

CHAPTER - X *

REVIEW AND REFLECTIONS

In a fundamental sense, the origins of 1962 Sino-Indian conflict lay in Chinese expansionism and occupation of Tibet. The issue got further aggravated due to failure of Chinese to win over the Tibetans. Indian asylum to Dalai Lama raised Chinese suspicions about ultimate Indian intentions. On the other hand, India while tacitly accepting the Chinese occupation of Tibet through a treaty in 1954, failed to obtain any quid pro quo on the border issue.

The hub of Sino-Indian differences on border continued to be the Aksai Chin plateau. The Aksai Chin area was of vital strategic significance to the Chinese, as geography dictated that it was only through this area that China could establish a road link between Tibet and Sinkiang, both turbulent regions for China due to ethno-religious factors. Aksai Chin held no such advantage for India and was of no strategic significance for defence. For India it was a question of national sentiments roused by loss of national territory. But this admirable sentiment was not tempered by military logic. Ignorant and vaciferous media and opposition parties played a disastrous role in forcing a reluctant Nehru on a confrontation course. There is some sketchy evidence to show that in 1960 the Chinese were prepared to exchange Aksai Chin for Chumbi Valley, an area of vital strategic importance to India(1). Apparent Indian rejection of this proposal may have confirmed China's worst fears about India's aggressive intentions. The Chinese leaders were veterans of the long civil war, and saw things primarily through military glasses.

The clash of arms between India and China was not a world shaking event. The military dimensions were puny - merely 2½ divisions on the Indian side and 4/5 divisions on the Chinese side were involved. The attention of whole world at that time was focussed elsewhere - on the Atlantic. The Cuban missile crisis occurred almost simultaneously and world had come perilously close to an Armageddon.

The Dhola clash that occurred in early September 1962, paralleled the call up of American reservists on 11 September. It appears obvious that the time between this event and 20 October was used by the Chinese to build up their forces opposite NEFA and Ladakh. In Atlantic, the Americans detected the

* Prepared by Dr P.B. Sinha and Col A.A. Athale

Soviet missiles in Cuba on the 16th October and started a naval quarantine of Cuba on 20 October, the day Chinese launched their massive attack on the Indians(2).

It is indeed plausible to speculate that the Chinese deliberately timed their attack to co-incide the Cuban missile crisis. The Super Powers, who were engaged in a deathly struggle, ensured the required degree of freedom for the Chinese to use force against India without fear of their interference. The subsequent Soviet charge of 'adventurism' and the various polemics between the two Communist powers lend a further credence to this hypothesis(3).

Immediately after independence, Government of India had naturally laid great emphasis on the economic development of the country, impoverished by two hundred years of alien rule. The bulk of resources were, therefore, diverted towards that end. Sustained economic growth and development require a peaceful atmosphere and India's policy of peace and friendship eminently suited that end.

No major security threat other than from Pakistan was perceived. And the armed forces were regarded as adequate to meet Pakistan's threat. Hence very little effort and resources were put in for immediate strengthening of the security of the borders. Efforts were, however, made for indigenous production of military hardware which would make the country self-sufficient in production of arms and ammunition in the long run. For that, defence related industries in the public sector were promoted, which, in addition, could save hard earned foreign exchange to be utilised for development purposes. Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister since 1957, did not favour imports of weapons and equipment. A personality clash between him and Finance Minister Morarji Desai further starved the defence services for funds, it was rumoured.

The above, however, does not mean that the political leadership was oblivious to any threat to India's security which could emanate from the north. After the armed occupation of Tibet by People's Republic of China in early 1950's, the political leadership in India had realised that an expansionist and hegemonistic China would ultimately pose a threat to the security of democratic and peace loving India. Sardar Patel's letter (7 November 1950)(4) to the Prime Minister Nehru and Nehru's own observations in that regard testified to that fact. To counter that threat India went in for treaties with Bhutan (8 August 1949), Nepal (31 July 1950) and Sikkim

(5 December 1950). A committee was appointed under the Chairmanship of Mr Himmatsinhji to suggest steps to strengthen India's security.

But the pace of the implementation of the recommendations of the Committee was extremely tardy and casual. The state of drift continued on the basis of the belief that the Chinese threat was a distant one, not imminent(5).

When China began to adopt bellicose posture on the Indo-Tibetan border after the conclusion of a treaty in 1954, it was thought the matter would be taken care of by India's policy of peace and cooperation with China. After all, India was among the first countries giving recognition to the Communist Government in Peking. India had been instrumental in bringing an almost internationally untouchable China into the fold of Afro-Asian community. She had been Championing the cause of Chinese admission to UNO all through. And there could be no military solution, according to the current military thinking(6).

In the years 1959-60, Lt Gen S.P.P. Thorat, GOC-in-C Eastern Command, had made an appreciation about the magnitude of Chinese threat to Indian borders in the Eastern Sector and had made projections about his requirements to meet that threat. But the Army HQ as well as the Defence Minister paid little heed to Gen Thorat's appreciation(7). It was not even brought to the notice of the Prime Minister.

In the end of February 1961, a four-member (another member was included later on) Border Defence Study Group, headed by the then Chief of General Staff, Lt Gen L.P. Sen, DSO, was appointed to review problems concerning the defence of the borders. The group had submitted Part I of its report dealing with Eastern Command at the end of May 1961 (the same month Gen Sen took over as GOC-in-C, Eastern Command). The Defence Minister decided to send the copies of the report to the Prime Minister (who was also incharge of External Affairs) and Home Minister and to the Chiefs of Staff through the Defence Secretary for examination of the proposals. In August 1961, the report was ordered to be kept in Defence Minister's Secretariat to be put up to him only after receipt of the second part dealing with the Western Command. On 17 August, Foreign Secretary reminded the Defence Secretary about the follow up action on Part I of the Report. But nothing happened; the report remained pending in the Defence Ministry; and was taken up only in July 1963(8). The so called "Forward Policy" was based on the firm view of the political leadership that there

would not be a big scale armed conflict with China. There might be skirmishes or isolated clashes here and there, but the Chinese would not escalate them into a war(9). War between India and China could escalate on a global level with the potential of a nuclear conflagration and, therefore, China would desist from it. The low-key Chinese reaction to the setting up of some Indian posts in Ladakh in the initial stages tended to confirm the view, which remained a basic premise of India's relations with China until that belief was shattered on 20 October 1962.

After Gen K.S. Thimayya, Lt Gen S.D. Verma and Lt Gen S.P.P. Thorat, the Army set-up came to be dominated by officers who either shared the Government assessment of the Chinese intentions or were too weak to stand up to the aggressive Krishna Menon always backed by Nehru(10). The "Forward Policy" was implemented vigorously under Gen P.N. Thapar. As against the Government directive of 2 November 1961 ordering setting-up of posts as near to the border as possible with firm bases behind them the Army HQ order (5 December 1961) made the establishment of border posts mandatory even without the necessary backing.

The establishment of the Dhola post in Kameng Frontier Division in June 1962, was in pursuance of the said policy. Provocative and violent incidents created by the Chinese troops, on 8 September 1962, in the area forced the Government of India to react strongly. The Government had been assuring the Parliament that the defence forces of the country were in sound position to defend its territory(11). To many, the successful operations in Goa tended to confirm the Government claim. Increasing encroachments by the Chinese into Indian territory had been agitating the public mind and the Parliament. The 8 September incident gave rise to strong public clamour to throw the Chinese out from Thag La Ridge, which in the reckoning of the Government was south of the McMahon Line. The Army was directed to get the Thag La Ridge vacated as early as possible. The Government, in its fond belief, did not expect serious retaliation from the Chinese and it assumed that whatever mild reaction came from the Chinese, the Indian Army would be capable of neutralising it. It appears that the political leadership was misled into believing that while in Ladakh the odds were in favour of China and 'some loss of territory' was possible, in NEFA, the Indian Army was capable of 'throwing out' the Chinese. Conditions on ground were, however, entirely different. When on 25 October 1962, Nehru told the Parliament that the stories of Shergarh, etc, were lies, he was basing himself on the advice

presented to him by the Army Headquarters(12). The fact was that there were shortages of everything from bullets to boots.

Except the field commanders like Brig JP Dalvi, Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad and Lt Gen Umrao Singh, the Army top brass, too, seemed to believe that China might not react strongly and the operation to evict the Chinese from the Thag La Ridge would be carried through successfully. Included among them were Gen PN Thapar, Lt Gen LP Sen, Lt Gen BM Kaul, Maj Gen JS Dhillon,(13) and Brig DK Palit(14). Gen Thapar seemed to have some reservations, but not about eviction operations in the Dhola Sector. He was apprehensive only about their likely serious repercussions in the Western Sector. But when Foreign Secretary assured him (on what basis?) that there was nothing much to worry on that account, Gen Thapar agreed to carry out the operation, after the Government order was reiterated in writing by a Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Defence(15). But if the Army Chief was aware of the serious implications of the order, which he ought to have been, he could have protested emphatically, to the extent of tendering his resignation. But he did not say that the operation was beyond the means then available to him.

Circumstances indicate that Lt Gen LP Sen also regarded the 'Op Leghorn' as a feasible proposition. To him the reservations, protests and misgivings of Lt Gen Umrao Singh, based also on the assessment of Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad and Brig JP Dalvi, seemed quite unjustified. If he were replaced by a more 'dynamic and energetic' Commander, the operation could be conducted successfully. Lt Gen Umrao Singh was, therefore, removed and in his place Lt Gen BM Kaul was appointed GOC, IV Corps. Thus both Gen Thapar and Lt Gen Sen accepted the orders as viable for implementation under the given circumstances without worthwhile protest.

Lt Gen BM Kaul had been occupying the post of Chief of General Staff in Army HQ for sufficiently long to know all the implications of such an operation. The orders for eviction were issued to the Army while he was CGS. And he accepted the assignment of GOC, IV Corps to carry out 'Op Leghorn' only as a stop-gap arrangement. No new officer was posted as CGS and Maj Gen JS Dhillon, Dy CGS was to officiate so long as Kaul was away. The idea seemed to be that 'Op Leghorn' would be a 'cakewalk' and after its quick execution, Kaul would resume duties as CGS. Kaul took over the task with fanfare and publicity, and appeared totally bewildered at the massive retaliation of the Chinese at Namkha Chu.

The Army top brass believed that the Chinese would not react strongly. Worse still, their belief permeated into the lower echelons of the Army, with the result that even field formations became complacent.

Thus the Government of India ordered the Army to rid the Thag La Ridge of the Chinese as early as it was prepared to do it and the Army accepted the task - both having based their decision on the unmilitary assumption that the enemy would not react strongly and that mere starting of military activity by India would make the Chinese vacate the Thag La Ridge. The voice of those, who apprehended Chinese attack on a big scale, could not reach the political leadership, nor did it convince the Army top brass of the serious implications of such a decision in view of the inadequacies suffered by the Indian troops.

In this way Op "LEGHORN" was launched at a place and time when the Indian Army was hopelessly unprepared, both physically and mentally, to meet the enemy who was thoroughly prepared militarily and was just looking for a pretext for a showdown. The die was thus cast for a political gamble by India without adequate military means to back it up.

The Indian troops, facing the Chinese onslaught, had been suffering from several handicaps, some of which were; (i) Obsolete weapons unsuitable for warfare in mountains, and that too in short supply, (ii) Lack of winter clothings/shoes etc and (iii) Absence of a road network, which made line of communications difficult. Supplies and reinforcements were sent mostly by air.

In Ladakh, the Indian troops suffered from all those handicaps, yet they put up a brave resistance to the invaders. They had a plan of defence. When attacked by the enemy the troops in Ladakh fought valiantly, inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and withdrew according to plan. Theirs was a retreat under extremely adverse conditions and not a rout out of panic. They would have given a still better performance had the well trained and fully-acclimatised ITBF personnel been assigned a more active role in the operations. This was not done on the basis of a none-too credible argument that the Field Commanders had no idea about the state of morale of fighting capability of the ITBF men. But the fight at Gurung Hill and Rezangla was in true Indian tradition, and saved Leh, and the Indian Army's reputation.

The Eastern Sector, particularly the Kameng Frontier Division, however, presented an altogether different picture. Of course, here, too, the troops had to operate with the same handicaps and deficiencies as in the Ladakh Sector. But in this sector the available resources, inadequate though they might have been, were not put to the best and fullest use. Except in a few engagements where a stiff fight was given to the enemy, the performance of Indian formations left much to be desired. Here, due to a number of maladies with which the political and military set-up in the country suffered, and due to some crucial errors of commission and omission made by the Army down to the level of Field Commanders, the troops did not perform creditably.

To begin with, the Army was given no firm objective. Tawang had been declared the Divisional Vital Ground, but there were not sufficient troops to defend it. It was perforce abandoned. Thereafter differences cropped up as to where the main defences of 4 Inf Div should be located, at Se La or Boadila? This controversy was allowed to rage openly with all its adverse implications.

Decisions were taken on an ad hoc basis. Some of those decisions were patently incomprehensible. For example, when 2 Rajput were stopped on their way to the plains for reinduction, they were sent to Kameng, a totally new area for them, instead of being sent back to Walong Sector with which they were quite familiar. The result was confusion all around. Formations were ordered to move out practically without any notice to destinations not known to them. Under the circumstances, chopping and pruning of units was freely resorted to. In some cases, one part of a battalion came under command of CO of another battalion, while a part of the other battalion had to fight under the CO of the first battalion, as happened in the Walong Sector. Unplanned induction of troops on ad hoc basis and the consequent breaking of original formations ruined the cohesiveness and compactness of fighting formations. Affiliations between formations and units were broken. Esprit-de-corps, so very essential for a fighting formation, was lost in the process, thereby impairing the fighting ability of the troops. All this unbalanced the planning by IV Corps as well as blunted the enthusiasm of the troops. In this, the Eastern Command acted like a passive onlooker. It worked like a post office, passing on orders received from above to lower formations. No notice was taken of the Chinese build-up, the difficulties of terrain and

logistic limitations of Indians which the Eastern Command should have done with all seriousness, being the highest authority responsible for operations in area exclusively under its jurisdiction.

The Army did not carry out a joint planning of operations with the other service involved, viz., Air Force. Not only this but even the Chiefs of the three services, it is reported,(16) never met to discuss the developing situation on the border during the operations. Hence there was no coordination between Army and Air Force and the tasks were projected and taken on an ad hoc basis(17).

The Army top brass erred on the lower side in assessing the military capabilities of China. There was dearth of information about the Chinese activities. But whatever intelligence was available it did not receive careful attention by the Army HQ. For example, on 09 October 1962, GOC IV Corps received a message from Army HQ carrying a reliable intelligence report that some three hundred mortars and guns had been seen moving near Tsong Dzong towards the McMahon Line and that the objective could be Tawang. But the message did not indicate as to what steps the Army HQ proposed to take to counter it(18). Lt Gen Kaul had got full and complete information about the dispositions and strength of Chinese troops at Thag La Ridge through intelligence sources. He had informed the Eastern Command and Army HQ about it immediately with a request for offensive air support(19). But nothing was done. The same information was presented by the Corps Commander in detail at the highest level meeting at Prime Minister's residence on 11 October. Kaul also explained the comparatively very weak position of Indian troops there. The Prime Minister expressed the view that he did not want the troops to commit suicide and asked for suggestions as to what should be done in the circumstances. But Gen Thapar, agreeing with Lt Gen Sen, opined that the troops must hold on to their positions in the Thag La Sector(20). Lt Gen Kaul, too, did not press for any safer option which he could certainly have done having seen the situation on the ground. Also, Brig KK Singh, BGS, IV Corps had warned in his 'Appreciation of the Situation' on 15 October 1962, that China will react violently to any penetration North of Namkha Chu River(21). This warning does not seem to have been taken note of seriously.

While no studies of Chinese war tactics were made their intentions, too, were not judged correctly. No debriefing was done after the Korean War to learn about their ways of working and fighting(22). Nobody seems to have cared to know. It is hardly surprising when Indian troops did not have adequate knowledge

even of their own area where they were to operate. On the other hand, the enemy had planted its spies and agents in the area of operations which provided the Chinese with necessary information about the plans and movements of Indian troops(23). Chinese Radio broadcasts mentioned the exact movements of Indian troops, the number of guns and tanks, etc(24).

After the Indian withdrawal from Tawang, it was felt that there would be no more shooting war. The period of lull which followed the withdrawal from Tawang was therefore utilised neither for quick build up of defences nor moves of adequate forces in quick time to the operational area, nor even for carrying out administrative backing. The Corps Commander is reported to have asked troops in the Se La area to prepare themselves against winter rather than against the enemy(25). Understandably, the utmost speed with which India should have proceeded with the build up during the three week interregnum was not there. Things were being taken casually, without an element of urgency. Two instances may be cited here of the prevalent mood. In spite of forewarning by the Army HQ on 22 October 1962 about the likely threat of L of C between Se La and Bomdila via Poshing La, as well as reports about Chinese build up along the Poshing La axis received from locally available intelligence, only a platoon was despatched to counter it. Also, on 16 November, when enemy build up was continuing rapidly around the Divisional defended area, the Div HQ continued celebrating Zojila Day - the regimental day of 4 Rajput - attended by all officers, including the Div Commander.

By and large, Indian troops acquitted themselves well in the high altitude terrain. But for a few in Walong Sector, junior level officers generally proved equal to the task. But Indian troops had been training and fighting all their life in plains. Warfare in mountains was a different proposition, in which the troops felt handicapped to some extent.

In the IV Corps, the chain of command was ignored frequently. Lt Gen Kaul, GOC IV Corps, often approached the Chief of the Army Staff directly without going through the GOC-in-C. On the other hand, he gave orders directly to junior officers like battalion commanders and Bde Majors, bypassing a chain of intervening officers. Army HQ, too, communicated with the Corps Commanders directly. When Lt Gen BM Kaul arrived at Tezpur to take over charge as GOC IV Corps, the GOC-in-C, breaking the protocol, came to the air-port to receive him. No wonder, in the then state of affairs, an ailing Lt Gen Kaul was allowed to command his corps from his sick bed in distant Delhi at a critical time.

There was frequent interference by senior commanders in the spheres of commanders below, to the extent of issuing orders about minor tactical details. Orders were issued as to how Bns, even Coys, were to be deployed, or which place was to be occupied, and so on. For example, it is reported that it was the Army HQ which, in conjunction with the Eastern Command, ordered the linear deployment of 7 Inf Bde along the Namkha Chu(26). Such orders tied down the hands of local commanders completely. By taking away the independence of action of local commanders, it seriously hampered the efforts put in for the attainment of a given objective.

Another factor which hampered the smooth conduct of operations was the large scale change of commanders during the course of the operations. And such changes were often effected because of likes or dislikes of the decision makers. It is well known that Lt Gen Sen, GOC-in-C Eastern Command, was unhappy with Lt Gen Umrao Singh, Corps Commander. Gen Singh was eased out of the command. The obvious choice was to promote Maj Gen Sam Manekshaw and to appoint him in his place. But the then Defence Minister would not tolerate it. The choice fell on Lt Gen BM Kaul, who, though a competent and an energetic officer, lacked the requisite experience. After the fall of Tawang, Maj Gen Nirranjan Prasad was relieved of the Command of 4 Inf Div and Maj Gen AS Pathania was appointed in his place. Commanders of 62 and 65 Infantry Brigades were also changed similarly. In the Walong Sector, GOC 2 Infantry Division, Maj Gen MS Pathania, did not want to have Brig JC Hartely, MC, of 181 Inf Bde. So HQ 181 Inf Bde had to be replaced by HQ 11 Inf Bde commanded by Brig NC Rawlley, a choice of the Division Commander, although there was no change in the constituent battalions. Precious four days were thus lost at the time when enemy pressure was building up.

After the disaster at the Namkha Chu, when Commander IV Corps, Lt Gen BM Kaul was lying sick in Delhi, Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh was appointed as GOC IV Corps with effect from 23 October. Gen Harbakhsh had not only taken over charge but had also taken over command of the situation in the IV Corps area. His appointment had created a new sense of confidence among the troops. But then suddenly, only after a six-day period, Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh was removed and Lt Gen BM Kaul resumed as GOC IV Corps. The idea was to enable Gen Kaul to retrieve his reputation and to rehabilitate himself. It is widely believed that had Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh continued as GOC IV Corps, the outcome of operations in Sa La - Bondila area might have been different.

The bane of ill feelings and strained relations spread in the lower levels of crucial formations also. For example, GSO-1, 4 Inf Div was reportedly at daggers drawn with the Adjutant and Quarter Master. This kind of strained relationship was obviously detrimental to smooth functioning of the Divisional HQ.

The errors of commission and omission on the part of the General Staff in the Army Headquarters were compounded by many tactical mistakes committed during the conduct of operations in the Eastern Sector. Some of those mistakes were common to the operation as a whole and some were peculiar to specific engagements.

To begin with, 'Op Leghorn' was decided to be launched but the troops were checked from imbibing the offensive spirit. It is significant that Indian troops were asked not to call the Chinese "enemy" and, while doing bayonet practice, they were not allowed to use Chinese dummies(27).

The non-utilisation of Indian Air Force in combat role during the operations was another strategic blunder. It seems that, as per the normal practice, and general assessment of the threat posed by neighbouring countries, including China, was carried out by Air HQ. But no specific appreciation of the threat posed by the Chinese Air Force in the context of the 1962 operations, was undertaken nor was any analysis prepared of the advantages and disadvantages in different courses of action. Air HQ decided in a casual and off-hand manner that use of the IAF in a combat role would not be advantageous to India(28). The Army was not consulted before arriving at such a decision. But Army HQ did not appear dissatisfied with that decision. In their view, if India were to use its Air Force and in retaliation China were also to use its Air Force, India would have more to lose than China, since Indian troops mainly depended on air for logistic support(29). However, arrangements were said to be underway to provide offensive air support to troops under IV Corps at short notice but sanction for its use would be given by the Government only in extreme emergency(30). Neither the Government, of their own, felt that such a situation had arisen, nor were they so told by the Army Chief. In fact, it is said that even on advice from Staff Officers, Gen PN Thapar did not show any desire to approach the Government to authorise offensive air action in support of the Army(31). But at that time the Chinese Air Force was not capable of retaliating in such a way as was apprehended by India(32).

As regards various engagements during the operations in October-November 1962, some tactical mistakes of field commanders came out glaringly, which ultimately proved decisive for the outcome of that engagement and even the war.

The linear deployment of 7 Inf Bde along the river line was tactically indefensible, whether it was Brig Dalvi's own idea or it was thrust on him from above. However, once it was done, it should have been rectified immediately after it was decided to postpone 'Op Leghorn', particularly in view of the preparations being made by the Chinese on the Thag La Ridge for something serious. Bulk of the troops could have been withdrawn to more defensible positions like Hathongla. But this was not done. Brig Dalvi subsequently claimed that he tried to move troops to more tactically sound and defensible positions, even at the point of submitting his resignation, but the idea was firmly ruled out by the Corps Commander. Not only this, Lt Gen Kaul ordered even for continued build-up of the Tsangle position north of the Namkha Chu. Nehru declared that Government had not attached any condition regarding a particular pattern of deployment, and how the troops were positioned was the decision of the Army Commanders(33). Hence, the responsibility for continued deployment of 7 Inf Bde in tactically unsound positions lies squarely on the Corps Commander and the Army Commander.

The above, however, does not absolve Brig Dalvi from his share of the blame. As Commander in charge of the operation, and in view of the disparity between his and the Chinese forces, of which Brig Dalvi was fully aware, he should have drawn a plan of withdrawal. His whole brigade disintegrated in a couple of hours, which indicates that most probably the troops had not even dug in.

After the withdrawal of Indian troops from Tawang, the 4 Inf Div, instead of concentrating all its defences at Bomdila - the most suitable of all the locations from the point of view of logistics - deployed its troops at various places. This decision, it appears, was of the Army and the Government had nothing to do with it(34). The result was that, but for Se La, Indian troops were nowhere in a strong position.

Se La was a well-defended position, called by many as an 'impregnable fortress'. On 17 November 1962, its four battalions had sufficient stocks of ration and ammunition to last for a week's battle or so. The dropping zone at Se La, serving the Se La

garrison, was the best available in Kameng Frontier Division. It is estimated that about 50% of the airdrops could have been retrieved. With enemy having brought no anti-aircraft weapons, at least air drops could have continued even if L of C of Se La was disrupted by the enemy. But the GOC, 4 Inf Div, proved too sensitive to outflanking moves of the Chinese and reacted poorly when his positions were cut off. Instead of waiting for the enemy in strongly defended positions, he frantically sent insufficient troops to remove road blocks. Failing to do that, hasty withdrawal of his troops from the besieged area seemed to be the only way left open to him.

The same tendency to send out troops from well-defended localities to remove road blocks led to the fall of Bomdila.

In the Walong sector, over-eagerness to execute an 'offensive defence' plan led to the collapse of the front. Bde Cdr, 11 Inf Bde, had planned to launch an assault on the Yellow Pimple to eliminate the threat of attack from the enemy entrenched in the area. But the offensive was started on 14 November without knowing correctly the strength of the enemy and without the concentration of his own troops on the launching pad to the required level of strength. The fresh battalion 4 Dogra - was scheduled to concentrate on 15 November. It is surmised that undue haste in launching this assault, without making a firm base and without catering for the likely retaliation by the enemy, was made in order to complete it on 14 November, so as to make it a gift to Prime Minister Nehru on his birthday. The assault so launched not only failed but it boomeranged.

Indian troops did not possess adequate automatic and semi-automatic weapons to fight with. Even worse, whatever weapons they had, were in short supply, and on many occasions the stock of ammunition fell far short of the required level. Proper winter clothing and boots were lacking. But this cannot justify Indian troops in Kameng putting up no resistance to the enemy at all taking resort to the safety of withdrawal. After the battle of Namkha Chu and the withdrawal from Tawang, a defeatist miasma seems to have overpowered the officers and men in NEFA. It almost became a rule that whenever any formation position was threatened or attacked by the Chinese, the Indian troops were to withdraw.

'There are no good or bad Soldiers; there are only good or bad Generals', so goes the saying. In the Kameng Frontier Division, on a few occasions, like the battle of IB Ridge on the Bum La axis, and the

Battle of Nuranang, when the soldiers were given a decent chance to fight, they performed creditably. But, by and large, during those operations the field commanders displayed lack of determination and will to fight. Lower level officers generally performed creditably. But the fault lay at the military leadership of the level of Brigade Commanders and above. It was this level of Commanders which could not display those qualities of courage, determination, self-sacrifice and inspiring leadership which would have, even if not averted the reverse, at least prevented the name of the Indian Army in general and the 'Red Eagles' in particular from being tarnished.

One of the important contributing factors to the state of demoralisation among the senior Commanders in the Army was the manner in which it was being administered for the past few years. V.K. Krishna Menon, who became Defence Minister in 1957, had to share much of the responsibility for this state of affairs in the Army. Krishna Menon was a brilliant, intelligent and dynamic person and an intellectual par excellence. But these very qualities of his proved to be a bane for the armed forces. He regarded senior Army officers intellectually far inferior to him. Even in matters military he thought he knew more than the Generals. His short shrift behaviour with, and wrong management of the officers, bred discontent among them. A man of strong likes and dislikes, Krishna Menon would not bear with any officer whom he disapproved for one reason or the other. He played favourites in matters of posting and promotion, and pushed forward one officer as against another. This created a schism in the Armed Forces. It eroded the morale, confidence, discipline, cohesiveness and elan of Indian officers' corps, and respect for superior rank, which are so very essential for an efficient army. The Thimayya affair had shown that, as against Krishna Menon, even seniormost Army officer could not get a favourable treatment from Nehru. This had created a mental attitude of helplessness among officers, and, as a result, demotivated them.

In the aftermath of the Chinese invasion, President S Radhakrishnan had aired the then generally prevalent view that "owing to the difficult terrain and numerical superiority of the Chinese we suffered military reverses"(35). No doubt the Chinese had employed bigger number of troops in the operation than India could(36). The Chinese weapons, equipment, organisation and training were also better than that of the Indians. But this superiority was only marginal. By itself it would not have proved decisive. So far as the terrain was concerned, it was difficult for both the sides. Moreover, the Chinese

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were operating in areas not theirs, about which Indians should have been more familiar. In the ultimate analysis, it was superior leadership and higher morale of the Chinese Army that tilted the balance heavily in favour of China. As against that, the Army top brass in India did not possess either the vision to see the military operation in its right perspective, or they lacked guts to express their objective assessment of the situation to the Government with all the firmness at their Command. And, when an armed conflict between India and China became inevitable, the field commanders did not give that inspiring leadership which would have enabled the troops to perform creditably.

The 1962 conflict was indeed a big blow to India's prestige. Militarily, however, it was in no way a national catastrophe, as in a melancholy mood it was made out to be. It was only a small segment of the Indian Army which was directly involved in the operations. In that too, it was only the failures of commission and omission of some of the top brass and middle level officers that brought, mainly in the Kaneng Frontier Division, shameful reverses. The exaggerated importance given by the nation to the magnitude of reverses in October-November 1962, however, proved a blessing in disguise, as it brought home to the nation the dictum of Vegetius - "Let him who desires peace prepare for war -" and consequently added realism and a sense of urgency in comprehensive military preparations on priority basis.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Michael Brecher, 'India and World Politics'; Krishna Menon's view of the World' Oxford University Press, Toronto - Bombay, 1968, pp.145-154.

There is no direct and clinching evidence on the exact nature of reasoning behind the initiation of 'Forward Policy' or rejection of Chinese reported offer of exchange of Aksai Chin for Chumbi valley. The only record is Krishna Menon's conversation with Brecher. Krishna Menon was extremely reluctant and guarded over this issue. However, some points are clear. Coupled with Indian asylum to the Dalai Lama, Indian rejection of Chinese offer(?) on what was called 'Krishna Menon Plan' (of perpetual mutual lease of Aksai Chin and Chumbi valley) raised Chinese suspicions about Indian intentions in regard to Tibet. Menon also mentions that Nehru was forced to take a strong stand due to pressure of public opinion and some of his cabinet colleagues like Pant and Shastri. It transpires that security considerations or national interest never intruded in the decision making. Neither was military feasibility considered. Menon is also clear on the NEFA issue. The choice of Thagla ridge, according to him, as a theatre for show down, was based on military advice. Brigadier Palit, the DMO, had personal knowledge of the area and Kaul who was a powerful CGS, and they must share the heaviest responsibility in this.

Also account of Pandit Sunderlal in 'Swadhinta', 26 January 1966 (Hindi) pp.25-27.

2. Keessings Contemporary Archives, 3 -10 November 1962, pp.19058 -19060.
3. Asian Recorder, 8-14 January 1963, pp.4980-4982.

The initially cautious Soviet response to the Chinese adventure in the Himalayas could well have been prompted by the desire to maintain Communist block's solidarity in view of the on-going Cuban missile crisis. As soon as it became clear (by December 1962) that the crisis was over, Soviet Union came out strongly against China. In view of the then prevalent close Sino-Soviet relations it is entirely possible that the Chinese may have had prior information about Soviet plans to instal missiles in Cuba. In any case, by September 1962, it was public knowledge and Chinese exploited the details of this Sino-Soviet relations in the Himalayas to coincide with the Cuban crisis.

4. This letter, published in Hull by K.M. Munshi in Phayau's Journal, Vol. XIII, No. 16, dated 26 February 1967, has been reproduced in B.M. Mallik, The Chinese Betrayal, pp. 115-122.
5. Suidip Nayar has reported Indira Gandhi as having said that during their visit to China in 1954, Nehru and Indira Gandhi had found some faint signs of Chinese aggressiveness over the border issue, but Nehru did believe that China would not attack India that soon though both of them were "definite that it (viz Chinese attack) would come some day". Between The Lines (New Delhi, 1969), p. 139.
6. Gen K.S. Thimayya, Chief of the Army Staff until 1961, wrote in an article in Seminar (July, 1962), that "I cannot even, as a soldier, envisage India taking on China in an open conflict on its own; we could never hope to match China in the foreseeable future. It must be left to the politicians and diplomats to ensure our security". Quoted in D.R. Mankekar, The Guilty Men of 1962, p. 162.
7. Thorat, S.P.P. From Revielle to Retreat (New Delhi, 1986, pp. 199-200.
8. From Official Records.
9. Sometime in 1959, V.K. Krishna Menon, Defence Minister, while ridiculing the apprehensions of Lt Gen S.P.P. Thorat, GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, about Chinese threat, had said that "there would be no war between India and China, and in the most unlikely event of there being one, he was quite capable of fighting it himself on the diplomatic level". Quoted in S.P.P. Thorat, From Revielle to Retreat, p. 191. On 10 January 1960, speaking at Tezpur, Krishna Menon categorically stated that "the India-China border dispute was not of such magnitude as could precipitate a war". A PTI report quoted in Bhargava, G.S., The Battle of NEFA - The Undeclared War (Bombay, 1964), p. 67.

Lt Gen B.M. Kaul had also stated that in a number of meetings held by the Defence Minister the general view was that the Chinese would not provoke a show-down. From Official Records.

In 1961, while on a visit to the troops in Bomdila, Nehru was asked by a junior officer, "How in the absence of equipment and other things, the Indian Government could expect the

troops to face the Chinese?". The Prime Minister had furiously replied that "there will be no war with the Chinese. There will be a political solution to the problem". Interview of Lt Col Shamsher Singh (Retd), held on 15 April 1988.

That the Government of India had been believing firmly that China would not invade India was confessed by Nehru in his speeches after the invasion. On 8 November 1962, he stated in Lok Sabha: "Even the Chinese aggression on our border during the last five years, bad as it was and indicative of an expansionist tendency, hardly led us to the conclusion, though it troubled us greatly, that China would indulge in a massive invasion of India". Jawaharlal Nehru, We Accept China's Challenge (Speeches in the Lok Sabha on India's Resolve to Drive out the Aggressor) (Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi, November 1962), p.6.

In another speech, in Lok Sabha, on 14 November 1962 Nehru admitted that "after the Chinese started nibbling at our territory in Ladakh a couple of years ago, we considered the question of what we should do if they attacked. We expected that they would not attack in such large numbers as to bring about a regular invasion with several divisions, as they did". Ibid., p.16.

10. In June 1962, with respect to the Western Sector, Lt Gen B.M. Kaul, CGS, had stated in his report to the COAS : "It is better for us to establish as many posts as we can in Ladakh, even though in penny-packets, rather than wait for a substantial build-up, as I am convinced that the Chinese will not attack any of our positions even if they are relatively weaker than theirs." From Official Records.

Sometime later, in September 1962, in a note, Dy CGS, Maj Gen J.S. Dhillon (who was then officiating as CGS) had observed that "it has not been our appreciation that the Chinese had created conditions in the Galwan area as if they intended to launch a "full-scale attack". Their tactics so far have been to create tension and uncertainty as well as to isolate our Galwan post". This observation made in this note of Offg CGS were agreed to by the COAS. From Official Records.

11. As early as 25 November 1959, Prime Minister Nehru had assured the Lok Sabha that "at no time since our Independence, and of course before it, were our defence forces in better condition and we are quite confident that our defence forces are

well capable of looking after our security".
Lok Sabha Debates, 25 November 1959, Vol.V, 1959,
(16-27 November 1959), Cols.1693 and 1695.

Later, on 15 January 1962, addressing an election meeting in Bombay in support of Krishna Menon's candidature to Lok Sabha, Nehru declared : "I say that after Menon became the Defence Minister our defence forces have become for the first time a very strong and efficient fighting force. I say it with a challenge and with intimate knowledge....It is for the first time that our defence forces have a new spirit and modern weapons". Indian Express and Statesman, 16 January 1962.

12. Selected Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol.IV, p.240-241. Also From Official Records.
13. In September 1962, Maj Gen J.S. Dhillon, officiating CGS, had told Lt Gen L.P. Sen, GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, that "experience in LADAKH had shown that a few rounds fired at the Chinese would cause them to run away". - From Official Records.
14. Brig D.K. Palit, Director of Military Operations, said in a meeting at HQ 4 Inf Div in Tezpur, sometime in the middle of August 1962, that it was the Appreciation of Army HQ that a shooting war with China could be ruled out... Chinese would not react and were in no position to fight. (From Official Records). The Chinese were incapable of mounting a serious offensive till the completion of their rail-link with Lhasa sometime in 1964. Praval, K.C., The Red Eagles, p.193.
15. From Official Records.
16. Interview of Lt Gen J.S. Dhillon (Retd), the then Dy CGS, held on 06 July 1987.
17. Interview of Air Marshal H.C. Dewan, PVSM(Retd), the then Director of Operations, Air Headquarters, held on 4 May 1988.
18. Praval, K.C., Indian Army After Independence, p.271, also Praval, K.C., Red Eagles, pp.230-231.
19. Kaul, B.M., The Untold Story, p.372.
20. Mullik, B.N., The Chinese Betrayal, pp.361-364.
21. From Official Records.

22. Marshall, S.L.A., The River and the Gauntlet-Defeat of the Eighth Army by the Chinese Communist Forces, November 1950, in the Battle of the Chong Chang River, Korea. (New York, 1953), p.105.

23. Brig S.P.S. Shrikent, MVC, (Retd), who was Adjutant of 1/9 GR at the time of the Battle of Namkha Chu, had confirmed this in an interview. Interview of Brig S.P.S., Shrikent, MVC, (Retd), held in Lucknow on 4 May 1987.

In a meeting held by Chinese Army in Tawang on 8 December 1962, two local residents were identified among the Chinese Army personnel. From Official Records.

24. Interview of Col M.A. Uthappa (Retd), held at Virajpet (Karnataka) on 18 June 1987.

25. Interview of Maj Gen B.M. Bhattacharjea, MVC, PVSM (Retd), held in Calcutta on 18-19 November 1987.

26. Interview of Brig Manohar Singh, AVSM, (Retd), held on 22 April 1988. According to Brig Dalvi, Commander 7 Inf Bde, the COAS had directly ordered 9 Punjab : "Capture Thagla, contain Yumtsola and Karpola II by 19th September." Himalayan Blunder, p.211.

27. Interview of Brig S.P.S. Shrikent, MVC, (Retd), held on 4 May 1987

28. Interview of Air Marshal HC Dewan, PVSM, (Retd), held on 4 May 1988.

29. According to P.V.R. Rao also, who became Defence Secretary soon after the 1962 operations, the Chief of the Air Staff was reluctant to use the IAF in the operations and it was on his assessment the Government decision for non-use of IAF was taken. Interview of P.V.R. Rao, held in Pune on 25 June 1987.

30. From Official Records.

31. According to Maj Gen D.K. Palit, VrC (Retd), who was then DMO at Army HQ, during a high-level meeting held on 10 July 1962 under Prime Minister Nehru, he and Lt Gen B.M. Kaul prodded Gen Thapar to secure Government approval for 'offensive air action' against the enemy in case of outbreak of hostilities. But Gen Thapar kept quiet and did not raise the subject. Interview of Maj Gen D.K. Palit, VrC, (Retd), held on 10 October 1987.

32. According to Air Marshal Arjan Singh, DFC(Retd), the Air HQ assessment was, probably, based on reports of intelligence agencies which had built up a formidable picture of the Chinese Air Force without taking into consideration its limitations of operating so far forward. Interview of Air Marshal Arjan Singh, DFC(Retd), held on 6 August 1987.

According to Air Chief Marshal Da La Fontaine, Indian bombers like Vampire could have been used effectively against the Chinese intruders especially in the Tawang Valley. Interview of Air Chief Marshal Da La Fontaine, held at Air HQ, New Delhi on 3 July 1987.

Also Air Marshal Arjan Singh, who was AOA at Air HQ during the 1962 Ops and who had flown a few sorties in transport aircraft in the Eastern Sector during this period, felt that in certain areas the terrain was ideal for IAF fighter aircraft operations. Interview of Air Marshal Arjan Singh, DFC,(Retd), held on 6 August 1987.

33. Prime Minister Nehru, while replying to the debate in Lok Sabha on the Resolution for enforcement of emergency, informed on 14 November 1962 that the decision to keep 7 Inf Bde on the Namkha Chu after Op 'Leghorn' was officially suspended, like any other vital military decision, was taken in full consultation with COAS and other Senior Army Officers concerned. The civilian authorities had not ordered the soldiers to "stick out where the military situation was not very favourable". It was the decision of Gen Thapar and Lt Gen Sen, as conveyed to the Defence Minister, because "our soldiers themselves have a reluctance to go back and they stuck on at considerable cost to them". Lok Sabha Debates, 14 November 1962, Vol.13 (8-20 November 1962), Col.1652.

34. On the morning of 23 October 1962, three days after the battle of Namkha Chu, in a meeting held in Defence Minister's Room, Prime Minister Nehru unhesitatingly told COAS in the presence of DMO : "It is now a matter for the Military to decide where and how to fight. I have no doubt in my mind that what we lose, you will eventually bring back for us. I cannot lay down conditions for, or on place or ground other than the Military". From Official Records.

35. Cit. in R.S. Paul(ed), Our Northern Borders : India-China Border Dispute (New Delhi, 1963) p.75.

China Today: The Military Affairs of The Chinese Army Vol. I. Published by the Government of Peoples Republic of China and edited by GS Branch PLA, Beijing, 1990.

At the time of writing of the official account of the Sino-Indian War, there was acute dearth of any worthwhile material from the Chinese side. The publication quoted *ibid* (in Chinese) can claim to be the official Chinese version. Chapter XX of Vol I deals with the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962.

In 1959, when tension mounted, the Chinese formed an Eastern Command with Zhang Gouhua as the Commander, while the Chief of Staff Wang Kang remained in Lhasa. It appears that China had thus bifurcated the responsibility into internal and external tasks. Xinjiang Military Region (Sinkiyang) set up a Western Command Headquarters, headed by Xinjiyang Commander He Jiachan. This formation was to look after the Ladakh front.

The Chinese account claims that, after initial bombardment, the Indians launched an attack on Chinese forces in Ladakh and NEFA area. Chinese forces attacking Indian positions are described as companies and sections. There is no mention of artillery and other supporting arms. The Chinese description of attack on Namkha Chu (7 Mountain Brigade) conforms to Indian accounts. The Chinese forces had infiltrated and attacked the positions from rear. Here again the only units mentioned are 7, 8 and 9 Companies of the Frontier Guards.

For the attack on Sela-Bomdila, the Chinese mention that they had set up "Command Council" under Army Commander Ding Sheng. Attack on Walong was to be co-ordinated by Commander Xi Jinwa, of the Changdu military sub-region. This command set-up does give an indication that the likely Chinese strength was in excess of 4/5 divisions.

The account fails to throw much light on the conflict as it is couched in the tedious Chinese Marxist idiom. The extract below will indicate the futility of trying to rely on it:

"During the course of war (near Se La) the Deputy Commander of 3rd Section of 9th Company, Pang Gouzing...collected 3 more such soldiers and entered 15 km deep in Indian held area. In

all he fought five times, occupied two Artillery camps, killed seven Indian soldiers, seized seven guns and two automobiles. After the war he was honoured with the title of Brave Fighter by the Defence Ministry". So, for getting the true Chinese version, the readers may have to await further political changes in China.

On the whole the Chinese version, if read between the lines, does corroborate the Indian account in large measure. Some inaccuracies are also likely to have crept in on account of translation from the Chinese original.

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CONFLICT WITH CHINA, 1962

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

- April 1954 - India-China sign agreement on Tibet
- June 1954 - Chinese PM comes to India on an official visit and is very warmly welcomed
- 17 July 1954 - Chinese for the first time protest against the presence of Indian troops in Barahoti.
- October 1954 - Indian PM visits Peking.
- 28 June 1955 - A Chinese party is detected at Barahoti in Uttar Pradesh.
- Summer of 1956 - A Chinese survey party comes into the Spiti area and armed Chinese personnel intrude into Nilang-Jadhang.
- 26 July 1956 - China claims Barahoti as Chinese territory.
- November 1956 - Chinese PM visits India. Lt Gen J.N. Chaudhuri visits China as head of Indian military delegation.
- October 1957 - Chinese announce completion of Sinkiang-Tibet highway.
- February 1958 - A Chinese military delegation visits India and is present at a combined Army and Air Force Exercise named 'Dhanush' at Ambala Cantt.
- June 1958 - The Chinese occupy Khurnak fort in Ladakh, capture an Indian police patrol in Aksai Chin.
- July 1958 - An official Chinese magazine publishes a map of China showing large areas of NEFA and Ladakh as Chinese territory.

RESTRICTED

- September 1958 - Large Chinese party enters Barahoti.
- October 1958 - Chinese construct outposts at Lapthal and Sangchamalla in U.P.
- November 1958 - Chinese Government notifies that the Indian patrol, reported missing, had been detained on the Sinkiang-Tibet road and had now been deported through the Karakoram Pass.
- January 1959 - The Chinese Prime Minister suggests that the Sino-Indian boundary be determined after mutual consultations.
- March 1959 - Revolt in Tibet. The Dalai Lama escapes from Lhasa and seeks asylum in India.
- July 1959 - An armed Chinese detachment enters the region of western Pangong Lake and sets up a camp at Spangur.
- 7 August 1959 - Chinese forces intrude into Khinzemane.
- 25 August 1959 - Chinese overpower an Indian outpost at Longju.
- 27 August 1959 - Chinese hoist their flag near Rezangla - 35 km (22 miles) south of Spangur.
- 28 August 1959 - Indian Prime Minister makes an announcement in the Lok Sabha to hand over the task of defending NEFA to Army.
- 8 September 1959- The Chinese Prime Minister writes to the Indian PM and claims 64,000 sq km (40,000 sq miles) of Indian territory.
- 20 and 21 October 1959 - Chinese intrude 80 km (50 miles) within Indian territory near Kongka Pass and open fire on an Indian police patrol, killing nine persons.

- 7 November, 1959 - Chinese PM proposes withdrawal of the armed forces of each country 20 km from the McMahon Line in the north-east and from the line of actual control in Ladakh.
- 16 November 1959- The Indian PM replies, agreeing to withdraw troops in Ladakh as far west as the line claimed by the Chinese as the boundary, provided Chinese troops withdrew behind the traditional boundary alignment claimed by India.
- 17 December 1959- China rejects the Indian proposal.
- 6 April 1960 - Responsibility for the defence of border in Ladakh is handed over to the Army.
- April 1960 - The Indian and Chinese Prime Ministers hold talks in New Delhi for six days, and only agree that the officials of the two governments should meet to examine all relevant documents in support of the respective stands and report.
- 14 February 1961- Report of the officials of the Government of India and China on the Boundary Question published by Indian Government.
- April 1961 - Chinese establish more posts near Nyagzu in Ladakh and build roads linking them with rear bases.
- May 1962 - China and Pakistan agree on negotiations "to locate and align" the portion of the India-China boundary in Pak occupied Kashmir.
- July 1962 - The Chinese encircle an Indian defence post in the Galwan valley.
- 21 July 1962 - Post Commanders in Ladakh authorised to open fire at their own discretion for defence of their posts.
- 8 September 1962- About 600 Chinese troops surround Thole post.

- 9 September 1962- Meeting at New Delhi, presided over by the Defence Minister, decides that the Chinese must be evicted from south of Thag La ridge immediately.
- 18 September 1962- Indian Government spokesman announces at a Press Conference that the Army had been instructed to drive the Chinese out of the Dhola area.
- 4 October 1962 - A new Corps (IV Corps) created to look after operations in NEFA and Lt Gen B.M. Kaul, CGS at Army HQ, named Corps Commander.
- 10 October 1962 - Indian post on the north bank of Namkha Chu (Tseng-jong) attacked and over-run by the Chinese.
- 11 October 1962 - Meeting at New Delhi, presided over by the Prime Minister, decides that the Namkha Chu position be held but no offensive action be taken to evict the Chinese from the north bank of the Namkha Chu.
- 11-18 October 1962- Firing between the Indian and the Chinese troops in Namkha Chu sector.
- 18 October 1962 - Chinese cross McMahon Line in Dichu (Walong Sector).
- Night 19/20 October 1962 - Chinese launch a massive attack simultaneously in the Namkha Chu Sector as well as Ladakh. Galwan valley post in Ladakh destroyed by the Chinese.
- 21 October 1962 - After over-running the Indian post at Dhola, the Chinese advance south in Kameng Frontier Division. The Chinese also attack Kibithoo in Lohit Frontier Division, and Sirijap complex in Chushul Sector.
- 22 October 1962 - Chinese capture Kibithoo and gain control of northern bank of Pangong Lake, in Chushul Sector. Kongka Post in Changchenmo valley abandoned.

- 23 October 1962 - Chinese attack to capture Tawang and outposts in Subansiri and Siang Frontier Divisions. Maja in Subansiri Frontier Division abandoned. 4 Inf Div withdraw from Tawang.
- 24 October 1962 - Daulat Beg Oldi abandoned. All the forward posts in Chip Chap and Nachu Chu valley withdrawn. Chinese attempt to capture Jang bridge (Kameng Divn) but it is blown up by Indians. Takaing in Subansiri Frontier Division abandoned. 2 Inf Div formed to look after operations in Subansiri, Siang and Lohit Frontier Divisions.
- 26 October 1962 - Massive Chinese attack to capture Walong 3 Him Div formed at Leh.
- 27 October 1962 - China attacks simultaneously at Changla, Jarala and New Demchok in the Indus Valley Sector.
- 14 November 1962- Indians attack Yellow Pimple (Walong Sector) and capture forward slopes of the objective.
- 15 November 1962- Indian troops fall back against massive Chinese attacks on all the locations simultaneously in the Walong Sector. Poshing La (Kameng Division) attacked by the Chinese, and captured.
- 16 November 1962- 11 Inf Bde order withdrawal of all troops from Walong. Chinese constructed a bridge over Tawang Chu (Kameng Div).
- 17 November 1962- Chinese attack Indian positions at Nuranang (Kameng Division). Indian troops ordered to withdraw to Sela. Chinese attack Thembang also.
- 17 November 1962- Chinese establish two blocks, on road Bomdila-Dirang Dzong. Chinese attack Menchukha defences in Siang Division of NEFA.

RESTRICTED

- 18 November 1962- Indian troops abandon Sela and Dirang Dzong. Chinese attack Bomdila and Indian troops ordered to pull back to Rupa. Indian troops at Menchukha ordered to withdraw on night 19/20 November to Along. Chinese launch simultaneous attacks on Rezangla and Gurung Hill near Chushul. Rezangla captured by the enemy after bitter fighting.
- 19 November 1962- Chinese attack Rupa and Tenga Valley. Indian troops at Tuting (Siang Division) ordered to withdraw to Along.
- 19/20 November 1962- Indian troops withdraw from Gurung Hill (Ladakh).
- 20 November 1962- Indian troops fall back to Foothills (Kameng Division).
- 20 November 1962- Indian troops at Lemeking and Taliha (Subansiri Division) ordered to withdraw to Daporijo.
- 21 November 1962- Chinese announce Cease-fire from midnight 21/22 November.

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EXTRACT FROM THE APPRECIATION FOR THE DEFENCE OF
KAMENG FRONTIER BY BRIG D.K. PALIT, Vr.C., COMDR
7 INF BDE ON 28 NOVEMBER 1959

FACTORS

Approaches through KAMENG

(a) Western KAMENG

This is by far the more developed part of this Division, particularly in comns. Shown in Trace Patt, the main routes of entry from TIBET into INDIA are situated across the SELA massif. The SELA pass is the bottle-neck through which all these frontier approaches must pass in order to converge towards the BOMDILA Ridge except for the diversion via the TSELA pass directly NORTH of BOMDILA Ridge. There are only two main trs crossing it over the MANDALA MS 45 and BOMDILA Passes. These routes, respectively, lead through KALAK THANG MS 33 and CHAKO MS 64 to enter the NORTH ASSAM plain at BHAIRABKUND MS 21 and FOOT HILLS. (There is however a third axis approach to INDIA - BIETING MR 88, TASHI GONG NR 76, BHAIRABKUND - but since this enters via BHUTAN it has been discounted for the purpose of this appreciation. In ops, however, this route would have to be guarded).

Obstacles

- (b) The SELA massif forms the first continuous topographical obstacle on the routes leading into Central KAMENG.
- (c) The BOMDILA Range is the sec obstacle coming Southward, but can be crossed at several pts - though for a maj invasion only the DHIRANG DZONG MS 46 - MANDA LA and the BOMDILA trs need be considered.

The PIRI LA Range MS 63, though somewhat lower in gen altitude, is a more formidable obstacle than the BOMDILA Range because of the dense and in many parts impenetrable vegetation on its Southern slopes. This

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The PIRI LA Range MS 63, though somewhat lower in gen altitude, is a more formidable obstacle than the BOMDILA Range because of the dense and in many parts impenetrable vegetation on its Southern slopes. This

Range is crossable only at PIRI LA and JHUMLA MS 34 on the two main approaches Southward. There is a possible alternative through TAMPA LA MS 44 and PANKIM LA MS 53 or the SHERGAON MS 34 BLONK SONG MS 53 route for smaller parties.

Deductions

By holding the SELA Pass I can effectively prevent the enemy from breaking out of the TOWANG region. The TSELA would also have to be defended to prevent being by-passed.

- (d) By holding the MANDA LA and BOMDILA Passes I can effectively prevent the enemy's Southward drive beyond the BOMDILA Range. This section of the BOMDILA is ground vital for defence of KAMENG.
- (e) After the BOMDILA Range, the trs again proliferate, and I would have to hold the PIRILA Range at several passes in order to hold the enemy on that line.

Summary of Deductions

(a) My main tac def lines are -

- (i) The border;
- (ii) The SELA Pass;
- (iii) The BOMDILA - MANDA LA Line.

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EXTRACT FROM THE DO LETTER OF BRIG D.K. PALIT, Vrc TO MAJ GEN AMRIK SINGH MC, ON 22 MARCH 1960

Based upon this aim - To Hold KAMENG Division - I made my appreciation. I concluded that the ridge between the MANDA MS 4457 and BOMDI MS 6266 Passes was my Brigade vital ground. I also appreciated that TOWANG was ground of tactical importance to me, besides being a VP, and wished to dispose of a complete battalion there; whereas, my right flank being reasonably secure from threat, I did not wish to pre-commit regular infantry either at BAMENG or KHANEWA, thus conserving concentration on my vital ground. These proposals were approved by your staff (in the absence of a GOC).

The holding of TOWANG by no means ensures the security of my vital ground, because there are other routes across the SELA still left unguarded. The route via the TULUNG Pass MN 4222 - CHUNA MN 3811 and then to DHIRANG DZONG MS 4664 via either JANG MS 1493 or the TSELA MN 5700, is as good as any of the other routes (that is, as good as the BHUTAN - BETING route MR 8283, the CHUTANGMU route MM 9213 or the BUMLA route MN 0509. (It will be remembered that 4,000 KHAMPAS used this route last spring and summer). Also, the Southern road to JANG from BETING is a perfectly feasible route to by-pass TOWANG. If therefore I am expected in the middle of my battle to commit the Brigade to the defence of TOWANG, I feel that this sudden shift of focus will constitute a change of aim; and the holding of the MANDA LA - BOMDILA Ridge would then become the subsidiary task.

Coming to the next phase of the battle - that is, once the fighting shifts to east of the SELA (assuming that the TOWANG battalion were overrun). Here again, for me to sit rigidly with one battalion each at MANDA LA and BOMDILA, mutually non-supporting positions, would invite defeat in detail. However, here my plan for the conduct of battle will be to use the BOMDILA Battalion (less two companies) as a reserve to influence the MANDA LA battle during the first stage, and then to fall back intact to BOMDILA if the situation at MANDA LA became untenable. In this way I could prevent the enemy enjoying overwhelming superiority at either battle. But again, this would demand a lateral track connecting BOMDILA and MANDA LA SOUTH of the Ridge.

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EXTRACTS FROM WESTERN COMMAND OPERATION INSTRUCTION
NO 26 DATED 9 APRIL 1960

23 My assessment of the threat from CHINA is as follows:-

- (a) As there are two regiments of the Chinese located in RUDOK and GAKGUNSA areas, it is likely that four to five battalions may be employed in the DEMCHOK-CHUSHUL-CHANG CHENMO Valley Area, supported by some light armour. This is the main Chinese threat to LADAKH. The Chinese would endeavour to gain early control of the CHUSHUL Airfield.
- (b) Approximately a battalion group may be expected to operate through the KARAKORAM Pass, along the traditional trade route towards LEH.
- (c) In the PUNJAB and HIMACHAL PRADESH, one battalion group may be expected to operate through the KAURIK and SHIPKI Passes.
- (d) The Chinese have built a few airfields and landing grounds around LHASA and along the borders of INDIA. Due to lack of information, it is difficult, at present, to estimate the size and composition of the Air Force that the Chinese are likely to deploy in TIBET. It can be assumed, however, that the Chinese Air Force is capable of interference with our air support operations, and can carry out offensive air raids against our forward posts.

24 Likely intentions

With the Chinese troops disposed as they are, I consider the likely Chinese intentions would be that -

- (a) retaining of control of the AKSAI CHIN Area and gaining control of the KARAKORAM Pass and DEMCHOK Area;
- (b) occupation of CHUSHUL Airfield. This would place them at a considerable advantage for subsequent operations towards LEH;
- (c) political and military infiltration into LADAKH, with the ultimate aim of capturing LEH:

- (d) securing the KAURIK and SHIPKI Passes.
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

METHOD

30(a) Tasks in general

- (i) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- (ii) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- (iii) Defend the INDO-TIBET Border in LADAKH against any further Chinese ingress.

This was amended on 30.5.61 to read as under:-

"Prevent infiltration into unoccupied areas in LADAKH".

(b) Tasks in particular

- (i) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- (ii) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- (iii) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- (iv) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

(v) At present, with the resources available to you "to deny the main approaches into LADAKH through the areas of KARAKORAM Pass, TSOGSTSALU/PHOBRANG, CHUSHUL, DEMCHOK/ZARSER and to hold LEH. Forward posts to be established at ZARSER, DEMCHOK, CHUSHUL, PHOBRANG, TSOGSTSALU and if weather conditions permit at KARAKORAM Pass". When a brigade group consisting of a minimum of four infantry battalions, including two JAMMU and KASHMIR Militia battalions, with the necessary supporting arms, is inducted into LADAKH, your task will be "to deny the main approaches into LADAKH through the areas of the KARAKORAM Pass, TSOGSTSALU/PHOBRANG, CHUSHUL, DEMCHOK/ZARSER and to hold the following:-

- (aa) SASEA - BRANGSA - MURGO
- (bb) SHYCK and PHOBRANG
- (cc) CHUSHUL
- (dd) BULGET
- (ee) LEH

Forward posts to be established at ZARSER, DEMCHOK, TSOGSTSALU, and if weather conditions permit at KARAKORAM "Pass". This (Para 30(b)(v)) was later amended on 30 May 61 to read as under:-

"At present, with the resources available to you deny the main approaches into LADAKH through the areas of KARAKORAM Pass, TSOGSTSALU/PHOBRANG, CHUSHUL, DEMCHOK/ZARSER and to defend LEH. Forward posts will continue to be established as planned from time to time".

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN COMMAND (TOP SECRET)
LETTER No.2019/1/A/GS(OPS) of 17 AUGUST,
1962, ADDRESSED TO CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF(2)
ARMY HEADQUARTERS, DHQ PO, NEW DELHI - 11 ON THE
SUBJECT "DEFENCE OF LADAKH".

1. Ever since the Army was made responsible for the security of our Northern Borders, a number of appreciations for the defence of Ladakh have been made. The first major paper on this subject was submitted vide this Headquarters letter No.1005/10/A/GS(OPS) dated 12 Dec 59 in which our minimum requirements of one infantry brigade of five battalions with certain supporting arms was reflected. Subsequently, as a result of Exercise SHEEL held in Oct 60, it transpired that the 'five battalion plan' met only our immediate minimum requirement but that our overall requirement to ensure reasonable security of LADAKH was one infantry division with appropriate supporting arms. A reference is invited to this Headquarters letter No.2019/16/GS(OPS) dated 1 Mar 61. The requirement of one infantry division was reiterated in our paper entitled "Operational considerations and Requirements - Western Command" submitted vide our letter No.2019/2/A/GS(OPS) dated 15 Dec 61. However, as you are aware, we have not yet even succeeded in raising our LADAKH Garrison to five battalions; mainly for want of adequate logistic support required for induction and maintenance of this force. Consequently, the deployment pattern of our existing small force in LADAKH has been actuated to claiming territory by 'show of flag' rather than by tactical consideration.

2. The above assessments were undertaken before we embarked on the "forward policy", since the inception of which, CHINESE reaction has been sharp and significant. This reaction, I estimate, has led them to build up to a full division in LADAKH. Against this, we have been able, in three years, to build up to only two regular and two militia battalions. It is obvious, therefore, that if we continue the present race for the establishment of posts, they will outrun us in every sector and at every stage. In fact, with the present quantum of forces and military capabilities on either side, it will be immeasurably to their advantage to entice us to continue this race. The CHINESE capacity for the build up of their forces in LADAKH is out of all proportion to ours, and they start off with a four-to-one superiority.

3. The present assessment, therefore, is an attempt to bring military logic to bear on a problem where, so far, militia means have been grossly out of step with political needs. Our forward posts in LADAKH are nowhere tactically sited, whereas the CHINESE everywhere are. Our forward posts anchored to their DZs, are tactically dominated by CHINESE posts on higher ground. Our general deployment has been dictated by the 'show flag' political requirement rather than by rational military considerations and is lacking a planned military pattern. The CHINESE deployment and build-up, on the other hand, shows clear evidence of a tactically sound military plan, in support of a declared objective. We do not as yet appear to have a clear-cut aim in LADAKH, or, if there is one, it is not served by adequate military means. While there can never be a proper military plan to support a non-defined aim, the military assessment now made is based on the assumption that we must deny to the CHINESE at all costs, territory to the WEST of their 1960 "claim-line".

They have the military capability today to extend their occupation in LADAKH to well beyond that line and whether they have the intention to do so, is a matter for the Government to assess. If they have that intention, we, today do not have the ability to prevent it.

I would be failing in my duty if I did not draw attention to the size and shape of this potential threat and the means required to contain it. This, therefore, is the purpose of the attached paper.

Finally, I submit that this is an issue which permits of no delay in decision-making at the highest national level. I concede that the military means asked for appear to be of somewhat considerable size, but that is not so when viewed in the context of safeguarding national security in this theatre. Anything less will not make that aim realisable.

Sd. DAULET SINGH Lt Gen
GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF

NOT ON ORIGINAL

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ARMY HEADQUARTERS, GENERAL STAFF BRANCH, LETTER NO 15458/1/H/TS/MO3 OF 5 SEPTEMBER 1962 ADDRESSED TO HEADQUARTERS WESTERN COMMAND ON THE SUBJECT OF "DEFENCE OF LADAKH"

1. The recommendations contained in your letter No.2019/1/A/GS(OPS) of 17 August 1962 and the enclosed reappraisal paper were discussed at length in a meeting held on 24 August 1962 which was presided over by the COAS at which the GOC-in-C Western Command and the CGS were present. During this meeting, the COAS conveyed to the Army Commander his views on the various points raised in the reappraisal paper, the gist of which is given in the succeeding paragraphs.
2. As regards our aim in LADAKH, it is laid down in the Army Headquarters Op Instruction No 26, i.e. to resist any further Chinese ingress into our territory and to defend LEH. This HQ has pointed out to Govt that with the limited means at present available, the fulfilment of this aim is difficult to guarantee. The Govt being well aware of our present limitations accepts this position.
3. The contention that our general deployment in LADAKH has been dictated by political considerations and the requirement to show the flag is partly correct. You are aware that vis-a-vis the Chinese, it is vitally important to stake our claim, as unless this is done, they have the habit of pouring into any vacuum. There were two alternatives open to us: to consolidate where we stood a year ago and thus permit the Chinese to come up to their 1960 claim line, or to adopt a forward policy and to prevent an unchecked advance. Subsequent events have justified the policy adopted.
4. Neither Government nor Army Headquarters have ever proposed to have an unprovoked "show down" in LADAKH, but if it is forced on us, we must do the best we can under the circumstances.
5. If the Chinese aim was to capture LEH, it would have manifested itself by now in GALWAN, SUMDO and elsewhere in LADAKH, where they could have exploited our military weakness. Also, they have never so far claimed any area beyond their claim lines. But there is no knowing what the Chinese ultimate aim in LADAKH is, or likely to be.

6. As regards our inducting into LADAKH one Mountain Division of three Brigades Groups by September 1963, one Brigade Group by December 1964 and keeping one Brigade Group suitably poised for induction into LADAKH by March 1965, whereas the last two formations could be earmarked in 1964 and 1965 as suggested, it is not possible to accept the schedule proposed for the Mountain Division of three Brigades Groups to be completed by September 1963, specially when you are not in a position to accept more than two battalions during the same period, as verbally conveyed by the GOC-in-C to the CGS the other day. Suitable action is, however, being taken to get Govt sanction for a Div HQ in LADAKH.
7. As regards your suggestion for augmenting our present fleet of transport aircraft and helicopters, Army and Air Headquarters have been pressing Government to do so. It is most unlikely, in view of our financial stringency generally and shortage of foreign exchange in particular, that the numbers and scales of helicopters demanded by you will be sanctioned by Government.
8. So far as your suggestions on the development of roads in LADAKH are concerned, you know that the LEH-CHUSHUL task is in hand and will be completed before the end of this year. The inclusion of the roads LEH-SHYOK-DAULAT BEG OLDI, LEH-PHOBRANG-TSOGSTSALU-HOT SPRING and KULU - ROHTANG-KEYLONG-BARALACHALA-PANG-UPSHI in the border roads programme is under examination and a further communication will follow on this subject. If accepted by Government, it will be some years before they are completed.
9. Regarding the suggestion to find a political solution to the GALWAN river post, the Government are doing this not only regarding this post but also concerning the whole INDIA-CHINA dispute.
10. Lastly, every effort must be made to provide suitable accommodation for all the forward posts established, so that we do not have to withdraw any post. This should be possible particularly as all your requirements for suitable tentage and huts have now been met or are in the process of being met.

Sd/- JS DHILLON
Maj Gen
OFFG CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF

TEXT OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT STATEMENT
ISSUED ON 21 NOVEMBER 1962 FOR CEASEFIRE
AND WITHDRAWAL

In the past two years, first in the western and then in the eastern sector of the Sino-border, Indian troops crossed the line of actual control between China and India, nibbled Chinese territory, set up strong points for aggression and provoked a number of border clashes.

Relying on the advantageous military positions they occupied and having made full preparations, the Indian troops eventually launched massive armed attacks all along the line on the Chinese frontier guards on October 20, 1962.

This border conflict deliberately provoked by India has been going on for a month. The Chinese Government served repeated warnings in regard to the increasingly serious Indian encroachments and provocations, and pointed out the gravity of their consequences. The Chinese frontier guards all along maintained self-restraint and forbearance in order to avert any border conflict. However, all these efforts by China proved of no avail, and the Indian acts of aggression steadily increased.

Pressed beyond the limits of endurance and left with no room for retreat, the Chinese frontier guards finally had no choice but to strike back resolutely in self-defence. After the present large-scale border conflict broke out, the Chinese Government quickly took initiative measures in an effort to extinguish the flames of conflict that had been kindled.

On October 24, that is, four days after the outbreak of the current border clashes, the Chinese Government put forward three reasonable proposals for stopping the border clashes, reopening peaceful negotiations and settling the Sino-Indian boundary question. The three proposals are as follows:

1. Both parties affirm that the Sino-Indian boundary question must be settled peacefully through negotiations. Pending a peaceful settlement, the Chinese Government hopes that the Indian Government will agree that both parties respect the line of actual control between the two sides along the entire Sino-Indian border, and the armed forces of each side withdraw 20 kilometre from this line and disengage.

2. Provided that the Indian Government agrees to the above proposal, the Chinese Government is willing, through consultations between the two parties, to withdraw its frontier guards in the eastern sector of the border to the north of the line of actual control; at the same time both China and India undertake to cross the line of actual control, i.e. the traditional customary line, in the middle and western sectors of the border. Matters relating to the disengagement of the armed forces of the two parties and the cessation of armed conflict shall be negotiated by officials designated by the Chinese and Indian Governments respectively.
3. The Chinese Government considers that, in order to seek a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question, talks should be held once again by the Prime Minister of China and India. At a time considered to be appropriate by both parties, the Chinese Government would welcome the Indian Prime Minister to Peking; if this should be inconvenient to the Indian Government, the Chinese Premier would be ready to go to Delhi for talks.

On the very day it received them, the Indian Government hastily rejected the Chinese Government's three proposals and insisted that the Chinese Government should agree to restore the state of the boundary as it prevailed prior to September 8, 1962, that is to say, India wanted to reoccupy large tracts of Chinese territory so that the Indian troops might regain the position from which they could launch massive armed attacks on the Chinese frontier guards at any time.

In his reply to Premier Chou En-Lai dated 14 November, Prime Minister Nehru put forward even more unreasonable demand, which, on the one hand, required the Chinese Government to agree to the Indian troops reverting to their positions prior to 8 September, and on the other hand, required the Chinese frontier guards not only to withdraw to their positions as on September 8, but to retreat farther in the western sector to the so-called positions of November 7, 1959, as defined for them by India unilaterally? That is, requiring China to cede to six thousand square miles (thirteen to fifteen thousand square kilometres) more of Chinese territory.

In the meantime the Indian Government, relying on large amounts of US military aid, again launched powerful attacks in the eastern and western sectors of the Sino-Indian border in an obstinate attempt to expand the border conflict.

It is by no means accidental that the Indian Government has taken such an extremely unreasonable attitude. To meet the needs of its internal and external politics the Indian Government has long proposed the policy of deliberately keeping the Sino-Indian boundary question unsettled, keeping the armed forces of the two countries engaged and maintaining tension along the Sino-Indian border.

Whenever it considered the time favourable, the Indian Government made use of this situation to carry out armed invasion and provocation on the Sino-Indian border, and even went to the length of provoking an armed clash, or else, it made use of the situation to conduct cold war against China.

The experience of many years shows that the Indian Government has invariably tried by hook or by crook to block the path which was opened up by the Chinese Government for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. This policy of the Indian Government runs diametrically counter to the fundamental interests of the Chinese and Indian peoples and the common desires of all the peoples of the world, and serves only the interests of imperialism.

The Chinese Government's three proposals are most fair and reasonable; they are the only proposals. However, the Indian Government has so far rejected these three proposals and continued to expand the border conflict, thus daily aggravating the Sino-Indian border situation. To reverse this trend, the Chinese Government has decided to take initiative measures in order to promote the realization of these three proposals.

The Chinese Government hereby declares the following:

1. Beginning from the day following that of the issuance of the present statement, i.e. from 00.00 hrs on 22 November 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will cease-fire along the entire Sino-Indian border.
2. Beginning from 1 December 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometres behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on November 7, 1959.

In the eastern sector, although the Chinese frontier guards have so far been fighting back in self-defence on Chinese territory north of the traditional customary line, they are prepared to withdraw from their present positions to the north of the line of actual control, that is, north of illegal Macmahon line and to withdrew 20 kilometres farther back from that line.

In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw 20 kilometres from the line of actual control.

3. In order to ensure the normal movement of the inhabitants in the Sino-Indian border area, forestall the activities of saboteurs and maintain order there, China will set up checkpoints at a number of places on its side of the line of actual control with a certain number of civil police assigned to each checkpoint. The Chinese Government will notify the Indian Government of the location of these checkpoints through diplomatic channels.

These measures taken by the Chinese Government on its own initiative demonstrate its great sincerity for stopping the border conflict and settling the Sino-Indian boundary question peacefully.

It should be pointed out, in particular, that, after withdrawing, the Chinese frontier guards will be far behind their positions prior to September 8, 1962. The Chinese Government hopes that, as a result of the above-mentioned initiative measures taken by China, the Indian Government will take into consideration the desires of the Indian people and the peoples of the world, make a new start and give a positive response.

Provided that the Indian Government agrees to take corresponding measures, the Chinese and Indian Government can immediately appoint officials to meet at places agreed upon by both parties in the various sectors of the Sino-Indian border to discuss matters relating to the 20-kilometre withdrawal of the armed forces of each party to form a demilitarised zone, the establishment of check-posts by each party on its side of the line of actual control as well as the return of captured personnel.

When the talks between the officials of the two parties have yielded results and the results have been put into effect, talks can be held by the Prime Ministers of the two countries for further seeking an amicable settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question.

The Chinese Government would welcome the Indian Prime Minister to Peking; if this should be inconvenient to the Indian Government, the Chinese Premier would be ready to go to Delhi for the talks.

The Chinese Government sincerely hopes that the Indian Government will make a positive response. Even if the Indian Government fails to make such a response in good time, the Chinese Government will take the initiative to carry out the above-mentioned measures as scheduled.

However, the Chinese Government cannot but take into account the following possible eventualities:

1. The Indian troops should continue their attack after the Chinese frontier guards have ceased fire and when they are withdrawing.
2. That, after the Chinese frontier guards have withdrawn 20 kilometres from the entire line of actual control, the Indian troops should again advance to the line of actual control in the eastern sector, i.e. the illegal Macmahon line, and/or refuse to withdraw but remain on the line of actual control in the middle and western sectors; and
3. That, after the Chinese frontier guards have withdrawn 20 kilometres from the entire line of actual control, the Indian troops should cross the line of actual control and recover their positions prior to September 8, that is to say, again cross the illegal Macmahon line in eastern sector, reoccupy Wuhi in the middle sector, and restore their 43 strong points for aggression in the Chip Chap river valley, the Galwan river valley, and Pangong lake area and the Demchok area or set up more strong points for aggression on Chinese territory in the western sector.

The Chinese Government solemnly declares that, should the above eventualities occur, she reserves the right to strike back in self-defence, and the Indian Government will be held completely responsible for all the grave consequences arising therefrom.

The people of the world will then see even more clearly who is peace-loving and who is bellicose, who upholds friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples and Asian-African solidarity and who is undermining them, who is protecting the common interests of the Asian and African peoples in their struggle against imperialism and colonialism, and who is violating and despoiling their common interests.

RESTRICTED

The Sino-Indian boundary question is an issue between two Asian countries. China and India should settle this issue peacefully; they should not cross swords on account of this issue and even less allow US imperialism to poke in its hand and develop the present unfortunate border conflict into a war in which Asians are made to fight Asians.

It is from its consistent stand of protecting fundamental interests of the Chinese and Indian peoples, strengthening Asian-African solidarity and preserving world peace that the Chinese Government calls upon all Asian and African countries and all peace-loving countries and people to exert efforts to urge the Indian Government to take corresponding measures so as to stop the border conflict, reopen peaceful negotiations and settle the Sino-Indian boundary question.

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CONFLICT WITH CHINA, 1962GALLANTRY AWARD WINNERS

S.No	Rank, Name & Number	Unit	Sector	Date of Award
<u>PARAM VIR CHAKRA</u>				
1.	Maj Dhan Singh Thapa IC-7990	1/8 GR	Ladakh (Sirijap Post)	20-10-1962
2.	Maj Shaitan Singh IC-6400 (Posthumous)	Kumaon Regt	Ladakh (Rezangla)	18-11-1962
3.	Sub Joginder Singh JC-4547 (Posthumous)	1 Sikh	NEFA (Bumla axis)	23-10-1962
<u>MAHA VIR CHAKRA</u>				
1.	Naik Chain Singh 2437390 (Posthumous)	9 Punjab	NEFA (Tsengjong)	10-10-1962
2.	Sepoy Kanshi Ram 2442148	9 Punjab	NEFA (Tsengjong)	10-10-1962
3.	Sub Sonam Stopdhan 9100419 (Posthumous)	14 J&K Militia	Ladakh (Charlani Post)	19-10-1962
4.	Hav Sarup Singh 9105087 (Posthumous)	14 J&K Militia	Ladakh (Bhujang Post)	19-10-1962
5.	Brig Tapishwar Narain Raina IC-1850	Kumaon Regt	Ladakh	20-10-1962
6.	Maj Sardul Singh Rardhawa IC-2651	(Rajput) J&K Militia	Ladakh (Karakoram Pass and Chip Chap river)	20-10-1962
7.	Maj Mahander Singh Chaudhary IC-8164 (Posthumous)	9 Punjab	NEFA (Tsengjong)	20-10-1962
8.	Maj Gurdial Singh IC-1880	2 Rajput	NEFA (Namkha Chu)	20-10-1962
9.	Maj Sher Pratap Singh Shrikent IC-5192	1/9 GR	NEFA (Namkha Chu)	20-10-1962

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10.	Capt Mahabir Prasad IC-8423 (Posthumous)	1 Sikh (attached GR)	NEFA Nankha Chu)	20-10-1962
11.	2/Lt Bhagwan Dutt Dogra IC-13176	1/9 GR	NEFA (Tsangdhar area)	20-10-1962
12.	2/Lt Gopalakrishna Venkatesa Prasanna Rao IC-13413 (Posthumous)	4 Grenadiers	NEFA (Khinzemane)	20-10-1962
13.	Naik Rabi Lal Thapa 5733537	1/8 GR	Ladakh (Sirijap Post)	21-10-1962
14.	Maj Ajit Singh IC-3276	5 Jat	Ladakh (Nulla Junction)	22-10-1962
15.	Lt Col Bejoy Mohan Ehattacharjea IC-1338	4 Garh Rif	NEFA (Tawang-Jang)	25-10-1962
16.	Sepoy Kewal Singh 3349770 (Posthumous)	4 Sikh	NEFA (Walong)	26-10-1962
17.	Jam Ishe Tundup 9100075 (Posthumous)	7 J&K Militia	Ladakh (Changla Post)	27-10-1962
18.	Havildar Stangin Phunchok 9100170 (Posthumous)	7 J&K Militia	Ladakh (Changla Post)	27-10-1962
19.	Rifleman Jaswant Singh Rawat 4039009 (Posthumous)	4 Garh Rif	NEFA (Nuranang)	17-11-1962
20.	2/Lt Shyamal Dev Goswami IC-12665	Regt of Artillery	Ladakh (Gurung Hill)	18-11-1962

VIR CHAKRA

1.	Hav Malkiat Singh 2436723 (Posthumous)	9 Punjab	NEFA (Tsengjong)	10-10-1962
2.	Sep Suram Chand 2440890	9 Punjab	NEFA (Tsengjong)	10-10-1962
3.	Capt Raja Amirthalingam MS 6497	ANC	Ladakh	19-10-1962
4.	Jem Rigzin Phunchok 9100488	14 J&K Militia	Ladakh (Bhujang Post)	19-10-1962
5.	Hav Tulsī Ram 9125198	14 J&K Militia	Ladakh (Ramu Post)	19-10-1962
6.	Sep Dorje Phunchok 9133805	14 J&K Militia	Ladakh (Chardani Post)	19-10-1962

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7.	Capt Gurucharn Singh Bhatia IC-8596 (Posthumous)	2 Rajput	NEFA (Dhola Area)	20-10-1962
8.	2/Lt Naveen Chander Kohli IC-12955 (Posthumous)	9 Punjab	NEFA (Namkha Chu)	20-10-1962
9.	Sub Ehab Bahadur Katwal JC-5180 (Posthumous)	1/9 GR	NEFA (Namkha Chu)	20-10-1962
10.	Sub Brajerdra Chandra Roy IC-40451	Rajput Regt	NEFA (Dhola Area)	20-10-1962
11.	Hav Saudagar Singh 2932655	2 Rajput	NEFA (Dhola Area)	20-10-1962
12.	Hav Kaula Singh Thapa 5831357 (Posthumous)	1/9 GR (9 Gorkha Rif)	NEFA (Tsangdhar)	20-10-1962
13.	Hav Ganga Bahadur Rawat 5832160 (Posthumous)	1/9 GR	NEFA (Tsangdhar)	20-10-1962
14.	Lance Naik Sardar Singh 2640716 (Posthumous)	4 Grenadiers	NEFA	20-10-1962
15.	Sep Jagpal Singh 2944566 (Posthumous)	2 Rajput	NEFA (Dhola Area)	20-10-1962
16.	Sep (Ambulance Assistant) S. Joseph 6797987 (Posthumous)	20 Fd Amb (AMC)	NEFA	20-10-1962
17.	Sub Dewan Chand JC-25926	14 J&K Militia	Ladakh (Takkar Post)	20-10-1962
18.	CHM Anant Ram 9130040	14 J&K Militia	Ladakh (DEO Sector)	20-10-1962
19.	Sep Sonam Wangchuk 9135845 (Posthumous)	14 J&K Militia	Ladakh	20-10-1962
20.	Sep Sonam Angchok 9136074 (Posthumous)	14 J&K Militia	Ladakh (Chardani Post)	20-10-1962
21.	Sub Nihal Singh JC-6022 (Posthumous)	5 Jat	Ladakh (Galwan Area)	20-10-1962
22.	Lance Naik Raghavan 1315743	Fd Coy Engrs	Ladakh	21-10-1962
23.	Riflesman Tulsī Rama Thapa 5739236	1/8 GR	Ladakh (Siri-jap Post)	21-10-1962
24.	Sep Lobsang Chhiring 9135788 (Posthumous)	14 J&K Militia	Ladakh (Chardani Post)	21-10-1962

RESIDENCED

25.	Naik Bahadur Singh 4139362 (Posthumous)	6 Kumaon	NEFA (Kibithoo Area)	21-10-1962
26.	Rifleman Purna Bahadur Tawang 29859	2 AR	NEFA	22-10-1962
27.	2/Lt Harish Chankler Gujral IC-12920	Jat Regt.	Ladakh	22-10-1962
28.	Lance Hav Dharam Singh 3138184	5 Jat	Ladakh	22-10-1962
29.	Naik Munshi Ram 3132623 (Posthumous)	5 Jat	Ladakh	22-10-1962
30.	Lt Hari Pal Kaushik IC-11811	Sikh Regt	NEFA (Tongpengla Position)	23-10-1962
31.	Major Pandharinath Anant Rege IC-3174	The Assam Rif (4 Dogra)	NEFA (Siang FD)	24-10-1962
32.	L/Nk Hasta Bahadur Gurung 111604	11 Assam Rif	NEFA (Siang FD)	24-10-1962
33.	Rfm Bajiram Thapa 112293	11 Assam Rif	NEFA (Siang FD)	24-10-1962
34.	Naik Chhimat Dorje 9100678	7 Ladakh Scouts	Ladakh	27-10-1962
35.	Signalman Dharam Chand Dhilan 6280652 (Posthumous)	Signals	Ladakh	27-10-1962
36.	Sep Sonam Rabges 9100690 (Posthumous)	7 J&K Militia	Ladakh	27-10-1962
37.	Capt Rudolph David Rosario IC-8228 (Posthumous)	2 Sikh LI	NEFA (Sela-Jang Road)	30-10-1962
38.	2/Lt Pradeep Singh Bhandari IC-123221	Regt of Artillery	NEFA	4-11-1962
39.	Sub Jagandhoj Limbu 26460	2 AR	NEFA	4-11-1962
40.	Capt Ravi Kumar Mathur IC-10156	6 Kumaon	NEFA (West of Walong)	6-11-1962
41.	Capt Balbir Chand Chopra MS 6455	ANC	NEFA	14-11-1962
42.	2/Lt Amar Singh Khatri IC-12970	6 Kumaon	NEFA (Yellow Pimple)	14-11-1962

RESTRICTED

43.	Capt Prem Nath Bhatia IC-7077	6 Kumaon	NEFA (Walong)	15-11-1962
44.	Lt Yog Raj Palta IC-11832 (Posthumous)	4 Sikh Regt	NEFA (Walong)	15-11-1962
45.	Hav Kirpa Ram 3330962 (Posthumous)	4 Sikh	NEFA (Walong)	15-11-1962
46.	2/Lt Vinod Kumar Goswamy IC-12323 (Posthumous)	4 Garhwal Rifles	NEFA (North of river Tawang Chu)	14-11-1962
47.	Rfm Madan Singh Rawat 4040008 (Posthumous)	4 Garhwal Rifles	NEFA (North of river Tawang Chu)	14-11-1962
48.	L/NK Trilok Singh Negi 4037614 (Posthumous)	4 Garhwal Rifles	NEFA (Nuranang bridge)	17-11-1962
49.	Rfm Gopal Singh Gusain 4038646	4 Garhwal Rifles	NEFA (Nuranang bridge)	17-11-1962
50.	Hav Govind Kamble 4529486 (Posthumous)	7 Mahar	NEFA (Sela)	18-11-1962
51.	2/Lt Surindar Nath Tandon IC-12691	4 Garhwal Rifles	NEFA (Between Jang & Nuranang)	17-11-1962
52.	Sub Udai Singh Rawat JC-10211	4 Garhwal Rifles	NEFA (Nuranang)	17-11-1962
53.	Jemadar Jatan Singh Gusain JC-10921	4 Garhwal Rifles	NEFA (Nuranang)	17-11-1962
54.	Capt Purushottam Lal Kher IC-6405	1/8 GR	Ladakh (Gurung Hill)	18-11-1962
55.	Capt Ashwani Kumar Diwan IC-7024	20 Lancers	Ladakh (Gurung Hill)	18-11-1962
56.	Jemadar Tej Bahadur Gurung JC-17616 (Posthumous)	1/8 GR	Ladakh (Gurung Hill)	18-11-1962
57.	Jemadar Ram Chander 4132072	13 Kumaon	Ladakh (Rezangla)	18-11-1962
58.	Jemadar Surja 4136414 (Posthumous)	13 Kumaon	Ladakh (Rezangla)	18-11-1962
59.	Jemadar Hari Ram 4132208 (Posthumous)	13 Kumaon	Ladakh (Rezangla)	18-11-1962

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60.	Naik Hukan Chand 4140476 (Posthumous)	13 Kumaon	Ladakh (Rezangla)	18-11-1962
61.	Naik Gulab Singh 4140983 (Posthumous)	13 Kumaon	Ladakh (Rezangla)	18-11-1962
62.	Naik Ram Kumar Yadav 4139673	13 Kumaon	Ladakh (Rezangla)	18-11-1962
63.	L/Nk Sing Ram 4134106 (Posthumous)	13 Kumaon	Ladakh (Rezangla)	18-11-1962
64.	Sep (Nursing Asstt.) Dharampal Singh Dahiya (Posthumous)	AMC	Ladakh (Rezangla)	18-11-1962
65.	Gunner (Tech. Asstt.) Gurdip Singh 1155599 (Posthumous)	Arty Regt	Ladakh (Gurung Hill)	18-11-1962
66.	Hav Bhag Singh 3941391 (Posthumous)	9 Dogra	J&K	19-11-1962
67.	Capt Eshwar Narayan Iyengar MR-1444	AMC		21-11-1962

AIR FORCE OFFICERS

MAHA VIR CHAKRA

1.	Sqn Ldr Jagmohan Nath 3964	GD(P)	--	---- 1962
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VIR CHAKRA

1.	Wg Cdr Purshotam Lal Dhawan 2351	GD(P)	J&K	---- 1962
2.	Wg Cdr Tom Lionel Anderson 3126	GD(P)	Ladakh	20-10-1962
3.	Sqn Ldr Chandan Singh 3460	GD(P)	Ladakh (Chip Chap area)	20-10-1962
4.	Sqn Ldr Arnold Sochindranath Williams 3950	GD(P)	NEFA	12-10-1962
5.	Sqn Ldr Surya Kant Badhwar 3973	GD(P)	Ladakh	4-10-1962
6.	Flt Lt Vinayak Bhiwaji Sawant 4401	GD(N)	--	---- 1962
7.	Flt Lt Krishan Kant Saini 4436	GD(P)	NEFA	18-11-1962
8.	Flt Lt Kuppuswami Lakshmi Narayanan 5053	GD(P)	Ladakh	4-10-1962

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LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

S.No.	Date of Interview	Name and Rank of the officer	Position held in 1962
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)

CIVILIANS

1.	25-6-1987	Shri PVR Rao	Defence Secretary (Soon after the 1962 Ops)
2.	15-3-1988	Shri Chetan Anand	Film Producer and Director (who made "Haqqeqat")
3.	15-3-1988	Pandit Pradeep, Poet	Author of the Song "Ae mere watan ke logo"
4.	07-9-1988	Mr ID Kumar	Intelligence Officer under DIB at Tawang

ARMY OFFICERS

5.	29-8-1986	Gen PP Kumaramangalam, DSO (Retd)	Adjutant General Army HQ
6.	31-8-1986	Lt Gen SPP Thorat, DSO, KC (Retd)	Retd as Army Commander, Eastern Command in May 1961
7.	13-3-1987	Maj Gen Narinder Singh, (Retd)	GSO-2/Ops at HQ 4 Inf Div (Major)
8.	25-3-1987	Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh, VtC (Retd)	Corps Commander IV Corps from 24-29 October 1962
9.	02-5-1987	Lt Col JR Saigal, (Retd)	DQ, 65 Inf Bde (Major)
10.	04-5-1987	Brig SPS Shrikent, MVC (Retd)	Adjutant, 1/9 CR (Major)
11.	06-5-1987	Hony Capt NB Mall, (Retd)	L/Nk, 1/9 CR
12.	06-5-1987	Sub CB Shahi (Retd)	Rfn, 1/9 CR

13.	18-6-1987	Col MA Uthappa (Retd)	OC 6 Fd Regt (Lt Col)
14.	20-6-1987	Col WH Grant (Retd)	GSO-2/Ops 3 Him Div (Major)
15.	21-6-1987	Lt Col KPP Nair (Retd)	Coy Cdr 4 Rajput (Major)
16.	29-6-1987	Maj Gen MN Rawat, PVSM (Retd)	Bde Major 48 Inf Bde (Major)
17.	06-7-1987	Lt Gen JS Dhillon (Retd)	Dy OGS, AHQ (Maj Gen)
18.	14-8-1987	Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad, (Retd)	GOC 4 Inf Div upto 24 October 1962
19.	22-9-1987	Lt Gen HK Sibal (Retd)	BGS, HQ Eastern Command (Brig)
20.	24-9-1987	Maj Gen JDS Datta (Retd)	Bde Major, 62 Inf Bde (Major)
21.	27-10-1987	Maj Gen DK Palit, VrC, FRGS, (Retd)	DMO, AHQ (Brig)
22.	18/19-11-1987	Maj Gen BM Bhattacharjea PVSM, MVC, (Retd)	CO, 4 Garh Rif (Lt Col)
23.	01-12-1987	Lt Gen KK Singh, MVC (Retd)	BGS, IV Corps (Brig)
24.	14-3-1988	Brig JFN Vakil (Retd)	Brig ASC, Western Command
25.	15-3-1988	Maj Gen MR Rajwade, PVSM, VSM, MC, FIE (Retd)	Chief Engineer, IV Corps (Brig)
26.	15-4-1988	Lt Col Shamsher Singh, (Retd)	AQ, 4 Inf Div (Lt Col)
27.	22-4-1988	Brig Manohar Singh, AVSM (Retd)	GSO-I/Ops, 4 Inf Div (Lt Col)
28.	16-9-1988	Maj Gen AS Pathania, MVC, MC (Retd)	GOC, 4 Inf Div from 24 October 1962 onwards
29.	19-9-1988	Maj Gen DD Saklani, AVSM, MG GS(A), Northern Command	Adjutant 13 Kumaon (Major)
30.	22-9-1988	Lt Gen DSR Sawhney, SM, GOC IV Corps	9 Fd Coy (Lt)

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| 31. | 01-10-1988 | Maj Gen Jagjit Singh,
(Retd) | Bde Maj, 114 Inf Bde |
| 32. | 24-4-1989 | Lt Gen NC Rawlley,
PVSM, AVSM, MC (Retd) | Bde Commander,
11 Inf Bde |

AIR FORCE OFFICERS

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|-----|-----------|---|----------------------------------|
| 33. | 03-7-1987 | Air Chief Marshal
DA La Fontaine,
PVSM, AVSM, VM,
ADC (Retd) | Flt Lt |
| 34. | 06-8-1987 | Air Marshal Arjan Singh,
DFC (Retd) | AOA at Air HQ |
| 35. | 04-5-1988 | Air Marshal HC Dewan,
PVSM (Retd) | Dir of Ops, Air HQ
(Air Cmde) |

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