonomskih in političnih motivih za nastanek gibanja čajank. Če je krepitev pristojnosti izvršilne veje oblasti in njeno vmešavanje v delovanje prostega trga tako velika grožnja za čajankarje, zakaj se niso družno uprli predsedniku George W. Bushu, ko je razširil vladni nadzor nad komunikacijskimi kanali s t. i. patriotskim zakonom ali ko je sprejel odločitev o reševanju bank in drugih finančnih ustanov oktobra leta 2008 (Katel 2010, 244–249)? Zakaj se gibanje ni pojavilo, ko je Bush povečal zvezni javni primanjkljaj bolj kot katerikoli predsednik v zgodovini ZDA? Bush je med drugim povečal tudi diskrecijsko porabo; ta se je v času njegovega predsednikovanja povečala za skoraj 50 odstotkov, tako je svojemu nasledniku zapustil dolg v višini 1,3 bilijonov dolarjev, medtem ko je sam podedoval presežek v višini 700 milijard dolarjev. Povedno drugače, George W. Bush je bil najbolj razsipni predsednik po Lyndonu B. Johnsonu (Edwards v Parker in Barreto 2013, 251). Za gibanje čajank bi torej lahko rekli, da je mobiliziralo čustva, nastala v obdobju predsedniške kampanje 2008, in jih manifestiralo kot nasprotovanje Obami in njegovi politični agendi takoj po prevzemu predsedniške funkcije (Jacobson 2011, 6–7). Čeprav bi na enak odziv pri konservativcih najverjetneje naletel vsak demokratski predsednik s podobnimi progresivnimi političnimi načrti, pa je možno, da se je odziv okrepil tudi zaradi rasnih zamer in strahu belskega prebivalstva. Predsednik ZDA je namreč črnec, njegov oče je Kenijec, za svojo zgodovinsko zmago pa se lahko zahvali predvsem koaliciji liberalcev, mladih volivcev ter glasov rasnih in spolnih manjšin (Abramowitz 2012, 196).

Domneva o elementih rasizma znotraj gibanja čajank se je sprva pojavila na podlagi materializacije družbenega gibanja takoj po izvolitvi Baracka Obame, a so se sumi poglobili ob razpravah o Obaminem morebitnem rojstvu v tujini in njegovi povezavi z islamsko vero (Katel 2010, 249). Povezava med rasizmom in gibanjem čajank je bila dokončno zapečatena ob izidu poročila leta 2010, naslovljenega »Nacionalizem v gibanju čajank«, v katerem avtorji številne vidne predstavnike gibanja obtožujejo uporabe rasističnih opazk in simbolov, kar je najbolj razvidno iz protestnih napisov, kot so »Vas v Keniji pogreša svojega idiota: Deportirajte Obamo!«, »Kongres = Sužnjelastnik, Davkoplačevalec = Črnuh«, »Obama želi prepovedati svinjino: Ne pustite mu, da vam ukrade meso« (Maxwell in Parent 2012, 3). Obenem nazorno prikažejo vezi med slednjimi in združenji, ki promovirajo belsko nadvlado (Burghart in Zeskind 2010). Ugibanja o rasističnem delovanju gibanja čajank so ponovno splavala na površje med obravnavo reforme zdravstvenega sistema, ko je kongresnik John

Lewis poročal o čajankarjih, ki so ga zmerjali s »črnuhom«, medtem ko je njegov kolega Emanuel Cleaver povedal, da so ga isti protestniki pljuvali, ker je sledil Lewisu (Zernike 2010, Stein 2010). Gibanje čajank se je na obtožbe odzvalo z absolutnim zanikanjem omenjenih dogodkov, zanikali so tudi obtožbe o smrtnih grožnjah, ki naj bi jih prejeli predstavniki organizacij, odgovorni za sestavo poročila »Nacionalizem v gibanju čajank«. O žaljivih sloganih pa so enostavno pripomnili, da mnenja posameznih protestnikov ne izražajo prepričanj celotnega gibanja (Martin v Burghart in Zeskind 2010, 65). Sledile so izključitve spornih posameznikov, omejenih v poročilu, zanikanje obstoja rasističnih elementov znotraj gibanja pa so prevzeli črnski konservativni predstavniki, ki imajo dolgoročne vezi ali s samim gibanjem ali z republikansko stranko (Burghart in Zeskind 2010, 64–66). Mnenje o obstoju takšnih elementov znotraj gibanja čajank je bilo tako prepuščeno raziskovalcem s področja družbenih ved, le-ti pa so podali številne, pogosto nasprotujoče si študije.

Pričujoče magistrsko delo je usmerjeno k raziskovanju vprašanja rase znotraj gibanja čajank. S pomočjo analize relevantne literature ter javnomnenjskih raziskav smo iskali odgovor na vprašanje, ali izvira nasprotovanje predsedniku Obami in njegovim politikam s strani privržencev gibanja čajank iz njihovega lastnega nasprotovanja preobsežni in zapravljivi zvezni vladi, ali pa je motivirano z rasnimi predsodki, uperjenimi zlasti proti črncem v ZDA. Kljub dejstvu, da gibanje zagovarja tradicionalne konservativne vrednote, kot so omejene pristojnosti izvršilne oblasti, vladavina prava, fiskalna odgovornost in podobno, pa je možno potegniti vzporednice tudi z rasističnimi desničarskimi gibanji iz dvajsetih in šestdesetih let 20. stoletja. Gibanju sta z omenjenimi skupna demografska struktura privržencev in dinamika znotraj gibanja, ravno te podobnosti pa Parkerja in Barreta (2013, 10) pripeljejo do prepričanja, da čajankarje motivira kombinacija tako politike kot rasizma. Ku Klux Klan in The John Birtch Society sta privlačila predvsem belce moškega spola, ki so se po zaslužku uvrščali v srednji družbeni razred in so bili pripadniki protestantske veroizpovedi (Parker in Barreto 2013, 28). Tudi gibanje čajank je najbolj popularno med belimi moškimi srednjih let protestantske veroizpovedi in konservativnih prepričanj. Povprečen čajankar je prav tako višje izobražen od povprečnega Američana in spada v srednji družbeni razred, torej v starostno skupino, ki je po mnenju Lowndesa (Katel 2010, 249) najbolj netolerantna do kulturnih in rasnih razlik v družbi.

Raziskovanja elementov rasizma med članstvom gibanja čajank smo se lotili s pomočjo teorije simbolnega rasizma, ki sta jo Sears in Kinder prvič predstavila leta 1971 in jo

izpopolnjevala naslednja štiri desetletja. Avtorja sta prepričana, da rasizem kot politična sila z doseženo enakopravnostjo črncev v šestdesetih letih 20. stoletja ni preprosto izginil, temveč se je transformiral v novo obliko rasističnega izražanja (Sears in Henry 2005, 98). Medtem ko je stara oblika rasizma, ki bazira na biološki superiornosti bele rase, bržkone poniknila, je na dan prišla nova, bolj prikrita oblika rasizma oziroma t.i. novi rasizem (Rattansi 2007, 95).

Teorija simbolnega rasizma je prva izmed teorij novega rasizma, njene meritve rasnih stališč pa med najbolj globalno razširjenimi (Sears and Henry 2002, 4). Idejo za nastanek teorije simbolnega rasizma sta avtorja dobila med analizo županskih volitev v Los Angelesu, kjer sta se leta 1969 za stolček potegovala takratni župan Sam Yorty, belec s konservativnimi nazori, ter mestni svetnik Tom Bradley, črnec z bolj liberalnimi pogledi (Kinder in Sanders 1996, 291). Odkrila sta, da je bila podpora Samu Yortyju najvišja med belci, ki so menili, da imajo črnci slabo delovno etiko in v resnici ne potrebujejo socialne pomoči, da so njihove zahteve nelegitimne, pa tudi, da vlada namenja preveč pozornosti prav črnskemu prebivalstvu (Sears in Henry 2005, 99). Zagovorniki teorije simbolnega rasizma menijo, da je takšno negodovanje glede črncev v svojem bistvu simbolne narave, saj je posredno povezano z nezadovoljstvom nad organizacijo družbe kot take in z vero v tradicionalne »ameriške« vrednote, ter ni rezultat belskega nezadovoljstva z lastnim življenjskim standardom (Kinder in Sanders 1996, 291).

Ustvarjeni koncept simbolnega rasizma se je izkazal kot izredno močan dejavnik odločitve v primeru belih volivcev na županskih volitvah, njegov vpliv pa je presegel tako učinek, ki ga povzroča pripadnost določeni politični stranki oziroma ideologiji, kot tudi učinek ogroženosti, ki ga belci čutijo v zasebnem življenju zaradi sobivanja s črnci (Kinder in Sanders 1996, 291). Teorija predpostavlja, da je treba razlog za belsko nasprotovanje črnskim političnim kandidatom iskati ravno v konceptu simbolnega rasizma (Sears and Henry 2003, 259), simbolno izražena rasistična stališča pa podobno vplivajo tudi na belski odpor do politik pozitivne diskriminacije črncev, politik blaginje in politik integracije črnskih otrok v pretežno belske šole, ki se nahajajo izven črnskih sosesk. Po drugi strani pa taisti učinek pri belcih povzroča rast podpore restriktivnim politikam vzdrževanja javnega reda in miru ter zniževanju davkov (Sears et al. 1997, 17). Iz slednjega je razvidno, da koncept simbolnega rasizma črpa elemente iz ideologije konservatizma, kar po mnenju strokovnjakov še otežuje njegovo zaznavo, saj je rasna sovražnost do črncev mnogokrat zamaskirana z rasno-nevtralno konzervativno retoriko oziroma konsenzualnimi političnimi vrednotami (Sears in Henry, 2005, Ward 1985).

V pričujoči magistrski nalogi smo se osredotočili na preučevanje nasprotovanja privržencev gibanja čajank prvemu črnskemu predsedniku ZDA in njegovim politikam blaginje, in sicer gospodarskemu stimulacijskemu načrtu in reformi zdravstvenega sistema. Omenjeni politiki sta bili za privržence gibanja čajank največji kamen spotike, medtem ko ju je predsednik Obama prišteval med najpomembnejše legislativne akte svojega prvega mandata. Povezavo med rasnimi vprašanji in politikami blaginje je poleg teoretikov simbolnega rasizma raziskoval tudi Gilens (1996), ki v raziskavah poroča o učinkih rasnih stališč na posameznikovo mnenje o politikah blaginje. Pravi, da javnost politike blaginje dojema kot kodirana politična vprašanja, ki pri belcih spodbujajo negativne občutke do črnskega dela prebivalstva brez kakršnekoli omembe rase. Črnci se namreč v medijih prevečkrat prikazujejo kot stereotipno leni del prebivalstva, zato se pomoč revnim s strani države prek socialnih programov dojema skozi prizmo pomoči nezaslužnim črncem. V zvezi s tem izpostavljamo še prepričanje avtorjev Edsalla in Edsalla (1991), ki pravita, da je v primeru obravnave predsedniških politik, davkov, politike blaginje, kriminala, pravic in vrednot dejansko govora o vprašanju rase v ameriški družbi.

Čeprav je bil načrt administracije Baracka Obame s stimulacijskim načrtom ponovno oživiti ameriško gospodarstvo, pa je medijska hiša Fox News kot glavni medijski zaveznik gibanja čajank ob sprejetju le-tega ekstenzivno poročala o posledični rasti porabe javnofinančnih sredstev za socialne programe. Po njihovi oceni naj bi stimulacijski načrt, vreden 767 milijard dolarjev (naknadno se je vrednost paketa povzpela na 831 bilijonov dolarjev), vključeval kar 224 milijard sredstev za posamezne socialne programe, kot so zdravstveno zavarovanje, nadomestilo za primer brezposelnosti, boni za prehrano in pomoč revnim družinam (Wilson 2009).

V primeru gospodarskega stimulacijskega načrta je bila socialno šibkejšim oziroma starejšim državljanom namenjena približno tretjina sredstev, v primeru Obamine reforme zdravstvenega sistema pa gre za najbolj obsežno širitev socialnih pravic od sprejetja zveznih politik socialnega varstva (*Social Security*) v tridesetih letih oziroma zdravstvenega varstva (*Medicare* in *Medicaid*) v šestdesetih letih 20. stoletja (Skocpol 2011). Reforma predvideva razširitev zdravstvenega zavarovanja na 33 milijonov nezavarovanih Američanov in bi po izračunih kongresne proračunske službe prispevala k znižanju proračunskega primanjkljaja za 143 milijard dolarjev v obdobju med letoma 2010 in 2019 (Amadeo 2012). Omenjena strokovna služba je poročala o pozitivnih učinkih stimulacijskega načrta, saj naj bi ta po

njihovi oceni v letu 2011 zmanjšal stopnjo brezposelnosti v povprečju za 1,2 odstotka ter zvišal realni BDP za 2,1 odstotka, medtem ko se je na podlagi sprejetih politik BDP v letu 2012 v povprečju povečal za 0,5 odstotka in prispeval k nastanku 1,1 milijona novih delovnih mest (Parker in Barreto 2013, 38).

Raziskavo morebitnih učinkov simbolnega rasizma na nasprotovanje čajankarjev predsedniku Baracku Obami in njegovemu stimulacijskemu načrtu ter zdravstveni reformi smo izpeljali na podlagi predhodno zbranih podatkov ameriške nacionalne volilne študije (*American National Election Study*), natančneje podatkov prvega cikla javnomnenjske raziskave o evalvaciji vlade in družbe. Raziskava, ki sta jo izvedli univerza Michigan in univerza Stanford, je potekala med 8. in 19. oktobrom 2010 in je zaobjela 1240 Američanov, starejših od 18 let (DeBell et all 2011, 4). Preverjali smo dve zastavljeni hipotezi, in sicer, da privrženci gibanja čajank nasprotujejo predsednikovanju Baracka Obame zaradi lastnih latentnih rasističnih prepričanj, izraženih kot simbolni rasizem, taista rasistična stališča pa vplivajo tudi na njihovo nasprotovanje gospodarskemu stimulacijskemu načrtu in zdravstveni reformi kot dvema politikama blaginje Obamine administracije.

Najprej smo preverili povezanost med spremenljivkama, ki merita podporo gibanju čajank in prisotnost simbolnega rasizma. Ugotovili smo, da med njima obstaja močna in statistično značilna korelacija. Opažamo, da je simbolni rasizem v večji meri prisoten pri tistih anketirancih, ki podpirajo gibanje čajank, kot pri anketirancih, ki gibanju nasprotujejo. Povedano drugače, višja stopnja simbolnega rasizma pri posamezniku pomeni večjo verjetnost, da bo ta posameznik imel pozitivno mnenje o gibanju čajank. V nadaljevanju smo preverili, kakšna je povezava med mnenjem o gibanju in vtisu o Obami kot predsedniku ZDA. V skladu s pričakovanji smo ugotovili, da imajo nasprotniki gibanja čajank o Obami veliko bolj pozitivno mnenje kot čajankarji, ki imajo o Obami najbolj negativno mnenje. Posameznikovo mnenje o gibanju čajank ima torej očiten vpliv na njegovo dojemanje predsednika Obame, čeprav nas naše raziskovanje napeljuje k prepričanju, da je nasprotovanje Obami s strani privržencev gibanja le v določeni meri posledica simbolnega rasizma. Tako prve hipoteze ne moremo niti potrditi, niti ovreči.

Naša druga hipoteza se nanaša na preverjanje učinkov simbolnega rasizma na podporo oziroma nasprotovanje stimulacijskemu načrtu in zdravstveni reformi pri podpornikih gibanja čajank. Dokazali smo, da obstaja pri privržencih gibanja 95 odstotkov večja verjetnost, da

bodo nasprotovali gospodarskemu stimulacijskemu načrtu kot pri nasprotnikih gibanja. Simbolni rasizem na splošno sicer ima vpliv na posameznikovo odločitev o podpori oziroma nasprotovanju stimulacijskemu načrtu, vendar ugotavljamo, da nasprotovanje privržencev gibanja čajank izvira iz drugih razlogov, ne iz domnevnega učinka simbolnega rasizma. Čeprav ima simbolni rasizem pomembno vlogo pri odločanju o podpori stimulacijskemu načrtu, pa ima podpora gibanju čajank neodvisen učinek na podporo omenjeni politiki blaginje, ki ni povezan s konceptom simbolnega rasizma. Podporniki gibanja namreč trdijo, da so primarno zaskrbljeni nad finančnim stanjem zvezne države, ki jo gospodarski načrt po njihovem mnenju dodatno obremenjuje, zato na podlagi opravljenega dela zavračamo drugo postavljeno hipotezo o gospodarskem stimulacijskem načrtu.

Do podobnih zaključkov smo prišli tudi glede reforme zdravstvenega sistema. Čeprav je verjetnost nasprotovanja reformi s strani čajankarjev za 84 odstotkov večja kot pri nasprotnikih gibanja, se zdi, da njihovo nasprotovanje zdravstveni reformi ni povezano z rasnimi predsodki, izraženimi kot simbolni rasizem. Enako kot pri prej omenjeni politiki ima tudi v primeru reforme zdravstvenega sistema simbolni rasizem v splošnem vpliv na odločanje o podpori zakonu, vendar je ta vpliv neodvisen od pripadnosti posameznika gibanju čajank. Tako lahko našo drugo hipotezo zavrnemo v celoti, saj je imela pripadnost gibanju čajank v primeru gospodarskega stimulacijskega načrta in zdravstvene reforme neodvisen učinek na podporo politiki, torej učinek, ki ni povezan z učinkom simbolnega rasizma.

Omenili smo, da ima simbolni rasizem vpliv na podporo gibanju čajank. Raziskava pa je pokazala, da imata na podporo gibanju močen in statistično značilen učinek tudi ideologija in strankarska identifikacija. Tako lahko z gotovostjo trdimo, da je lahko posameznik podpornik gibanja čajank in ne deli elementov simbolnega rasizma, kljub dejstvu, da nasprotuje predsednikovanju Baracka Obama. Podobno lahko rečemo tudi za nasprotovanje čajankarjev obema politikama blaginje, saj tudi tukaj beležimo pomembno vlogo ideologije in strankarske pripadnosti na mnenje posameznika. Pri tem želimo ponovno poudariti, da je že v modelu teorije simbolnega rasizma, kot sta si ga zamislila Sears in Henry (2005), konservatizem pomemben dejavnik vpliva na preference belcev do črnskih kandidatov in sodobnih rasnih politik. Kljub temu pa smo v primeru vtisov o Obami dokazali, da povezanost med pripadnostjo gibanju čajank in simbolnim rasizmom obstaja ter vpliva na njihovo dojemanje prvega črnskega predsednika ZDA, očitna pa je tudi pozitivna korelacija med spremenljivkama privrženosti gibanju čajank in simbolnim rasizmom. Pri tem izpostavljamo,

da je v primeru črnskega predsednika ZDA povezava med rasno drugačnostjo belcev in črncev posamezniku tako rekoč »pred očmi« in bi zato lažje sprožila negativne občutke do črncev, kot recimo sprejetje določene politike blaginje, kjer je ta povezava manj očitna oziroma bolj posredne narave. Toliko bolj, če se o njih razpravlja kot o finančno neodgovornih ukrepih, ki omejujejo svobodo trga.

Namen naloge je bil odkriti, ali nasprotovanje gibanja čajank do predsednika Obame in njegovih politik blaginje izhaja iz latentnih rasnih predsodkov, ki so skupni privržencem gibanja, ali pa je to nasprotovanje le rezultat njihovega trdnega prepričanja v ideologijo fiskalnega konzervatizma. Menimo, da obstaja povezava med simbolnim rasizmom in gibanjem čajank, kar dokazuje močna in statistično značilna povezava med obema spremenljivkama. Prav tako smo pokazali, da je povezavo med simbolnim rasizmom in gibanjem čajank mogoče zaznati v primeru percepcije Baracka Obame kot predsednika. Vendar pa povezanost med konceptom simbolnega rasizma in gibanjem čajank postaja vse šibkejša, ko se osredotočimo na stimulacijski načrt in zdravstveno reformo, torej Obamini najpomembnejši politiki blaginje v prvem predsedniškem mandatu. Privrženci gibanja čajank očitno nasprotujejo obema politikama, vendar se zdi, da je njihovo nasprotovanje bolj posledica vere v idejo fiskalno odgovorne in manjše zvezne vlade kot pa simbolnega rasizma. Ideje manjše zvezne vlade, omejenih predpisov in svobodnega trga so od nekdaj ideološka osnova ameriškega fiskalnega konzervatizma, ki se je v letu 2009 manifestiral v vrstah gibanja čajank. Prepričani smo, da lahko gibanje čajank brez zadržkov označimo za družbeno gibanje, ki se zavzema za ideje omejene vlade in individualnih svoboščin, vendar pa bo le-to zaradi decentralizirane organizacije in nejasno definiranih ciljev ter usmeritev še naprej privlačilo ljudi z različnimi interesi – tudi tiste, ki še vedno gojijo rasne predsodke do črncev v ameriški družbi.

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APPENDIX A: Demographic structure of the Tea Partiers and the general public

Table A.1: Demographics of the Tea Party supporters (in percent)

Sociodemographic factors / Survey	CNN/Opinion Research Corp.	Pew Research Center	USA Today/ Gallup	New York Times/ CBS News
AGE				
18 – 29	20	8	16	7
30 – 49	40	33	34	16 (30 – 44)
50 – 64	29	33	29	46 (45 – 64)
65+	12	23	21	29 (64+)
GENDER				
Male	60	56	55	59
Female	40	44	45	41
RACE				
Non-Hispanic White	80	81	79	89 (White)
Non-Hispanic Black	2	3	6	1 (Black)
Hispanic	10	9	15 (Other)	3 (Hispanic)
EDUCATION				
High School or less	26	38	34	29
Some College	34	27	34	33
College Graduate +	40	35	31	37
INCOME				
Less than $30 000	8	38	19	18
$30 000 – $50 000	18	31 ($30 000 –	26	17
$50 000 – $75 000	32	$75 000)	55 ($50 000+)	25
$75 000+	34	36		31
RELIGION				
Protestant	68			61
Catholic	16			22
Jewish	/			1
Other	6			5
None	9			7
IDEOLOGY				
Conservative	77	72	70	73*
Moderate	20	30	20	20
Liberal	3	6	7	4
PARTY ID				
Republican	44	53	49	54
Democrat	4	9	8	5
Independent	52	36	43	36

Source: CNN/Opinion Research Corporation (2010), Pew Research Center (2010b), Saad (2010), New York Times/CBS News (2010).

Table A.2: Demographics of the general public/all respondents (in percent)

Sociodemographic factors / Survey	CNN/Opinion Research Corp.	Pew Research Center	USA Today/ Gallup	New York Times/ CBS News
AGE				
18 – 29	20	21	17	23
30 – 49	35	34	36	27 (30 – 44)
50 – 64	27	26	27	34 (45 – 64)
65+	12	17	20	16 (64+)
GENDER				
Male	50	49	49	49
Female	50	51	51	51
RACE				
Non-Hispanic White	71	69	75	77 (White)
Non-Hispanic Black	11	11	11	12 (Black)
Hispanic	11	13	15 (Other)	12 (Hispanic)
EDUCATION				
High School or less	45	47	35	47
Some College	26	25	32	28
College Graduate +	28	28	33	25
INCOME				
Less than $30 000	28	31	25	32
$30 000 – $50 000	19	31 ($30 000 –	25	16
$50 000 – $75 000	17	$75 000)	50 ($50 000+)	18
$75 000+	25	25		26
RELIGION				
Protestant	50			52
Catholic	22			21
Jewish	1			2
Other	12			6
None	14			16
IDEOLOGY				
Conservative	40	41	40	44*
Moderate	39	34	38	38
Liberal	18	20	21	20
PARTY ID				
Republican	25	28	28	28
Democrat	32	34	32	31
Independent	44	35	40	33

Source: CNN/Opinion Research Corporation (2010), Pew Research Center (2010b), Saad (2010), New York Times/CBS News (2010).

1) CNN/Opinion Research Corp. poll was conducted via telephone with 1023 adult Americans between the 12th and 15th February, 2010. (The survey includes 124 respondents who are active Tea Party supporters – they have either donated money or attended a rally) (CNN/Opinion Research Corporation 2010)

2) Pew Research Center conducted their survey by telephone between the 11th and 21st March, 2010. They interviewed 2505 adult Americans, among them were 704 Tea Party supporters (Pew Research Center for People and the Press 2010).

3) USA Today/Gallup's national poll was conducted over the telephone with 1033 adult Americans (28 percent of all the respondents (289) declared themselves as Tea Party supporters). The survey was carried out between the 26th and 28th March, 2010 (Saad 2010).

4) NYT/CBS News poll was conducted April 5–12 2010. It included 1580 adult Americans, 881 of them Tea Party supporters. Note that 78 percent of all Tea Party supporters have never donated money nor attended a rally or a meeting organized by the Tea Party movement, as oppose to the CNN/Opinion Research Corp. poll which describes a Tea Party supporter as an individual who actively participates in the movement (New York Times/NBC News 2010).

*) The NYT/CBS News poll asks the respondents to describe their conservative views as either somewhat conservative or very conservative. In the case of the Tea Party supporters, 39 percent of all conservative Tea Partiers see themselves as very conservative, while 34 of them are somewhat conservative. The ideological self-identification as conservatives was very different when all the answers were taken into consideration – 22 percent of all respondents identifying themselves as conservative would call themselves somewhat conservative, and only 12 percent very conservative (New York Times/CBS News 2010).

APPENDIX B: Relevant articles of the Constitution of the United States of America.

> ***Article I, Section 8:*** 1) The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; 2) To borrow Money on the credit of the United States; 3) To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; 4) To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States; 5) To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures; 6) To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States; 7) To establish Post Offices and post Roads; 8) To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries; 9) To constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court; 10) To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations; 11) To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; 12) To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; 13) To provide and maintain a Navy; 14) To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; 15) To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; 16) To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; 17) To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings; And 18) To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof (Constitution of the United States of America).

Article I, Section 2, Clause 3: "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. [Modified by Amendment XIV]" (Constitution of the United States of America).

Article I, Section 9, Clause 1: "The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person" (Constitution of the United States of America).

Article IV, Section, 2, Clause 3: "No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due. [Modified by Amendment XIII]" (Constitution of the United States of America).

Article XXIII, Section 1: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. ***Section 2***: Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation" (Constitution of the United States of America).

> ***Article XXIV, Section 1***: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. ***Section 2***: Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. ***Section 3:*** No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. ***Section 4***: The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by

> law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. Section 5: The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article (Constitution of the United States of America).

Article XV, Section 1: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. ***Section 2:*** The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation" (Constitution of the United States of America).