



Home Office

Sovereign Borders: International Asylum Comparisons Report

Section I: Drivers and impact on asylum migration journeys

Migration and Border Analysis

September 2020



Home Office Analysis and Insight

Informing Decisions Through Evidence

Overview of analytical request

As part of the Sovereign Borders work programme, this evidence pack has been prepared by HOAI to address two separate but related evidence requests on international asylum comparisons. Sovereign Borders is a collation of ideas around protection and irregular migration. It seeks to address Ministerial questions and embed them into a wider programme that protects the vulnerable and reduces abuse of the systems designed to do so.

The picture is complex for people migrating irregularly and those migrating for protection. Not all asylum seekers become irregular migrants and not all irregular migrants are asylum seekers. Unpicking drivers for different migratory journeys can be difficult therefore this pack aims to present asylum seeking journeys and experiences in the round.

Request 1: To carry out international comparisons work building an evidence base to better understand and baseline the operation / efficacy of Home Office current measures, and the extent to which new measures will have a positive (or adverse) impact on asylum seeking migrants.

Request 2: To understand why migrants crossing the Channel might prefer to claim asylum in the UK than in France.

The evidence pack has an executive summary and 4 embedded sections:

1. **Drivers and impact on asylum migration journeys - exploring motivations for migrants to travel to the UK specifically, rather than seeking asylum in other safe European countries;**
2. Access to welfare and right to work for asylum seekers in the UK, France, Spain and Germany – a comparative overview;
3. Border policies and bilateral agreements to manage migration in the UK, France, Spain and Germany – a comparative overview, and
4. Failed asylum seekers and returns in the UK, France, Spain and Germany.

*This slidepack should be viewed as an evolving document which will change as updated information becomes available, therefore the evidence and data is accurate at the time of writing and subject to change.

* To note, we are still awaiting a response from Spain and the pack does not include analysis models currently being developed for Failed Asylum Seekers. All data and information references can be found in the 'notes' section of each slide.

* Some data and information routes used for this evidence pack may be no longer accessible after the transition period this year (including Eurodac data).

Drivers and impact on asylum migration journeys

- Not all refugees or asylum seekers are irregular migrants and not all irregular migrants apply for asylum, the picture is complex.
- Many asylum seekers are unable to 'choose' a destination country due to human trafficking and the influence of organised crime networks.
- **Drivers for migration are not fixed** (overtime or between groups) and push factors do not end in Europe. Changes to border controls and reception conditions can force asylum seeking migrants to change routes and destination country.
- **Social networks, shared languages and diaspora communities can motivate asylum seekers to reach certain destination countries.** The proportion of the diaspora in the EU+ residing in the UK correlates with the proportion of asylum applications across the EU+ made in the UK. Conversely the UK received more asylum applications than expected from Vietnam and Albania relative to diaspora estimates which could be attributed to other factors including organised crime networks.
- The majority of individuals escaping persecution are internally displaced (57%) and most refugees displaced abroad stay within their region of displacement, living in countries neighbouring their countries of origin. Of the number of asylum seekers that reach Europe, only a small percentage claim asylum in the UK. In 2019, the UK received just 6% of total EU+ asylum applications.
- A major driver for people to migrate irregularly is to improve their life and livelihoods with many applying for asylum from 'safe' countries. Economic migrants and asylum seeker's needs and motivations could be addressed separately such as by creating alternative legal routes for those unlikely to be granted asylum and streamlining asylum application processes for those who are most vulnerable.
- Many asylum seekers **have little to no understanding of welfare policies** and access to provisions with many coming from countries with no welfare state.

Drivers and impact on asylum migration journeys

Section One Summary

What factors affect migrant decision-making?

Migration trends and secondary movement towards the UK

- Since 2017, the number of asylum applications in the UK has been increasing, by 2019 returning to levels seen during 2015-16 although the UK was relatively little affected by the European 'migration crisis'. This recent increase is likely due in part to movement to the UK by those already in Europe.
- In 2019, at least 1 in 6 asylum applicants to the UK had made a prior application in a European country.
- However, only a small portion of secondary movement across Europe is to the UK – in 2019, the UK produced just 6% of Eurodac hits relating to prior applications elsewhere in Europe.
- While many entering the UK may travel through France, most top nationalities applying for asylum in the UK do not apply in France in large numbers (with the exception of Sudanese, Afghan and Albanian applicants).

Social networks, shared languages and diasporas motivate asylum seekers to reach certain destination countries

- Social networks aid migrant integration to society, acting as facilitators of information relating to life in the destination country. They are considered **trusted sources** and are likely to influence migration journeys more than information from formal institutions.
- **The presence of diaspora communities can motivate migrants to reach certain destination countries.** The proportion of diasporas in the EU+ residing in the UK is correlated with the proportion of asylum applications across the EU+ made in the UK (see slide 21).

Armed conflict, human rights abuses, poverty, political & economic instability and violence are factors that forcibly displace migrants

- The majority (57%) of individuals escaping persecution are internally displaced within their own countries and most refugees displaced abroad stay within their region of displacement, living in countries neighbouring their countries of origin¹.
- Of the number of asylum seekers that reach Europe, only a small percentage claim asylum in the UK. In 2019, the UK received 6% of total EU+ asylum applications.²
- A major driver for people to **migrate irregularly** is to improve their life and livelihoods with many applying for asylum from 'safe' countries. Economic migrants and asylum seeker's needs and motivations could be addressed separately such as by creating alternative legal routes for some of those unlikely to be granted asylum and streamlining asylum application processes for those who are most vulnerable, to reduce the temptation to use illegal means.

Migrants have limited to no knowledge of migration and welfare policies

- The role of welfare policies, economic factors and labour market access as potential drivers of migration to the UK is limited as many asylum seekers **have little to no understanding of current asylum policies and the economic conditions of a destination country.** Many asylum seekers have no experience of a welfare state and they expect to be able to work to support themselves.³
- Restrictive migration policies may increase the number of applicants that fall into irregularity, displacing them into more dangerous and exploitative routes (such as trafficking).

Migration trends


Asylum seeker vs irregular entrant

Asylum seeker: any person claiming protection. Such individuals may travel to the UK irregularly, or via regular routes (such as using a visa).

Irregular entrant: any person crossing the border using unofficial channels. This includes clandestine entrants, and those who (attempt to) enter using fraudulent or inadequate documents.

Not all irregular entrants become asylum seekers, and not all asylum seekers are irregular entrants.

Main pathways into irregular migration status in the UK




Source: The Migration Observatory

Irregular migrant: any person who is in the UK without leave to remain (excluding those awaiting the outcome of a claim) and is therefore subject to removal. Whether an individual is an irregular migrant or not could change over time.

Around 30% of asylum seekers in the year-ending September 2019 were believed to have entered the UK through **regular** routes, e.g. with documentation, before claiming asylum¹ (however, this is a tiny proportion of the total number coming to the UK through such means – nearly 1.69 million visas were issued to Indian, Pakistani and Chinese nationals alone in the same period, with less than a third of 1% going on to claim asylum).

A further 40% enter clandestinely, and 22% inadequately documented¹. This varies significantly by nationality (see chart below).

Top 10 asylum seeking nationalities to the UK, by entry type, YE September 2019¹




Asylum intake in the UK

Since 2017, the number of asylum applications in the UK has been increasing, and by 2019 had returned to levels seen in 2015/16 (although the UK was little affected by the European ‘migration crisis’ at that time) (see European irregular arrivals, slide 10).

Over half the increase in intake in the UK over the past two years is accounted for by Iranians and Albanians. The recent increase is likely in part due to increased movement towards the UK from those already in Europe, as well as some new arrivals not typically seen on these routes. There were over 35,000 asylum applications (main applicants only) in 2019, well below the levels seen in early 2000s when intake most recently peaked at 84,000¹.

Asylum applications to the UK, 2001 to YE June 2020



Recent increase in intake due to arrivals on ‘non-traditional’ routes

Applications from Chinese, Vietnamese, El Salvadoran and Turkish nationals have increased in the last year. These nationalities (along with Iranians) are rarely detected using the Mediterranean irregular routes into Europe, often using legal routes, fraudulent documents, or smuggling groups instead.

Secondary movement from other European countries

Intake from nationalities such as Iraqis and Eritreans have also increased, despite relatively low numbers of new arrivals being detected on traditional routes across the Mediterranean. These increases may stem, in part, from secondary movement from elsewhere in Europe – an issue not unique to the UK (see EURODAC data, slides 13-15).

Increase in asylum claims by those held in detention


There were around 4,850 claims from detention in 2019 (11% of all asylum applications), up 15% on the previous year, despite declining numbers held in detention.²

A third (32%) of claims from detention were by **Albanians**, whose claims from detention more than doubled to 1,550 (37% of all Albanian applications over the period), accounting for much of the overall increase in applications from detention. There was also a modest increase in Chinese nationals, up 41% to just under 600³.

Irregular migrants from these countries often attempt to remain in the UK undetected, claiming asylum only following enforcement action.

Where do refugees to the UK come from?

This chart shows the number of grants of asylum or other forms of humanitarian protection, including those granted through resettlement scheme and following an asylum application. The height of each 'stream' represents the number of grants of asylum to that nationality in a given year. In each year, the streams are ranked from top to bottom, by number of grants. Not all nationalities are shown.




Overview: Irregular Arrivals to Europe – Long-Term Trends

In 2015/2016, during the ‘migration crisis’, irregular arrivals at external European borders increased sharply (2.05m in YE March 2016), primarily due to large numbers arriving in Greece on the Eastern Mediterranean route from Turkey (1.03m detections) and moving onwards through the Western Balkans (840,000).¹

Irregular arrivals to Europe across the Mediterranean have now fallen to much lower levels (see graph below). However, with the large number of arrivals to Europe since 2015, alongside new arrivals there are now a sizeable number of irregular migrants already on the continent, a small portion of whom attempt to reach the UK irregularly.

Monthly detections of Illegal Border Crossings at the external borders of Europe and EU+ Asylum Claims, January 2014 to March 2020^{1,2}



Western Mediterranean Route – Arrivals to Spain

Arrivals across the Western Mediterranean route from North Africa to Spain have traditionally been much lower than on the other main routes to Greece and Italy.

However, arrivals to Spain increased sharply in 2018, up to 65,400, likely in part due to displacement from upstream routes to Italy. However, collaboration between the EU, Spain and Morocco led to a sharp reduction in arrivals from early 2019 onwards (see case study in Section 3, slides 11-12).³

Top nationalities using this route do not go on to attempt irregular entry to the UK or claim asylum here in large numbers. They are predominantly North African and Francophone West African, tending to claim asylum in either France or Germany.

Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkans Routes – Arrivals to Greece and onward movement toward the Hungarian and Croatian borders

Large increases in primarily sea arrivals to the Greek Islands saw over 1.03m arrivals on the Eastern Mediterranean route in YE March 2016, but following the EU-Turkey Agreement in March 2016 and restrictions on movement through the Western Balkans, arrivals fell sharply (see Section 3, slides 13-15).¹

Still, these migration routes remain important for key nationalities who attempt irregular entry to and apply for asylum in the UK – e.g. Iranians, Iraqis, Afghans and Syrians.

Central Mediterranean Route – Arrivals to Italy and Malta

The Central Mediterranean route was the main route of irregular arrival to both before and after the 2015-16 crisis. Collaboration between the EU, Italy and Libyan authorities from mid-2017 saw arrivals fall sharply, with further (smaller) reduction following Italy’s ‘closed port policy’ from mid-2018 (see Section 3, slides 9-10).¹

This migration route has been key for Eritrean and Sudanese arrivals to Europe, though in recent years Eritrean arrivals in particular have fallen to very low levels. Both are relatively important nationalities attempting irregular entry to and applying for asylum in the UK.

Secondary movement of migrants in Europe and other routes into Europe


With the large numbers of arrivals to Europe since 2015, some who look to irregularly enter the UK may have been in Europe for some time. In 2019, at least 1 in 6 asylum applicants to the UK had made a prior application in a European country, with evidence suggesting movement toward the UK of those who have been in Europe for some time is increasingly important (see slides 13-15)

Meanwhile, not all those attempting irregular entry to the UK from Europe will have used the above Mediterranean routes to reach the continent - others enter the EU legally, irregularly via air routes or less used clandestine routes. For example, **Albanians** have visa-free access to the Schengen area while **Vietnamese** nationals often use migratory routes through Eastern Europe.

Who claims asylum in the UK?

The demographics of those claiming asylum can vary significantly by nationality. This is likely to be affected by a number of factors such as (among other things) the routes to the UK available to different nationalities (legal vs irregular) and the cost of these routes, the type of groups that are likely to have a legitimate protection claim, and social, political, economic and cultural factors of migrants and their origin countries.

Demographic of asylum applicants, by nationality (top 10), 2019



Families

Around 12% of 2019 asylum intake was from family groups.

However, for **El Salvador**, who have seen increases in intake over the last year, almost half (47%) of total intake was from families. Salvadorans are visa-free nationals, so travel to the UK as a family group is easier and safer than for those who come on irregular routes.

Vietnamese (2%) and Eritreans (1%) had a much lower proportion of applications from family groups.

In particular, **Vietnamese** (2%) and **Eritreans** (1%) had a much **lower than average** proportion of applications made by family groups.

Adults

In 2019, 77% of all asylum applications to the UK were made by single adults (59% male, 18% female).

Nationalities such as **China, India** and **Pakistan**, who often come to the UK using legal routes, typically see higher proportions of older adults (over 30) and in the case of China, females. 91% of asylum applications from Chinese nationals were made by single adults.

Some Chinese and Indian nationals that do arrive irregularly often use safer routes, such as air facilitation. These routes are often more expensive, but safer than, alternative clandestine routes.

China and India in particular have very low grant rates at initial decision (12% and 5% respectively in 2019).

Unaccompanied asylum-seeking children (UASCs)

In 2019, 11% of all asylum applications were made by unaccompanied asylum seeking children (UASCs). In particular, around 30% of applicants from **Eritrea, Afghanistan, Sudan** and **Vietnam** were UASCs, all top nationalities making applications to the UK.

98% of unaccompanied children from Afghanistan and 99% of unaccompanied children from Sudan were males. For Eritreans, males accounted for 80%. Vietnamese had a much higher proportion of females, with 64% being male.

Iraq also see slightly above average proportions of unaccompanied minors (15%), with a further 55% being young adults.


These nationalities often enter the UK clandestinely, such as via the juxtaposed controls. While organised crime groups are often involved in facilitating this, these methods are often cheaper and more dangerous than more sophisticated methods (such as air facilitation). These migrants are likely to be less affluent than those coming on other routes.

Asylum applications to the UK - European context

In 2019, the UK received the 5th highest number of asylum applications across European countries, comprising 6% of all applications received across Europe during that time. While asylum applications to the UK increased to their highest levels since the 'migration crisis' the picture across other European countries was more mixed, with total applications across the EU+ 45% lower (761,500) than the 1.4m applications made in 2015¹.

The UK's near neighbours saw increased applications between 2018 and 2019 – Belgium (up 22% to 27,500), France (up 10% to 151,100) and the Netherlands (up 5% to 25,300). Spain (more than doubled, up 118% to 117,800) and Greece (up 15% to 77,300) also saw increases. Meanwhile, applications fell to Germany (down 10% to 165,700) and Italy (down 27% to 43,800).

Top 10 EU+ countries receiving asylum applications, 2019



Asylum trends in Germany and France

France – asylum applications to France increased to their highest levels in the last decade in 2019, up to 151,100, having steadily increased each year from just 64,300 in 2014. In 2019, France received more than treble the number of UK asylum applications.

- France receives asylum applications from French-speaking and other nationalities who rarely apply for asylum in the UK (e.g. Georgians, Guineans, Ivorians, Haitians and Malians)
- Few nationalities who apply in France in large numbers also apply to the UK – the exceptions are **Sudanese, Albanian and Afghan** nationals (see slide 26).

Germany – asylum applications to Germany have fallen to 165,700 in 2019, significantly lower than the over 745,000 applications received in 2016 during the 'migration crisis'.

- Many top nationalities applying in Germany also apply to the UK in large numbers. Between 2018 and 2019, the largest falls in applications were from **Syrians, Iraqis, Iranians and Eritreans**, all of whom are commonly seen applying in the UK.

Top UK nationalities in a European context

The UK received 6% of all asylum applications in Europe in 2019. However, for key nationalities, the UK often received a higher proportion. For example:

- UK was top destination in Europe for **Vietnamese** applicants, receiving almost half (46%) of all asylum applications in the EU+.
- Behind France (35% of Sudanese applications), the UK received a quarter of all Sudanese asylum applications in the EU+, the 2nd highest.
- Over a fifth (22%) of all **Iranian** applications in the EU+ were made in the UK, 2nd only to Germany.

Afghan nationals are a key exception - while prominent in applications to the UK, the UK received just 4% of Afghan applications in the EU+, the 6th highest. **Greece** (38% of applications), **France** (19%) and **Germany** (18%) all received substantially more applications by Afghans than the UK.

Away from our top intake nationalities, for many other nationalities claiming asylum across Europe, the UK is often not a major recipient of asylum applications, with low numbers of applications compared with the numbers made elsewhere.

Spain and Greece face different challenges to the UK.

81% of intake in Spain is from Latin America, particularly Venezuela and Columbia. Applications to **Spain account for 78% of all Latin American intake in the EU+ in 2019**, likely reflecting the importance of language, diaspora and historical ties on migrant decision-making.

Asylum applications to Greece are highly dependent on flows across the Mediterranean from Turkey, a key migratory route for irregular migrants seeking to reach Europe - factors such as language and diaspora are likely less important in explaining intake.


In 2019, irregular arrivals to Greece increased by 48% primarily due to increasing arrivals by Afghan and Syrian nationals.¹ This has likely been reflected in the 15% increase in asylum applications across the year, with Afghans and Syrians the top applying nationalities to Greece.

Secondary movement to the UK in a European context

While secondary movement of those who have already applied for asylum elsewhere in Europe is an important aspect of the UK's asylum intake (see slides that follow), evidence suggests that only a small portion of such secondary movement across Europe is toward the UK. In fact, in 2019 the UK produced just 6% of Eurodac hits relating to prior applications elsewhere in Europe (6th) – the same proportion it received of asylum applications in Europe.

In 2019, asylum applicants to France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy all produced more Eurodac hits reflecting previous applications in another European country than applicants to the UK did (see graph below).

Eurodac hits produced (not numbers of people) by asylum intake reflecting previous applications elsewhere in Europe, 2017-2019¹



Eurodac data suggests that in 2019, the most sizeable onward movements in Europe of asylum seekers were:

1. applications in France by previous applicants to Germany;
2. applications in France by previous applicants to Italy;
3. applications in Germany by previous applicants to Italy, and
4. applications to Germany by previous applicants to Greece.

For most key European countries of prior application before the UK, evidence suggests that the UK is not the main country receiving onward movement:



Germany: in 2019, the UK ranked 5th (6% of hits) in terms of Eurodac hits showing prior asylum applications in Germany. Data suggests that France (43% of hits) received by some margin the most secondary movement from those previously applying in Germany, followed by the Netherlands (16%), Italy (9%) and Belgium (7%).



France: in 2019, the UK ranked 5th (11% of hits) in terms of Eurodac hits showing prior asylum applications in France. Data suggests that Germany (36% of hits) received most secondary movement of asylum applicants from France, followed by Belgium (13%), the Netherlands (12%) and Italy (11%).



Greece: in 2019, the UK ranked 5th (6% of hits) in terms of Eurodac hits showing prior asylum applications in Greece. Data suggests that Germany (40% of hits) received most secondary movement of asylum applicants from Greece, followed by France (16%), Belgium (8%) and Italy (7%).




Italy: in 2019, the UK ranked 5th (3% of hits) in terms of Eurodac hits showing prior asylum applications in Italy. Data suggests that France (44% of hits) and Germany (31%) together received the clear majority of secondary movement of asylum applicants from Italy, followed by the Netherlands (8%), with Belgium (3%) producing the same number of hits as the UK (3%).

In fact, in 2019, the only country-pair where the UK received the most 'hits' to prior applications elsewhere was with Ireland (87% of hits to prior applications in Ireland were in the UK), almost certainly reflecting geographic proximity and use of migratory routes through Ireland to reach the UK.

Top nationalities applying for asylum to the UK in 2019 – Links to Previous Applications in Europe

Among the top 10 nationalities applying to the UK in 2019, there was sizeable variation in the extent to which applicants (main applicants and dependents) were matched to a previous asylum application in Europe. Asylum seeking nationalities who typically enter the UK irregularly from Europe tend to have higher proportions of their intake matched to prior applications in Europe (Eritreans, Afghans, Sudanese, Iraqi, Iranian), while those asylum applicants who arrive on regular routes (such as on a visa) tend to have lower proportions of intake matched to prior applications (India, China, Pakistan).

Proportion of UK asylum intake in 2019 matched to a previous asylum application in Europe, Top 10 nationalities applying in UK



Indian, Chinese and Pakistani applicants tend to enter the UK via regular routes (on a visa) and rarely matched to prior asylum applications in Europe

Very few Indian, Chinese and Pakistani applicants to the UK in 2019 were linked to previous asylum applications across Europe using Eurodac data.

This may reflect the fact that, unlike the other nationalities in the top 10, a majority of these applicants are thought to enter the UK on regular routes (on a valid visa), and are less likely to pass through Europe irregularly en-route to the UK.

Those nationalities often thought to enter the UK irregularly from Europe tend to have larger proportions of intake matched to prior applications in Europe

In 2019, an important proportion of Eritrean (55%); Afghan (44%); Sudanese (38%), Iraqi (27%) and Iranian (19%) intake were matched with prior applications across Europe:

Eritreans – well over half of all Eritrean applicants to the UK in 2019 were matched to prior applications in Europe (55%).

- In particular, at least a fifth of all Eritrean applicants to the UK in 2019 (22%) had previously claimed asylum in Germany, while 16% had applied in Italy.

Sudanese – two fifths (38%) of Sudanese applicants were matched to a previous application in Europe.

- In particular, around a quarter (24%) of all Sudanese applicants to the UK had previously applied in France.

Vietnamese and Albanian asylum applicants are outliers – irregular entry to the UK, but few relatively few recorded prior applications in Europe

Albanian and Vietnamese applicants are overwhelmingly thought to enter the UK irregularly, are much less often matched to prior applications in Europe than other nationalities who also do so.


Both nationalities often only claim asylum on encounter, sometimes having been in the UK for some time, with issues around illegal work and MSHT. This might help to explain a lack of prior asylum applications in Europe, alongside:

- **Albanians:** visa-free travel in the Schengen area may mean greater mobility and less need to make applications in mainland Europe (two fifths of matches that do occur for Albanian nationals are to recent applications in Ireland (39% of those Albanian individuals matched)).
- **Vietnamese:** the UK receives around two fifths of all Vietnamese asylum applications in Europe, suggesting the aim is often to reach the UK.

UK Asylum Intake: Secondary Movement and Previous Asylum Applications in Europe

In 2019, around 1 in 6 of all asylum applicants to the UK (17%, 7,750 – main applicants and dependants) were bio-matched to at least one previous asylum application in Europe. Of those matched, around a third (33%, 2,600) were first recorded applying asylum in Europe during the ‘migration crisis’ in 2015/16. Though there are a range of caveats attached to this data, this is a minimum estimate of UK intake that have previously applied for asylum in another European country. (request Annex for key caveats to the Eurodac data).


Proportion of UK asylum intake matched to a previous application in Europe on Eurodac, 2014 to 2019¹



In 2019, around 1 in 6 of all asylum applicants to the UK (17%, 7,750) were bio-matched to at least one previous asylum application in Europe

- **This was an increase from around 6,100 individuals in 2018 who were matched to a prior application in Europe, up 26%.**
- The proportion of our intake matched to a previous asylum application in Europe has been steadily increasing over the last few years.
- **This is indicative of increased secondary movement from those who have already made applications elsewhere in Europe**, though there are evidence gaps around possible improvements in recording biometrics across Europe over time.

Year of first recorded asylum application in Europe for UK asylum applicants matched on Eurodac, 2019¹



For an important number of those matched to prior applications in Europe, the first application in Europe on record dates back to 2015/16, during the ‘migration crisis’

Of the 7,750 individuals in the 2019 UK intake matched back to prior applications in Europe, a third (33%, 2,600) were first recorded applying for asylum in Europe in 2015/16.


- This suggests that at least 1 in every 15 asylum applicants to the UK in 2019 (6%) had applied for asylum elsewhere in Europe during the ‘migration crisis’ and may have remained in Europe since then.

For most other individuals, their first recorded asylum application in Europe is more recent, with 57% first recorded applying in Europe between 2017-2019.

Top European countries where asylum applicants to the UK have previously applied

Of the 2019 asylum intake, around 7,750 asylum applicants were biometrically matched to at least one previous asylum applications across Europe. In particular, around 2,100 (around 27% of matched applicants) had previously made at least one application in Germany, as had 1,500 (20%) to Greece, 1,250 (16%) to France and 1,100 (14%) to Italy (see Annex, slide 31 for more details)

Top European countries of previous asylum applications for UK asylum intake in 2018 and 2019¹



Increased matches to prior applications in Ireland

In 2019, there was a sizeable increase in UK intake matched to a previous asylum application in Ireland (up 88% to just under 550).

- It is possible that those matched to previous asylum applications to Ireland enter the UK via the Common Travel Area (CTA). Most previous asylum applications in Ireland themselves occurred in 2019, suggesting fast onward movement.
- It seems to be a route most commonly used by Albanian** nationals in particular, comprising around a third (31%) of individuals in 2019 linked to a previous application in Ireland.

Prior asylum applications in Germany and France

Germany is the top country in Europe where applicants to the UK in 2019 had previously applied for asylum.

- In particular, at least a fifth (400, 20%) of all those matched to prior applications in Germany were **Eritreans**, followed by **Iraqis** (17%, around 350) and **Iranians** (15%, around 300).
- Prior applications in Germany were often from 2016 or earlier (47%), reflecting onward movement from those applying in Germany around the 2015/16 'migration crisis'.

France is a particularly important country of previous application for certain key nationalities (e.g. Sudanese, Afghans).

- Sudanese** were by some margin the top asylum seeking nationality matched to prior applications in France, comprising a third (over 400, 34%) of all individuals matched, the largest nationality-country dyad in the Eurodac data for the 2019 UK intake.
- Prior applications in France were often more recent than in Germany, with over half (56%) made in 2018 and 2019.

Prior asylum applications in Greece and Italy

Greece and Italy are key arrival countries for irregular migrants reaching Europe across the Mediterranean, who then form an important portion of the asylum intake for both countries. Many who apply for asylum in both countries may not view them as end destinations.

Greece: in 2019 at least 1,500 applicants to the UK had previously applied in Greece, with Iranians (19% of individuals matched to Greece), Iraqis (18%) and Kuwaitis (17%) the top nationalities linked to previous applications there.

Italy: in 2019, at least 1,100 applicants to the UK had previously applied for asylum in Italy. In particular, over 300 Eritrean applicants to the UK in 2019 were matched to prior applications in Italy (28% of individuals matched to Italy). Until mid-2017, Eritreans arrived across the Mediterranean from Libya to Italy in large numbers, though numbers have fallen to much lower levels in recent years.

Migration drivers of asylum seeker destination pathways

Recognising complexity in human migration decision making

Migrant decision making is often described as **the result of a set of factors which ‘pushes’ migrants to leave their country of origin and ‘pulls’ them towards a host destination.** Asylum seekers – a group defined by their search for protection – are ‘pushed’ from their countries due to factors such as violence, conflict and violations to human rights and can be ‘pulled’ to destination countries with shared cultural similarities, languages, diasporas and social networks.

However, both academics and practitioners have consistently critiqued viewing asylum migration in the context of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors as it is a **simplification** which conceals the following complexities:



Many migrants are unable to ‘choose’ a destination country due to the influence of established human smuggling routes, or coercion and influence from organised criminal networks, preventing personal decision making



Motivations and drivers of migration are not fixed. They vary between individuals and change over the course of the journey to Europe and the UK. Migrants will respond differently to the same push and pull factors.



It is often assumed that migrants operate in an environment where information is easily accessible. However, in practice, migrants are required to make cost/benefit decisions relating to migration journeys with very **limited information. This information also varies considerably in its accuracy and may be manipulated by organised criminal networks.**



Factors influencing migrant journeys are interlinked and should not be viewed in isolation. ‘Push’ and ‘pull’ factors do not consider how conditions in countries of origin and destination interact with other factors in determining migration decisions, such as personal characteristics and circumstances encountered along the journey.

Known drivers of asylum from the countries of origin

Known factors to forcibly displace individuals from their countries of origin:

1) Armed conflict

2) Human rights abuses

3) Political instability

4) Poverty and economic instability

5) Violence and threats to personal security (real or perceived)

Although conflict and oppression are major drivers of displacement, many asylum seekers are attempting to escape a broader environment of instability. Severe poverty and a lack of opportunities can cause people to claim asylum and many irregular migrants leave their countries in search of a better quality of life.

The Syrian Refugee Crisis

- The largest group of refugees worldwide are fleeing civil conflict in Syria, with over **6.6 million Syrians** forced to leave the country since 2011.¹ **Turkey alone hosts 3.6 million Syrians**².
- **Syria has the largest internally displaced population, with 6.7 million people** having fled their homes. They remain trapped inside their country in areas where humanitarian aid deliveries continue to be a key challenge^{1,3}.
- Parties to the armed conflict in Syria continue to commit **serious violations of international humanitarian law**, including war crimes and gross human rights abuses⁴.
- Primarily through the Vulnerable Person Resettlement Scheme (VPRS), Syrians were the top nationality resettled in the UK in YE March 2020, accounting for around 80% (3,995) of all those resettled to the UK over the period.⁵

The majority of asylum seekers stay in their region of origin and do not claim asylum in Europe

- At the end of 2019, there were **79.5 million forcibly displaced people worldwide** as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, and human rights violations. This includes 26m recorded refugees, 45.7m internally displaced people, 4.2m asylum seekers and 3.6m Venezuelans displaced abroad⁶.
- **Most refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad (73%) stay in their region of displacement** and are living in other countries neighbouring their countries of origin⁶.
- Of those asylum seekers that reach Europe, only a small percentage claim asylum in the UK. **In 2019, UK received 6% of total EU+ asylum claims**⁷.

Social networks often play an important role in shaping migrant decision-making and movements

Where migrants can exert a degree of agency over their destination choice, **social networks** often play an important role in shaping their journeys. These networks are usually understood to comprise **friends and family members, community organisations and intermediaries**.

How do social networks impact migrant decision making?

- Social networks act as **facilitators of information** relating to:
 - Feedback mechanisms relating to the overall migration experience and life in the destination country.
 - Knowledge of accommodation and housing facilities
 - Information on employment prospects, opportunities and labour market demand.
- The presence of family, friends and communities exerts a particularly strong effect on decisions of ultimate country of destination.
 - For example, research shows that the **presence of friends and family accounted for one third of asylum seekers reasons for choosing the UK** as a destination country.¹
- Social networks lower the barriers to migration and provide migrants with the confidence and security required for an **easier integration to society**



Social networks are relied upon throughout the whole journey

- **Across the journey, social networks are used for both provision of information and access to financial resources.** This can often lead to decisions over ultimate destinations being made by those that fund the trip (e.g. family members) or ‘travelling companions’ met en route.
- **Social networks are often vital whenever smugglers are required.** In many cases, migrants determine which smugglers to trust based on recommendations from individuals they already know.²




The source of information provided needs to be trusted in order to influence migration journeys

- **Information is perceived as trustworthy when transmitted by social networks** with whom the asylum seeker already shares a relationship of (at least some) trust.
- However, this information can vary in **quality, quantity and accuracy** and can lead to differences between perceptions and the realities individuals face upon arrival³.
- Government information campaigns aim to provide accurate information relating to asylum policies and practices, but their impact is limited due to the following:
 - **Migrants trust their own knowledge and sources more than foreign governments**
 - People are resistant to information they believe comes from a vested interest
 - Their immediate situation makes the journey worthwhile (in spite of the risks)⁴

Comparing asylum intake and diasporas across Europe for key nationalities applying in the UK

- The presence of diasporas influences destination pathways for asylum seekers that can exercise agency over their journey. **A large diaspora in the destination country is associated with increased asylum applications from the same group in the future**, notwithstanding changes in acceptance rates or the economic context¹. For some nationalities, such as India and Pakistan, Commonwealth links have provided those connections.
- Other factors, such as the presence of smuggling networks or organised criminal networks, also influence numbers of applications to a destination and may be more relevant for specific nationalities (e.g. Vietnamese). Diasporas lower migration barriers through the provision of valuable information and attract new migrants by aiding the integration process.

Proportion of diaspora in EU+ residing in the UK vs proportion of EU+ asylum applications made in the UK for the top 10 nationalities seeking asylum in the UK, 2019



EXPERIMENTAL STATISTICS






- Data is for 2019 for applications and diaspora estimates
- Asylum applications refers to both main applicants and dependants

This relationship between diaspora and asylum applications holds across Europe, with the exception of Greece (the country of irregular arrivals to Europe for those on the Eastern Mediterranean route) and the Netherlands (see Annex). The Netherlands experiences a large amount of secondary movement (see slide 13) and therefore might not be the preferred destination choice for asylum seekers, which may explain the weaker link to diaspora.

Diaspora populations in the UK

The proportion of the diaspora population in the EU+ residing in the UK correlates with the proportion of asylum applications made in the UK.

This is evidenced by the following nationalities in 2019²:

-  **Iran** was the top nationality claiming asylum in the UK in 2019. The UK receives 23% of all Iranian asylum applications in the EU+ (ranking 2nd), with an estimated 19% of Iranians in Europe thought to reside in the UK (ranking 2nd in the EU+).
-  **Iraq** asylum applications in the UK: 11%, 3rd
UK diaspora estimate: 13%, 3rd
-  **China** asylum applications in the UK: 20%, 2nd
UK diaspora estimate: 20%, 2nd
-  **Sudan** asylum applications in the UK: 23% of EU+, 2nd
UK diaspora estimate: 34%, 1st
-  **Eritrea**: asylum applications in the UK: 13%, 3rd
UK diaspora estimate: 8%, 5th

Vietnam and Albania (to a lesser extent) are examples of where we receive more asylum applications than expected relative to diaspora estimates (see Annex). The UK receives fewer applications than expected from India and Pakistan.

What influences asylum seeker destination pathways? The role of language and economic factors



Shared language aids the integration process

- **A shared language facilitates the exchange of information and support amongst potential asylum claimants.**
 - Common languages will often be the product of a **shared colonial past** between those who seek asylum and those who have already formed a migration network in the destination country.
 - Countries sharing a language and colonial past may have similar institutions and political ties that stimulate movement between the two, leading to the **general perception of an easier integration into society**. Some asylum seekers may believe that, as a former imperial ruler, the destination country has an obligation to protect them.
- Research suggests that for asylum seekers who chose to come to the UK, the existence of social networks, the ability to speak English and the belief that the UK is a safe and democratic country were important determining factors¹.



Economic factors in the preferred asylum destination country

- Severe economic instability in countries of origin can cause some people to flee and seek asylum.
- For the minority of asylum seekers who can exercise control over destination choice, they are likely to be drawn to countries perceived as rich and industrialised².
- However, **migrants have little knowledge of the current economic conditions** (e.g. employment rates) in host destination countries. This may in part be due to information of varying quality propagated by social networks (see slide 19).
- The importance of economic factors in destination countries appear to be relatively small, and their attraction will depend strongly on other variables and **will not be equal across migrants with a variety of skills and family situations**.
- **The cost of the journey matters**. Migrants with limited financial means may 'choose' more accessible locations if they are unable to fund further migration journeys.

Border policies and restrictive migration regimes increase the cost of migration



- **Restrictive migration policies in destination countries increase the cost of international migration**, and have been used in preventing large numbers of migrants from being able to access their preferred destinations at particular times. This can be evidenced by sharp reductions in irregular arrivals following measures such as:
 - Border barriers (e.g. Hungary erecting a fence with Serbia on the Western Balkans route in 2015 - see Section 3, slide 14)
 - Identity checks at the border (e.g. Sweden-Denmark - see Section 3, slide 16)
 - Technological developments to increase border security measures. The UK has invested heavily in infrared detection technology, CCTV, lighting and high-security fencing at both Calais and Dunkirk ports and the Coquelles Terminal (see Section 3, slides 7-8 for UK-France bilateral co-operation measures).
 - Enforcement measures in departure countries, preventing migrants from embarking on journeys (see Section 3, slides 9-12 for Spain-Morocco, Italy-Libya)
- Direct controls such as border fences not only prevent migrants' ability to enter the country but also are employed as a deterrent strategy to discourage further migrants from crossing the border. However, they will vary considerably, are expensive and tend to work only in specific circumstances.
- **Such measures are also unlikely to diminish asylum seekers' motivations in the longer-term.** Migrants often encounter a variety of other 'push-backs' en-route and attempt multiple crossings of the same border following interactions with border police, arrests and in some cases imprisonments. Migrants evicted from the Calais 'jungle' had travelled thousands of miles and spent thousands of pounds to reach that destination and are unlikely to alter their intentions easily¹.
- Asylum seekers often report little to no specific knowledge of migration policies of different European countries. Where migrants do have some knowledge of these policies, it is the interpretation and perception of the policies (often inaccurate or incomplete) that is most significant in altering behaviour rather than the policies themselves².

Restrictive migration regimes can also increase the number of migrants that fall into irregularity

- **It has been estimated that a 10% increase in asylum rejection raises the number of apprehended irregular migrants by on average 2-4%⁴.**
- Restrictive asylum policies may lower asylum application numbers, however this may lead to an increase in less 'visible' types of irregular migration which are harder to detect and measure, displacing potential and rejected protection seekers into potentially dangerous and exploitative routes (such as trafficking). Asylum seekers can also be displaced into irregular migration routes by limited or absent legal and safe migration routes (such as humanitarian visas)³.
- This also implies that the effects of migration policies may be over-estimated as studies cannot properly test for deflection or displacement effects⁴.

Welfare policies and labour market access have little impact on migrant decision making



Welfare policies

- Any effects exerted by asylum policies and welfare systems are difficult to isolate.
- A recent systematic review found that **there was no evidence to suggest welfare rights and labour market access acted as pull factors**¹.
- A separate study comprising in-depth interviews with 43 asylum seekers and refugees living in the UK found that **the majority of respondents had no knowledge of the welfare benefits** and support before coming to the UK².
 - Of those respondents who had knowledge of welfare, this was limited and there was no evidence to suggest that they perceived the UK welfare system to be more generous than the welfare systems of other countries.
- ‘Confirmation bias’ also plays a part. Once a view has been formed (e.g. *the UK is more likely than France to grant asylum*), asylum seekers may embrace information that confirms this whilst ignoring or rejecting contradictory information.
- For the majority of asylum seekers, the priority is finding safety (whether economic or physical security). The destination country choice may not be the result of deliberation but of a set of circumstances encountered along the journey. **It is therefore unlikely that benefits or support will weigh heavily in the decision-making process.**




Access to the labour market does not drive migration

- **Economic rights do not act as a pull factor for asylum seekers.** A review of the relationship between Right to Work and numbers of asylum applications concluded that no study reported a long-term correlation between labour market access and destination choice¹.
- **Very few migrants have any experience of a welfare state** such as exists in the UK and imagine that they will be able to (if not expected to) work and support themselves upon arrival.
- Denied the right to work, many migrants may be forced to turn to clandestine work in highly insecure jobs in both the formal and informal labour markets to meet their basic needs³.

Does grant rate act as a pull factor for asylum seekers?

Evidence does not suggest that grant rate has a significant impact on an asylum seeker's choice of destination, and it is not clear whether migrants have accurate information on grant rates. Social networks, shared languages and diaspora communities more likely motivate asylum seekers to reach certain destinations.

Average grant rate at initial decision, EU vs UK, 2010 to 2019



Source: Eurostat

How does the UK grant rate compare to the EU?

Prior to 2014, the UK grant rate was broadly in line with the EU more generally.

From mid-2014 and through the 2015/16 'migration crisis', the EU grant rate increased markedly, predominately due to more Syrian nationals – who typically have a high grant rate (98% in 2016) – claiming asylum in the EU. Over the same period, there was no similar increase in UK grant rate.

From 2018, the UK grant rate has increased, following changes to Asylum system service standards. This has led to changes in the way cases are prioritised to help reduce support costs. As a result, more decisions are being made on cases with a higher chance of success (such as vulnerable cases, and UASC). But it is not that equivalent cases now have a higher chance of success. This recent change in the UK has increased the grant rate, raising the UK average above the average across the EU.

There is no clear relationship between grant rate and destination in Europe (see Annex, Slide 33-34), for example:

Iranians:

While Germany was the top destination country for Iranian asylum seekers between 2017-19 (averaging 10,000 applications per year), they had a *relatively low* grant rate, averaging 38% across the same period.

Meanwhile, Switzerland, Belgium and Italy all had grant rates of two-thirds or more (66%+), but only averaged around 500 applications.

The UK received an average of 4,000 applications per year between 2017-19, with an average grant rate at initial decision of 53% over the period.

Albanians:

France has been the top destination country for Albanians over the last 3 years (averaging 11,000 per year), despite having a relatively low grant rate (averaging 9%).

Germany (4,000 per year) and Greece (3,000 per year) were next highest, despite having a grant rate of 1% and 0% respectively.

The UK had an average grant rate of 14% over the last 3 years, and just under 3,000 applications per year.

What might explain why some migrants travel from France to the UK to claim asylum?

France is a key transit country at our near border for those seeking to enter the UK irregularly

- Migrants are detected attempting to irregularly enter the UK from France through a number of methodologies, including:
 - **Clandestine entry via juxtaposed controls** (around 26,900 prevented attempts in YE June 2020).¹ Detections at the controls peaked in late 2018 and since May 2019 monthly detections have been lower than monthly levels the preceding year. Detections fell sharply in late March 2020 following the imposition of lockdown in France and reduction in traffic through the controls.
 - **Small boat crossings** (around 3,750 small boat arrivals in YE June 2020).¹ Small boat arrivals reached record levels in recent months, likely in part due to displacement from other methods of entry, made less viable due to restrictions relating to COVID-19 (e.g. the juxtaposed controls) alongside improved crossing conditions in Summer months.
 - **Irregular entry via air routes**, (around 1,250 inadequately documented passengers (arrivals at UK airports and those denied boarding at French airports) in YE June 2020).¹ Detections declined to very low levels from mid-March as restrictions relating to COVID-19 saw a sharp reduction in air traffic.
 - **Non-juxtaposed French ports (e.g. Caen)**, detected at much lower levels when compared to the juxtaposed controls.

While many entering the UK travel through France, most top nationalities applying for asylum in the UK do not apply in France in large numbers

- Many top asylum seeking nationalities to the UK do not apply in France in large numbers. Relatively few Iranians, Iraqis or Eritreans apply for asylum in France, despite being among the top nationalities attempting irregular entry to the UK from France. These nationalities instead tend to make most asylum applications in Germany.
- A lack of key pull factors such as diaspora, shared language and historical/family ties in France could help to explain why these nationalities do not often apply for asylum in France
- Exceptions are **Sudanese, Afghan** and **Albanian** nationals, who all apply for asylum in France in large numbers. In fact, Eurodac data suggests an important portion of Sudanese and Afghan applicants to the UK have previously applied for asylum in France: of the 2019 UK asylum intake, at least a quarter (24%) of Sudanese asylum applicants had previously applied for asylum in France, as had at least 1 in 10 (9%) Afghan nationals².
- However, while France is a key country of departure toward the UK, evidence suggests that **the UK only receives a small portion of onward movement of those who have previously applied for asylum in France**. In 2019, Germany (36% hits in EU+), Belgium (13%), the Netherlands (12%) and Italy (11%) all received more Eurodac hits from their asylum intake relating to prior asylum applications in France than were received by the UK (11% of hits in the EU+)².

Reception conditions in France – a possible driver for onward movement toward the UK

- It remains unclear why those that have applied in France move onward to the UK. While for some it may reflect an unsuccessful asylum application in France, for others it could reflect inadequate conditions that they were faced with in France. France recorded 150,000 asylum applications in 2019, more than three times the number received by the UK.
- As a result of this pressure France is reported to be failing in practice to meet its obligation to provide accommodation to all asylum seekers, with **only 52% of eligible asylum seekers accommodated at the end of 2019**^{3,4}. Many asylum seekers in France are forced to live in **informal makeshift camps** in the absence of access to official accommodation.
- For those living in these makeshift camps, life is often uncertain and precarious, with camp clearances and forced evictions that can lead to damage and confiscation of personal belongings and reported police brutality and abusive practices⁵. There is often limited access to water and sanitation facilities, while many depend on local associations for food distributions. This may act as a factor driving onward movement out of France, a small portion of which is to the UK.

References and notes

Slide 5

Sources:

1. UNHCR Global Trends, Forced Displacement in 2019 - <https://www.unhcr.org/5ee200e37.pdf>
2. Eurostat - https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctza&lang=en
3. Mayblin & James, 2016 <https://asylumwelfarework.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/is-access-to-the-labour-market-a-pull-factor-for-asylum-seekers-long.pdf>

Notes:

While many entering the UK may travel through France, most top nationalities applying for asylum in the UK do not apply in France in large numbers

Slide 7

Source:

1. Sources of asylum claims, PRAU (data relates to YE September 2019), unpublished. Figures are for main applicants only. Those classed as 'Other' (around 8% of main apps in YE September 2019) include a) those who could not be matched to any of the categories; b) those coming visa-free to the UK; c) those proactively brought to the UK under the Calais Camp Clearance (Op Purnia) or Dubs Amendment.

See Annex (slide 26) for an overview of key routes into Europe and the UK for top nationalities applying for asylum in the UK

Migration Observatory report: <https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/irregular-migration-in-the-uk/>

Bar chart notes:

1. Includes main asylum applicants only.
2. YE September 2019 here refers to asylum applications made between 01/10/18 to 29/09/19.
3. Nationalities have been ordered by percentage of asylum applicants assessed to be clandestine entrants, **not** by number of asylum applications over the period (for number of applications, see previous slide).
4. 'Other' includes those who couldn't be matched to any of the categories; those coming visa free and those proactively brought to the UK under Calais Camp Clearance (Op Purnia) or Dubs Amendment

Slide 8:

Sources:

1. Home Office, Immigration Statistics (published) – main applicants only
2. Internal MI, Home Office (PRAU on demand. IE – Weekly – Asylum Claims Made in Detention). Comparisons with overall asylum intake are from published Home Office asylum statistics and include both main applicants and dependants.
3. Internal MI, Home Office (PRAU on demand. IE – Weekly – Asylum Claims Made in Detention).

The Annex (slide 26) shows asylum trends since 2010 for the top 10 nationalities claiming in 2019, as well as Syria and El Salvador, which have seen numbers rise over the last year but do not feature in the top 10.

References and notes

Slide 9:

Source:

1. [Asylum statistics](#), House of Commons Library

Slide 10:

Sources:

1. Frontex, Detections of Illegal Border Crossings
2. Eurostat, European Monthly Asylum Data
3. UNHCR, *Mediterranean Situation* arrivals data.

Slide 11:

Source:

1. Data on this slide come from Immigration Statistics, year ending December 2019. <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/immigration-statistics-quarterly-release>

Slide 12:

Source:

1. UNHCR, *Mediterranean Situation* arrivals data.

*Asylum data on this slide comes from Eurostat. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/database>

Caveats

EU+ relates to EU member states, EEA countries, Switzerland.

Eurostat data includes main applicants, dependants and reapplications and is not directly comparable to Home Office published statistics.

Slide 13:

Source:

1. EU-LISA, Eurodac data (published)

Notes:

1. Data reported here are Category I – Category I Eurodac hits, which reflect an asylum application in a European country matching with a prior asylum application in another European country.
2. Data is a count of ‘hits’ not of individuals – an individual can make multiple asylum applications in a given country and therefore produce multiple hits.
3. Data is not directly comparable with the Home Office Eurodac data reported on the following slides.

References and notes

Slide 14:

Source:

1. Home Office, Eurodac Data (Internal). **Notes:** See caveats on slide 32

Slide 15:

Source:

1. Home Office, Eurodac Data (Internal).

Slide 16:

Source:

1. Home Office, Eurodac Data (Internal)

Notes:

1. Includes main applicants and dependents.
2. Data here is a count of individuals not applications; individuals may make multiple applications to the same country.
3. For a full list of data caveats please see slide 32 in the Annex.

Slide 18:

Source:

EASO Report 2016 - <https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/The%20Push%20and%20Pull%20Factors%20of%20Asylum%20-%20Related%20Migration.pdf>

Slide 19:

Sources:

1. <https://www.unrefugees.org/news/syria-refugee-crisis-explained/>
2. UNHCR <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria>
3. USA for UNHCR <https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/syria/>
4. Amnesty, Syria 2019 <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/syria/report-syria/>
5. Home Office published immigration statistics.
6. UNHCR Global Trends, Forced Displacement in 2019 - <https://www.unhcr.org/5ee200e37.pdf>
7. Eurostat - https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctza&lang=en

References and notes

Slide 20:

Sources:

1. Robinson & Segrott, 2002 – <https://www.embraceni.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/hors243.pdf>
2. Hagen-Zanker & Mallet, 2016 – https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jessica_Hagen-Zanker/publication/295864747_Journeys_to_Europe_the_role_of_policy_in_migrant_decision-making/links/56cf2af108ae4d8d649fa098/Journeys-to-Europe-the-role-of-policy-in-migrant-decision-making.pdf
3. Crawley & Hagen-Zanker, 2018 – <https://pure.coventry.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/22103524/Binder5.pdf>
4. Brekke & Thorbjørnsrud, 2020 – <https://academic.oup.com/migration/article-abstract/8/1/43/5061473>

Slide 21:

Sources:

1. Weber, 2018 - <https://www.demographic-research.org/volumes/vol39/47/39-47.pdf>
2. **For diaspora estimates:** United Nations, Population Division, Department of Economic & Social Affairs, Migrant Stock by Origin and Destination workbook 2019

Slide 22:

Sources:

1. Robinson & Segrott, 2002 - <https://www.embraceni.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/hors243.pdf>
2. The Refugee Council, Crawley 2010 - <https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/rcchance.pdf>

Slide 23:

Sources:

1. Hagen-Zanker & Mallett, 2016 - <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/10297.pdf>
2. Crawley & Hagen-Zanker, 2019 - <https://pure.coventry.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/22103524/Binder5.pdf>
3. Cooper, 2019 - https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5cd99936e5274a38bed21639/569_Regular_Pathways_Effects_on_Irregular_Migration.pdf
4. Czaika & Holboth, 2016 - <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1465116516633299>

Slide 24:

Sources:

1. Mayblin & James, 2016 <https://asylumwelfarework.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/is-access-to-the-labour-market-a-pull-factor-for-asylum-seekers-long.pdf>
2. Refugee Council - <https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/rcchance.pdf>
3. Dwyer et al., 2016 - http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/101312/1/DWYER%20etal%20JICSP_finalREVISED.pdf

References and notes

Slide 25:

Source:

1. Eurostat - <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/database>

Caveat:

'Grant rate' relates to initial decision. Grant rate at final outcome is likely to increase by 10 to 20 percentage points in the UK.

The analysis comparing grant rate and asylum intake is based on a three year average of the data. This is because the impact of grant rate on intake is likely to have a time lag.

Slide 26:

Sources:

1. Home Office MI (unpublished)
2. EU-LISA, Eurodac Category I - Category I match data (slides 11-14)
3. AIDA France country report, 2019 - https://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/report-download/aida_fr_2019update.pdf
4. French Government, budget law 2020 - https://www.performance-publique.budget.gouv.fr/sites/performance_publique/files/farandole/ressources/2020/pap/pdf/PAP2020_BG_Immigration_asile_integration.pdf
5. The Human Rights Observers Project, Forced Evictions in Calais and Grand-Synthe, 2019 - https://helprefugees.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Forced-Evictions-in-Calais-and-Grande-Synthe-ENG-1.pdf?utm_source=ECRE+Newsletters&utm_campaign=dcef662914-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_06_24_10_48&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3ec9497afd-dcef662914-422328957